

An Illustrated History of

NORTH  
WAZIRISTAN MILITIA

&

TOCHI SCOUTS

1895-2012

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## Message

My association with Tochi Scouts dates back to the year 2005 while I was commanding a brigade at MiranShah and later, as General Officer Commanding 7 Division. I cherish the memories of playing and living with the spirited Scouts and enjoyed their company. Not only that, I have the honour to remain ‘Dining Member’ of Tochi Scouts Officers Mess, throughout my stay in the area. I did not know that one day, I will have the unique honour to call it my second home, as Inspector General Frontier Corps.

With such cherished association, it was a solace to know that the unit has engaged an eminent research scholar, Major Aamir Mushtaq Cheema, to compile its history, so rich in culture and acts of valour. In spite of having an eventful heritage, the meaningful documentation of various unit account has been lacking. For the young generation in ranks and the one to follow beside rest of the humanity, the true illustration of history is a noble project. My compliments and appreciation to Tochi Scouts and the author for collecting, collating, compiling and consolidating the events in their correct perspective.

The book provides a useful insight and intimate knowledge of all facets of Scout’s life, bringing into sharp focus the precious cultural heritage of the brave people of Frontier. Besides, it highlights the significant role of Tochi Scouts in the ongoing War Against Militancy and pay rich tributes to its shuhada. It will, therefore, capture the imagination of readers to correctly gauge the role of unit as a sheet anchor in the security paradigm of North Waziristan Agency and Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

May Tochi Scouts always come out with flying colours in all their pursuit. Ameen.

## Foreward

History is an integral part of military life. I have no hesitation to confess that when I was posted here, I had no idea about Tochi Scouts and to my surprise, the same situation existed down the ladder. This urge to know made me realize that how important it is for the Tochi Corps and to others to know about their history. On assumption of command I found two fabulous historical institutions; Mess and Museum. The richness of historical value of these institutions obliged me for documenting it. The project of compiling the history started accidentally, while working on the history of the Tochi Corps, I came across a renowned research scholar Major (retired) Aamir Mushtaq Cheema who change our dreams of compiling the history into reality.

Initially, I thought that a hundred odd pages booklet within a month would be sufficient but the author put his heart and soul into it and dug out an extraordinary feat of Tochi Scouts history. First result of this research is that we have added five more years to our birth, Tochi Scouts instead of 1900 was in fact raised as Corps of Tochi Levies in 1895; this is one aspect. Another radiant addition to our history is the knowledge about our brothers who sacrificed their lives in Kashmir during 1971 War; no less than 58 Scouts of Tochi Corps embraced shahadat in that sector. We had very little information about them. Now with the access to the Indian army officers written account we have been able to establish the true value of our Scouts valour.

Contemporary time is interesting because it is challenging, dangerous and demands the best out of every one; there is no room for error and nothing can be veiled from history. Through these pages

of history one learns about shortcomings, for instance considerable number of casualties in present conflict is attributed to water and driving; both are now given special attention. These are the positive aspects which makes such tiring and gruesome research a worthy effort.

I, on behalf of Tochi Scouts convey my deepest gratitude to Major (retired) Aamir Mushtaq Cheema for his efforts; he is now a part of us. Tochiets are grateful to Inspector General Frontier Corps Major General Ghayur Mahmood for his support and guidance and to Major General Ali Abass Haider General Officer Commanding 7 Infantry Division for providing much needed insight into present circumstances.

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## **Glossary**

Algad	Mountainous stream, seasonal in nature
Afd	Afridi
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
Bng	Bangash
Btn	Bhittani
BEIC	British East India Company
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
DC	Deputy Commissioner
Durand Line	International boundary between Pakistan & Afghanistan
Derajat	Dera Ismail Khan & Dera Ghazi Khan collectively known as.
FC	Frontier Corps, Frontier Constabulary is also having same abbreviation .
GOC	General Officer Commanding
HE	High Explosive
IGFC	Inspector General Frontier Corps
Khassadar	Tribal policeman/men
Ktk	Khattak
Khel	Sub Tribe or clan
LMG	Light Machine Gun
Malak	An elder of the tribe, it is not hereditary in nature
Mwt	Marwat
Mmd	Mohmand

NWA	North Waziristan Agency
NWFP	North Western Frontier Province
Okz	Orakzai
Pawani	Local shrub or small tree
PA	Political Agent
Qaum	Nationhood or tribal blood brotherhood
RMO	Regimental Medical Officer
Riwaj	Native Customs
RPG	Rocket Propelled Grenade
SMG	Sub Machine Gun
Swt	Swati
SWA	South Waziristan Agency
Tur	Turi
Yzi	Yusafzai
Wzr	Wazir
Wing	Equivalent to an infantry battalion in strength.

A word about spelling, natives used many version for the same place or person with minor variations in spellings for instance Chashma {stream} is also known as Chashmai, Darduni is commonly known as Dardoni , Saidgai as Saidgi ; in the book both versions have been used. Same holds true for person's name; names as written in records/boards have been used.

## Waziristan-Historical Review

World history originates around the banks of rivers especially the Nile, Mesopotamia, Yellow and Indus River. Unlike the other three civilizations there is no written record of Indus Valley but through the archaeological evidence it is regarded as the cradle of civilization. The oral history Rig Veda which dates back to almost 1100 years B.C. highlights the fact that the mountainous tribes Aryans migrated from Central Asia and came down upon the plains of Indus Valley. These Aryans were fun loving cruel nomads who had their own code of conduct in which it was expected to honour the guests and not to let anyone go empty handed if he has knocked on your door, Aryans gamble and drink Soma which was an intoxicating substance, Aryan was generally scared of his mother in law especially after losing in gambling. These Aryans entrenched themselves in the upper part of Indus Valley at Harappa and later they destroyed the Dravidians living in the lower part of Indus Valley notably Mohenjodaro. Who were these Aryans? the history is not very clear or precise the reason being lack of any physical evidence as present in other riparian civilisations.<sup>1</sup>

Herodotus the ‘Father of History’ wrote an account of Indus Valley in 400 B.C. The Indus Valley was divided into two separate layers. Lower portion known as Mohenjodaro, the upper portion was known as the Tashkila (present day Taxila) it was the last of the

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1 *AryaDesh was the name of India, Northern Tribes call it India or Hindu as noted by Hsin-Tu in 7<sup>th</sup> AD, see The Discovery of India, Jawaharlal Nehru[John Day ,New York,1945],p-63.Chinese called India as Shin-Tu see James Legge, A Record of Buddhist Kingdoms The Chinese Monk Fa-Hien of His Travels in India & Ceylon AD 399-414,(Oxford,1886),p-26.also see Jhon Keay History of India(Grover;NewYork,2000),p-57,word for river in Sanskrit is Sindhu.*



twenty satrapies (provinces) of the Persian empire under Darius and the most wealthy because it was paying the highest amount of tax, it was paying 360 talents of gold where as the Bactra was paying 360 talents of silver and the gold was worth 15 times more than silver. The whole of the Indus Valley region was called Hindu by the Persians, Sindhu in Sanskrit language is the name for river and because of phonetics the Persians started calling it Hindu and all the inhabitants were known as Hindus. Alexander the Great from 330 B.C. entered into the region which is presently known as Central Asia and entered into present day Pakistan in 326 B.C. The natives whom he encountered in his expedition were fierce and militant in nature. Alexander entered from the Khyber Pass in a two pronged advance and later crossed Indus close to present day Attock, had his major and decisive battle against Porus on the banks of Hydaspes (Jhelum River), moved forward and finally on the eastern banks of Ravi his troops mutinied and he rolled back his forces opting to follow the River Indus downstream. He sailed with portion of his forces and majority marched on the banks for protection. He met constant resistance and attack during this sojourn from tribes inhabiting the banks of Indus. Alexander was able to survive and considered himself fortunate enough to reach back Persia through the present day Balochistan.<sup>2</sup> This Greek invasion provided the first ever written account of the natives as Alexander had no less than five court historians to record his adventure, unfortunately none of that has survived today.

India by Alexander time had progressed into two distinct riparian civilisations the Ganges/Jumna & Indus with its Punjab tributaries. Alexander had left his Greek lieutenants in the conquered territories which soon after Alexander's death erupted into a civil war with

<sup>2</sup> *The Lost Histories of Alexander The Great, Lionel Pearson(Scholar Press,Chicago,1983),p-1*

River Indus acting by and large as the boundary. The Mauryan Dynasty under Chandragupta Maurya emerged at the Magadha on the banks of Ganges and later his grandson Asoka expanded the empire but he soon became an ardent Buddhist renouncing all kind of violence. This non violent approach was adopted as the state policy and became an integral part of Ganges culture where as the tribes of Indus Valley especially living in the adjoining mountains retained their Aryan identity.

### **Islam in Central Asia**

The very first Islamic army had knocked on the doors of the Central Asia when they were in the hunt of the Firuz the emperor of Persia, Muslims had settled at Merv by 646 AD. Qutaibah ibn Muslim was the governor of Khurasan the north eastern part of Persia who between 710-715 A.D., conquered the Central Asia especially the Bactria and Ferghana valley the heart land of the Turks, these Turks were nomadic tribes originating from the Mongolian steppes and one of the tribe Ye Hu was able to establish himself in the Jaxarates (Amu Drya) area, Turk was the name given by Arabs to all nomadic tribes of Central Asia thus it does not represent any particular ethnic tribe<sup>3</sup>. In 751 A.D., a decisive battle between the Muslims and the Turks who also had the support of the Chinese army, not only the Turks were defeated but it also put an end to the Chinese rule in the area for another thousand years. Resultantly almost all Turk tribes accepted Islam.

Afghanistan was not a country at that era in same sense as one talks of Persia of that time. The society dwelled around the mountains and a tribal system which was a direct descendent of Old Testament flourished in mountainous region of Hindu Kush, a kind

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3 *The Muslim World, Age of Caliphates, p-37*

of controlled anarchy, where all the tribes were independent to run their affairs which amounted mainly in livestock breeding and raids on the caravans and low lying villages astride the foothills.

These Turks became an elite force as due to consistent civil strife the Caliphs at Baghdad felt the need to have a force which should be above political alliance for their personal security, with the passage of times these Turks became the king makers and Seljuk Turks were the first one which entered Baghdad and were granted the titles of Sultan, these Turks however retained the Caliphate to the Abbasids but were the real power behind the throne. Another of these Turks established the first Islamic dynasty in Central Asia under the name of Samanids which were eventually overpowered by the Oahu Turks, from these Samanid Turks emerged the Ghazna Turks which shaped the destiny of the India for another five hundred years.

## **Islam**

Traditionally the Pathan considers them to be one of the lost tribe of the Moses for the reason that it gives them a lineage to the Abraham religion rather than to be termed as anything else. The Pathan tradition highlights that they are one of the early converts of Islam, one of their tribal leader was called by the most famous of all the Muslim and Arab General Khalid Bin Waleed to the Mecca and there they embraced Islam, the one logic which the Pathan gives in support; the fact that they have the same name of their pass the Khyber which is also the name of another important place in the Arab and early Islamic history 'The Khyber' of the Jews.

## **Ghazna**

The founder of the dynasty was Sebuktegin (r 977-997 A.D.,) a Turk slave who rose to distinction and it was he who like earlier Aryans claimed his territory to the natural boundary of Indus. This frontier including Kabul were under Hindu Shahi kingdoms. He first invaded India and defeated the Hindu Shahis (989 & in 991 AD) who gave tribute to Ghazna. After his death his son Mahmud of Ghazna continued the conquest(1000-1030 A.D.,). The striking aspect of the successive humiliation of the Hindu states year after year takes the art of warfare to new heights, the psychological impact on the overall population must have been devastating as it created a myth of geographical superiority between the plain dwellers of Punjab, Sind, Deccan and Ganges Valley who were ruthlessly being subdued by the mountainous people. The nomadic tribes and Turks were after all nothing else but nomads. Wealth taken at will from the Hindu temples help him create the Ghazna culture which became the symbol of the Turkish people. On the historic note it was the culmination point of the Aryans who almost 2000 years ago humiliated the Dravidians, this time they built Ghazna seat of first Islamic Kingdom of Hindustan. Notable historian Al Berouni was able to write down the history of the regime and the social life pattern of the India. India in practical term was just a vassal state of Ghazna. As its very capital of Harsha empire Kanauj was sacked by him in 1018 in which the Rajputs displayed their honour of committing mass Jauhar (suicide) after defeat, in 1024 Mahmud's most severe psychological blow came with his almost 500 miles deep expedition to the southern Dravidian sacred temple at Somnath 'it had 1000 Brahmins, 300 barbers and 350 temple prostitutes in constant attendance and chief idol a huge lingam the phallic symbol of Shiva was washed in water from the sacred Ganges carried over

750 miles.<sup>4</sup> For Hindu nation it was a knockout blow an ultimate defeat of Dravidian culture's and religious surrender. The destruction of the myth and symbol of Brahmin and Hindu identity was a mental surrender, from this state of mind Hindus never recovered right till the end when India was divided on the religious line.

India after the Mahmud of Ghazna's raids became a vassal state for the Turk dynasties of the western mountains, Indus became part of mountain dwellers. The very fact that Indus Valley had embraced Islam changed the overall picture of the area. The invading Turks were not regarded as invaders rather as brethren of Islam. Ghazna was destroyed by the neighbouring Ghor and with it the India also passed from the hands of the Ghaznavities to Ghorids. Shihab ud Din Ghorī was initially resisted by the Ganga Valley but very next year the all semblance of resistance were destroyed by Shihab ud Din and from 1206-1526 A.D., India or more specifically all the three riparian civilisations were under the control of Muslims who were chiefly Turks and Afghans, later this was overthrown by the Moguls who descended down from Central Asia. The rule of Delhi Sultanate<sup>5</sup> is divided into following dynasties. Mamluks 1206-1290 A.D., Khiljis 1290-1320 A.D., Tughluqs 1320-1414 A.D., The Sayyids 1414-1451 A.D., and Lodhis 1451-1526 A.D.,

Shihab ud Din Ghorī had no male heir, he had appointed three governors in occupied India, Qutub Ud Din Aibak was given the rule of Jumna/Ganga Valley, Nasir al Din Qabachah was made the governor of lower Indus valley and Taj al Din Yaldiz was given the helm of affairs of Karman and Sankuran. Aibak was made governor of Delhi in 1192 A.D., with instructions to made conquest further

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4 *A History of Asia Volume I, Formation of Civilisations from Antiquity to 1600.* Woodbridge, Hilary & Frank (Allyn, Boston, 1964), p-208

5 *The rulers who ruled India before the Moguls have been termed as Delhi Sultans and the empire is termed as Delhi Sultanate.*

east.<sup>6</sup> All these Turk governors were related to each other through intermarriages which took place on the command of Shihab ud Din Ghorī. Aibak was married to the daughter of Yaldiz similarly another daughter of Yaldiz was married to Qubachah. Apparently Shihab ud Din Ghorī had the idea of creating peace among his governors through these marriages but it did not work the way he had thought as soon after his death the civil war broke out among these chieftains for the control of the power. Yaldiz occupied Ghazna; Aibak declared himself sovereign in Ganga and so was Qubachah in Sind or lower Indus. Aibak was regarded very high by the late Shihab Ghorī.

The bloodline of this empire were the Afghans and Turks Muslims which formed the fighting backbone of the military and ruling junta. The invasion of Tamerlane in 1399 A.D., and before him the Mongols in 12<sup>th</sup> century both originating from the Central Asia once again engraved the racial superiority of the mountain dwellers. Since Tamerlane had specifically targeted the Hindu population thus the religious supremacy of Islam over the non believers remained intact.

## **Mughul**

Mughul Empire was established by Babur of Ferghana in 1520 A.D., after crushing the Muslim Sultan of Delhi, (Sultan Lodhi was an Afghan) Mughul empire later not only protected the native population from the raids of mountain tribes of Afghanistan but also adopted a more liberal approach towards the non believers with varying degree of freedom. Afghanistan did not exist as a country under Mughuls,<sup>7</sup> Kabul the main city acted as a base camp for the Babur, other important cities like Kandahar, Herat, Khiva

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6 Agha Hussain Hamdani *The Frontier Policy of The Delhi Sultans*, Pakistan National Institute of Historical & Cultural Research (Islamabad, 1986).p-39.

7 Charles, Miller, Khyber, *The Story Of The North West Frontier*, (McDonald & Jane's London, 1977) ,pp xiii

and Bukhara were ruled by the native tribes and might is right was the law. It was Akbar the Great who had Kandahar under his rule, another Mughul King Shah Jehan did try to capture the Central Asia and was successful for a short time to keep imperial forces at Ferghana. Western part of Afghanistan remained under control of Persia before the Hostilak rebellion of 1720 A.D., which again put the Kandharis in power. In 1738 A.D. Delhi was ravaged first by the Persian Nadir Shah and later in 1763 A.D., by the Afghan Ahmed Shah Abdali who in true sense is the founder of modern day Afghanistan. He kept Lahore, Kashmir and Multan as provinces of his Afghan empire and from this point in history the cultural clash took a new shape in the form of religious animosity between the Afghan Muslims and the Punjabi Sikhs.

## **Sikhism**

Sikhism took birth in Punjab in 1520 A.D., and despite having Muslim Sufi saints teachings as part of their religion they were persecuted ruthlessly by the Aurangzeb and as such when the Abdali's forces were marching back to the mountain retreat they were attacked by the Sikh bands. In 1799 A.D., the Sikhs finally captured Lahore and within years had the Kashmir, Multan and Peshawar under their control. For the first time in a thousand years the martial supremacy of the mountain dwellers of Hindu Kush was broken by the native dwellers of plains of India.

Sikhs did not had an easy and comprehensive control over the territory and people living on the Western bank of River Indus yet through a blend of diplomacy and militancy Ranjeet was able to have his forces in Peshawar<sup>8</sup> and for a short time had the control over the Khyber Pass as well. The Kabul and Lahore thus remained

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8 *Khullar, Maharaja Ranjit Singh. (Hem, New Delhi, 1980). pp-48-52, pp 121-129*

embroiled in a constant war of attrition. The tribes inhabiting the mountainous region remained independent and owed no allegiance to any ruler however the religious and ethnic commonality bounded them together against Sikhs. Furthermore the tribes internal feuds were such that they were erratic and unpredictable in their conduct, looting, levying of taxes on trade and forces passing through their area of influence were the cornerstone of their economy. Ranjeet Singh had kept the Kashmir under the Dogra rulers in a semi autonomous state. Kashmir at that time had no well defined boundary in the North, West and East. Dogra expanded the frontiers of Kashmir in these three directions and were able to capture the Gilgit, Skardu and Laddakh and also made inroads into tribal territory of Marghalla and Hazara hills. Ranjeet Singh also staked claims on Eastern Afghanistan.<sup>9</sup>

### **Waziristan**

Waziristan is perhaps the only tribal area which is afforded the status of an independent country and it is obvious from its name , the suffix of ‘Stan’ is important because it is used with a nationhood concept. Other examples are that of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan but it was Waziristan which had this name long before any other nation had that. Wazirs are an ancient tribe most probably an Aryan in nature who with the passage of history migrated with the pioneer Aryan tribes and instead of descending down to the Indus Valley preferred to have their habitat in the mountainous region of Hindu Kush close to the Indus itself rather than dwelling at the plains.

The ancient migration of Aryans took place almost 2000 years B.C., and they came down from Central Asia towards the fertile

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9 *Miller, Khyber, p xv*



Indus Valley through the passes of Hindu Kush which starting from extreme north includes Karakorum, Mintka, Baroghil, Khyber, Peiwar Kotal or Kurram, Tochi, Gomal and Bolan. The Aryan migration or invasion took place along the rivers flowing from west towards east as each river namely Gilgit, Kabul, Kurram, Tochi and Gomal ultimately joins with the Indus thus these river beds became the routes. Wazirs or Waziristan is the country between the River Kurram and River Gomal.

The tribal structure and the society developed around clan system intermarriages among blood relations bonded the ties and each family settling around some water source. These river unlike Nile are not based upon a single water reservoir rather the mountain streams called Algad are formed due to melting of snow and frequent rain. The valleys are thus inhabited by clans who fought with each other as they are doing so even today for the right over water and land.

Waziristan as seen from air is beautiful in outlook, it is not as hostile or deathly as the Northern Hindukush mountain territory looks from air. It has green valley's high mountain ranges not exceeding the snowline and plains which seem once were fertile but still the width and breadth is not good enough to have air field in every valley.

Area between the Kurram River and the Peiwar Kotal Pass down south till Gomal Pass or Gomal River is the country of Wazirs, it is in terms of historical contest, in terms of administrative boundary the area is divided into valleys thus Valley adjacent to Peiwar Kotal is termed as Kurram Valley and inhabited by tribes other than the Wazirs.

The overall topography of the area is pleasant and seems lively when compared to the Balochistan and extreme northern Hindukush. The rivers are the source of life but they seem to have dried out in the era of Aryan migration and one cannot rule out that the major reason and cause of migration was this dearth of water. For last five hundred years these river beds occasionally come to life due to heavy snow fall or rain which causes the small innumerable riverines and streams to gush down the mountains and join the major rivers. Thus the population is based around these beds of fertile land, overall the area is rocky but not menacing in nature. Mountains are high yet none is higher than 12000 feet. The layout of ground between Tochi River and Gomal is most pleasant with green pastures and lively valleys dotted with fruit trees and wildlife however the area over all cannot sustain the inhabitants purely on its own produce. The major crop is maize and wheat, rice is not produced in the area. Fruits are in abundance especially the apple, grapes, walnut, pomegranate and watermelon. Weather is tolerable both in winter and summer however the cold weather does force temporary migration of nomadic peoples known as Powindahs who at the start of winter season migrate from the highland west of Durand Line towards the Indus Valley and then return to their lands in summer.

This country between latitude 32°-33° 22 minutes north and longitude 69° 20 minutes to 70° 36 minutes east is known as Waziristan and inhabited by Wazirs as the major tribe. The origin is obscure in history, the tradition goes that once upon a time long long ago there were two brothers and one of them was childless and the other had a daughter, they both were out hunting when they found a child who was left at an army camping ground they found an axe also. The childless brother adopted the baby, which in Pashto was named as Karlanri (meaning axe). When the boy grew up, he was

married to the daughter of his uncle. This Karlanri had two sons, one was named as Koday who in turn had two wives, from the first wife the Orakzai took birth and from second wife the Afridis, Khattaks, Mangals and Turi were bred. Kokay was the second son of Karlanri, he had two sons one named as Sulaiman and the other as Shitak, Daurs are the descendants of Shitak<sup>10</sup>.

Sulaiman also had two sons<sup>11</sup>; Bangash are the descendents from Malikmir the youngest son of Sulaiman. Wazir the eldest son of Suleiman had two sons namely Khizri and Lali. Khizri had three sons namely Musa, Mahmud and Mubarak. Musa was called Darwesh from his religious character and thus the clan that is today known as Darwesh Khel Wazir are his descended. Musa had two sons namely Utman and Ahmed that thus forms the sub clans of Darwesh Khel as Utmanzai & Ahmedzai. Mahmud had a son called Mahsud which forms the Mahsud Wazir Tribe or clan similarly Mubarak had one son name Gurbuz which forms the Gurbuz Wazir tribe. Thus, it is seen that all the clans are interlinked through blood. All these tribes are Aryan genetically and culturally. They have fair complexion (exceptions are there) with broad head with plenty of hair, narrow long nose and dark eyes; it is the length of their nose which gives rise to the theory of their being Jewish by descends.<sup>12</sup> These tribes are also Turk, culturally and socially.

### **British East India Company**

On 31<sup>st</sup> December 1600 A.D., Queen Elizabeth granted a charter to 'The Company of Merchants of London trading unto

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10 Olaf Caroe Pathan, p-463. Also, see Imperial Gazetteer of India Provincial Series NWFP, 1909, pp. 72-73, 182, 243-248.

11 The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review and Oriental and Colonial Record, Volume IX, Nos 17 and 18, January – April 1895 (Oriental University Institute, Woking,) page 153, 'The Afghans Wazirs and Their Country' by Major H.G. Raverty

12 Imperial Gazetteer of India Volume 1, pp. 186 & 293.

the East Indies.’ On 11<sup>th</sup> January 1613 A.D., the Mughul Emperor Jahangir issued a firman to establish a factory at Surat to Captain Best the company’s representative. In 1625 A.D., a trading centre was established at Masulipatam (Madras) and in 1634 a trading factory was established at Piplee (Bengal). Later these factories and trading centres were fortified and troop, some British some natives were employed for the protection, in 1698 A.D., a new Company of Merchants received its charter, and in 1708 A.D., both companies were amalgamated under the title of The United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies or East India Company. Thus old factory areas became the presidencies of Bombay, Madras and Bengal each having its own army commanded by separate commander in chief who also was the president answerable to directors at London thus military and politics came under one head with sole aim of increasing the profit. By 1741 A.D., the Bombay Army had a battalion of troops consisting of seven companies and formal artillery was raised in 1748 A.D., in the same year Major Lawrence Stringer was appointed as the commander in chief of all the armies in India. Promotion was strictly based upon seniority, only in Bombay the battalion system was adopted in other two presidencies, the companies remained the basic unit. The feud between the French & British trading companies brought a larger influx of European troops into India and also an increase in the army of native soldiers. In 1754 A.D., the British and French troops clashed at Madras, in the same year the first detachment of Royal Troops 39<sup>th</sup> Foot arrived in India as reinforcement it also brought into effect the Mutiny Act into India thus the forces in India were divided into Royal Troops, Company’s European Troops and Company’s Native Troops. In 1757 A.D., the first Indian Regiment was organised onto European pattern it had native troops but officers were all British it was known as ‘Lal Paltan’ , it had three British officers several

British non commissioned officers, 42 Indian officers and 820 Indian rank and file, the Paltan had ten companies. It also had an Indian commandant and adjutant. In Madras six such battalions were raised in 1759 A.D., and in Bombay native battalions were raised in 1767 A.D., the man responsible for this pragmatic organisation was Clive known as ‘Clive of Plassey’ in history. The officers of East India Company troops despite their seniority were junior to the King’s troops and this created several mutinies among them mainly over pay the native Bengal troops also show their resentment mainly over the financial aspect. This resulted in reorganisation of the army in India in 1796 A.D., the number of British troops in India both company & King amounted to over 13000 where as the native troops numbered around 57000. Reorganisation resulted in decrease of native troops and increase in the number of British officers which were increased to 22 from the previous 12 per battalion. The system of two battalion regiment was also introduced. A colonel commanded the regiment having two lieutenant colonels, one for each battalion which also had one major, four captains, 11 lieutenants and five ensigns. The battalions were also numbered for the first time in this organisation. In 1824 A.D., further reforms were carried out in the army which resulted in the breaking up of two battalion regiment for the Indian troops it also necessitated renumbering of battalions the irregular cavalry regiments were also raised, the ratio of cavalry to infantry battalions was 1 to 7.

From 1800 A.D., onwards the British East India Company felt the threat from Napoleon who was presumed to be making an alliance with the Russians and in this regards the Company made a treaty with the Maharajah Ranjit Singh of Punjab and also sent officers for intelligence gathering towards Persia which resulted in a treaty with the Shah in 1807 A.D., soon the threat of Napoleon subsided however the Russians remained a distant reality.

## Great Game & Forward Policy

Europeans came to India during the period of Mughul and established trading factories they included British, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese and French. However, at the end of 18<sup>th</sup> Century only two serious rivals remain in India or for that matter in Europe also.

The political and military rivalry of European continent also had its effects on the sub continental politics, initially British had apprehensions about the Napoleon's advance towards the India which were later replaced by the Russians after the treaty of Vienna in 1815 A.D.,. By this time in history the area West of present day Afghanistan was a conglomeration of independent small valley states all Islamic in nature like Khiva and Merv<sup>13</sup>, these were captured by the Russians therefore British in order to keep an eye on the affairs wanted to have a friendly and a subservient ruler in Kabul which was at time under control of a Pathan, ruler Dost Muhammad (1793-1863 A.D.,). British failed in diplomacy to achieve their aim and therefore the First Anglo Afghan War started in 1839. Ranjeet Singh did not allow troops of BEIC to march through his territory, which was the most feasible in terms of logistics that stands out as a masterpiece of diplomacy. The First Anglo Afghan war did achieve for a brief time a friendly Afghan ruler, the Shah Shuja at Kabul, however Afghans revolted against Shah Shuja and British Consulate at Kabul was burnt in 1841 A.D.,<sup>14</sup> thus ended the sphere of influence in Afghanistan for the British, Dost Muhammad was back to throne and this time he ruled till his death in 1863 A.D.,.<sup>15</sup>

13 Anila, Bali .*The Russo-Afghan Boundary Demarcation 1884-95: Britain and the Russian Threat to the Security of India*, (School of Humanities, University of Ulster. Thesis submitted for the degree of D.Phil.1985). pp. 25-27. Also see J.A. MacGahan *Campaigning on The Oxus and the Fall of Khiva* ( Simpson, London, 1874)pp 163 – 193.

14 Azmat, Hayat, *The Durand Line its Geo-Strategic Importance* ( Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar,2000) pp. 63-64

15 Ibid p,64

## **Waziristan Military Expeditions 1852-1895**

Disaster in First Afghan War led to a chain of events in which, first the Sind was annexed in 1842 and later Punjab in 1849 A.D.,

### **Punjab 1849**

After the death of Ranjeet Singh the Sikh empire collapsed after waging two wars against the British, First Anglo-Sikh War (1845-1846 A.D.), which resulted in cessation of certain areas of Punjab to the British including Kashmir, the resultant Second Anglo-Sikh war (1848-1849 A.D.) resulted in annexation of Punjab by the BEIC, with Sir Henry Lawrence (1806-1857 A.D.) and his 'Young Men' now trying to govern the Punjab especially the North Western Frontier. Henry's brother John Lawrence was also among those Young Men, he later became the Viceroy of India (1864-1869 A.D.). Young Men who tried to solve the riddle of North West included Captain James Abbott (Abbottabad), Lieutenant Harry Lumsden (Corps of Guides), Captain Neville Chamberlain (Later Field Marshal). Political Agent John Nicholson (Nicholson Memorial near Islamabad), Lieutenant Herbert Edwardes (1819-1868 A.D.), founder of Edwardesabad (Modern Bannu), Lieutenant William Hodson (1821-1858 A.D.) of 'Hodson Horse' & 'Guides Cavalry' Captain John Coke (1806-1897 A.D.) of '1<sup>st</sup> Punjab Regiment'.

### **Punjab Irregular Frontier Force (Piffer)**

Corps of Guides was raised in 1846-47 A.D., by Harry Lumsden, the very first instance of recruiting the natives into a military organisation. Success of Guides led to formation of a separate force the Punjab Irregular Frontier Force (Piffers-1849 A.D.), under command of Punjab Government instead of Central Government

at Calcutta<sup>16</sup>. Henry Lawrence's Young Men also carried out the administrative reforms in the frontier areas dividing it into frontier districts (Peshawar, Kohat, Hazara, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan collectively known as Derajat) entering into treaties, pacts and agreements with the native Pathan Tribes and Afghanistan<sup>17</sup>. The District of Bannu was the one of the two districts within the Waziristan in the north-east and Derajat in the east and southeast.

Wazirs, which hitherto remained independent, had no other means of sustenance other than plundering the plains of Punjab; they on regular interval in mass or in small parties raided the settled areas. Sir Henry Lawrence was adamant to stop this, to establish the writ of Company and to provide protection to the subjects living under the British rule from the marauding tribesmen. Between 1849-1854 A.D., over eighteen military punitive expeditions<sup>18</sup> were conducted by the Piffers to punish the tribes for their acts of hostility that included looting of caravans and attacks on BEIC, which from tribes' perspective was nothing new. These small expeditions can be dealt with in few words.<sup>19</sup> In 1852, the very first expedition against the Wazirs was carried out from the Tank.

After 1857 the troops of the East India Company were placed under the crown, the proclamation of Queen Victoria on 1<sup>st</sup> November 1858 practically ceased the existence of East India Company and its troops. The company's European troops became British regiments and artillery of three presidencies was amalgamated into Royal

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16 Timothy Robert Moreman "*Passing It On The Army In India & The Developmental Frontier Warfare 1849-1947.*", Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, King's College, University of London. pp. 20-25

17 *Ibid*, p 246

18 *The Durand line*, pp. 244-245

19 H.L.Nevill Captain, *Campaigns on the North West Frontier*, first published 1910 (Sang-e-Meel, Lahore, 2003), p. 13.



Artillery. Meanwhile Henry Lawrence entered into a treaty with Dost Muhammad in which latter agreed to be an ‘enemy of enemies of honourable East India Company’<sup>20</sup>. Another treaty was signed in Peshawar on 26<sup>th</sup> January 1857, in which British agreed to pay the Dost Muhammad one-lakh rupees per month for his assistance against the Persian, which later helped in capturing Herat along with 4000 muskets.<sup>21</sup>

In Post 1857 A.D., the War Office and politicians in London especially prime ministers Disraeli and Gladstone had varying policy on countering the Russian threat, one school of thought favoured a ‘Forward Policy’ which promoted an aggressive posture having British military contingents stationed as far forward as possible thereby making Afghanistan a dependency of British India, the other school of thought favoured an isolationist policy,<sup>22</sup> thereby rejecting the very idea of any Russian invasion to India as not practical, they considered River Indus as an viable and economical defence line.<sup>23</sup> The policy of Lawrence of Punjab in dealing with frontier has been termed as Masterly Inactivity. Diplomatic and military moves between the Russia and Great Britain from 1829 A.D., onwards on the Western, North Western & Northern Frontiers of Indus Valley were like a game of Chess and is termed as Great Game, the very term coined in 1828 A.D., and made famous by the Rudyard Kipling.

### **Wazirs Strikes**

In March 1860 A.D., the first major attack was launched by the Wazir (Mahsuds) with a lashkar of 3000 on the Tank town led by

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20 *Durand Line*, p 246

21 *Ibid* 248.

22 Miller, *Khyber*, pp. 85-86.

23 Mujtaba ,Razvi, *The Frontiers of Pakistan, a Study of Frontiers Problem in Pakistan Foreign Policy* (National Publishing House,Karachi,1971)pp,144-145.

Jhangi Khan, a partial success. In April, the Piffers retaliated and penetrated till Palosina Plains ‘a stiff fight’.<sup>24</sup> Piffers were able to reach Kanigoram and Barari Tangi and after staying one night at Razmak, they returned to frontier district via Khaisora River valley.

In 1865-66 A.D., Major Graham, the Deputy Commissioner (Dera Ismail Khan) initiated the peace process by allotting the agricultural lands to Mahsuds; he also inducted twentyfive Mahsuds in a levy to protect the same lands from raids across the border. It was a replica of Lumsden’s Guides. Later eight sowars and rest footmen replaced these 25 sowars. The sowars were being paid Rs 20/month and the footmen an amount of Rs 8/month. Under the silladari system the maliks who recruited them took almost half the pay of these men; legally. By 1881 A.D., the silladari system was disregarded and men were paid directly but less than their previous pay.

The favoured clan was not the one with most peaceful attitude rather the most troublesome Bahlolzai Mahsuds. Malik Umar Khan Son of Jhangi Khan spoiled the party by insisting on having equal shares and stamping himself as the Chief Malik, his terms were accepted. The main branches of Mahsud namely Alizai, Shaman Khel, Amal Khel & Shingi were thus treated equally. The notable Mahsud chiefs were Nusratee, Jungee Khan, Sidh Khan & Golanee Khan.<sup>25</sup>

Peace did not prevail in area and Mahsuds continued ‘Sad and humiliating record of offenses ... their raids without any intermission between 1867-1872 A.D.,’<sup>26</sup>

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24 Evelyn Howell Resident in Waziristan *Mizh a Monograph on Government's relations with the Mahsud Tribe ( Government of India, Simla, 1931)p - 1*

25 Herbert Edwardes *A Year in Punjab, Volume 1, p – 248.*

26 *Mizh Monograph, p- 1*

In 1861 reorganization was carried out in army under which the strength of British officers in cavalry and infantry regiments were reduced to six per battalion however; the presidency system was retained but a staff corps was introduced into them. Captain Macaulay took the control of the District (Derajat) in 1873 and more importantly, he assumed the control of border affairs eliminating the Nawab of Tank from the process, who was put on pension at Lahore. Macaulay was able to reach settlements with tribes, the Shaman Khel were forced to pay a fine to get their prisoners released, Bahlolzai also followed suit in 1874 paying a sum of Rupees 7085 as fine.

In 1875 the tribes of Bhittanis, Mianis & Ghorezai were also inducted into the protection of the frontier. In 1877, the scheme of Major Graham for the distribution of agricultural land was revived and Mahsuds were given the land near Gomal Pass on the condition that they provide one footman for every 100 kanals of land and one horseman for every two hundred kanals of land allotted. In 1878, the tribal escort took Major Macaulay to the Khajauri Kach in Mahsud land. Macaulay reached an agreement with the maliks for raising of Wazir and Mahsud Levies for the protection of Gomal Pass in lieu of Rupees 10/ per person per mensem. Government of India was eager to bring the tribes onto its side.

*'In order to detach from all political consideration with the Afghan Government these independent tribes on our border whom it is most important... to bring permanently under our own influence to the exclusion of that of the Amir'*<sup>27</sup>

In 1878, the kidnapping of a Hindu from Tank deteriorated the relationship and Macaulay put the whole of Mahsud tribe under the blockade, previously it was only the concerned clan, which was

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<sup>27</sup> Mizh Monograph, p – 3.

punished. Resultantly in 1879 the Mahsuds put together a combined lashkar, the first in modern history purely for war and under Malik Umar Khan Salimi Khel, Matin Langer Khel, Yarik Langer Khel, Azmat Shingi, Bahlolzai, Boyak Aimal Khel Bahlolzai, Malik Abdur Rahman Khel and Nana Khel Bahlolzai struck hard at Tank and with that all hopes of goodwill evaporated. Art of uniting the tribes especially the Wazirs requires something special in a Malik to do so. This was also the last of the Wazirs Expedition, which were not in the name of religion. The leadership was not centralised rather every clan bonded with another due to bloodline and words of honour. The motivation was not religion rather the tribal pride, the Wazirs came for the war purely because this is how they were brought up. The Afghan hand cannot be ruled out rather it was the most logical benefactor. Wazirs have been active players in the Afghan matters. The British reaction was mixed and cautious; there was another school of thought among the British, which regarded all these activities of Mahsuds to be an instigation of Amir Sher Ali Khan of Afghanistan. The British took 183 of the Mahsud maliks present in the tank into captivity as hostages and blockade was imposed on the Mahsuds, which lasted for another two years.

### **Second Anglo-Afghan War 1878-79**

After the death of Dost Muhammad in 1863, his son Sher Ali Khan ruled Afghanistan till 1866 and then displaced for two years and then he regained the crown and ruled till 1879. As part of Great Game Britain engineered the western borders of Afghanistan and Russians agreed on having a clear sphere of influence, a treaty was signed with Russia on the extent of spheres of both empires in 1873, which later became the boundary between Afghanistan and Russia. Sher Ali Khan thus maintained a very dicey relationship with both superpowers.

Second Afghan War started because in London the policy makers now adopted the forward policy. ‘Coming of the Conservatives in power in 1874, Lord Lytton became the new Governor General in India. The Forward Policy was pursued (by new Governor General Lytton) and the tension grew... a mission under Neville Chamberlain left for Afghanistan, but on 25<sup>th</sup> August 1878 it was not permitted by the Amir Sher Ali to enter Afghanistan’.<sup>28</sup>

Thus, a military expedition was carried out ‘to remove all anxiety about India’s north western frontier...decision for war has been taken’.<sup>29</sup> The war itself was a replica of first Anglo Afghan war. This time also the British forces had to make a detour from the South via Kandahar to reach Kabul. Amir Yakub Khan (son of Sher Ali who had fled from Afghanistan) now the Amir of Kabul signed a peace treaty at Gandamask, with British forces at a British military camp approximately 79 miles south east of Kabul on 30<sup>th</sup> May 1879.

*British Government agreed to restore to Afghanistan the towns of Kandahar and Jelalabad which were in the possession of them exception being the districts of Kurram, Pishin and Sibi however they agreed to pay the revenues of these districts, after deducting the charges of civil administration to Afghan Amir. As a bargain, the British Government retained the Khyber and Michni Passes, which lie between the Peshawar and Jelalabad districts and of all relations with the independent tribes of the territory directly connected with these passes. It was also agreed that a line of telegraph from Kurram to Kabul shall be constructed for which the cost will be borne by*

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28 Dr Sultan-I-Rome *The Durand Line Agreement (1893): Its Pros and Cons* ,WWW.VALLEYSWAT.NET,accesed on 26<sup>th</sup> January , 2011

29 *Durand Line*, pp. 110-112 also see Aslam Khattak, *A Pathan Odyssey*, (Oxford, Karachi, 2000) pp., 70-71. Also see, MuhammadQaiserJanjua. “In the Shadow of the Durand Line; Security, Stability, and the Future of Pakistan and Afghanistan”. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterrey, California, pp., 66-67.

*the British Government and the Amir of Afghanistan to provide for the protection of this telegraph line.*<sup>30</sup>

Despite the treaty the Afghans again revolted and scenes similar to First war were re-enacted, ‘A rebellion took place and the Mission’s members were killed on 3<sup>rd</sup> September 1879’.<sup>31</sup> British thus concluded that without having a King in Afghanistan who is reliable to their cause and also acceptable to the Afghans, problem of Afghanistan will remain agitated, Yakub Khan was put into exile in India. The British Viceroy in India, Edward Robert Lytton Bulwer had three choices: to annex Afghanistan and declare it a part of the British Empire, to make Afghanistan a strong British ally or disintegrate Afghanistan into small independent states. All these options were rejected by London;<sup>32</sup> instead, Abdur Rehman nephew of Sher Ali who had been in exile in Russia was put on throne on 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1880.

## **Waziristan**

Waziristan came into limelight because of Forward Policy & the Great Game. Defeat of Yakub Khan also brought the Wazirs to the reality and in April 1881, all the lashkar leaders gave themselves up to the authorities. Two British army columns, one under General Kennedy moved upwards from Tank into Jandola-ShahurTangi-Kanigoram-Makin-Razmak encountering stiff resistance at Shah Alam. The other column under General Gordon marched from Bannu via MirAli-Isha-Razmak without firing a single round.<sup>33</sup> Survey parties conducted survey for maps and both columns returned.

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30 Ibid,

31 *Sultan Rome, Durand Line 1893*, p 36.

32 *Abdur Rehman Khan*, ” [http://www.1911encyclopedia.org/Abdur\\_Rahman\\_Khan](http://www.1911encyclopedia.org/Abdur_Rahman_Khan)

33 *Mizh Monograph*, p -4.

Amir Abdur Rehman started warming up with Wazirs again promising them the revival of subsidies, which they have been enjoying under his uncle Amir Sher Ali. A force of 1000 Mahsuds tribesmen were enrolled for him and act of allegiance was given to him by the Mahsuds. The art of politics is as strong among the Wazirs as it was practiced by the Greeks, a Wazir is under no central authority and as such no single individual can deal on behalf of them, they handed over the chief recruiter Daulat Khan to the political agent.

This was the most complete act of submission that the Mahsuds have ever done, before or since. Mahsuds agreed to pay a fine of Rupees 30,000 for attack on tank, eighty hostages ‘chalweshtas’ with British and also paying their monthly cost of maintenance which was Rupees 1000. In 1884 the leaders of 1878 attack on Tank were released, thus all the efforts and submission of the tribe was aimed at getting the release of their maliks and not as a sign of weakness.

The two disastrous campaigns in Afghanistan were a logical base to expect another campaign sooner or later and in 1885 the Defence Committee contemplating the future course of action in case of third war or the intrusion by the Russian reached the conclusion that control of all passes leading to Afghanistan should be explored and kept under the control of the Crown.<sup>34</sup> The tribes inhabiting the area should be made an ally with an aim that in any future conflict their loyalty will be with the British rather than with Afghanistan. The only two passes still not under the control of British were the Gomal & Tochi.

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34 *Report on Waziristan & Its Tribes, viz the Mahsuds, Darwesh Khel, Daurs & the Bhattanis, showing our relations with the tribes to the end of March 1900 First Edition 1901 Lahore. Reprinted by Sang- E- Meel Publications, Lahore, 2005. P-2.*

Sir Fredrick Roberts then Commander-in-Chief in India wrote a note in June 1887 on the necessity of opening both passes. ‘There are strong reasons for a fresh departure in our policy towards the frontier tribes...sharing in our maintenance of our lines of communication... establishing with them closer relations than have hitherto existed between them and our districts in the Derajat’.<sup>35</sup> The Government of India replied in August 1887 ‘The opening of country can only is affected in two ways, either by the use of military force or by endeavouring to draw the tribes into close and friendly relation with ourselves’.<sup>36</sup>

In February 1887 after the release of the Wazir maliks the government attempted to carry out the survey of the territory hoping to cash on the goodwill existing and knowing that these tribes have subjugated in the past, but they were in for a surprise because when the expedition under Mr Ogilvie, Deputy Commissioner Derajat proceeded it met with great resistance, failed and came back costing the accountant a loss of Rs 17000/. Mr Bruce replaced Ogilvie and he revived the Silladari system, which amounted to 61 in numbers, predominant was Bahlolzai. In the end, Mr Bruce was able to figure out the 51 leading Maliks of the Mahsuds and Wazirs who in his opinion hold the key to any venture of British in this area. They thus formed a Jirga, which was to deal with the British; it was different from the traditional Jirga of the tribes. ‘For the first time in our dealing with Mahsuds tribe, it appears that substantial progress has been made towards the formation of a manageable representative Jirga on a sound basis’ remarks of commissioner Derajat .

In November 1889 the Viceroy Lord Lansdowne accompanied by, commander-in-chief, lieutenant governor of Punjab and Sir

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35 *Ibid*, P-3.

36 *Ibid*, Government of India letter No. 1633F dated 17<sup>th</sup> August 1887.



Robert Sandeman toured Derajat and Gomal Pass was opened, annual fees of rent Rs. 50,000/. to be paid to the Gomal Pass tribes (Wazir & Sheranis) and Rs 25,000/. for the Mando Khel of Zhob. In January 1890 a grand Jirga was held at Appozai (Fort Sandeman/ Zhob) where the Jirga also endorsed the pact with government and the subsidise granted. Amir of Afghanistan was not happy with the events taking place at Waziristan and he sent his own emissary and also an armed escort promising the equal grants to the tribes in lieu for reunification of any treaty entered with British, Waziristan and especially the Mahsuds were now divided into pro government and pro Afghanistan factions. A British military expedition was sent to Mahsud area in the summer of 1892. Which reached Jandola and Khajauri Kach by August 1892. In the same period Mr Kelly a British Public Works Department official was murdered at Zhob by two Bahlolzai tribesmen; both were signatories of Appozai. A sowar of the regular cavalry was murdered near Zam Post, after some time four regular sepoy were also murdered near Ghwaleri Kotal in the Gomal Pass. Mr Bruce was able to convince the Jirga that the culprits of these crimes be handed over or at least they should be put onto, the Jirga trail itself, he was able to achieve a partial success 'a remarkable success'.<sup>37</sup>

### **Durand Line 1893**

Abdur Rehman was a bold ruler and he tried to assert his authority over the areas, which were historically under Afghanistan, for instance in 1882, Abdur Rehman laid claim to Chitral, (rejected by the British). In 1886, his forces occupied Chageh (in Balochistan) but the British forces uprooted and evicted the Afghans. In 1888, he interfered in Bajaur and Swat. Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, the Foreign Secretary of India, wrote to the Viceroy:

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<sup>37</sup> *Mizh monograph*, p – 8.

*'We are getting bad news all along the border, from the Black Mountain to the Wazir territory. The Amir is threatening Kurram, and the Afridis are in a very shaky condition.... Finally, when the Viceroy felt the need to meet with the Amir, he made an intelligent move and wrote to the Amir, "...whether you accept this offer or not, it will be necessary to decide what territory does, and what does not form part of the Kingdom of Afghanistan.'* Abdur Rehman resisted the mission on one pretext or the other and finally agreed to receive the British mission, under the foreign secretary of state Mortimer Durand. The main issue from Abdur Rehman's point of view was his insistence on having the Yaghistan (Chitral, Bajaur, Swat, Dir, Chilas and Wazirs) under his influence.<sup>38</sup>

Durand Line remained the Apple of Discord between Afghanistan & British India and later with Pakistan also.<sup>39</sup> Therefore, it is pertinent to have the full text to fully comprehend the future events. The "Durand Line Agreement" between Abdur Rehman and Sir Mortimer Durand was signed on November 12<sup>th</sup>, 1893, which formulated the formal borders between British India and Afghanistan and defined the sphere of influence especially in Waziristan.

Text of the Agreement: Whereas certain questions have arisen regarding the frontier of Afghanistan on the side of India, and whereas both His Highness the Amir and the Government of- India are desirous of settling these questions by friendly understanding, and of fixing the limit of their respective sphere of influence, so that for the future there may no difference of opinion on the subject between the allied Governments, it is hereby agreed as follow:

38 Sultan Rome, *Durand Line*, p 8, also see Azmat Hayat, *Durand Line*, pp. 128-131 also see *Waziristan & Tribes 1900* p-4. Also see Charles Dilke, *The Baluch and Afghan Frontiers of India*, ( Littels Living Age American Periodical), May 4<sup>th</sup> 1889, p- 287.

39 The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review and Oriental and Colonial Record, Volume IX, Nos 17 and 18, January – April 1895 ( Oriental University Institute, Woking,) page 29, '*Afghan Affairs and Waziristan by Ex Panjabi Official*. Also page 153, '*The Afghans Wazirs and Their Country*' by Major H.G.Raverty

1. *The Eastern and Southern frontier of His Highness's dominions, from Wakhan to the Persian border, shall follow the line shown in the map attached to this agreement.*
2. *The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India.*
3. *The British Government thus agrees to His Highness the Amir retaining Asmar and the valley above it, as far as Chanak. His Highness agrees, on the other hand, that he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur, or Chitral, including the Arnawai or Bashgal Valley. The British Government also agrees to leave to His Highness the Birmal tract as shown in the detailed map already given to His Highness, who **relinquishes his claim to the rest of the Wazir country and Dawar**. His Highness also relinquishes his claim to Chageh.*
4. *The frontier line will hereafter be laid down in detail and demarcated, wherever this may be practicable and desirable, by joint British and Afghan commissions, whose object will be to arrive by mutual understanding at a boundary which shall adhere with the greatest possible exactness to the line shown in the map attached to this agreement, having due regard to the existing local rights of villages adjoining the frontier.*
5. *The above articles of agreement are regarded by the Government of India and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan as a full and satisfactory settlement of all the principal differences of opinion which have arisen between them in regard to the frontier; and both the Government of India and His Highness the Amir undertake that any differences of detail, such as those which will have to be considered hereafter by the officers appointed to demarcate the boundary line, shall be settled in a friendly spirit, so as to remove for the future as far as possible all causes of doubt and misunderstanding between the two Governments.*

6. *Being fully satisfied of His Highness's good will to the British Government, and wishing to see Afghanistan independent and strong, the Government of India will raise no objection to the purchase and import by His Highness of munitions of war, and they will themselves grant him some help in this respect. Further, in order to mark their sense of the friendly spirit in which His Highness the Amir has entered into these negotiations, the Government of India undertake to increase by the sum of six lakh of rupees a year the subsidy of twelve lakh now granted to His Highness.*<sup>40</sup>

Amir Abdur Rehman had also stated that: "The province of Wakhan, which had come under my dominion, I arranged to be left one portion of Waziristan came under my rule, and I renounced my claims from the railway station of New Chaman, Chageh, the rest of Wazir, Bulund Khel, Kurram, Afridi, Bajaur, Swat, Buner, Dir, Chilas, and Chitral to the British for protection, as it was too far from Kabul, and cut off from the rest of my country, and therefore very difficult to be properly fortified. The boundary line was agreed upon from Chitral and Baroghil Pass up to Peshawar, and thence up to Koh Malik Siyah in this way that Wakhan, Kafiristan, Asmar, Mohmand of Lalpura came on the west of Durand Line. The Amir further states that: "*The misunderstandings and disputes which were arising about these frontier matters were put to an end, and after the boundary lines had been marked out according to the above-mentioned agreements by the Commissioners of both Governments, a general peace and harmony reigned between the two Governments, which I pray God may continue forever.*"<sup>41</sup>

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40 *Azmat, DurandLine, appendix, p 244.*

41 *Ibid, pp., 134-144. Also see, MuhammadQaiserJanjua. "In the Shadow of the Durand Line; Security, Stability, and the Future of Pakistan and Afghanistan". Naval Postgraduate School, Monterrey, California, pp. 79-82.*

## **Appozai Massacre-1894**

The culprits of Mr. Kelly's murder were finally put on trial by the Jirga and sentenced them to five-seven years of imprisonment, but an opposition also emerged against the very maliks who sanctioned the punishments, three of them were murdered. Bruce and British were busy in the Demarcation of the Afghan borders with India. Government of India also decided to occupy the Wana on permanent basis, the very first British military establishment in Waziristan.

At this stage Mohiuddin Mahsud 'Mullah Powindah' enters into limelight. He was vociferous about the military occupation of Wana by the British troops. In October 1894, the British force under Mr Bruce arrived at Kaarb Kot on the way to Wana when at night lashkar of 2000 Mahsuds attacked the camp and inflicted heavy casualties. From 18<sup>th</sup> December 1894, the British forces again entered Waziristan under General William Lockhart, the columns were led and guided by the friendly maliks and political control was handed over to army. The aim was to capture the main leaders /areas of the hostile clans that included Shabby Khel, Abdur Rehman Khel and Ahmadwam and certain Langar Khel. Lockhart had three brigades, one moved from Bannu-Razmak via Khaisora. The other Brigade moved from Tank-Jandola, Makin via Takki Zam and the third brigade already at Wana had to move to Kanigoram via Tiarza. By 21<sup>st</sup> December 1894, all the three brigades reached their objectives, tribesmen refused to enter into any fight with the British. By February 1895 the tribes accepted all the conditions of the government including the hostages were compiled, it was also accepted that government can have a military presence at Wana, the last condition of the government to expel Mullah Powindah was also accepted.

British thus established army garrison at Wana, Jandola and at Barwand the open plains north of Sarwekai, only Barwand was in Mahsud territory.

Tochi Pass was a different ballgame as the Amir of Afghanistan had claims over the territory and it was decided that before reaching on any agreement with the Wazir Tribes it is pertinent that issue of sphere of influence be settled first with Afghanistan. Before the opening of Gomal Pass, the Afghan Government realising the moves of British made efforts to assert its influence over the Wazirs of Tochi Valley. Wazirs or for that matter no tribe of Waziristan had ever acknowledge any suzerainty of any government in their history however the cultural and religious ties bound them to the Afghanistan. These tribes were not agricultural rather they were and still are nomadic in nature. To them going down or eastward was only for replenishing their fortunes through raids to them west was their cultural hub. Cities of Ghazna, Ghor and Kabul were their ancestral seats and their summer camps, language was the key factor. Pashto was spoken in the area west of Indus however in the east it was amalgamation of regional languages. Area west of Tochi was all Islamic in nature and infidels were not worthy more than slaves but in east they had their own states thus to these Wazirs no matter how independent they were but a soft corner still existed in heart for Kabul and this is what Afghan Amir wanted to exploit.

### **The Waziristan Commission**

The first commission, known as the Khyber Demarcation Commission, was designated for the demarcation of the border from the Safeed Koh to the Kabul River. The Kurram-Afghan Commission was represented from the British side by the British Commissioner,

J. S. Donald and by Sherin Dil Khan from the Afghan side. The border demarcation from Sikaram to Laram was done with minor adjustments to the Durand Line map in favour of the Afghans. Both the British and Afghan representatives sanctioned this border in mid 1895. The Baloch-Afghan Commission was responsible for the border demarcation from Domandi to the Iranian border. The boundary from Domandi to Chaman was easily settled by February 16, 1895. The border from Domandi to Persia (the top of Koh-i-Malik-Siah Mountain) was finalized in June 1896.

After the three main Commissions, a fourth commission was set up under L.W. King to delimit the Afghan frontier on the border of Waziristan in 1894-95 but the actual work did not start until early 1895. Amir Abdur Rehman had claims over the Waziristan purely on the basis of historical values. He wrote to the Viceroy that:

*‘But if you should cut them out of my dominions, they will neither be of any use to you nor to me: you will always be engaged in fighting or other troubles with them, and they will always go on plundering. As long as your Government is strong and in peace, you will be able to keep them quiet by a strong hand, but if at any time, a foreign enemy appears on the borders of India, these frontier tribes will be your worst enemies.... In your cutting away from me these frontier tribes, who are people of my nationality and my religion, you will injure my prestige in the eyes of my subjects, and will make me weak, and my weakness is injurious to your Government.’*<sup>42</sup> Viceroy Lord Lansdowne replied *‘British government had always dealt directly with the Wazir tribe and would continue to do so’*.<sup>43</sup>

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42 Azmat, *Durand Line*, p131.

43 *Ibid* 132.

In April 1894, Amir of Afghanistan was informed that a brigade of force will be accompanying the demarcation commission to avoid any trouble with Wazirs, this brigade would be stationed at Spina Valley and actual strength of escort would be 400. The Demarcation Commissioner Mr Bruce who was also the commissioner of Derajat along with Mr Anderson Deputy Commissioner Bannu and Mr King camped at Domandi. In August 1894, the tribes were informed about this demarcation.

The demarcation in Waziristan commenced from Charkiagarh Hill and passing across the Tochi at Pachagari follows the crest of the hills, which lie, between the Birmal and Shawal Valleys leaving Birmal within Afghanistan boundary-up to Khawaja Khidar and from the latter to near Shakin, which will also remain within the Afghan boundary. From Shakin, the line runs due south to the crest of the range crossed by the NazanKotal to a place six miles to the south of the Kotal. Thence it follows the Spira Range to Domandi, which lies, on the junction of the Gomal & Khidar River to Khawaja Khidar<sup>44</sup>.

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44 *Waziristan Report 1900, p-4.*



## **Tochi Levy Corps 1895**

By 1895 Waziristan was divided into two main administrative areas the North & South basing upon the two rivers namely Tochi in North and Gomal in South with the plateau of Razmak (6666 feet) forming the boundary. Tribes in North Waziristan were placed under the Deputy Commissioner Bannu and South under Deputy Commissioner Dera Ismail Khan; both working under Commissioner Derajat who was Mr Bruce. After 1895 political officers were placed at Tochi & Wana with special powers for northern and southern parts working under the Commissioner Derajat. Tochi River collects the drainage of the Afghan districts of Sarabi & Birmal and on British side that of Shawal and all the valleys running into Daur. It runs along the hills north of Datta Khel, Boya, MiranShah, and Khajauri and joins Kurram River east of Lakki. Its total length in the North Waziristan is approximately 80 miles. This river is the main source of irrigation in this area.

The valley may be divided into four distinct parts. Upper Tochi Valley from DwaToi to Muhammad Khel, from Muhammad Khel to Isha Pass is termed as Upper Daur where as the Lower Daur from Isha Pass to Khajauri and then from Khajauri to the Bannu Plains is termed as Lower Tochi. Floods are rare but when they occurred, they seldom last more than half a day. The traders of Ghazna and Kabul largely preferred the Gomal Pass route where as the Tochi Pass was more frequently used by the Powindahs.

North Waziristan covers an area of 2318 square miles. Tochi Valley from Datta Khel to Khajauri is fertile and intensively

cultivated with the water of the Tochi River. On its North West is Afghanistan, in the North East is Kurram Agency, in the South is South Waziristan, and in the East are Bannu and Kohat Divisions.

Much of the North Waziristan is incredibly bare. The area is in reality largely unpopulated, the tribesmen congregating in villages and hamlets situated in the less arid portions of the valley or the areas which lie within their reach of grazing grounds. It would appear from the topography of the area that at one time, the whole region was largely covered with woods but the reckless cutting of trees has altered the character of land and climate. In the hills, cultivation is practiced on every flat piece of ground. Due to these natural conditions, the population remains pastoral & migratory.

Khajauri is the gateway to North Waziristan from Frontier Region Bannu. As the name indicates, it has an abundance of date palms covering an area of about five square miles. It is situated on the left bank of Tochi River at its junction with Shana Algad. Other main towns in North Waziristan are DattaKhel, MiranShah, Boya, MirAli, Razmak, Shiwa, Dosalli and Ghulam Khan. All these are located on the riverbanks or water source. Small villages are scattered all over the agency. The inhabitants live in villages of all sizes. The general grouping and frequency of villages vary from valley to valley but mud bricks wall and towers invariably defend these. A peculiarity of many Wazir villages is their close proximity to large caves, to which the tribesmen have access as dwelling places in winter for the sake of protection from harsh weather. These caves are also admirable as air raid shelters. The way of life is as primitive as it was almost thousand years in every aspect not only in terms of construction of houses but also in the form of social values, which are termed as Riwayj. Each village is the home of a certain

clan which for all practical purposes acts and behaves as a sovereign state, formulating and ratifying treaties and declaring war providing amnesty and shelter to outlaws from other clans depending upon either a collective decision or at times acting at their own will. Surrounding grazing grounds are joint property and so are fruit trees and orchards.

There is no central hereditary power junta rather it varies with time to time. Polygamy is a common practice, which becomes a necessity because of frequent feuds and war. There is no concept of population control rather more the children stronger is the clan and tribe. Women are treated with respect and are seldom seen outside their walled compounds. Kidnapping or rape of females is a rarity. The practising religion is the Sunni sect of Islam. Elders are respected, Jirga is the parliament of the clan where collective decisions are taken and are bound to be observed.

North Waziristan thus includes the country of the Darwesh Khel and Gurbuz Wazirs, the latter live between the Tochi and Khost Valley and after Durand Line came under the Kabul regime, however a small clan occupies area astride Tochi Pass and southern slopes of Mazdak, which came under Delhi regime. Daur was another tribe that came under the North Waziristan apart from Bhittanis who to some extent came under the control of Deputy Commissioner Bannu. The District of Bannu was formed in 1861 and it had three sub administrative tehsils namely Bannu itself, Lakki and Mianwali. In 1895 the Marwats were the numerous tribe within Bannu having a population of 52000, Wazirs numbered 24000 and Bhittanis a mere 2000. Bhittanis were the first tribe to have a Levy and as such, they were not in the good books of Wazirs (Mahsuds).

## **Raising of Tochi Levies 1895-1900**

In November 1889 the proposal for raising of Levies for the Waziristan was floated aim was to keep peace in the area and above all to escort the officers while on a tour of the area. Commissioner Bruce recommended that 12 Mahsuds be employed as non commissioned officers and 112 mounted men at a cost of Rupees 28,440 per annum, he further recommended that four non commissioned officers and 54 mounted men be taken from Darwesh Khel of Wana and from Sheranis two non commissioned officers and 23 mounted men. In January 1890 the tribal levies were raised but not according to the strength recommended by Bruce. The initial posts were Mortaza, Spinkai, Kach, Khajauri Kach and Kashmir- Kar. Soon the Kajaury Kach post came under attack from the Taji Khel, the garrison was held by the 80 odd lately enlisted Wazir Levies. Syed Akbar Shah and his brother Sanobar Shah both Mahsuds of Kanigoram were incharge of the Levies as non commissioned officers. In October 1890 the boundary between Balochistan and Punjab was settled and also the boundary between Balochistan and Waziristan was finalised which runs north of Gomal River from Khudar-Domandi to Khajauri Kach. In January 1891 the Levies posts were earmarked they were supposed to collect the revenues, the question of collecting the revenue from tribes was raised by the Punjab Government but it was pended on the advice of Commissioner Bruce. In June 1891 Punjab Government formulated the scheme for opening of Tochi Pass on the recommendation of Commissioner Bruce who also insisted on approving of his levies scheme which was till then being given a cold treatment mainly on the basis of financial aspects but now the opening of Tochi Pass was intractably linked with the safety of caravans still Bruce's scheme was not approved whole heartedly and partial blessing was given at an annual cost of 18000 Rupees.

The Durand Line agreement brought a drastic and pragmatic change in the attitude of Punjab Government towards the Levies and on 13<sup>th</sup> September approval was given for the raising of Waziri Levies and in March 1895 Tochi Levies was raised at Idak.<sup>45</sup>

The Tochi Valley demarcation was completed by April 1895<sup>46</sup> and the escort troops which included three infantry and one cavalry regiments and one battery field artillery were pulled back and camped at Idak<sup>47</sup>. On 7<sup>th</sup> April 1895 a delegation of 500 Daur and Darwesh Khel Maliks put forward a petition to political officer at Miran Shah whereby they showed the interest of coming under the British protectorate on certain conditions. In the time between the offer and acceptance the political administration distributed ten thousand rupees among these tribes just to keep their morale high. The agreement evinced Rupees 66000 annual as Maliki and service allowance. Troops were moved up into Degan (Mohammad Khel) and detachments were left at Shinpai, Kotal, Idak and Miran Shah with the passage of years these very initial posts became the hub of militia and scouts. On 25<sup>th</sup> July 1895 the camp was moved down from Degan to Boya and then from Boya to MiranShah which thus became the political headquarters. On 18<sup>th</sup> October 1895 the Government of India accepted the Daur offer of coming under the British protection, it was also spelled out that political control should be exercised over the Darwesh Khel both in Tochi Valley beyond Kunigarha and in tracts bordering Daur. Thus the Daur territory became protected areas. A total of Rupees 63,736 were distributed among Daur and Darwesh Khel , Daur were given 4,884 Rupees as

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45 *Richard Isaac Forward Policy and its Results*, p-315 also see pages 265 & 320 also see *Foreign Department Frontier Letter No's 164-167, August 1896. Miran Shah Archives.*

46 *Border & Administration Report for the year 1895-1896, Political Agent Archives Miran Shah.*

47 *Ibid.*

Maliki and 10, 980 as service where as Darwesh Khel were given 16,516 Rupees as Maliki and 31, 356 Rupees as service which is a fair indication of how the tribes stand in the eyes of the British political administration.

In December 1895 the building of Levy Posts on the main road up to the valley commenced and towers were erected at Chauki, Ajan, Roitsa, Galemot, Shinnari, Kotnil& Khawaja Khel in Bakka Khel country in lower Daur. In January a temporary civil post was constructed at Idak which later became the home of Levy. In January 1896 the temporary accommodation for the political officer was made and road from Bannu to Miran Shah was improved.

Life was not idle there was always something going on in one way or the other. On 7<sup>th</sup> April 1895 a langri of 6<sup>th</sup> Punjab Infantry (P.I) was murdered within the limits of Khaddi village, on 13<sup>th</sup> May Lieutenant Lemond of the same unit along with his syce was attacked by four tribesmen at Boya as he was marching to Degan with his escort; both died but three of the attackers were cut down on the spot. On 31<sup>st</sup> July Lieutenant Campbell was shot in knee. Justice was through the Jirga for the murder of the langri a fine of Rupees 100 was paid but in case of Campbell the Jirga acquitted the accused due to lack of substantive evidence. The political officer Mr Caisson was stabbed through the liver on 13<sup>th</sup> March 1896 by a Daur, Caisson survived. Slowly and gradually the rules of the game were being established among the tribes and the British with give and take here and there. For instance on 16<sup>th</sup> August 1896 one Gul Hassan Daur fired at Boya Post but managed to escape and instead his brother was put in jail. In 1895 there were nine murders, 39 theft cases, 10 house breaking and 140 cases of hurt in the protected areas and 272 civil cases were decided, a total of 1100 Rupees fine

was imposed in cases against the government<sup>48</sup>. The cases within the tribal areas were not the jurisdiction of the political officer and they were settled through Jirga who at times invited political agent for arbitration, for instance in June 1895 the water dispute between the Daur and Tori Khel of Tappi Village was amicably resolved.

The raising and over all administrative structure of the Tochi Valley was governed by the Foreign Department (Frontier) of Government of India however the on ground actions were the domain of Punjab Government.

The continuous harassing of the political and military establishment finally touched the limits of government patience when the Muharrir FoudaBaur a Hindu was murdered at Datta Khel, a force of one infantry battalion, two companies of infantry and one battery of artillery along with forty sowars moved from Miran Shah to Datta Khel and camp was established a mile from Datta Khel. In December 1896 the telegraph line was completed; communication was established between Miran Shah and Datta Khel. It was also decided in December 1896 to make MiranShah as the political headquarters with a very strong advance post at Datta Khel. Levy posts at Saidgi, Khajauri, Katerisia, Idak, Lam Ghundi, Isha, Muhammad Khel and Kanirogha were completed by end 1896 but 'no progress made on military posts and roads'.<sup>49</sup> In the same year the cultivation of sugarcane was introduced in Lower Daur, it was a success later cultivation of rice was also experimented by having seed from Peshawar, an irrigation Darogha was appointed and Daur agreed to bear his expenses collectively. It is obvious that the Daur who had agreed to be part of British political system were now reaping the good harvest, the political officer noted that the 'general

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48 *Ibid.*

49 *Tochi Valley Administrative Report 1896-97.*

conduct of the Daur through the year very good'<sup>50</sup>. It does not mean that there was peace in the area but it is a relative term because majority of the cases were committed against the government property. In July 1896, 42 goats of the Levy were looted about two miles above Idak, two coolies namely Jaimal and Jahandur were murdered near Pai Khel later Imanzai Khel and Daur paid a fine of Rupees 60 for them. There were eighteen cases of wire cutting, Jalal Khan alone committed five offenses he infested the road near Isha. There were 57 cases of criminal nature committed against the British Government in the year 1896 which include four cases of murder and thirty nine cases of theft and this also includes the theft of General Bird's luggage which was looted near Datta Khel after the sowar of his camel belonging to 1<sup>st</sup> Punjab Cavalry name Niaz Muhammad was shot dead. The number of tribal cases were 286 which included 17 cases of murders and 109 cases of robbery, only 17 cases were such which involved women; fine inflicted was 797 and compensation awarded was 7362 Rupees.

Levies were utilised to spare the regular troops of chasing the minor cases however there was no guarantee that a minor case will not erupt into a major issue of peace in the Tochi Valley. Levy posts were regularly attacked but an analysis of the reports reveal that overall the Levies lost less number of rifles as compared to the regular troops and further more their casualties were also less as they adhered to centuries old principles of war as applicable in the area. They kept a good understanding with the natives; in majority of the cases the stolen/looted items were recovered. Levies used drummers on their posts to warn the adjoining villages about an incident. On the night of 20<sup>th</sup> August 1897 Murad Shah a Jemadar of Tochi Levies was killed by a gang of raiders whom he attempted

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50 *Ibid.*



to arrest single handily while they were driving off with loot which included a dozen of donkeys from Hindu traders. The crimes that took place in the Valley ranged from burning of grass being used by troops, theft and stealing of weapons, looting on the highway and kidnapping the travellers. In August 1897 the work started on the construction of Levy Post at Datta Khel and was completed by the end of year. The cartwheel road between Bannu and Datta Khel was completed by end 1897.

### **Maizar-1897**

In 1896 Political Agent Mr H.A.Gee was confident enough to claim the whole of Tochi Valley under the British jurisdiction, he was sadly mistaken in his approach. In autumn of 1896 the political and military headquarters were moved forward in the Tochi Valley to the Datta Khel the last of the Madda Khel Wazirs homeland. In an incident the munshi a Hindu who looked after the correspondences for the Madda Khel was murdered, resultantly a collective fine was imposed which the Malik Sadda Khan of Madda Khel accepted and imposed. Dreplari a sub clan having their kots few miles west of Madda Khel in the Maizar Plateau refused to pay the fines rather insisting that guilty party should pay in full. To settle the dispute Mr Gee went there with an escort of 300 foot soldiers and 16 sowars alongwith two field guns. This force was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Browne and had four other British officers also. They marched out from camp at Datta Khel moving westward for eight miles skirting supporting Sherrani a Madda Khel village and traversing another two miles. They forded Shawal and Tochi rivers to reach an elevation of 4600 feet Dotoi the last post was another two miles further west.

The force was lured by the Dreplari into a garden on the pretext to have more comfortable place for consuming breakfast which Malik Sadda Khan has arranged. The British force took precautions yet they moved into the garden thus coming into the effective range of rifle fire from the village. All in all, British officers were wounded and one died of wounds.

British retaliated by sending two brigades from Punjab which after great difficulty crossed Indus at Khushal Garh and then marched through Kohat – Bannu- Mir Ali – MiranShah – Boya to Data Khel. The Madda Khels and Dreplaris had migrated to higher summer grazing grounds, others present did not offered any stiff resistance. The village and the towers were razed and operation was called off in January 1898.

Tochi Levies manned the posts and guided the troops. Their navigational skills were of greatest use. They acted as the bridge between the army and the natives.

On 22nd March 1898, 99 Hindu coolies of government stores were attacked near Ghalekot while encamped for the night, Levies pursued the robbers along with Village Chiga and most of the loot was recovered. On 23<sup>rd</sup> March Levy post at Saidgi came under attack and one bandit Saif Ali Kabul Khel was killed. The regular troops were the target of the native miscreants on 16<sup>th</sup> March 1898 a sepoy of 33<sup>rd</sup> P.I was killed with stones while he was supervising the grazing of goats, In July 1898 a Naik of 20<sup>th</sup> Native infantry disappeared from Miran Shah Post and his bones were recovered after two days almost three miles away in the hills. The most serious was the attack on 3<sup>rd</sup> August 1898 when a gang from Afghanistan attacked the coolie's camp at Kanirogha Levy Post, seven coolies were killed on the spot and two died later, offenders were the Bakka

Khel out laws settled in Khost. Very next day the luggage camel of the Levy Commandant Mr Donald was attacked and looted, it was carried out by Aziz Shabi Khel. A levy shepherd was murdered just 700 yards away from the Boya Post on 17<sup>th</sup> August 1898 which gives a fair picture of the living conditions of that era. Jalal Khel Mahsud and Mohmit Khel Wazirs were fined Rupees 1000 for this. There were few cases which involved women also and it gives an insight into the culture of the area. On 11<sup>th</sup> April 1898 a man was killed at Tappi in Daur by another inhabitant of village who was having an intrigue with the deceased's wife, he hired an assassin to perform this task. In May 1898 a Johar woman who was living in bigamy at Spalgha was put to death by her first husband. On 2<sup>nd</sup> September 1898 an unmarried girl was shot dead by a Waziri who claimed her earlier as part of a settlement of feud but his claim was rejected by the Jirga, he was arrested and put to jail. In January 1899 a murder took place in Daur area in which a Talib of desperate character was involved the back ground of the murder dates back to almost forty years ago when the deceased had killed a member of the assassin family thus he now settled the feud. By 1898 the concept of having a licence for the weapon within the protected areas was introduced and a register was kept to have a record of all such rifles, over 200 licences were issued. Also the criminal acts were imposed in the area thus criminals were put to jail at Peshawar, Bannu or at Montgomery.

Tochi civil establishment was revised in August 1898 under Mr H.A. Anderson the Commissioner and Superintendent of Derajat Division. Levies were stationed at Boya, Idak and Saidgi, a Naib Tehsildar was also stationed at Idak, there were three tehsils in the Tochi Valley, Datta Khel and Miran Shah were other two tehsils. Mr Lorimar was the political officer at Miran Shah where as Lala

Bogha Ram was the native assistant political officer even at Datta Khel, a Hindu Lala Khushal Mal was performing the duties of Naib Tehsildar. It was at the end of the year 1898 that Tochi Levy Corps as it was known officially was equipped with uniform and other equipment initially 122 rifles were issued and another 100 were issued after few months. Mr Donald became its first commandant, 'result was an immediate improvement in spirit and efficiency'<sup>51</sup>.

### **Establishment**

Officer in charge of Levies was Mr Donald where as Risaldar Major Muhammad Amin Khan was the Native Political Assistant in regards of Levies; he was not a permanent appointment holder rather on attachment, Sattar Khan and Zaffar Khan remained as native adjutants drawing a pay of Rupees 80 per month.

Levies Commandant Mr Donald was authorised an English language clerk for Levies register on 18<sup>th</sup> June 1898<sup>52</sup>. The pay of native adjutant was Rupees 60 whereas that of English clerk was drawing Rupees 30 and an extra 60 Rupees was the deputation pay. Commandant apart from having one English clerk also had one muharrir, two orderlies drawing a pay of Rupees eight and one tent pitcher who was paid Rupees ten per month.

There were 200 foot sepoy, 4 naiks, 8 havildars, 40 sowars, 8 daffadars and seven Jemadars, a total strength of 274 all ranks.<sup>53</sup> A foot soldier was drawing Rs 8 per month as pay where as the pay of sowar was Rs 17 and daffadar was being paid Rs 22 and naik Rs

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51 *Administrative Report Tochi Valley 1897-98*

52 *Foreign Frontier Department letter No. 152-153 dated 18<sup>th</sup> – 20<sup>th</sup> June 1898, Miran Shah Archives. Also see letters No's 92-102 dated September 1899.*

53 *Letter No 101 A, From Captain Fergusson Davie Commandant North Waziristan Militia to Political Officer Tochi dated 25<sup>th</sup> April 1901, in this the reference has been made of Levy Corps strength.*

10 monthly. There were eleven sweepers and surprisingly their pay was more than the pay of foot soldier they were being paid at the rate of Rs 10 monthly, all these sweepers were enrolled for the post establishment. Eleven Munshis were also enrolled as part of post establishment and were being paid Rs 15 and baniyah also a part of post establishment was also being paid Rs 15. An annual recurring charges for uniform amounted to Rs 2210. The grand total annually was Rs 53642.

### **Insight**

The political officer report at the end of year is perhaps the only first hand primary source we have which encompasses the every fibre of British administration in the newly acquired areas. North Waziristan or Tochi Valley was unlike any other mountainous area of the North West. In 1894 the British made forward moves in Gilgit where an hierarchical system existed, same was the case in Balochistan but in Waziristan there was no central authority, only legal and moral ground which the Raj had was the formal agreement with Daur Tribe. The resistance of other Wazir tribes although segregated into over a dozen clans yet they offered resistance but in a limited manner. Political officer noted and wrote that the Mahsuds and tribes living in Afghanistan are the main cause of trouble regarding the behaviour of Daur in which four fanatics had attacked the political officer and their other petty offenses are attributed to the excessive use of Charas. Tochi Levies was one ray of hope in which the induction of locals and the over all conduct of the levies was commendable. ‘ The system of day picquetting upon cart road was developed and picquetting duty performed with far more regularity and success than in the preceding year...a spirit of obedience and discipline was observable which did not formerly exist’<sup>54</sup>.

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54 *Political Officer Mr Lorimar remarks in a confidential report 1899. Miran Shah Archives.*

Tochi Levies had forty Sowars which were the striking force mainly used for escort and patrolling. These Sowars were put through an equitation course, it is to be noted that majority of the natives were not as good horsemen as the tribes of Gilgit Agency. The instructors were mainly borrowed from regular army units especially the cavalry. The footmen were put through the drill classes held in rotation at the principal posts. Tochi Levies took part in quite a number of successful pursuits of raiders. One Levy was permanently disabled in rescuing travellers from a gang of robbers armed with breech loading rifles near Surkamar. It speaks high of Tochi Levies that only one prisoner escaped from their custody during the year of 1898. Lal Khan a Jemadar of Tochi Levy was killed in a bold attempt to make a Barampta of a large caravan of Khaisora Mohmit Khel near Tal.<sup>55</sup> There were grey areas also, two cases of extortion by the Levy from travellers were reported in the year, and both were punished for this severely. The initial reaction of the regular military officers was not very positive regarding the Levies and there was an air of distrust around them. However the regular army picquets were removed during the cold weather in the road above Miran shah and these duties were performed by the Tochi Levies with commendable tactical insight 'The comparatively great security of the road especially above Miran Shah during 1898-99 was I believe chiefly due to the better performance of picquet duty by the Levies'.<sup>56</sup> Unauthorised leave or absent without official leave was not that uncommon and few desertion also took place mainly when men were not given leave on Eid at Bakka Khel Posta in the lower Daur valley. To counter the regular raids in upper Daur in Hamonzai a tower was built at Samiekon also a post was commenced at Bicha which was regarded as the most important at the head of the Dande

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55 *Border & Administrative report 1898-1899, Miran Shah Archives.*

56 *Ibid. Remarks by the Political Officer.*

Plain but it was not finished due to Kanirogha outrage. Badawan Post was dismantled on its being indefensible.

In January 1899 Mr Cooke took over as Commandant Tochi Levies his pay was 450 Rupees per month, Mr Donald the former Commandant took over as political officer of Tochi Valley, the commandant of Tochi Levies also acted as assistant political officer with powers to give punishment to criminals on major offenses.

There was a requirement for an increase in the numerical strength of the Levies for the reason that the work was incessant and hard thus Wazirs and Daurs the two tribes manning the Levies were reluctant to join apart from the leave issue thus an increase in numbers was seen as a logical end to both grievances. In August the proposal to introduce non Silladari Militia were submitted.

*'Past year have shown that however untaught they are by no means un-teachable and there is every reason to think that reorganisation would be successful. Both classes are capable of strong party feeling which turned into proper channel would become spirit de corps'.<sup>57</sup>*

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57 *Ibid.*

## North Waziristan Militia 1900 -1922

In North Western Frontier region of Punjab the very first native militia was raised in 1878, The Khyber Rifles was composed of irregular tribesmen commanded by a Sadozai Afghan of the royal family of Durrani the ruling elite, however the Rifles itself revolted in 1882. In 1892-3 Captain Roos Keppel form the Kurram Militia composed entirely of the local Turi Tribe, in the same period the Gilgit Scouts was raised by Colonel Algernon Durand as part of Gilgit Agency. Similarly in 1900 two militias were raised in Waziristan, one as North Waziristan Militia (NWM) and other as South Waziristan Militia (SWM), collectively all were known as Frontier Irregular Corps.

North Waziristan Militia and South Waziristan Militia were raised as a consequence of Lord Curzon the Viceroy of India's frontier policy<sup>58</sup> in which the regular British Army was intended to be pulled back from Waziristan into the settled districts and responsibility of law and order to be entrusted to the Militia. In the same context North Western Frontier Province was also formed in 1901 from the five districts<sup>59</sup> under the Punjab Government namely Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Hazara and Derajat (Dera Ismail Khan, Dera Ghazi Khan & Dera Ghulam Khan). There were five agencies apart from these districts namely North Waziristan also known as Tochi Agency, South Waziristan also known as Wana Agency, Kurram, Khyber and Chitral (Dir & Swat). The agencies had a political officer who worked under the commissioner, in case of

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58 *Lord Curzon Speech at Quetta Durbar dated .at Peshawar Durbar on 24<sup>th</sup> April 1901. Also see Pall Mall Gazetteer, 2<sup>nd</sup> October 1900.*

59 *Imperial Gazetteer p-27*



Tochi Agency the Commissioner of Derajat was the incharge who exercised his authority through the political officer stationed at MiranShah. On Army side there were three independent brigades stationed at Kohat, Derajat and Bannu being part of the northern command, there were also two divisions of army one stationed at Peshawar and other at Rawalpindi. The agencies were dependent upon the Punjab Government before the raising of the new province for financial aspects and also to the Frontier Office of the Foreign Department Government of India which had its capital at Calcutta.

North Waziristan Militia was raised at Idak on 1<sup>st</sup> June 1900<sup>60</sup> with 487 foot soldiers and thirty mounted infantry, there were three British officers Lieutenant Finnis, Lieutenant Godwin and the Commandant Captain Fergusson Davie. By end of the year the strength raised to 679 all ranks. Troops from regular army were also part of the NWM. The militia was organized on the pattern of regular native infantry regiment. NWM establishment had the similar authorization of manpower and horses but there was a difference in the equipment. There were 32 havildars authorized in NWM along with 32 lance naiks where as in a regular army unit the number of havildar were 40 and lance naik were also 40. The role of Political Officers Tochi Valley, Captain Down and Mr Donald in the raising and support of the NWM is worth recording. The NWM had 800 foot sepoy and 50 mounted infantry sowars as part of establishment but it took almost a year before this strength was achieved.

NWM initially had no accommodation and they remained in bivouacs for almost a year. The space at Idak was limited and the two rooms available for officer's accommodation were shared with the

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<sup>60</sup> Government of India Foreign Department letter No.1253 dated 15<sup>th</sup> May 1900, in it raising of two battalions of militia were sanctioned, one for North Waziristan & other for South Waziristan.

assistant political officer, the telegraph office was also located in the same premises. The troops from regular army had volunteered for the NWM, money was not the key issue in this decision rather sense of adventure was the paramount factor. Majority of these troops had already been in the action as part of Tochi Force and as such the thrill of frontier warfare overcame the other inconveniences.

The rank and file distribution of the NWM by April 1901 was as under. Three British officers (in the official correspondence the word European has been used instead of British), one to act as commandant having a rank of captain, one second in command and one as adjutant. The native officers comprised of one subedar major, one Jemadar who also acted as native adjutant, one drill havildar, one drill naik, one English clerk and one reader; they all were part of headquarters and as such drew staff pay. There were eight subedars, a word about them they were categorized in terms of pay thus two senior most subedars were drawing a pay of Rupees two hundred and rest were paid slightly less than this. There were eight Jemadars also, 32 havildars, eight moharrars, eight paid havildars, 32 naiks, eight buglers and 712 sepoy; they constitute foot infantry contingent. The mounted infantry comprised of 48 sepoy, one havildar and one Jemadar. In every battalion of British Infantry 160 men were trained as mounted infantry.

NWM was tactically organized into two wings known as right wing and left wing both commanded by senior subedars, each wing had four companies also commanded by subedars and Jemadars. There were a host of non combatants also being part of NWM. They include Ferrier in mounted infantry who looked after the horse's shoes, one mistri, one Tindal he lookafter tents, magazines, collect lead, make up targets; a khalasi to assist the Tindal. One

mochi, one darzi, ten bahishtis and ten sweepers. There was a medical establishment also which had two hospital assistants, two compounders, two dressers, two sweepers, two bahishtis and two langri. It is obvious that no carpenter is authorized in the over all establishment and neither cooks were authorized to the wings. There was no provision for officers mess and cook house for the troops in the establishment. In the regular army the concept of companies replaced the 'wings' in 1900 but NWM retained the nomenclature of wings. Indian army units were issued with .303 Magazine Rifles in 1900-01, the cavalry was armed with Lee Enfield carbines since 1897 and British Infantry units were equipped with Lee Metford rifles in 1899. In North Waziristan Militia, initially there was reluctance on part of army to arm it with .303 Rifles as it was feared that the soldiers will runaway with new rifles but Captain Fergusson strongly pleaded in favour of arming the militia with new rifles but it took time.

## **Drill**

The most glaring aspect are the twenty drill sepoy and one drill havildar, it clearly indicates the importance of drill in training the tribesmen. For many of us in present era the most intriguing question is that how the British tamed or trained these tribesmen and the most logical answer lies in this overwhelming strength of drill instructors. For days nothing else was imparted to the newly inducted recruits but only drill movements which inculcated the discipline in them. The drill commands were all in English and all these instructors were from regular army who has volunteered for a minimum stay of five years in the NWM.

The role of NWM in the abinitio period was not very clear, it all depended upon the outcome of the Mahsud blockade and the

agreement with the Wazirs. As soon as the blockade was lifted the regular troops started pulling back and their positions were occupied by the NWM. The operational task of NWM was to look after the Tochi Valley 'it is expected that the Tochi Valley will be partially handed over to the North Waziristan Militia, which is nearly ready to garrison the posts'.<sup>61</sup>

There were 16 posts that the NWM in the teething period looked after. They were as under (all distances in miles from Idak)

Bannu  
MirAli  
Saidgi  
Shinkai  
Katira  
Isha  
Tal  
Ahmedzai  
Semakone  
Wuzzi  
Muhammad Khel  
Tut Narai  
Kanirogha  
Datta Khel

From October 1900 onwards the NWM troops started manning these posts, as a result the requirement for an increase in the establishment was highlighted to the higher authorities. The normal channel of communication was to put up the demands to the political officer at MiranShah who if convinced would forward it to either commissioner or agent to the governor general at Peshawar.

<sup>61</sup> *The Times, February 11, 1901, Page 5, Column 6.*

There existed a road fit enough for Tonga that runs from Bannu via MiranShah to Datta Khel.

### **First Report**

On 9<sup>th</sup> January 1901, the very first inspection of the NWM was carried out; on it depended the future of NWM. *'Having just paid a visit to the Tochi Valley, I have the pleasure of reporting for the pleasure of Government of India, that the experience of raising a local militia has so far proved a complete success in Northern Waziristan. Captain Fergusson Davie has now strength of 697 rank & file. The recruits are of an excellent stamp and physique, as good as that of the men of any Punjab Frontier Force regiment...their drill is executed with smartness and precision. The native officers appear to be well selected...force is already accepting its share in the defence of the Tochi, Tutnarai...is held inefficiently...detachments have occupied the posts of MirAli, Saidgi, Ghalakote, Shinkai, Katira, Lakka Narai and Muhammad Khel. At the last named place I was particularly struck with the fact that Madda Khel contingent was as good and cheerful as the rest of the militia...great credit on the Commandant, Captain Fergusson Davie'.*<sup>62</sup>

### **Tribal Composition**

North Waziristan Militia by end 1901 had strength of 736 soldiers with 357 belonging to local tribesmen and 379 to other. It comprised of 192 Utmanzai Wazirs, 81 Ahmadzai Wazirs, 81 Dauris, 3 Mahsuds and 95 Afridis; these tribes were regarded as local where as 59 Marwats, 57 Bannuchis, 137 Khattaks, 3 Yousafzais and 28 other Pathans were considered as part of British subjects. They

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<sup>62</sup> Foreign Department Frontier January 1901, No's 177-179 Report on the Recruitment & Efficiency of The Northern Waziristan Militia submitted by W.R.H. Merk Commissioner & Superintendent Derajat Division.

were organized into eight companies. The Scarlet Thread of raising these militias revolved around having an almost equal number of troops<sup>63</sup> inducted from local and British subject Pathan tribes. In the original plan one company of Daurs, one company of Ahmadzai Wazirs and two companies of Utmanzai Wazirs were to form as the local tribes. Two companies of Marwats, one company of Bhittanis and one company comprising of Khattaks and Bannuchis were to be raised; thus half the force of locals and half of other tribes. There was confusion in categorizing the tribes as locals and others on the reason that many of them especially the Wazirs had settled in the administrative boundaries of Bannu District and were recruited under the subject category. It seems trifling affair but this proved to be a catastrophic lacuna in later years especially in 1919. Bhittani Company was not raised and neither were they recruited in NWM for the reason that they preferred to be enrolled in South Waziristan Militia.<sup>64</sup> This was a sound policy and the prophecy that ‘Wazirs would not be likely to differentiate them or stand aloof from the Wazirs that live on both sides of the Tochi Valley. All Wazirs would be apt to make a common cause’.<sup>65</sup>

## Post Age

Posts were and still are the most fundamental corner stone of frontier warfare, their importance in North Waziristan is closely linked to their location. It was not the discretion of the NWM to choose posts of their own liking rather every post has to be weighed politically and not militarily although in the end a compromise was always reached. Should they be isolated or should they be close

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63 *Foreign Department Letter No. 1953 F dated 15<sup>th</sup> May 1900 & Punjab Government Letter No 796 Dated 25<sup>th</sup> June 1900, Tochi Scouts Archives, MiranShah.*

64 *Letter No. 58C dated 20<sup>th</sup> April 1901 & Letter No 784 Dated 23<sup>rd</sup> October 1900 by Commissioner Derajat. Tochi Scouts Archives.*

65 *Ibid.*

enough to the population to influence the native tribes with the fruits of civilisation and to foster a friendship bond were intriguing questions and had to be balanced. Captain Fergusson recommended that MiranShah be adopted as winter base and Datta Khel as a summer training camp. Tutnarai was a purely militia post, a cool summer resort. On the issue of posts Commandant Captain Fergusson recommended that the original strength of 800 foot soldiers and 50 sowars be augmented with additional 200 foot soldiers and 20 mounted sowars for the reason that a substantive strength has to be kept at Idak as reserves. This appreciation was pended by the Foreign Office on the recommendation of the army. The army point of view was that, till the time a clear picture does not emerge out of Waziristan there will be a constant and regular demand for increase in the militia strength thus they advice to wait and see.<sup>66</sup>

All in all 16 posts were initially to be manned by the NWM, two posts required one non commissioned officer each, six posts required two non commissioned officers each and seven posts were commanded by native officers and they required four non commissioned officers on each post, thus a total of 54 non commissioned officers were essential for the posts. Resultantly the numbers of havildars in each company were increased to five.

### **First Military Expedition**

The very first military expedition was undertaken by the Militia was in 1902 when NWM was employed against the Kabul Khel Wazirs. It was successful for the reason that NWM was able to provide protection to the retreating regular troops from forward posts and ensure that the lines of communication remains safe. The

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<sup>66</sup> Letter No 646 Dated 14<sup>th</sup> March 1901, Fort Williams from H.Barnes Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to Chief Secretary Government of Punjab.

very fact that militia was lightly equipped enabled it to move at a much fast pace than the regular army units. Pigeons were employed for passing back the information to Idak; there were eight pigeon carriers then. The militia remained steadfast on its pledge of loyalty however there were four desertions in which the sepoys took the rifles with them later these were recovered through the political agent. This expedition brought forward a key lesson in frontier warfare that the military and political wing both needs a very close contact therefore it was decided even before the termination of the expedition that the Militia should move forward from Idak to MiranShah.

### **Captain Arthur Francis Fergusson Davie**

North Waziristan Militia was fortunate to have Captain Arthur Francis Fergusson Davie (53 Sikhs) as the founding father. He was a tough officer an excellent shot and an exceptional rider. He above all had that head which makes a good frontier officer mainly to rely upon his own instincts and the desire to lead his men through example, he preferred a .30 Smith and Wesson revolver over the other arms and could put all six rounds in an inch, he was fluent in Punjabi and mastered his command over Pashto while he was serving in the frontier before raising the militia. It was Captain Fergusson who designed the very first crest of the Militia. From the official correspondence which took place during his tenure a picture emerges in which he is thinking all the times about the militia and how it can be made more useful. He frequently highlighted the necessary changes vital in manpower and organisation in NWM which were omitted in the raising period. He is responsible for the increase in manpower and other equipment. Few letters have survived of his tenure in which he even pleaded to other British officers in the district administration for the welfare of his troops.



## **Establishment**

When NWM was raised it was supposed to be at par with the Kurram Militia in terms of pay and allowances and other matters, however one of the key factors of British military culture has been the strict financial discipline in all aspect regarding expenditures incurred on army. In India it reached new heights because the inherent minute scrutiny of accounts by the natives resulted in NWM being treated financially on a lower tier. For instance the authorization of twenty sweepers was sanctioned after a prolong paper work. The NWM logic was that after darkness no gates are allowed to be opened at posts as it creates opportunity for the thieves to strike, on the other hand if a soldier wants to attend the call of nature then he has to do it within the post area therefore the requirement of sweepers for every post is mandatory. Similarly the issue of cooks for the posts was highlighted that the sepoy after a day long work needs rest and without a cook he has to prepare the food himself. Practically the soldiers were cooking the food collectively known as ‘handiwal’. The soldiers were not given free ration thus the arrangements were as under, a ‘Chaudri’ was nominated in each company who would collect and procure the food items for each company and then food was cooked either centrally for the company or individually by the handiwal, the cooked food was given one final touch by adding condiments known as ‘tarka’. This custom is still present in Tochi Scouts in a somewhat similar pattern where even the cooked food is given a ‘tarka’ by the soldiers in their barracks; it has got nothing to do with the standard of cooking but more as a tradition or Riway. Banya was another character, a Hindu who in simple terms was a shopkeeper of the NWM, he would procure the items from Bannu and then sell it in NWM, and he was paid for this. Ferrier induction also has a back ground in the initial days he was not part of the

establishment, the practice in other militias was to enrol a Ferrier as a soldier who would perform the duty of Ferrier rather than that of soldier. Captain Fergusson highlighted that where as the pay of a soldier with all his allowances was Rupees 20 and if Ferrier is enrolled than he would be paid rupees 16 only thus it still saves the government, on the other hand a soldier employed as Ferrier is a loss to the state and Militia. Carpenter was another issue as government was interested in that all such works is done by the Public Works Department's carpenter however in the end Captain Fergusson was able to get his point through. Socially these classes does not exists in the tribal area therefore darzi, mochi, tarkhan and baunya had to be lured from the Punjab. Idak was not a good choice as a raising station, it was too small and cramped, and in 1903 a portion of the post was demolished to make more room for the troops.

There were instances of desertion among the scouts who ran away with the official issued rifle but then they were apprehended through the men who brought them for recruitment. The daily routine in NWM started with the Fajr prayers the majority of the soldiers were strict in following the religion and here again was the difference between the regular army unit and the NWM. In regular army the class composition was based upon the Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus but in NWM it was only Muslims who were the fighting force, the small number of non Muslims were mainly for menial task and as such were kept separate from the militia with separate living quarters consisting of tent, their food was cooked separately and they ate separately. The reveille was sounded and even before it the syce groomed the horses for morning training. In the summer the horses were given work early in the morning. There was a physical training period for the newly inducted recruits and soldiers; mostly running. Breakfast would be consumed after sunrise and then a day

long training which was revolving around drill. Office routine was simple as there was no typewriter and all correspondence conducted in handwritten notes. Gasht was an important part of training in which long distances (10 -15 miles) were covered on foot and also by mounted infantry.

Hakim Dost Muhammad was the hospital assistant but in reality he was recruited as hakim keeping in view the social pattern of the natives who were not comfortable with the concept of doctor.

### **Pay Scales**

NWM was not an ideological military unit, its life line depended on keeping the native soldiers contented with good pay and other amenities and only then to expect a return in the form of loyalty and discipline. There were discrepancies in the pay of NWM troops and regular army. Subedar Major in NWA was drawing Rupees 150 only where as the same rank was drawing Rs 150 and a field batta of Rs 15 along with free ration. In some cases the terms offered to the regular army while attracting them to serve in NWM were not fulfilled, for instance a Havildar Major was offered Rs 28-8-0 which included Rs 15 as pay, staff pay of Rs 10 and Rs 3/8 as compensation of free ration but he was being paid only Rs 25/8/- (Rs 18 as pay, Rs 7/8 as staff pay) where as in regular army he would have been getting a total of Rs 26/- (Pay Rs 16/-, Staff Pay Rs 5/-, Good conduct pay and field batta of Rs 5/- along with free ration or Rs 3/8/0). The allowances of British officers were another issue because they were being paid less than that of Kurram Militia officers. The Commandant of NWM was drawing an allowance of Rs 100 as political agency and Rs 400 as staff pay, where as the Commandant of Kurram Militia was drawing a staff pay of Rs 500. Captain Fergusson raised this issue as

a matter of principal because it undermines the equality among the militias. Similarly the soldiers were paid only Rs 20 as a onetime allowance for purchase of uniform and subsequently only Rs 5 was given yearly as kit allowance which was insufficient. There was no provision of warm weather clothing for the troops. For the purpose of income tax act the NWM was placed as on same footing as that of Her Majesty's Indian Forces.

Lieutenant Governor agreed to the recommendations of the Commandant NWM regarding the pay discrepancies and stated 'Lieutenant Governor cannot resist the conclusion that as long as regulars are employed in Waziristan the native officers and men should receive the same pay...the grant to regulars seconded for service in the militia of same concessions as enjoyed by the troops serving in Waziristan and also an increase to the numbers of havildars and naiks fixed for each corps'.<sup>67</sup>

The annual cost of NWM amounted to Rs 1, 70, 940 in year 1901 inclusive of pay and allowances. The monthly expenditures on stationery were Rs 40, on firewood Rs 120 only for five months in a year and Rs 60 were spent on telegrams, repair of tents cost Rs 18 are some of the amounts that were expended out of annual grant given to NWM.

### **Move to MiranShah-1904**

On 16<sup>th</sup> October 1904 the North Waziristan Militia moved to MiranShah from Idak and ever since this town has remained as the permanent home of Militia. The decision to move from Idak was undertaken in April 1902 and construction of accommodation

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<sup>67</sup> Letter No.179C dated 27<sup>th</sup> February 1901 from Dowie Esquire officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of Punjab.

started at MiranShah which was already an army post. The initial layout of camp was mud brick construction covering an area of 400 square yards; the stables were kept outside the walled perimeter. The transfer of luggage and other equipment from Idak was an experience, it was conducted through horse driven carts and Hindu coolies; over one hundred such coolies were employed for this operation. MiranShah has a field elevation of 3050 feet, in 1904 it comprised of 3-4 hamlets having a population of 24000. It had a government school and a hospital. It was feverish and unhealthy between August–October. The strength of North Waziristan Militia was 1318 men including 106 mounted infantry. Regular troops left the garrison by end 1904 and only NWM and political offices were the main occupant apart from the agency doctor. MiranShah was barren and very little vegetation was visible. Trees were few and water scarce. On the positive end was the availability of vast expanse of flat ground for training.

By 23<sup>rd</sup> April 1904 Boya, Kajauri and Saidgi posts were handed over to the NWM; Boya was handed over on 15<sup>th</sup> June 1903. The major posts manned by NWM were Datta Khel, Tutnarai, Spin Khaisora, Muhammad Khel, MiranShah, Tal, Katra and Saidgi where as Isha, Shinkai, Mir Ali and Sur Kumar were regarded as minor posts. Idak was also considered as a major post. A further augmentation of 30 sowars was sanctioned in the NWM for the manning of major posts. It should be kept in mind that in a regular British Infantry<sup>68</sup> unit the total strength was 1034 all ranks including 29 officers and 1005 soldiers, in Indian native unit the strength was 927 all ranks with 13 British officers and 16 Native officers; thus NWM had more strength than both of these regular unit yet it was commanded by a captain, it speaks good of officers and also on the quality of native officers in keeping such a strength under control. The minimum height for

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68 *Gazetteer of India Volume 4, pp. 368-378.*

enrolment in NWM was five feet four inches with an age bracket of 16-25. The service was for three years and non pensionable. MiranShah was the only place in Waziristan which offered any sort of comfort. In 1910 even two nursing sisters came to look after patients. It was to be many a years before MiranShah saw their likes again.

On 25<sup>th</sup> September 1905<sup>69</sup> a gasht of NWM was ambushed at Spina Khaisora by Ilm Din and his gang, the gasht comprising of twelve sepoy was passing through a gorge when all of a sudden the leading scout was hit by a bullet in the chest. Rest of the sepoy took cover behind the stones but they were unable to locate the attackers and they just waited patiently but it was a fatal mistake as the next round of the volley came from an unexpected direction and took the life of another sepoy. The Militia challenged the attackers to come out in open as it is against the ethics to fire from cover. They fired back and were able to reach the safety with two more sepoy wounded. They got the dead bodies back later.

Captain Fergusson on promotion reverted back to regular army and in his place came Captain Jacob from 30<sup>th</sup> Baloch Regiment but he stayed as commandant for a year. The initial years of North Waziristan Militia till 1907 when the Frontier Corps Headquarters was raised at Peshawar were the teething period in its history it was commanded by captains, as Captain Dodd of 27<sup>th</sup> Punjab regiment commanded it from 1905 -1908 and later his unit officer Captain Keene also commanded the NWM for a year before the first field officer Major Moneile from 19 Lancers came for command. Keene had served the Militia as Lieutenant at MiranShah thus he was well conversed with the role of it and more importantly knew the men and their language very well. It was Keene who gave his pocket watch as marriage gift to his orderly. Keene had a volatile temper

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69 *The Times* 27<sup>th</sup> September 1905 issue.

and he paid dearly for this, he was shot on his right side by a sentry early morning outside the mess.<sup>70</sup> Keene survived. The reason is not clear but one tradition is that Keene was playing piano early in the morning in Mess and did not pause when the Fajr prayers were being called.

Militia had varying charter of duties, on 23<sup>rd</sup> August 1910 an Indian mail cart was looted near Bannu in which the mail remained unmolested but the Tehsildar of Tank was killed and another three passengers were kidnapped. The event took place at 1300 hours and by 1900 hours Lieutenant E.P. Quinan along with ten other sepoy were hunting the bandits and after two days of hectic chase they finally got the bandits trapped and freed the hostages, a havildar of Militia was wounded.<sup>71</sup>

### **North Waziristan Agency**

Was constituted as a full-fledge agency in the year 1910, with its headquarters at Miran Shah. NWA covers an area of 4707 Square Kilometres. The agency lies from 32.35 degrees to 33.22 degrees latitudes and 69.22 degrees to 70.38 degrees longitudes. It is bounded on the north by Afghanistan, Kurram Agency on the east by Bannu Districts. On the south by South Waziristan Agency and on the west by Afghanistan. It comprises of Tochi, Khaisora and Shawal Valleys. It consists of generally inhospitable mountain terrain which is barren and rugged in the north except for some plain areas around Spinwam, Mir Ali, Miran Shah and Datta Khel. The chief tribes in North Waziristan are the Utmanzai Wazirs and Daurs. Besides, there are small tribes like the Gurbuz, Kharsins, Saidgi and Malakshi Mahsuds. The Wazirs are from Sunni sect. The religious

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70 *Daily Exeter & Plymouth Gazette* 29<sup>th</sup> April 1909 also see *Manchester Courier & Lancashire General Advertiser* of same date.

71 *Ibid*, 22nd August 1910 issue.

teachers mullahs have influence only so far as the observance of religion, and are powerless in political matters yet they have that charisma to ignite a whole clan over a religious issue especially when it concerns the very existence of the Islam. In a mark contrast to the Baloch tribes who are loyal to one chief and obey and act on a central authority, the Wazirs are an especially democratic and independent people and even their own Maliks have little real control over them.

In 1913 Spinwam Post (the fourth post after MiranShah, Idak and Boya) was besieged by the tribes for no reason other than to carry out loot, Spinwam was also a mud fort and had an establishment of fifty scouts. The Militia carried out relief operation, which was sniped by the tribesmen. It took two months to relieve the besieged fort.

In October 1914 another Khost Lashkar descended down from the North West of MiranShah and threatened to annihilate Spinwam and MiranShah , in the end it ravaged MiranShah bazaar and serai, punitive expedition was undertaken in Ghulam Husain area. Captain A. Marjory Banks a Militia officer (52<sup>nd</sup> Sikhs) was responsible for the innovative training schedule of the troops, he was a good shot and he ensured that drill standards of Militia remain high, he served as an adjutant and also commanded right wing, he died of cholera at Datta Khel on 28<sup>th</sup> September 1914.

### **Victoria Cross**

7<sup>th</sup> January 1915 was a cold day even by the standards of North Waziristan it had rain overnight and sky remained cloudy for last two days. Captain Eustace Jotham was the wing commander at MiranShah who was in Boya Fort for last three days inspecting his



troops, an officer who was always in search of an adventure, he was quite a celebrity because he had saved passengers in a rail carriage that caught fire, Jotham was standing at the other platform and rushed to save the passengers risking his own life. It was the kind of an opportunity which every young dreams of rising to the occasion. After his first brush with death and fear Jotham was eager to try his fortune in the First Great War which had started in August 1914 and Jotham biggest fear was that it will terminate before he will see any action. It was a golden opportunity for the Afghans to settle the differences with British Government in India over the Durand Line dispute. Afghan government and especially King Abdur Rehman had been consistent in laying their claims over the Wazir country although Wazirs themselves never acknowledge any suzerainty of any one yet religious bound binds them to Kabul more than towards British. British Empire's entry into First Great War in Europe provided the perfect opportunity to the Kabul to adjust the Durand Line.

On the morning of 7<sup>th</sup> January 1915 Captain Jotham<sup>72</sup> finally finished the inspection of the Khar Kamar Fort which was a mud fortified complex built in the pattern of the native construction style with a bricked Kote locked with steel doors. There were rumours of Khost Lashkar gathering at Spina Khaisora on the northern bank of Tochi River with an intention of descending down and looting the Boya Fort in a pattern similar to the MiranShah of 1914.

North Waziristan Militia was raised for this very purpose to be able to detect and protect the Tochi Pass from any lashkar and to hold them at force till the time the regular Indian Army units stationed at Mir Ali can reinforce and provide firepower. Jotham had been riding for an hour towards the west of Boya in the Khaisora Valley

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72 *London Gazette* 23rd July 1915. Also see *The Frontier Scouts* p-28.

occasionally cracking a joke with the scouts who were all in their cheerful behaviour, Darim Shah a Waziri sowar was looking to find a Chikor and his hawk eyes were scanning the adjoining mountains. The valley is rocky and partially green at times restricting the mounted infantry to a single file and at places there was ample space for three ahead to gallop. Mounted Infantry was as name indicates an infantry mounted on horse they were not cavalry rather they use horse for movement but fight like any other infantry that is by getting dismounted and firing under cover but they were ideal out fit it was the idea of captain Dave Fergusson who insisted in having them because of inherent speed. The troopers have to be an excellent rider able to fire while galloping and being able to ride the horse between MiranShah and Idak. Horses were hardy and mountain bred normally of 14.1 hands and provided by the government in a sense that commandant paid for them thus the best one were bought from the fairs of Dera Ismail Khan, occasionally the Afghan or Central Asian horse traders also brought in the heavenly horses from Fergana. Trade volume increased many folds on the Tochi Valley route after the raising of NWM. Almost every officer had his own horse rather two, officers playing Polo had many. Horse was the property of the sowar a deduction in the pay was done against the price of the horse but in return the soldier would take it to his home on leave and militia paid extra amount to the soldier for the horse maintenance, if the horse died of negligence then soldier has to replace it. On completion of service it was soldier's to take home the horse thus mounted infantry was the most elite among the North Waziristan Militia. To survive in the mounted infantry required something extra even among the militia.

The Mounted Infantry do not charge on to an enemy which in any case was rare because tribal lashkar seldom fought on a plain area

presenting a concentrated target rather it was shooting at long range and closing in the gap which finally ends up in hand to hand combat. Mounted Infantry conducted their fighting after dismounting, in modern term they were a quick reaction force.

Captain Jotham reined in his horse Glasgow as he led his section of ten sowars into the narrow defile, his sixth sense alerted him to something which he was unable to explain logically but one of the key factor of success and longevity of any officer in frontier warfare is to trust the instincts, all of a sudden the first shot pierced the silence of the valley and noise ricocheted, Jotham knew as did all the other that they are on the verge of an ambush, something which has been regularly taught and which the old hands knew, the best option is to gallop and get away and find a place under cover to retaliate. Jotham wheeled his horse the way he does on a polo field to asses the situation and rest all galloped amidst the dust which obscured the vision of the attackers. Young Gulrung the baby of the Gasht a newly enlisted recruit out on his first Gasht was under fire and a bullet hit the horse which stumbled and Gulrung sprang out of his saddle half of his torso was over the head of the horse when horse hit the ground, another bullet hit Gulrung on the right thigh. Captain Jotham's mind was read by the Glasgow and galloped towards the Gulrung, behind Jotham, Darim Khan also turned back, he was impressed by the valour of his officer, today he was watching something which he had only heard that White Officers are brave, how can he leave him now. Jotham fired the shots from his .30 Smith and Wesson revolver towards the marauders approaching towards the Gulrung like a pack of wolves, if only he could reach Gulrung then he can plan the next move, from the cutting of the nullah the fire was coming incessantly, Jotham reached Gulrung and instantly he was attacked by four miscreants, Jotham had the option to turn

back and bolt for safety but this young man charged for the sake of his under command's safety, he took out his sword and charged in the manner of his favourite poet Tennyson's Charge of the Light Brigade, he slashed the first Afghani and cut the other to make his way to Gulrung. Meanwhile Darim took position behind a cover of stones and fired at the other; bullet hit the tribal on the thigh, he swerved felt to the side and fire back at Darim Khan. Captain Jotham picked Gulrung the way he picked a goat in Buzkushi, Gulrung half conscious half dead limbered and Jotham heeled on Glasgow's left and bolted, he was first hit on his right shoulder and then on his thigh but he held Gulrung positively, another Afghani with his sword stood in his way and Darim hit him in the head, Jotham bleeding profusely rode and Darim provided the cover till he was away safely.

Captain Jotham died of wounds an hour after he reached Spina Khaisora and so did Sowar Gulrung but Darim Khan survived to tell the tale of bravery. Waziri Lashkar. Strength was around 1500 men that poured over the Durand Line. Captain Jotham is buried at MiranShah cemetery.

Lieutenant A.E.B. Parson was the post commander at Datta Khel a mud bricked fort with high towers on both ends. Early in the morning before the first light the first shot was fired by an intruding Mahsud, Sepoy Tor Khan was the sentry at the western end and he reacted but by that time the Mahsuds were firing from the mountains, Tor Khan kept his nerves and gallantly fireback. For an hour the duel went on Tor Khan was joined in by Sepoy Amir Khan and Sepoy ZamirUllah and they kept the enemy at bay.

Major Scott led the leading relief force of 50 Mounted Infantry sowars towards Boya followed by Subedar Major Tor Khan with

another platoon of twenty sowars. Lieutenant N.H. Prendergast the post commander at Boya had set out with a platoon of twenty sowars to meet the Khost Lashkar and thereby to keep the notion of victory with him, he has to see himself as to what had happened, in his youth discretion was not the better part of valour, he had yet to learn the art of frontier warfare and he got his first lesson quickly when a volley of bullets welcomes him and his militia, they scattered, dismounted and took positions and returned fire which now it seems was coming from all direction. First grade Daffadar Makhmad Jan a Wazir was the first one to claim a hit when he took a shot at the hostile Waziri and saw him rolling down he knew he had killed him, it was his second kill of life the last was a year ago in his village when he lost temper with his relative for his being disrespectful to the North Waziristan Militia. He aimed another shot at what he perceived to be a human shadow. Lieutenant Prendergast's horse got the direct hit and it went limping down the ravine and so did Prendergast with his feet stuck in the saddle.

Major Scott reached just in time when the attacking Wazirs and Afghanis thought they had won the day, Scott took the positions and started firing at them and soon as per tribal warfare, the tribes realising that game has gone out of their hands started retreating. It was at this juncture that Lieutenant Prendergast emerged on the scene limping yet enthusiastic and brimming with confidence, he had just managed to run through a hail of fire, after he landed with the horse he was unconscious but soon came to senses and crawled to safety and then bolted for the fort, it was his luck and wits that saved the day for him because he just ran into a Waziri and in next instant Prendergast hit him with a stone and made his way around, and then he saw Major Scott's force. 'I want to attack them sir' were his first words and Major Scott just smiled back.

Subedar Major Tor Khan headed for the Datta Khel, he knew the area like the back of his hand, he was born here and it was among these ravines and stones that he grew up and growing up for a Waziri child is not an easy thing especially when you have family blood feud running around like these water lines in the area. Tor Khan had just one love in his life; to ride and ride with a gun in his hand and shooting at all those whom he hates and at the moment he hates none more than these marauding tribes. They have dared to enter his jurisdiction because for Tor Khan the whole of North Waziristan Militia was his responsibility, welfare, discipline and above all brutality to anyone who dares to enter it without his permission. He rode in a fury towards Datta Khel.

Captain Jotham set the tradition and standards of North Waziristan Militia, where the life of an under command has to be protected even at the peril of own safety. This thus becomes the new code of life in the Militia. The area itself has its own code of life known as Pakhtunwali the Pathan code of honour which is unwritten but followed religiously. Lieutenant Prendergast's wish to attack was granted and fulfilled, he made a flanking attack. Subedar Major Tor Khan's mere presence forced the attackers to seek refuge. Daffadar Makhmad Jan was killed, he was wounded but his ego did not allowed to fall back and he died in a hand to hand combat with another Waziri. The attacking Afghans left the area for the moment.

### **Ides of March-1915**

March is a beautiful time in MiranShah, the very roses and eucalyptuses start budding, the air becomes much fresh and birds start thinking of letting their young ones go out solo and it is also the time of year when tribes also set down to contemplate how to pick

a feud; pretext is not difficult to provide as a minor issue over water rights can be enough for the season campaign.

This was the beginning of the Third Afghan War which started with attack on the North Waziristan Militia and for next four years NWM became the front line and vanguard of British resistance towards the influence of Kabul regime in wooing the loyalties of the Mahsud and Wazir tribes. Major Scott the Militia commandant held the durbar and took the sepoys in confidence regarding the future course of action. Major Scott was fortunate enough to have the Tor Khan as the subedar major of the Militia , his influence over the troops was absolute and his own loyalty to the militia a byword, he was brave, bold, initiative and understood the tribes better than any other person. Major Fitzpatrick the political agent of North Waziristan was another extraordinary official engraved with the working philosophy of Robert Bruce and Sir Sandeman he immediately fulfilled the deficiencies in rank and file of the militia which included releasing of funds for the fortification of the posts and purchase of horses. The regular army had 25 Cavalry Frontier Force (Lieutenant Colonel Baldwin), 29 Mountain Battery (Major F.R.Patch) and 10Jat Infantry Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel H.E.Lewis) known as Bannu movable column under command Major General H.O' Donnell later Brigadier General V.B. Fane commanded it. The plan was to lure the tribes from the mountains where they were most effective to the plains and then meet head on using fire power to destroy the tribes of Khost. Major Scott was of the opinion basing upon his personal reading of the natives that tribes will seldom accept the set pattern battle and will resort to hit and run and as such it is paramount to lay a trap on their likely route of retreat. His proposal was accepted.

On 21<sup>st</sup> March 1915 the Khost Lashkar gathered fifteen miles North West of MiranShah there was a panic among the locals because only a year ago the town was molested by the tribes and people had not yet recovered from that shock when the news of this new thunderstorm was received. MiranShah was bustling with all kind of rumours, the British troops had already arrived at MiranShah; they were bivouacked on the periphery of the fort with cavalry taking position on the north east protecting the right flank. Artillery fired shells on the likely concentration areas of the lashkar. On 28<sup>th</sup> March's evening the garrison was put on full alert which lasted till morning. At noon the tribes struck with snipers and reports were received from informers that likely direction of attack is from north with an aim to cut off the lines of communication of the garrison. Cavalry was positioned across the northern stream. Major Scott as per plan marched with his three hundred sepoy towards the South West and from there he was able to march for another four hours and finally occupied the high ground behind the invading marauders. From his vantage point he ordered fire on the tribesmen who were taken by a surprise and swiftly started leaving the arena in a disorderly manner, MiranShah was saved by the North Waziristan Militia. The focus of violence shifted towards the South Waziristan where Mahsuds played havoc with the British troops. 'Success of the action was largely due to the skilful manner in which a column under Major Scott...gained a position in the rear of enemy'.<sup>73</sup>

#### **Musa Khan's Coup at Tut Narai.**

In May 1917, a well known hostile named Musa Khan carried out an astonishing coup, Musa had already shot a Militia sepoy at Boya from the heights, the present Musa Post is known after him.

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<sup>73</sup> *Tochi Valley Operations, Smart Work on Indian Frontier. The Times, March 21 1916, page 7, column 6.*



Musa and his gang were short of weapons and ammunition and what place better than a militia post to make up the deficiency was his deduction. From Boya a track leads to the high peaks which were covered with wild growth, it was a favourite hunting ground in 1917 and still is. Musa along with his seven accomplices trekked from Boya at night and by first light had reached the high ground where they spend the day in rest. The objective was a post of North Waziristan Militia at Tut Narai which is located at the track junction of Datta Khel and Boya. The surroundings are green and provide ample space for hiding even for days but Musa Khan had a novel idea, he discarded the concept of getting few rifles and ammunition by ambush, he was determined to pull the biggest heist of the area. He planned to enter the post, his colleagues kept quite after his stunt at Boya there was hardly any objection to his methods. Musa Khan was an expert in making disguises, he had shot the sepoy at Boya in the disguise of a shepherd looking after his flock and now he masquerade two of his companion as a women wearing black gown.

The attack was timed during a holiday, knowing that every one but the quarter guard would be off duty, their rifles locked in the kote, the men busy in their personal administration, no patrol would be out which might discover the gang hiding in nullah and woods. The post sentry Nur Bahadur was bit perplexed to see a family of seven walking with the woman limping, 'what's the matter he asked in his Pashto, the last thing that any Pathan or a sepoy would do is to ignore a women in pain. Musa Khan played with the emotions of the soldier and narrated how his wife who is expecting a baby has fallen from his house roof, his mother is also with him and so are his brothers, can we have some food and water he requested the sentry. After disposing off the sentry the Musa Khan's gang shut the main gate and rushed towards the kote where the lone sentry was

made unconscious by a rifle butt another sentry rushed forward and Musa Khan shot him. Subedar Haibat Khan was at the other end when he heard the shot and thought that today he will put the soldier no matter who he is if it turns out to be an accidental shot. Lance Naik Masti Khan was looking after the communication which was telegraph and pigeons. He saw the action and ran towards the Morse Code when a bullet hit him in the thigh but he managed to pass the signal. Haibat Khan tried to reason with Musa Khan and soon lost temper when Musa tried to lure him into treason ‘ you son of a swine how you even dare to think that Haibat Khan will go against his oath’ . Haibat Khan was lucky to survive despite receiving three bullets. The hostile got away with fifty nine rifles and thousands of rounds of ammunition.

### **Another Siege of MiranShah Fort. 1919**

On February 20<sup>th</sup>, 1919, Amir Habibullah of Afghanistan was slain in his tent near Jalalabad, his third son, Amir Amanullah became the king. On May 3<sup>rd</sup>, an Afghan army occupied the Khyber Pass. On 6<sup>th</sup> May British formally declare war and Third Anglo-Afghan War started. The initial success of the Afghans at Bagh convinced the major Pathan tribes in the Khyber, the Afridis and the Orakzais, that it would be safe to attack the British. The revolt by their kin proved too much for the Khyber Rifles, who deserted or went over to the Afghans and was disbanded on 17<sup>th</sup> May 1919. 14 battalions of Afghan regulars under General (and future king) Nadir Shah advance down the Kaitu Pass with artillery down the Tochi River valley into Waziristan. British weighed their options and decided to cut short their losses. On May 25<sup>th</sup> the commander of the 7<sup>th</sup> (Bannu) Brigade, Brigadier General E.G. Lucas, ordered the North Waziristan Militia to evacuate its forward posts and to consolidate its position

at MiranShah. 'Isolated detachments of North Waziristan Militia were ordered in the Upper Tochi Valley to evacuate their posts and withdrew to administrative border'.<sup>74</sup> Perhaps the stupidest blunder ever made in North West Frontier, wrote one Frontier Soldier in a letter to the editor of The Times.<sup>75</sup>

The Afghan offensive from Khost which commenced on 23<sup>rd</sup> May 1919 was considerably more successful when regulars and tribesmen advancing down the Kaitu Valley enlisted the support of local Wazir sections.<sup>76</sup> North Waziristan Militia had the conviction that if they were attacked by regular troops from Afghanistan, the Army would come for their help. But with the onset of invasion there were no troops to spare; North Waziristan Militia evacuated all posts in the Upper Tochi. From Datta Khel, Tut Narai, Spina Khaisora and Boya to Dardoni. The decision might have been correct militarily but politically it was disastrous and most Militia officers thought it was unwise. The sight of Militia burning their stores and marching out of their posts seemed clear evidence that the British were on the run. On 25<sup>th</sup> May 1919, the posts of Shewa and Spinwam were withdrawn in a very difficult rear-guard action across open country. The troops had hardly left the burning fort of Spinwam when Afghans and Wazirs were in it, only three hundred yards behind them. They were chased by Wazirs all the way back to Idak. The situation was most serious in MiranShah. To support the loyal elements in the garrison there were only two companies of the 1/4 Gurkha who were loyal and dependable. British had promised lucrative rewards for native troops of Militia if they remained loyal.<sup>77</sup>

74 *Timothy Robert passing it on, the Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare 1849 –1947, Thesis submitted for Degree of Doctor of Philosophy King's College University of London, 1995. pp., 167- 170.*

75 *The Times, September 5, 1921, page 9, column 5.*

76 *Passing it on, p -169.*

77 *British Cabinet Papers, War Cabinet No. G.T, 7311, Copy No.31, Letter of Viceroy of India dated 21<sup>st</sup> May 1919.*

27<sup>th</sup> May 1919 was a hot day and Major Scott the commandant hardly had a wink of sleep and it was not because of the hot weather but the fact that since the defection of Khyber Rifles the air within the MiranShah Fort also seems to be infected with the germs of treason. He had a late night meeting with the other three British officers pondering over the course available. It was irony of fate that almost sixty years ago in May 1857 a similar insubordination of sepoys led to a wide spread popular uprising a War of Independence, is the history going to repeat itself here at MiranShah, that was the only topic which occupied not only his but also the minds of fellow British officers. They all were solid in their conviction that MiranShah will be a Lucknow Residency. Not more than hundred yards from the officers mess a heated debate and discussion also went all night long. Jemadar Tarin a Tori Khel Wazir and also the adjutant was quoting from Koran and Hadith to urge his fellow soldiers to rise and kill all the British Officers and then join hands with the Afghans, he was supported by Subedar Paki Jan a Madda Khel Wazir decorated for his bravery. Subedar Major Tor Khan and Subedar Darim Khan listened to all the arguments which more or less now took the shape of a Jirga. Koran says be loyal to your officers was the reply of Tor Khan because to him there was nothing more important and sacred than to honour the words of loyalty given to the British Officers, Darim Khan was also rock solid in his loyalty. By the time the Fajr prayers were called by the maulvi there was no decision. Darim and Tor Khan had reached one conclusion that if the officers are attacked than they will not spare the culprits short of that they will remain neutral.

Major Scott was having a cup of tea in the mess lawn and thinking of his life and where he went wrong in his assessment of native character, he was confident that the troops will remain loyal,

he was considering of ordering a parade and addressing the soldiers. The moment he saw the native adjutant and Tor Khan along with Darim Khan he knew that he is late in making his move and time has come for the last stand. They all saluted to the commandant and then Jemadar Tarin mustered courage and addressed him ‘Sahib you know the situation, it is Jihad a religious war and i cannot serve you anymore and as such i am quitting’.

They (deserters) did not attack the officers and an Orakzai platoon formed a cordon around the officer’s mess to protect it. The Khattaks in the garrison remained loyal, Gurkha held the wall and gates so that the Wazir platoons could not get out. It was almost impossible to separate the loyal Khattaks from the volatile Wazirs and the Afridi and Orakzai of doubtful loyalty. Only eleven Wazirs including Darim Khan and Zari Gul who later became subedars in Tochi Scouts refused to join with their fellow tribesmen and soldiers. British officers were helpless spectators of their world crumbling beneath them but neither hand nor voice was raised against them and they also acted in a mature manner understanding that tribal loyalty and bond is much stronger than the uniform. When the darkness fell on 27<sup>th</sup> May, all the soldiers who wanted to leave were allowed to leave but without weapon; on this they dug a hole through the northern mud wall of the fort and left with their rifles.

There were mass desertions in the South Waziristan Militia also; all in all 1100 deserters took away 1190 rifles and over 700,000 rounds of ammunition. Idak, Dardoni and Jandola were all attacked. Between 9<sup>th</sup> August and 18<sup>th</sup> November, 1919, Mahsud and Wazir raiders committed 182 outrages in adjacent areas of Zhob, Derajat and the Punjab in which they killed 225 inhabitants of the settled area, wounding and kidnapping 400 more.

On 4<sup>th</sup> June 1919 the relief column from Bannu managed to evict Afghan lashkar and Waziri tribesmen from MiranShah and Dardoni. British managed to pull a stunning reversal of fortunes mainly due to their supremacy in air; they struck at Kabul through Handley-Page bomber of Royal Air Force<sup>78</sup>. An armistice went into effect from 3<sup>rd</sup> June 1919 and formal peace treaty was signed on 8<sup>th</sup> August at Rawalpindi.

The British terms of peace were rejected by the Wazirs '*The Viceroy reported on 11<sup>th</sup> November 1919 that the Mahsuds had refused the terms offered to them and that no reply had been received from the Tochi Wazirs...considerable damage has been done by our aircraft...three turbulent sections of Ismail Khel, Machas and Achars had been intentionally and contumaciously absent when the Kazha Madda Khel Jirga presented itself at Datta Khel on 18<sup>th</sup> November...on following day air operations were undertaken enbloc against the villages of Ismail Khel and Zuram Atsar and the desired result achieved.*'<sup>79</sup>

The war was officially over with the Afghanistan but the tribes remain engaged in carrying out costly and lives taking raids and ambushes. Major Scott and North Waziristan Militia conducted several operations in conjunction with regular army to eliminate the menace but it was partial success as there is no such thing as permanent peace in Tochi Valley. British deployed 29,256 combatants with 33,987 non-combatants in support to clear the area and to curb this menace there were six infantry brigades supported by cavalry and artillery brigades apart from Royal Air Force aircraft. Force commander was Major General Skipton Climo. One of the most

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78 *British Cabinet Report, British Empire, No.5 dated 26<sup>th</sup> November 1919. Telegraph of Viceroy of India No. 15710.*

79 *Cabinet Papers, British Empire Report No.5 26<sup>th</sup> November 1919. Serial No.103. Secret.*

serious aspects of the war was the consideration to use chemical gas for elimination of the tribes.<sup>80</sup>

### **Datta Khel**

On 18<sup>th</sup> November 1919 Tochi Valley was reoccupied without resistance by two brigades, the Tochi Column advanced from Dardoni on 13<sup>th</sup> November and reoccupied Datta Khel on 15<sup>th</sup> November 1919 ‘on arrival at Datta Khel column was met by local Wazirs who brought in supplies and apologised for past misdeeds.’<sup>81</sup> It took much more time in South Waziristan and casualties were quite high. On 27<sup>th</sup> July 1921 Tochi Valley was again in forefront when a major skirmish took place in which five soldiers of North Waziristan Militia were wounded.<sup>82</sup> They were ambushed in the Ahmed Khel area close to Boya. The hell broke loose on 11<sup>th</sup> December 1921<sup>83</sup> when over 500 tribesmen attacked the British convoy moving from Datta Khel to Muhammad Khel, North Waziristan Militia was part of this convoy, there were over 70 casualties of army. Deserters of NWM were part of the attacking force but they did not fired upon their old comrades.

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80 *Passing it on*, p-174.

81 *The Times* November 20<sup>th</sup> 1919, Page 12, column 5.

82 *British cabinet Papers, British Empire* No.49 Dated 4<sup>th</sup> August 1921, *Viceroy Telegram* No. 1346.

83 *The Times*, December 15<sup>th</sup> 1921, page 12, column 6.

## TOCHI SCOUTS 1922-1936

On 1<sup>st</sup> March 1922 the nomenclature of North Waziristan Militia was changed into Tochi Scouts. Scouting means spying, watching or observation. It is derived from a Latin word 'auscultare' which means listening.<sup>84</sup> Thus the role changed from an exclusive native population recruited to fight for their own land to one which envisages a higher degree of military competency in conjunction with regular army. In a more analytical manner it also symbolises a better equipment and more rigorous military discipline. This transition was part of an over all reorganisation of complete military system in India. Major Claude Ernest Torin Erskine, D.S.O, M.C, 5/12 FF became the first Commandant of the Tochi Scouts.

The first twenty two years of Militia experience in North Waziristan was a mixed bag of success and limitation. It had been decorated with a Victoria Cross and four Military Crosses, its native officers were praised by the His Majesty for their bravery and influence 'Finally Subedar Major Tor Khan, Sardar Bahadur, this officer has very powerful influence with his corps and his bravery and energy are a byword with all'.<sup>85</sup> Major General O'Donnell the officer who led the military force in North Waziristan in 1916-1917 is attributed with 'in his report... states that great credit is due to the North Waziristan Militia for the dash and spirits they displayed in the action against great odds'.<sup>86</sup> Men like Jemadar Zalim Khan, Jemadar Zarif Khan, Jemadar Pat Khan. Jemadar Mian

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84 *Major Muhammad Nawaz Khan , Militia, Scouts & Rifles an article published in yearly Frontier Corps Magazine Balahaisar 1987, pp-34-37.*

85 *Supplement to the London Gazette 20<sup>th</sup> March 1916, p-3039.*

86 *Ibid.*



Din, Daffadar Darim Khan, Drill Naik Sayad Akhmad, Drill Naik Khan Dais, Sepoy Gulbat, Sepoy Tor Khan, Sepoy Amir Khan and Sepoy ZamirUllah all distinguished themselves in these years by displaying an extra colour of bravery and loyalty. These men did not face the odds of losing life just for the sake of money but for them their personal honour code was much higher than the tribal affiliation. They fought against their own native tribesmen for the very reason that they had taken a pledge at enrolment that they will always give their best when the time will come and they rose to the occasion. These men were led and trained by an excellent outfit of young and mature British officers Captain E. Clement Smith, Captain N.H. Prendergast, Lieutenant Parson and above all Captain Fergusson Davie the first commandant and later Major G.B. Scott stands out for imparting discipline and sound training regime.

Militia was an experiment by itself, it can be compared with the Punjab Irregular Frontier Force for the reason that both were raised from the native tribes however where North Waziristan Militia and South Waziristan Militia differs from other similar organisation is in the nature of the recruits inducted and in the topography of the area of responsibility. North Waziristan as a result of Durand Line had divided the major tribe the Wazirs into two separate countries. Their way of life was altered and it was expected that they will act and behave in a manner similar to the tribes living in Scotland but North Waziristan is not like Scotland or for that matter no place on this earth can be compared to it and the men who inhabit it. There were incidents in almost all the militias in which the soldiers shot their officers,<sup>87</sup> North Waziristan was no exception and its Commandant Captain Keene was also one of them although he survived in the end. The reasons are varied and even after hundred years nothing

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87 *Frontier Scouts*, p-21.

solid can be said with confidence about those incidents. Unlike the other Indian mutinies which took place not only in native but also in British regiments since 1800 the paramount reason was always money (batta allowance) however in North Waziristan Militia it was never the monetary factor but the tribal traditions were the key factor, even more important was the ego of the individual soldiers which remained individualistic in nature despite the hard training regime.

1922 was a check point for the British in India and more importantly in North Waziristan the worst was over a peace treaty with Afghanistan had been reached yet North Waziristan remain volatile, the experience of 1919 when mass defection took place among the Wazirs had raise the very question about the utility of these militias, the obvious answer was in having more British officers in the Militia thus they were reincarnated as Tochi Scouts. The Afghan War was the test of leadership and the honour code of men, in the end Khyber Rifles was disbanded because of mass defection among the men similar occurrence took place in NWM but Subedar Darim Khan saved the honour of his qaum by steadfast with his pledge of loyalty to his officers. The remarks of Commissioner Merck proved prophetically true when he wrote as an observation on the class composition of NWM by highlighting that Wazir will stand by his Qaum and not with militia thus there should be balance among the tribes recruited in militia. Hard fact was and still is that the Wazir tribe as whole is spread on both sides of Durand Line there fore there was little to stop a Wazir in the militia not to help his blood mate living in Khost. On the other hand same feeling were not shared by the other Pathan tribes who had no reason to help a tribe with whom his own tribe is not enjoying cordial relations thus it was a primitive state of loyalty. The officers

were not at fault because it was something that has been taking place since the early days of history.

North Waziristan Militia was raised, organised, commanded with an aim that that the regular Indian Army will come to the rescue in case of an attack across Durand Line and these reinforcement forces in the form of Indian regular army units were stationed in the area at Mir Ali, Idak, Ladha and Bannu but despite all this firepower the notion of victory remained with the Afghans and Wazirs, reinforcement remained a fallacy.

In August 1921 amidst the debate to disband the militia Captain F.S.G. Campbell a Scott and Commandant North Waziristan Militia wrote a paper to the political authorities

*‘effective occupation of the Upper Tochi is essential as this alone will enable the political agent to exercise such control over the Wazirs as to ensure a minimum of raiding in the settled districts of the province...thus roughly speaking the problem here is the garrisoning of a stretch of country from Miran Shah to Datta Khel or preferably Sheranni, say 30 miles, partly in and partly surrounded by virile, lawless, reckless, well armed and very poor, though not, in ordinary times very hostile Wazirs. In the Thal-Idak tract the same problem arises regarding the line of 40 Miles all in Wazir country but in a sparsely populated area in the winter and almost deserted in the summer’.*<sup>88</sup>

In the areas mentioned by Captain Campbell the requirement to have a force strong enough to camp out for two to three nights at a moment’s notice in order to intercept a raiding tribe was

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88 Copy of letter send by Commandant North Waziristan Militia to Political Agent, the file number is missing, North Waziristan Agency Archives. Miran Shah.

paramount. The memory of 27<sup>th</sup> May 1919 when the Wazirs of the North Waziristan Militia mutinied and ran away to join the intruding fellow tribesmen thus brought forward the inherent risks of having trans frontier recruits and sepoys in the militia. The Political Agent did not agreed with the instincts of the Militia and strongly favoured raising of another company of Wazirs; the commandant was of the opinion that the composition should have more recruits from the tribes that are more settled on the eastern side of Durand Line. The Political Agent was Mr Cunningham who later became the governor of NWFP. He was an intellectual person and as such took the events of 1919 as part of the game and believed that by not trusting the Wazirs the matter will become even worse.

North Waziristan Militia at that time had a strength of 1600 which was deployed in two wings; Wing A responsible for Datta Khel with 200 men, Spin Khaisora 60 men, Tut Narai 60, Boya 50. Headquarters at Miran Shah was looking after the Ahmed Khel 30 men, Towers between mile stones 23-30 employed further 170 men, these towers were small piquet on Miran Shah – Idak Road, Thal with 40 men and Idak with 50 men where as the Wing B was responsible for Spinwam and sinews with 300 men. That was the operational deployment of the North Waziristan Militia in August 1921. This deployment left very little manpower for training ‘this is too large a percentage of the total strength to be on command to enable a practical system of training to be carried out.’<sup>89</sup> Captain Campbell suggested to organise the occupation of the above mentioned posts on the basis of groups which he named as Group A & B, where as each group to be relieved after a period of nine months but with a condition that the towers on Idak-Miran Shah Road be taken over by regular troops thus relieving 170 men.

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89 *Ibid.*

Between 6<sup>th</sup> January-24<sup>th</sup> January 1922, a high-level meeting was held at Delhi over the future of Waziristan. There were many options on this issue, the first one was to vacate the whole of the country as it has become ungovernable due to the militant Wazirs who now have Martini smooth bore rifles in their possession and further more have adapted themselves well in the art of mountain warfare the military cost of evacuation amounted to almost 154 lakhs of Rupees which was equivalent to the amount sanctioned by the council for the Waziristan in 1921, another factor was loosing face among the tribes and that would benefit only the Amir of Afghanistan 'Afghan agitators will loose no opportunity of telling the other tribes that Afghanistan has forced the British to evacuate Waziristan.'<sup>90</sup>

The second option was to keep the regular force in close military districts like Bannu, Kohat and Dera Ismail Khan ready to carry out punitive action against the hostile Wazirs it was fundamentally reverting to the 1890 position.

Third option was to maintain a larger regular force at key points within the Waziristan and there by intimidating the tribes, another option was to have an enhanced local force comprising of Militia, Scouts and raising of Khassadar force. In the end a compromise was reached in which military occupation of Razmak and enhancement of troops including Royal Air Force at Miran Shah along with regular army units at MirAli was reached. Resultantly the meeting agreed to increase the strength of North Waziristan Militia by 500 men and to make it a scout organisation rather than a militia the key difference in this change of nomenclature was the tacit approval of Captain Campbell's arguments to have a force comprising of

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<sup>90</sup> *Report of Committee assembled to consider the situation arising out the order in Council, dated 6<sup>th</sup> January 1922 which limited expenditure on Waziristan in 1922-23 to rupees 154 Lakhs. Copy No 23. Political Agent's Archive, Miran Shah.*

tribes other than purely relying on the local tribes which was the casus belli of North Waziristan Militia. Amount was sanctioned for the construction of a new cantonment at Razmak; Razmak was primarily selected for its close vicinity to heartland of Mahsud Tribe at Makin. To link it with Bannu a road was approved from Bannu -Idak-Isha and Razmak. Tochi Scouts was given the responsibility of keeping the lines of communication open, to inflict military fury at the insubordinate tribes, thus a three tier organisation emerged in the Tochi Valley, the Khassadar took over the role which North Waziristan Militia were performing earlier and Tochi Scouts became a potent force in the area to resolve all the issues less asking army to intervene. Khassadars were not government employees rather they were the persons nominated by the tribal Jirga to carry out police duties in their area of responsibility on behalf of the tribe. A Khassadar required a rifle and fifty rounds to produce at his own for enlistment; subsequent replenishment of rounds expended in conduct of duty was replaced or provided by the political agent at reduced rates. The political agent paid the amount (pay) not to the Khassadar but to the tribe. Any crime occurring within Khassadar's jurisdiction was payable by a fine paid collectively by the tribe.

During the campaigns in South Waziristan, Tochi Scouts was part of 7<sup>th</sup> Indian Infantry Brigade. During the period January 1922-April 1923 the focus was at Wana where the garrison was withdrawing and Mahsud taking opportunity of the moment kept their psychological pressure on the British. Tochi Scouts efforts were approved by the King and Major Claude Ernest Torin Erskine M.C., was awarded the Distinguished Service Order and Lieutenant Lance Mount Barlow was awarded Military Cross.<sup>91</sup> Names of Captain Rose Hurst M.C., Sepoy Ali Mast and Sepoy Ali Zar were mentioned in despatches.

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91 *The London Gazette*, 30<sup>th</sup> May 1924, p- 4305.

## Tribal Warfare

In 1924 a paper/pamphlet was issued as part of tribal warfare training, it hold true for the regular army and also for the Tochi Scouts. The observations were a result of years suffering; it was good enough at that era and is valid even today.

*The physique , powers of endurance and experience gained by the Mahsud and Wazir in years of incessant raiding made him a formidable enemy in his own hills, and there are quite 3,000-4,000 of them who have served in the militia or regular army and have an intimate knowledge of our habits and tactics...it is almost impossible to outflank him or cut off his rear...when troops commence to retire , it is astonishing how numbers of enemy will appear in places which had seemed to be deserted and the rearguard will be harried in the most determined manner; every opportunity which occurs of cutting off small parties will at once be seized...Mahsud and Wazir is an expert at attacking convoys or small detachments and is assisted by the nature of his country , the ravines being narrow and winding while the hillsides in the western tracts are often thickly covered with bushes. He attacks systematically with special parties told off for specific duties, such as the neutralization of adjacent piquet by fire, supports to his advanced parties of swordsmen, etc... ambushes may sometimes open by a few shots from one side of the nullah, untrained troops rush to cover on the side from which fire comes, this is what is waited for; heavy accurate fire from the other bank then finishes the party. Against troops proceeding to take up position the usual plan is to ambush the leading party of the advanced guard, firing a volley and charging immediately. Knives are used to cut free rifles and equipment and the tribesmen make off in the inevitable confusion before a counter attack can be organized... do not let a*

*man approach you scratching his stomach, he is looking for his knife, hit him on the elbow with a stick and he will drop it... avoid shaking hands with strange Pathan they will seize with their left hand and stab with their right on occasions...Mahsuds or Wazirs brought to bay always fight desperately should a party be surprised completely without hope of escape, an immediate and determined counter attack must be expected.*<sup>92</sup>

### **Tochi Scouts; Organisation & Deployment**

In June 1922 the strength of Tochi Scouts was 100 mounted infantry and 1415 infantry, in July 1922 it was increased to 150 mounted infantry and 1933 infantry and finally in October 1922 it was 150 mounted infantry and 2153 infantry men. There were 16 British Officers and 66 native officers apart from the soldiers mentioned above which formed Tochi Scouts.

The reorganized Tochi Scouts had its headquarters at MiranShah along with a troop of mounted infantry which acted as the commandant's personal force. One wing, A Wing with its headquarters and 10 infantry platoons was also stationed at MiranShah. Four Platoons of Infantry at Datta Khel, Boya had two infantry platoons; Mir Ali had two infantry platoons and one troop of mounted infantry. The other wing the B Wing was placed at Khajauri where it had not only the headquarters but also nine infantry platoons, Spinwam had seven infantry platoons, three infantry platoons were placed at Shewa and two infantry platoons were stationed at Razmak.

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<sup>92</sup> *Frontier scouts, extracts from an army pamphlet produced by HQ Waziristan district, 1924. P-48*



New posts were also constructed keeping in view the construction of new Bannu- Razmak road popularly known as Central Waziristan Road, Dosalli was one of these posts and later the B Wing was moved there. The present day Khajauri Fort was built in 1946 although its blue prints were completed in 1940.

### **Machine Gun Company**

Each wing had three companies and each company having three platoons there was one headquarters company and one Machine Gun Company which remained under control of commandant. Machine guns at posts were normally for defensive action and they were to fire only from the parapet of the posts, they were not to be taken out of the posts for action against an enemy except by orders of a British officer. The reason was that Tochi Scouts machine gunners were not taught tactical handling of indirect and overhead fire. They were however master in mounting gun for action fire and maintain it in action. It was stressed that post commanders must look upon machine guns as a reserve of fire power in his hand and should only use this fire power when the rifle fire power is not sufficient or effective. A machine gun team usually consisted of a gun commander and three other ranks but even at times two were also sufficient. On alarm at the post one machine gun complete and ready paraded with the post reserves platoon. One gun complete comprised of one gun with tripod, six belts in boxes with rounds and one tin of water for cooling, one condenser tube and bag, one spare parts box, one cleaning rod and one belt box carrier. The machine gun crew were given extensive training and not more than eight men were paraded with one gun. During training only dummy rounds were used and live ammunition was not even allowed to be taken on the training ground.

## **Tochi Scouts, Living & Training Pattern.**

Native officers were initially on a year's probationary period extendable on the recommendation of commandant, who could also reduce an Indian officer in his grade as punishment. The basic brick of Tochi Scouts was the platoon commanded by Jemadar, Subedars were utilised as post commanders and also to look after the interest of their class in terms of pay, enlistment and promotion. Jemadars at times were Indian where as subedars were pure native, collectively both were known as Indian Officers, they were allowed orderlies who must have minimum of four years of service and must not be a third class shot, only in exceptional cases near relatives with less than four years of service were allowed to act as orderly. These orderlies were not excused duties and parades however they were spared from gasht in which their officers were taking part.

A bad native officer can ruin his own company and half the Tochi Scouts by his bad example and likely to be a mischief ring leader was a common and guiding principal for the induction and subsequent promotion of natives. Thus men were selected who belong to good family and had a standing in their own class.

Non Commissioned Officers (NCO). They were wholly under the commandant's will and desire for promotion and appointment, the promotion up to the rank of Indian Officer within the Tochi Scouts was based upon seniority but commandants seldom promoted a person whose efficiency was below average a third class shot's promotion was an extreme exception. Promotion was on the basis of class and not by companies or platoons; all the men of one class were on one roll for promotion irrespective of companies or platoons which they were serving. Promotion examination were held regularly and had to be cleared before promotion.

NCO's had certain appointments like Pay Havildar who was the confidential vernacular clerk of the company commander, all men appointed pay havildars had to produce a security of 500 Rupees verified by his deputy commissioner or political agent, men serving in the Tochi Scouts were not accepted as security. An allowance carried with the appointment. He was responsible for daily orders, cash transaction book, auctions, custody of kits, numbering of uniforms, discharged men's account and His Majesty's accounts. There was a junior pay havildar as well who was responsible for morning report, vernacular rifle register, company rifle kote book, medal roll and messing account.

Tochi Scouts adopted its own way of life which was independent and clear of the regular army bureaucratic system. The first and fundamental step was to recruit a proper scout thus in 1922 the induction of bad class, wrong class and religious class were sternly discouraged to an extent that all those who were even recruited before this but now termed under these classes were released from the Tochi Scouts and those who had served for a period were restricted for promotion up till only havildars. A sound policy of recruitment was the fundamental and keystone. It was debarred to have recruits from low classes that include washer man, sweepers and fiddlers although they were recruited but not as soldiers. The emphasis was on having Pathans who have share in village lands. The theory behind this was the concept of a martial race, men who have for generations been accustomed to be cuffed and kicked by any particular class will not be willingly face them,

*'if you begin with this class of men they would rise to the rank and command, and your corps will be shunned by well bred young men who will look on themselves as disgraced by being ordered here*

*and there by those whom they have been accustomed to regard as menial... it is difficult for any European officer no matter of what experience to pick out the exact caste of the recruit...it is almost impossible for a recruit to deceive a native of his own faith...never allow your self to be talked out of your own judgement of a recruit...if you take one indifferent man a dozen others are sure to be smuggled in and the general appearance of your regiment will suffer’.*<sup>93</sup>

A sepoy was enlisted for three years after which he was free to leave or keep on serving as long as he desires. The composition of the platoons and companies were based upon the class (qaum). Marksman ship was strongly patronised and no class three shot the lowest standard was eligible for promotion. British officers had to pass a basic test of Pashto within three months before they were entitled for leave. Durbar was held on every Wednesday in which all the larger matters that affect the Corps and all subjects of general interest discussed, Commandant would address in Pashto. All enlistments and discharges required Commandant's approval less that of followers; similarly all promotions were his discretion other than promotion to and in the commissioned ranks of Indian officers which were made by Chief Commissioner on the recommendations of Inspecting Officer Frontier Corps which was raised in 1907 at Peshawar. Powers of Commandant were defined in the Constabulary Act of 1915 which was extended to Frontier Corps in 1925. Commandant, Tochi Scouts delegated certain of his powers to substantive Wing Commanders and post commanders, the power to give 28 days rigorous imprisonment, deprivation of Lance Stripes or forfeiture of three months Tochi Allowance. Tochi Scouts standing orders required that all cases or men transferred to Miran Shah for settlement should be accompanied by the evidence and no

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<sup>93</sup> Directive as part of Tochi Scouts recruitment Policy dated 22<sup>nd</sup> September 1925.

man placed in arrest may be released even by British Officer without the permission of Commandant to ensure uniformity, all cases were handled by the British officers when putting up to the commandant.

Discipline was strict in Tochi Scouts, sepoys were bound to have haircut in accordance with their custom and Indian Officers were responsible for ensuring this. Gambling and lending money among sepoys was prohibited so was shukrana which was normally given by the prisoners to the Havilat Guard on release, no Fakira or religious mendicant of any sort was allowed inside the post day or night neither they were allowed to accompany the parties on tour. No regular man was to be appointed as mullah during Ramadan at the post or at any other times yet religious liberties were fully given but no mosque was to be built at the post or at any other place without prior permission.<sup>94</sup> Same holds true for entertainment which was termed as 'Tamasha' however permission was granted if applied through the subedar major. Any sepoy or man wishing to have a guest was bound to report in MiranShah to the subedar major and at post to the senior Indian officer. No guest was allowed to stay for more than three nights, particulars like the name of guest and his father name, tribe sub section, village and name of Malik and finally the name of man responsible for the guest had to be furnished. The number of guests at Miran Shah was limited to four per company or total not exceeding twenty, in posts not more than three. The rifles of guests were lodged at the quarter guard. No Malik or civilian was allowed to enter into the posts unless accompanied by a civil orderly or accredited Khassadar, in case if the Naib Tehsildar requires more than five men at a time inside the post then prior permission of the post commander was required, similarly without the express permission of political agent not more than five tribesmen were

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<sup>94</sup> *Tochi Scouts Standing Orders 1922, these orders remained valid till 1929. (fakira is a religious person)*

allowed to be admitted into any fort or post and they have to be without arms and that includes daggers also. It was forbidden for the tribesmen to carry firearms within 1000 yards of the posts. Tochi Scouts were repeatedly told not to pluck fruit from the trees and neither were they allowed entering the villages except with the permission of British Officers and it was sparingly given. Loss of rifle or its being stolen had a fine of 1000 Rupees; loss of bolt carried a fine of 600 Rupees and loss of revolver a 400 Rupees fine. The fine was not liable to remission even if the weapon is found later. The fine was collected from the class as a whole present on the sheet roll. A subedar had six shares of fine, jemadar four, havildar three, naik two and sepoy & lance naik one.<sup>95</sup>

Armed party of Tochi Scouts proceeding to Datta Khel, Boya or Spinwam posts were usually in strength of 25 rifles with an escort of another 25. There were two medals in Tochi Scouts one was long service and other good conduct both these were awarded annually and only havildars were eligible for these.

### **Scout Serai MiranShah**

No scout under three years of service was encouraged to get married; the usual Riwaj of the area is to get married at early age. Scouts under three years of service were not given any accommodation in married Serai. There was a Scout Serai in the MiranShah where family or married men were allowed to keep their families. This serai had its own rules for living, it was Corps property and a rent was charged for its quarters and bill credited to Serai Fund, sweepers and bahishtis were provided for the serai out of this fund it was administered by the quartermaster. The Mullah of the corps was exempted from the rent. The normal period of stay in

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95 *Ibid*

the serai was restricted to six months. There was a strict rule which forbid two families occupying one quarter either single or double. In 1923 soon, after the raising of the Tochi Scouts there erupted a minor issue which by itself is of very trivial nature when seen from present perspective but it throws light on the working of the agency. MiranShah had a water shortage and by 1922 it was not fully resolved, the main components in the Bazar were the Civil Serai, Tochi Serai, General Hospital and few shops which were dependent upon the water supply apart from civil garden. On 23<sup>rd</sup> May 1926 an application was given to the political agent by a native named Shah Jahan who requested and brought into the notice that the Scouts have put up an one inch water valve on the main water supply connection resultantly the supply of water has diminished in civil serai which is causing a lot of difficulties to the women folk. Within six month this simple letter resulted in a full file with correspondence between the Tochi Scouts, Political Agent, Garrison Engineers Razmak and finally Bannu also.<sup>96</sup> Sketches of the bazar were made which incidentally is the only sketch of the Miran Shah Bazar of 1923 and by itself is a historical sketch now. In the end a new well was dug to furnish more water to the bazar. Just for the record in August 1936 there were 32 scouts who were residing with their wives who also numbered 32 having 55 children, in September the strength decreased to 27 males and 30 females with 42 children and in October the strength was 22 males, 27 females and 40 children and in November it rose to 31 males, 36 females and 51 children where as in January 1938 the strength was mere 13 males and 14 females having 18 children.<sup>97</sup>

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96 *Political Agent NWA record 1933.*

97 *Ibid*

## 1930 Census

In 1930 a census was conducted on all India basis in which Tochi Scouts also participated by carrying out the census duties, mostly the Hindu Clerks were employed in this regard however as a result the population of the Miran Shah Fort in 1930 was 1206 scouts with one female, at Boya 64, at Datta Khel 209, Dosalli 365, Khajauri 180, Mir Ali 62 and Spinwam had 190 Scouts, thus over all strength of Tochi Scouts was 2361 out of which 2360 were male, the lone female employee was a Hindu sweepress. RAF had strength of 66 at MiranShah. The civil population of MiranShah numbered 21239 males and 130 females, Razmak had a population of 8273, and Idak had 1237.<sup>98</sup>

## Holidays<sup>99</sup>

There were three types of holidays in Tochi Scouts which correspondingly relates to three religion, Islam, Christianity and Hinduism. Although there were no fighting manpower other than the native Muslims but all the clerks and contractors were Hindus. Even among the tribes in the villages there was always one Hindu employed collectively who was responsible for all written work of the tribe which included writing and preserving pacts and petitions. The tribes always regarded education as a menial task. There were five occasions which were declared as parade holidays it included one day for Shab-i-Barat, two days for Id-ul-Fitr& Id-ul-Zuha and also two days for Muharram and one day for Bara Wafat; on these days the office took place thus other than Muslims every one else worked. The office holidays were one day each for Basant Punchami, Shiv Ratri, Holi, Janamashtmi, Dewali, Solona and two

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<sup>98</sup> *The data on female is highly incorrect as natives never gave the number of females present in a house.*

<sup>99</sup> *Standing Orders 1922.*



days for Bisakhi and three days for Dussehra; on these holidays only one clerk was supposed to be in the offices. The general holidays were Sunday, New Year Day, Christmas Day, Good Friday, King's Birthday, Armistice Day (11<sup>th</sup> November) and Empire Day which was 23<sup>rd</sup> May.

### **Uniform & Liveries**

The dress regulations of 1922 specified that uniforms will only be issued in the presence of company and platoon commanders and they are responsible for its fitting. The basic dress item was kurta having two categories the sepoy had different pattern and recruits had different. A sepoy kurta was to be fitted over a cardigan or waistcoat and length to extend from 1 inch to one and half inch below the tips of the fingers when the belt is worn, Neck band should admit of two fingers being easily increased was another requirement, sleeves to extend to midway between the wrist joint and the upper joint of the thumb, button pleat in front of kurta to extend to the belt buckle the lower extremity being covered and hidden by the belt buckle. The recruit was same in all respect other than that the button pleat was eleven and half inches long but not extending to the belt buckle. One very key drastic item was the shorts which ordinarily are against the Riway of the area. Its height was four fingers above thigh bone to the top of the knee cap. Woollen socks were an option for guard duty between retreat and reveille other than this if a man wishes to wear them on parade then they must be covered under a leather sock. In 1846 when the very first Baluch regiments were raised the soldiers were allowed to wear the native dress code of kurta and pyjama with cap, shorts were not introduced then but by 1890s they gained popularity because of hot weather climate still it took some time for the recruits of Waziristan to adjust to shorts.

Headgear is of paramount importance and has cultural value also thus in Tochi Scouts the Shamla of the puggri in the infantry was nine inches long where as in mounted infantry the Shamla was to fall to one hands breadth above the belt and fall in line in the centre of the neck. Pantaloon were to fit four fingers above thigh bone and overlap at the knee at least four fingers. Mounted Infantry had a different dress their coats were supposed to fit over a cardigan waist coat the length to extend to the knee cap when belt was worn, further more it was to split down the front and buttoned with five buttons similarly it was to split in the back from waist downwards and to over flap and finally it was to be fully shirted from the waist downwards, the other specification remained the same as in sepoy kurta.

The dress of the Indian officers specified that the tunic should not reach lower than the tips of the fingers. The instructions specified that this measurement should be taken without belt; gold fringes were to be worn with the dress except when on gasht. Between 15<sup>th</sup> of April and 15<sup>th</sup> October every year a twill shirt with badges of rank, breast pockets and no medal was worn.

Medals were worn by both British and Indian Officers only when ordered however the ribbons were worn when bandolier was not worn.

On enlistment every sepoy was granted a sum of money to cover the initial issue of kit and if he serves for three years the kit belongs to him otherwise he had to refund the balance amount in cash which was 1/36<sup>th</sup> of the initial grant for every month of service short of three years, the deserters debits were collected collectively from the qaum or the class. Sepoys were not allowed more than two paggari

and two pairs of chapli a year debit able to their half-mounting amount. All kits were numbered, the mosquito kits were also issued to each recruit at reduced rates but subsequent renewals at full cost. Clothing was issued only once a week. Patients in hospital were issued with dressing gown but only for going to the latrines and not to be worn in bed.

### **Religion & Prejudice**

Tochi Scouts had three major religious groups within its payroll namely Islam, Christianity and Hinduism. Within Islam the two major sects Sunni and Shias were represented. In North Waziristan almost all the Wazirs are from Sunni Sect and Shias are from other tribes namely Bansash, Turi and Orakzai. It was a very delicate matter as any wrong step, word, gesture on part of any one especially the officer was bound to ignite an explosion of unprecedented magnitude. The official policy of the Tochi Scouts Commandants was ‘never to allow even for a minute any religious discussions not even among European officers and the men, former are not here for missionary’s purposes’<sup>100</sup>. MiranShah did not have any church rather a room was utilised for this purpose but in a discreet manner, the nearest Church was in Bannu. Wearing of cross was not a favourable item. For the commandants the issue was of dealing with their fellow religious men, where as the Muslims were allowed the full freedom of practice the same was not the case with Christianity. The peculiar and fanatic zealots of the Muslims and the tribesmen was the reason for this, during Ramadan the Officers Mess was not allowed to serve lunch openly and officers were advised not to smoke openly or in front of men in this month. To curb sectarianism among the Muslims it was not allowed to have mosques in the barracks and neither any monetary assistance was granted for any religious

rituals. The Commandant and all officers used to attend the religious celebrations of Muslims & Hindus. Hindus were also advised not to openly display any idol images. Pig meat was not allowed in the MiranShah and the ladies which started visiting the Fort were strictly advised not to wear any dress which may be termed provocative to the customs. The bitter experience of 1857 was always kept in mind by the officers and it goes to their credit that no religious uprising took place due to their conduct in Tochi Scouts or for that matter in North Waziristan Militia.

### **Post & Piquet**

By mid twenties the Posts have become an institution and a great care and money was spent on the maintenance and upkeep of them. They evolved a life pattern of their own because Scouts would practically remain confined for weeks. These posts were at key points, some of the old posts were handed over to the Khassadars and few new ones were being either taken from army or constructed as a result of Third Afghan War. Throughout the period the posts were either handed over to the Khassadars or taken over from army, at times the posts which had been handed over to the Khassadars were again ordered to be taken over by Tochi Scouts, Boya is a classic example, it was taken over from army in 1905 and then handed over to Khassadars in 1927 and again taken over in 1930.

Posts for all practical purposes were independent to carry out their routine life. They in a broad term can be classified as either big enough to have water source of their own or being dependent on an out side water source. These posts were constructed in a systematic manner, first a camp was established with well dug tents and bunkers a mud wall around the camp coupled with barbed wire and later construction of forts started and when they were completed only

then the camps were demolished. For instance at Musa Khan Post Scouts had to go down the hill daily to fetch and use water. Donkeys were purchased and issued for the water carrying purpose. Thus a team would descend down with Scouts at post providing protection; an emergency stock of water was always kept at the post. Ration and fire wood was also kept in reserve, in short every post was designed and supposed to hold at its own for at least a month in terms of ration and ammunition , water was the only Gordon's Knott. It was catered in the organisation to have a cook at each post; the number of cooks as such were in excess of thirty five.

Machine Guns at Posts were considered as a defensive weapon and only to be fired from parapet of the posts on the orders of British Officers, they were not allowed to be taken out of the posts. The posts were a complex of defensive fortification each supporting by fire to other in case of an attack. For instance Boya became the hub with Musa Khan Post in North across the Tochi River at a high ground and Pawani in East again on a high ground forming a complex. The men would rotate in these three posts. The Boya itself was much bigger in size and therefor acted as a base, almost the same pattern is still retained and time has lost its meaning at Boya. The troops at posts had their own life pattern, own jokes, own stories, watching, guarding and living in a confined space for weeks. Every post had a commander and that is why initially the numbers of havildars were increased in North Waziristan Militia for this very purpose. Telegraph and line communication was established but it was unreliable and always prone to cutting and sabotage thus mirror signalling and importantly pigeons were bred and trained. Even today there is almost a squadron of pigeons at Boya. Officially the pigeons have been discarded in favour of modern and more reliable means of communication but the pigeons of Boya still fly

every day, they are looked after by the scouts more as affection and pets. Keeping of pets at posts was a favourite past time, due to the paucity of space coupled with hygienic constraints only birds were kept; partridge and Chikoor became almost an obsession. They were captured from the high hills and would move from post to post with the individual scout; almost like a family. Goats were not allowed to be kept inside the posts for obvious reasons and neither the donkey. Not much of literary or art work has been produced or created at the posts one reason being the illiteracy of the scouts and secondly poetry and other forms of art were not considered as manly. Ration was in abundance at the posts, the posts commanders at their own although never allowed officially indulged themselves in a kind of barter trade, exchanging certain items of rations for certain goods or edibles from natives. Every post had a Union Jack flying and a picture of the King; fortunately during entire period of British governance in the North Waziristan it was always His Majesty and not Her Majesty. One wonders what would have been the reaction of the Scouts in case of a woman being the head of state.

### **Datta Khel.**

Probably one of the most famous and notorious name in the Frontier Warfare, it has been immortalised by Major William Brown of Gilgit Scouts who had a brief attachment with Tochi Scouts in 1940's by naming the operation for the overthrow of the Dogra regime at Gilgit and the subsequent affiliation of the agency with Pakistan in November 1947 as Operation Datta Khel.<sup>101</sup>

*'It was difficult to fill in the time and boredom hung heavily on my soul, we continued to carry out a weekly gasht on foot over the steep hills but we encountered no hostile tribesmen. We played football on*

101 Major William Brown, *the Gilgit Rebellion, (Ibex, Rawalpindi, 1998) pp., 99-122.*

*the level stony waste outside the fort. It was terribly hard falling and I bear the scars to this day. From the fort I spent hours watching the changing light and colours on the hills in the distance... we played peculiarly rough kind of basketball, there was none of your sequel and pass, you grappled with the man who had the ball to make him surrender it. Sometimes the Pathan officers used to invite me down to wonderful feasts of mutton pilau and thick fat whole meal bread served piping hot. We finished off the feast with green tea ...this spiced with white cardamom makes a wonderful carminative after a full feast'.<sup>102</sup>* These were the feelings of Captain Prendergast about his stay at Datta Khel. This farthest post of the British Empire had an all rank swimming pool a remarkable fruit and vegetable garden and it became a resting point for the migratory birds, some not even seen in India.

Datta Khel was not all that cake and cardamom, it came under attack in May 1930 when the Madda Khel attacked it, it was only with the help of RAF that the situation was brought under control.<sup>103</sup> On 11<sup>th</sup> May 1930 a strong Wazir lashkar of some 400 tribesmen attacked the Tochi Scouts, one Scout was killed due to sniping. The attack was in retaliation to the on-going armed conflict between Haji of Turangzai and the British Army in Mohmand Agency. ‘Royal Air Force attacked the lashkar but desultory firing on the post continued during the night of 11<sup>th</sup>. On the 12<sup>th</sup> the lashkar was reported to be dispersing and therefore no further action took place. On the night of the 12<sup>th</sup> however Datta Khel Post was again attacked and air action was again necessary on May 13<sup>th</sup>’.<sup>104</sup> This gives some insight to the way these tribes conduct warfare. To them war was nothing but deception. This skirmish was part of over all political

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<sup>102</sup> *The Frontier Scouts*, p-96.

<sup>103</sup> *Times of London*, 29<sup>th</sup> May 1930, Page 16 Coloumn 4.

<sup>104</sup> *The Times*, May 15<sup>th</sup> 1930, Page 10, Coloumn 4.

disturbance in the province in which Red Shirts were openly defying the authorities. The clan link of being Wazir was the reason of attack on Datta Khel.

## **Razmak**

Tochi Scouts had been in Razmak since 1924. Captain Victor Wainwright took over the Tochi Scouts Post in 1935, *'This was a tented camp for four or five platoons on the banks of the algal running from the Sui Dar to Razmak camp proper. It was there to try to prevent the constant bickering between the Abdullai Mahsuds and the Tori Khel Wazirs about the grazing around the algal. Mir Hamza a Jowaki Afridi (son of Subedar Major Tor Khan) was the senior subedar... his immediate reaction to any trouble was to rush at it bull-necked. He was quite alarmingly out spoken and the greatest fun...his best friend an another Subedar Kabul Khan an Aka Khel Afridi of much the same age and seniority, Kabul was more intelligent and given to thinking a little longer...they would behave like mischievous prep-school boys playing practical jokes with the object of making their victim late for parade...they would then have mock quarrels among themselves'*.<sup>105</sup>

Razmak has been termed as Jewel of North Waziristan, known as Little London; it had streets named after the streets in London like Piccadilly and Charing Cross. A cinema hall, a dancing hall and a swimming pool made it a perfect cantonment situated at an elevation of 6666 feet. John Masters a famous English writer was baptised into fire here. Razmak also has a unique distinction of being the first cantonment in North Waziristan where two ladies ventured under a disguise, ladies were not allowed in frontier cantonments, and their footsteps have been preserved. Razmak was not an exclusive Tochi

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<sup>105</sup> *Frontier Scouts*, p-103.



Scouts post or camp rather it was inhabited by a brigade of regular army.

These posts were learning schools for newly posted officers as Victor Wainright learnt later. He went out on a chiga party with the Mir Hamza to quell a fight between the Mahsuds and Wazirs over a grazing misunderstanding and resultantly Victor was invited by the Mahsuds for a deer hunt and food. 'I told the Subedar Sar Gul a Kuki Khel commonly known as Mian Sahib about the invitation... "You will do nothing so foolish" was his reply.

'Subedar Sahib may I remind you that I am commanding'.

" Sahib that is no problem my Kuki Khel platoon will restrain you, I am going on pension in less than a year and I would prefer to risk disciplinary trouble than be derided for the rest of my life as the subedar who let his young officer be had for a mug by Mahsuds"<sup>106</sup>.

### **Royal Air Force at MiranShah**

Almost in the same time period if not in the same month a similar meeting took place in London where the very future of Royal Air Force was hanging in balance as both British Army & Royal Navy took out the knives for either the reversion of this air force to them as it was at the beginning of the First Great War or failing it, to dissolve it. Air Marshall Hugh Trenchard the RAF chief was rescued by the events in Waziristan as he proposed that the RAF can look after the tribal insurgencies in Iraq and Waziristan in a much more economical manner as compared to Army, RAF was given a lease of life. The very first RAF aircraft BE-2 had been employed in December 1915 in the vicinity of Peshawar against tribes. Miran

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<sup>106</sup> *Frontier Scouts*, p-103.

Shah became an active airfield, one of the very first RAF station in Subcontinent. It is worth mentioning that RAF was operating in India more specific in North Western Frontier Province only, Karachi was the sole exception as aircraft had to be unloaded and assembled there at Drigh road a RAF station.

Miran Shah was a small mud fort but after the events of 1919 it was being fortified and now with the advent of RAF the pace of work started increasing. Razmak & MiranShah became the symbol of British military in Waziristan. Tochi Scouts numerically were too large to fit in wholly inside the Fort, thus a serai was established at MiranShah where Scouts family quarters were built, and the rest of the force was billeted inside the Fort. Razmak was completed in 1930.

MiranShah Fort had the landing ground on two directions one facing North and other on a West-East alignment; this was to cater for the landing and taking off for the aircraft which is dependent on wind direction. Hangars were built for the aircraft; a gate was made which remained closed at night but for aircraft operation will be opened and aircraft then taxied to the tarmac. Tochi Scouts had the accommodation on the southern side of the fort. There were only few buildings which were pucca even till 1938. The Fort was also inhabited by the mountain battery which later on came under the Tochi Scouts command.

The life at Miran Shah had it own colour, on 20<sup>th</sup> May 1922 the 101 Grenadiers lost 22 rifles, four pistols and eight thousand rounds of ammunition when its patrolling party was attacked by the tribal<sup>107</sup>, Tochi Scouts were sent in pursuit and after a day's gasht the

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107 *Statement showing the offences committed in Tochi for the month, May 1922-23, PA Miran Shah Archives.*

tribe was identified and from then on wards the political agent took over the affairs and resultantly the tribes deposited back the stolen arms and ammunition, this was the frontier way of working. The washer man of Tochi Scouts also became a victim of tribes when he was robbed of all the washing clothes worth Rs 150.

The population of Tochi valley in 1921 was 1, 44,379 where as in 1911 it was 1, 39, 415.

MiranShah was not considered as a healthy station especially in summers that is one reason that majority of the tribes particularly the Wazirs migrate to highlands. In 1925-26 Tochi Scouts lost eight men due to sickness where as in 1924-25 they had lost 24 men due to malaria, scurvy , dysentery and jaundice the improvement is mainly due to strict observance of anti malarial precaution that included mosquito nets supply and issue on reduce rates and wearing of long sleeves after sun set. A medical catastrophe was averted at Khajauri when Powindahs camped there, Captain Nat Cosby was the commanding officer at Khajauri and he observed these Powindahs digging extensive graves and later it was confirmed that they are suffering from Cholera, the post was drawing water downstream, Nat immediately took actions which included calling the doctor from MiranShah and making sure that the post draws water only from mid stream as the germs of cholera cannot survive in fast stream, there was only one casualty among the Scouts.

MiranShah Fort as it was known and two iron plates are still in use at MiranShah even today which bore the name. The RAF had its own life style; historically RAF never had good relations with the regular army even in Britain. They were more open and had few formalities in either dress or way of working. The initial

period of honeymoon between Tochi Scouts and RAF was marred by indifferent attitude on part of both. Tochi Scouts especially the soldiers never had any interaction with aircraft and for them it was something very supernatural, RAF on the other hand was wary of Scouts handling or even coming near the aircraft. RAF had very little manpower and was dependent upon the Khassadars for guard duties and other administration facilities. RAF had its own officers living quarters and same hold true for the troops, where as in regular army there are always native troops which used to interact with the Scouts the same was not the case with the RAF which had only 30 men at MiranShah and majority were British. One such person was Aircraftman Shah the famous Colonel T.E. Lawrence ‘Lawrence of Arabia’ who came to MiranShah in 1928 ‘the place is so peaceful and quite that at times I doubt that whether I have gone deaf’. Present day Commandant’s residence was RAF officers mess. The cold relations can be gauged from the orders passed to Tochi Scouts in 1927 where the Scouts while on night duty were not allowed to pass through the RAF area and had to take a long detour. ‘RAF had its own compound but there was a short cut between the Scouts and the RAF Officers Mess up an iron ladder over a flat roof and down another ladder’.<sup>108</sup> Lawrence or Shah was a lonely man running from his past and he found an ideal refugee at MiranShah where he can go for long walks, it must be remembered that when Lawrence was at RAF Drigh Road Base Karachi he did not went to the city for almost a year. At MiranShah he spent most of his time typing his book ‘Mint’, he was the only person among RAF who had friendly terms with the Scouts and was keen to learn about the Pathan Tribes, Lawrence had been with the Arab Tribes and as such he found himself back again in friendly environments. There was another Shah at MiranShah a Wazir Naik who was looking after the

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<sup>108</sup> *The Frontier Scouts*, p- 92.

maps in the Headquarters of Tochi Scouts and they both developed a bond based upon mutual respect. They would go out for long walks and exchange views and ideas about life; Naik Shah was having no idea about the fame or past of his companion. He would ask Lawrence about the aircraft, how it flies and so on. Lawrence on the other hand was inquisitive about the tribal system prevailing in the area and how does Shah lives in his home. It was this Wazir Shah who used to give Hashish to Lawrence and no doubt that some of the Mint passages are testimony to that.<sup>109</sup>

### **Chigha, Picquetting & Gasht**

Chigha in classical term stands for a village police which looks after and protects the village at night. In Scouts term it was regarded as a minor party which conducts routine patrolling to probe an incident. The strength of Chigha Party varies with the size of the post. In Tochi Scouts a Chigha Party was bound to carry 70 rounds of small arms along with field service dressing and only 25% of the chaguls to be filled with water. The signallers and stretcher bearers were part of the Chigha they used to carry the bandolier but not the rifles. It was also mandatory to carry the nails for the chaplli. In summer Khaki shorts were worn. There was always a possibility of staying night outside thus blankets were carried when ordered. At MiranShah it was conducted once a week. At posts these Chigha parties formed the reserves of the posts in case of an alarm.

Picquetting or ‘crowning the heights’ was and still is an important feature of frontier warfare rather the whole frontier warfare revolves around it. Scouting is another name of Picquetting and vice versa. The topography of the area and the militant culture is as such that

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<sup>109</sup> *There is an oral tradition in Jani Khel village where the grand son of that Wazir Shah is now serving in Tochi Scouts.*

every hill, every high ground is a potential base for the tribes to inflict heavy casualties on a moving convoy of regular troops through sniping, therefore heights had to be secured before any movement can be undertaken. During Viceroy of India Lord Irwin's tour of Waziristan the Picquetting was done by the Tochi Scouts. Scouts especially in Tochi Scouts were required to take position behind a cover during Picquetting<sup>110</sup> but it was not a permanent policy and depended upon the situation. Scouts were also directed not to stand on the road unnecessarily. The whole point was to ensure a safe passage of the troops; the most difficult part was the withdrawal of Picquetting parties itself which usually took place at evening.

### **Gasht**

Is a collective name for Picquetting and Chigha as both of these derive their strength from Gasht. Tochi Scouts in broad sense is a tribe in North Waziristan raised and funded by the state to protect its interest in the area, which included protection of the tribes loyal to the state. Gasht was thus a display of force and strength for tribes on the side of state for example the Daurs. Gasht was an important feature for the training of new recruits in the art of frontier warfare and for old hands it was polishing of the skills. There were two types of Gasht a normal and other was termed 'Strong as possible Gasht'. In the latter form every one except the sick, weak, langar men, Dums, and Goat Herd man were excused. The sick and weak were required to replace the men on duty who were required to go on a Strong as possible Gasht. The Gasht was not meant to attack any particular village or person rather it was intimidation by the display of force. It may last a day or extend to two or more nights outside the post. The Gasht will march through the area; follow tracks, cross country trekking there by collecting valuable topographical

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110 *Tochi Scouts Standing Orders for Picquetting, 1926.*

information. The usual pace of Gasht was four miles an hour in hilly areas covering twenty miles a day this type of Gasht was known as Star Gasht. Scouts were self contained on a gasht, they would carry pigeons for passing back the message, hand held flags were also used for signalling. A normal gasht was conducted twice a week in peace time. They did not had the heavy weapons rather it was all that can be carried on a person. In a way Gasht was the Scouts replica of tribe's way of warfare, men lightly armed and travelling great distances at astonishing pace. There was always the possibility of a Gasht being ambushed and it did happen in 1930 at Madda Khel.<sup>111</sup> Mounted Infantry had its own Gasht on horses but they usually lasted for a day.

Gasht was an ultimate test of an officer's judgment, he had to make the decision of what kind of an action to take on encountering lone or group of tribesmen, wrong judgments can become a flash point for a war, on the other hand it can also cost him lives of the troops if he is unable to read the situation and the body language of the natives. These Gasht were productive , in one instance Captain Victor Wainright while on a Gasht was presented with a clay bowl full of silver coins which were later testified by the curator of Lahore Museum as coins belonging to White Huns dating back to 300 AD.<sup>112</sup>

In August 1924<sup>113</sup> the first comprehensive policy was issued by the Resident in consultation with Erskine the commandant on the Gasht , the gist of the policy was that carry on gasht as much as possible in all direction, have cordial relations with Khassadars but do not use them as guides unless absolutely necessary . Gashting was done in coordination with the political agent. The tribes were

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111 *The Times*, May 15, 1930, page 10, column 4

112 *Frontier Scouts*, p-113.

113 *Letter of Resident Waziristan*, No. D/14-8-1924, *Tochi Scouts Archives*, MiranShah

adamant that Scouts or the state must pay them a kind of fees for gashting in their area. Political agent through Naib Tehsildars used to inform the maliks about the gasht, its limit; but not the date. Date of gasht was a well kept secret. In lieu the maliks were paid an allowance. Even the Khassadars were not informed about the date of gasht. By end 1924, Tochi Scouts was at freedom to Gasht anywhere less Sherranni (DattaKhel). All gashts did not proceed or ended peacefully. Captain Wiseman was commanding the post at Shewa and he was unable to carry out the gasht on the left bank of Kurram because the political agent regarding the gashts did not inform Miani Kabul Khel. The normal pattern in such cases was the start of a war of attrition between the tribe and the political agent.

In 1927, the restriction of the area<sup>114</sup> was imposed upon the Tochi scouts, they were not allowed to Gasht beyond ZiaratKili and Kazha in Datta Khel, Beyond Hassan Khel Tangi in Spinwam, Lower Khaisora in Khajuri area and beyond Pal Makhand and Goreshta in MiranShah. Gasht from Shewa Post towards the left bank of Kurram River was occasional.

From the available correspondence between the Commandant Tochi Scouts and the Political Agent North Waziristan, an impression arises as all was not well among them on the issue. The issue seems to be the insistence of the political administration on adhering to the laid down procedures, which Scouts seems to be deviating resulting in the tension among the tribes, and the political administration. The limits were the prerogative of the political agent.

*I wish now to open up the area still further and I will lay down no limits whatsoever for Scouts Gashts, in the Spinwam and Shewa areas. That is to say, scouts Gashts from these two places are at liberty*

<sup>114</sup> Letter No. 1124/A , Dated 12- 3- 1927



*to move anywhere in the tribal areas under my political control. The usual instructions to avoid villages etc. should be observed and Gashts should keep away from the Afghan boundary as much as possible. If you wish to send out gashts into any of the tribal areas under political control of the Deputy Commissioner Bannu you will, I presume, consult the latter officer before hand'* signed, Captain C.G.N. Edwards, Political Agent North Waziristan.<sup>115</sup> Tribes were paid by the government for allowing armed forces to enter their country. Tribes were treated like independent sovereign nations and separate treaty and payments had to be made to them in this regard.

In the south, the gashts from Saidgi and Khajuri were allowed to move southwards as far as the left bank of the Khaisora, there was no restriction in moving in northerly direction. Until end May 1927, the Scouts were not allowed to move westward of Hassan KhelTangi. However, after consultation with the Maliks of Titi Khel, Taji Khel, Kabul Khel and Tori Khel the Scouts were allowed to proceed on Gashts. The Scouts were expected to break the ground in a gradual way. The naib tehsildars were informed by the political agent and they in turn coordinated with the Maliks, it was a time consuming process. South Waziristan Scouts were taking Khassadars alongwith them on Gasht but Tochi Scouts were not allowed, reason was valid. Half the value of these patrols depends upon the secrecy of their movements. 'If we warn Khassadars there will probably be no secrecy at all'<sup>116</sup> Lieutenant Colonel G.B. Scott the Inspecting Officer of Frontier Corps also shared the same views.

Strength of the Gasht varied, in one instance when the situation in Spinwam (1927) was not conducive due to hostile attitude of

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<sup>115</sup> Letter No. 2545/D-1 Dated 12<sup>th</sup> May 1927. MiranShah archives.

<sup>116</sup> Demi official Letter No.3127 Dated 25<sup>th</sup> July 1927, from Political Agent to Commandant Tochi Scouts.

Maliks, a gasht of 150 was taken out which spent the night in the hills of Hassan Khel Hills.

From April 1928 the question of carrying out Gasht in Madda Khel territory was explored. Until then Tochi Scouts were not entering the Madda Khel territory despite having the treaty of 1908 and 1922 (Para 2 of the treaty allows the scouts to enter the Madda Khel area). This was the time of increased tension between the British and Afghanistan which later resulted in aerial evacuation of 586 people from Kabul. It is worth noting that the riots in Afghanistan erupted over the modernisation plans of King Amanullah that included wearing of western dresses and education for girls. The excerpts from a tribal agreement educate us on the way the Tribal affairs were conducted.

*An agreement was reached with the Sahib Zangi Khan son of Malik Sadde Khan Uthmanzai Madda Khel Wazir. ' I have heard the terms of the said (1908 pact) agreement read out to me...it was agreed that all roads between the Tochi Valley and Afghanistan , passing through the Madda Khel country will be open and safe for travellers, that the tribe concedes to Government full right to make roads, build posts and send troops anywhere in Madda Khel country...Scouts patrols have perfect right , if so desired, to move about Madda Khel country freely and I fully recognise that they do so as friends and not as enemies...I am now ready to assist the government whole heartedly.. no outlaws are harboured by my tribe...in future I will whole heartedly assist the government in every way recognizing as I do that the allowances given to my tribe, the Khassadars and the allowances and honours given to myself are conditional on my doing so. '*<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Agreement between Zangi Khan and C.E. Bruce Resident Waziristan on 17.4.28. MiranShah Archives

On the other hand, the tribes looking for trouble would always pick the fight with the political agent over the Gasht. Malik Shalwani (Shogi) was one such Malik who in May 1928 threatened Lieutenant Jones of Tochi Scouts commanding the detachment at Khajauri. In another case Miani Kabul Khel at Shewa informed Captain Wissman at the eleventh hour that since he has not received the allowance so far thus the Gasht cannot be undertaken. By March 1929 there were Gashts twice a week, although the second Gasht was for training purpose.

Dossali was occupied on 6<sup>th</sup> December 1929 and from New Year the Gash started, Captain J.A. Robinson was the pioneer officer at Dossali. Initial Gashting was limit to the junction of the Khaisora Track with the track leading north from Chinakai Narai. In summer the area around Dossali is filled up with 'Kiris' the nomadic tribe, night gashting was not allowed when these Kiris were around. Dossali is on the border of Mahsud territory and these Mahsuds were having disputes with Wazirs thus the post was advised to avoid getting into trouble with Mahsuds. These were the few of the consideration, which were part of the Tochi Scouts operations and Gashts.

In January 1933, a Gasht of 16 Platoons had a skirmish with a gang of Gilzais at MidaniNarai near Spinwam. In this action, five were killed and similar number was wounded, Tochi Scouts also suffered five casualties. Initial part of 1933 was spent on strong gashting in order to stop parties of Wazirs, moving into Afghanistan in support of former King Amanullah who was rumoured to be returning to Afghanistan from exile. In the process, a number of actions were fought in which Tochi Scouts distinguished themselves.

During 1934 a gasht of Tochi Scouts again engaged gangs of hostiles and inflicted heavy casualties on them. In the same year, a Barampta of Madda Khel Wazirs was carried out near Datta Khel in which 76 hostiles 44 Camels and 24 rifles were captured. Two Baramptas of Bora Khels were carried out at Bala Khel and 10 hostiles were captured. A gasht from Datta Khel encountered miscreants near Darani Narai and captured seven hostiles and four rifles. During later part of 1934, skirmishes took place in Manzer Khel and Matarqi Sar area in which casualties were inflicted on hostiles. On 12<sup>th</sup> January 1934 a Gasht of Tochi Scouts was ambushed by Ghilzais near Spinwam, in which three Scouts were killed and five were wounded, Ghilzais lost six and five were wounded ‘ Motive of attack is probably the revenge for a skirmish in a grazing dispute last year’<sup>118</sup>, It was a regular Gasht which had gone downstream on the Kaitu towards the Usman Khel a couple of miles south east of Spinwam. It was a cold morning with freezing wind blowing through the bones. At 1000 hours Gasht reached the graveyard where a funeral procession was undergoing. The native scouts out of respect joined the last rites of the departed soul, putting their rifles down and joining their hands together to offer the last prayers, when all of a sudden the fire came from the ridgeline on the east. The firing contest continued for an hour, in the meantime reinforcement came from the Spinwam, message for help was sent through the pigeon. This incident led to a further year of small skirmishes. In 1935 Tochi Scouts gashts also took part in skirmishes in Kaitu Valley stopping Wazirs and Mahsuds from an in house fighting.

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118 *The Times of London*, 15<sup>th</sup> January 1934, page 12, Coloumn 6.

## **Mentioned in Despatches**

Name of following Tochi Scouts were mentioned in despatches for their outstanding services<sup>119</sup>, their name appears in 1931 Gazette. The decorations as suffix were given

Subedar Mehdi Khan I.O.M (Indian Order of Merit)

Sepoy Ayam-ud-din No.4481, I.D.S.M (Indian Distinguished Service Medal)

Subedar Saidu, I.O.M

Jemadar Faujoon, I.O.M & I.D.S.M

Havildar Manawar Din No.1672

Sepoy Gul Zadah, No, 5312, I.D.S.M

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<sup>119</sup> *London Gazette*, 26<sup>th</sup> June 1931, 4154.

## **Tochi Scouts & Fakir of Ipi 1936 - 1947**

History repeats itself is an old idiom and it seems that North Waziristan is one place where this theory has been repeatedly proven to be true. In 1890's it was Mullah Powindah who became the focus of British Empire because Mullah Powindah was able to stir up an uprising against the British among the Wazirs on the basis of religion. In 1936 a similar uprising took birth in North Waziristan where again it was the religious sentiments which spread like a wild fire and for next decade and half British Empire was engaged in a manhunt. This uprising is peculiar because it was not a planned event rather an innocuous event at Bannu acted as a catalyst. From a historical perspective it has many lessons the foremost being the volatility of the region where even a rumour of an attack on Islamic values can erupt into lava of violence, binding the independent tribes to a common cause; something unachievable in any other circumstance.

### **1936. Islam Bibi & Mrs Simpson**

Love is a powerful factor in human relationship, it is an abstract in nature, it can be very creative and similarly it can be a destructive & disastrous event also. Helen of Troy initiated a war in ancient Greek history, within the sub continental perspective the very first Muslim Empress Razia Sultana's love affair with a black slave proved fatal not only for her but also for the slave dynasty. Emperor Jahangir's love bite with AnarKali ended in a death mausoleum for her and his son Emperor Shah Jehan made an expensive mausoleum of rare marble as a monument of his love Taj Mahal for his deceased wife Mumtaz Mahal at state expense.

In 1936 two love affairs hit the headlines. Both included British citizen, one involved the King of Britain Edward VIII when he abdicated his crown for Mrs Simpson. Another affair took place far away from London in Bannu City (North Waziristan) which almost exterminated British rule in sub-continent. A Hindu girl of sixteen years of age Ram Kaur fell in love with a Muslim Wazir tribesman Syed Noor Ali Shah, she embraced Islam, both got married, she adopted the name of Marjina, (Islam Bibi this name was given to her later on ) on 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1936, all of a sudden it became a communal affair.<sup>120</sup> This was almost a replica of an earlier love story that took place in 1910's, which involved Mr Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and Ruttie Dinshaw, Ruttie was also non-Muslim and underage. Islam Bibi's judicial battle initially led to an uprising in which the Daur raised a lashkar of several thousand to influence the magistrate. *'The Daur are a fanatical priest-ridden tribe, not particularly renowned for their valour, but when they attempted to enlist the sympathy of the neighbouring Tori Khel Wazirs and Shabi Khel Mahsuds, it was felt that military precautions should be taken'*.<sup>121</sup>

The love affair led to a tragic end not only for the two lovers (Islam Bibi and Noor Shah) who were separated, imprisoned and later she was reportedly cremated at Hoshiarpur and Noor Shah also vanished and spent his rest of life wandering in pain. This love story also initiated a chain of action which lasted for a decade and half and in the process took almost two thousand lives apart from causing British exchequer 7500£ a day in expense.<sup>122</sup> Mirjina became Islam Bibi and this became a battle for Islam, this was the start of Islamic renaissance in modern time or more specifically in the Western Frontier of India.

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120 *The Times of London*, 21<sup>st</sup> April 1936, Page 13, Coloumn 3.

121 *Times*, 21<sup>st</sup> April 1936, Page 13, Coloumn 3.

122 *Frontier Scouts*, pp., 148 – 149 also see *The Guardians of Frontier*; p- 142.

## **Fakir of Ipi**

Mirza Ali Khan Tori Khel an Uthmanzai Wazir alias Fakir of Ipi was born in 1897<sup>123</sup> in Shankai Kairta Banda which is located near Khajauri post of Tochi Scouts in North Waziristan. He belongs to sub tribe of Tori Khel Wazirs. His father was a religious man named Arsala Khan.

Mirza migrated from Tochi Valley to Bannu with his parents in 1905. Where he received his early religious education from Maulvi Ahmad Khan. In 1922 Mirza's father expired and he returned to his native Tochi Valley and bought land at Splagha Village and constructed a madrassah and started imparting religious education. Mirza was a restless soul, he set upon hajj and also travelled to Syria en-route, he stayed at Syria was married and bought property. He came back to Tochi Valley in 1928. His mother expired and Mirza could not bear the sadness, every place reminded him of her, thus he migrated to Bannu where he married the daughter of a religious person, who had migrated from Bannu to Afghanistan during Khalafat movement and later came back thus Afghan connection took birth. Haji Mirza came back to Tochi Valley (Spalga Village) with his wife. In those days not many people had the resources or blessing to perform Hajj and since Mirza was one such person thus he was taken as an authority on religious affairs, he had his first Hajj and as such was known as Haji. Mirza also travelled to Afghanistan in September 1934 to visit Syed Hasan Gilani alias Nazqeeb Sahib.

Mirza was not present at Bannu when the Islam Bibi case started, since case took time to reach any decision and within that time anti British and anti Hindu feelings reached a fervent zenith, many Hindu

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<sup>123</sup> *LaiqShah, Waziristan (Pashto), (Peshawar Press 2000), p – 141. In some books the date of birth is given as 1901.*



girls were abducted especially by the Bhittanis. A Jirga of Lower Tochi Valley Ulemas gathered on 11th April 1936 in which it was agreed that a joint action must be undertaken on this issue. The political administration of agency was also keeping an eye on the affairs and through intimidation they were able to create a split among the ranks of the tribe of Daur; a punitive action was undertaken by the No.2 Wing of Tochi Scouts in which the lashkar raised by Daur to support Haji Mirza was dispersed without bloodshed. Tochi Scouts must be given the credit for dissolving such a potential dangerous situation amicably. It was not the overwhelming numerical superiority of the manpower or the fire power rather the subtle art of negotiations so important in Frontier Warfare that was employed. The subedars knew the people by face and there fore their advice had different impact on the natives. *'However three houses of leading Daur Maliks including that of Fakir were destroyed by the contingents of the Tochi Scouts...the lashkar remains in the Khaisora Valley but is getting no support from neighbouring Wazir tribesmen'*.<sup>124</sup>

Mirza left his village in depression and for all practical purpose was heading towards the Afghanistan when the elders of Ipi village located not far from his native village requested him to stay with them, take care of village mosque. From there on he became immortal in history as Fakir of Ipi. Ipi was in any case among his own blood line the Tori Khel who occupied the surrounding heights.

Mirza Ali Khan was able to convince the tribes that he should be accepted as a leader in this cause, initially the motive and aim was only the Islam Bibi. Mirza despite being a religious person does not belong to the hereditary religious families of the area and thus his achievement of uniting the tribes stands out in history. There is a very strong historical resemblance of Haji Mirza with Omar

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<sup>124</sup> *The Times of London*, 25<sup>th</sup> April 1936, Page 11, Coloumn 2.

Mukhtar of Tunisia of the same era, also with Imam Shamial of Caucasus and above all with Hassan Bin Sabah. In year 2000 Osama Bin Laden also treaded on the similar path of history.

The conflict spread over next eleven years till British finally transferred the power in India to Muslims & Hindus. It will not be out of context to state that the Pakistan Movement and Two Nation Theory started from Bannu. On military level there were two distinct phases of the conflict.

In first phase which lasted from 1936-1938 Mirza operated in the lower Khaisora Valley among his tribe Tori Khel, which is South East of MiranShah, Mirza's followers also hit back in North of Bannu. In phase two that lasted from 1939-1947, Mirza had Madda Khel as his base, which is West of MiranShah, and his opposition to the regime became more disciplined and organized in nature. Also in this phase the other Mahsud Wazir tribes also joined in with Fakir of Ipi and Tori Khel. It engulfed Razmak and South Waziristan also. Resultantly more and more military power was poured in the Waziristan

There were no less than three infantry brigades and an air force group which remain committed in hunt of Mirza for a decade despite the start of Second World War. Tochi Scouts seems to be a minor force within such an over all order of battle which includes Duke of Connaught's own, Prince Albert Victor's own, Probyn, Cokes, Wildes, Rattaray's, Scinde's Queen Victoria's Own, King George's Own and a host of other units yet it was the Tochi Scouts which had the most intimate knowledge of the area and were really the eyes and ears of the force. The conflict and the operations have to be analysed within the background of 1919 affairs. This time around

there was no mass desertion and no mutiny in the Tochi Scouts or for that matter in any of the Frontier Corps units. In terms of phases of conflict there was another dimension, in the first phase the political administration of the agency remained in charge of the operation and it was brought under control by creating a dissention among the tribes and forcing Mirza Ali to be on the run and then there was a phase when the military took the complete control of the area with devastating results. This very much was the last act of Frontier Warfare for the British and it was again in 2000 that similar operations were under taken in the same area against the same tribes on almost the same issues thus these years of soldiering at Frontier Warfare are quite relevant even today.

### **1936. Biche Kashkai, (Lower Khaisora)**

Before the Islam Bibi incident the Tori Khel had reached an agreement with the political administration to allow the construction of a road from Mir Ali down south into the lower Khaisora Valley for which the tribe received Rs 7500 annually as Khaisora Allowance. Fakir of Ipi now linked this construction of road with the Islam Bibi; the road became a symbol of the oppression and a matter of ego also. Tori Khel now refused to allow the construction of the road, simultaneously the scouts of Tochi Scouts were kidnapped while coming or proceeding to Bannu, Bhattanis also started abducting the Hindu girls; the law and order situation became worst. It was now once again time for the show down in Tochi Valley.

There were two infantry brigades in the area one at Bannu and other at Razmak, for operational purposes forces whenever operating in Waziristan have been termed as column, one reason was that they always included additional auxiliary and ancillary

services. Collectively there was one Waziristan Military District responsible for all operations in Waziristan.

The plan in simple words was an 'As strong as possible gasht'. On 25<sup>th</sup> November 1936 Razcol (The Razmak column) accompanied by the district commander consisting of one British and three Indian battalions and three mountain batteries was to advance down the Khaisora from Damdil, covering a distance of twelve miles. Bannu Brigade known as Tocol (Tochi Column) consisting of two Infantry Battalions, one only recently arrived in the Frontier, and with no artillery, was to move 16 miles on comparatively easy ground, due south from Mir Ali which was the army base camp. Both forces were to join each other at Biche Kashkai by the sunset, spend the night and return to their respective stations next day.

*In both Columns Tochi Scouts had vital tasks, With Razcol eight platoons would provide flank protection and six platoons would operate in front of the advance guard ( total 14 platoons) with Tocol four infantry platoons as right flank guard and two platoons of mounted infantry as distant left flank guards<sup>125</sup>.*

Commandant Tochi Scouts Major Felix Williams was with the Razcol. Political administration had their intelligence operators within the tribes and ample warning was given to Major Felix and also to Razcol about the likely opposition. Captain Prendergast was the Wing Commander of No. 2 Wing associated with Razcol. Whereas No 1 Wing was under Captain Tim Taylor acting as flank guards to the mounted infantry he was also commanding the mounted infantry, Captain Victor Wainright was commanding the foot infantry, which was acting as the right flank guard. Medical Officer of the Tochi Scouts Captain George Graham was also accompanying the force.

<sup>125</sup> *Frontier Scouts*, p- 151.

**25th November 1936.**

After eating Sehri (it was Ramadan) Razcol started its march, terrain was rough, Khaisora narrow and full of boulders and stones with high cliffs overlooking the advance path. In the front were the Tochi Scouts platoons followed by advance guard which had Guides Infantry as the point company. Tochi Scouts had covered only four miles when suspected movement was spotted at Tangi ahead of them. The position was occupied and in this way all dominating positions were secured, at 1430 hours the column was still only halfway to camp. The speed of the column depended upon the speed of the Tochi Scouts which had to clear the over looking hill and occupy the dominating heights and act as a guardian to the complete column. It was almost a replica of Teutoburg Massacre of the Romans by the Germans in 200 A.D. The area and tribes have unbearably close resemblance and Major Felix being an ardent follower of military history therefore took no chance; company of Guides were also there in this operation. Both were made for this purpose the Scouts & Guides. Captain Prendergast describes the Picquetting on the left flank of the Razcol.

*I could hear the deep note of the medium machine gun and the sharper one of the light automatics, with the occasional crump of our light howitzers. Clearly there was quite a party going on. As the day wore on the noise grew fainter. It became hotter and hotter until you could fry an eggs on the rocks and I was beginning to feel the terrible pangs of thirst...in the late afternoon we were to withdraw to our fort at Dosalli, the opposite force has to cross over the valley to get to the road and we had to cover it with brisk fire as it was closely followed, then we trudged up the steep road to Dosalli. It had been a blazing hot day during the Ramadan ... scouts were exhausted and*

*scarcely able to carry our casualties...stretcher bearers had to be changed every hundred yards, officers taking turns.*<sup>126</sup>

At 1830 hours, the head of the column eventually reached Biche Kashkai although the rear-guard did not arrived until 2130 hours. Tochi Scouts had the difficult task of descending down from the high positions and then to act as rear guard to the column. It was not a quite operation as Scouts were fired upon and they also had to fire to keep the hostiles tribesmen under the cover a total of 1800 rounds were fired , as per the Frontier Warfare principles no cartridge round is left in the country let any tribesman use it, Tochi Scouts brought back 1760 fired cartridges also.

Tocol had comparatively a straight forward move, the area around Mir Ali is flat and vegetated providing cover, a track leads to the Biche. The mounted infantry provided the flank protection and Column crossed the Tochi River at Hassu Khel and marched through the Salam Kot, Malik Khel and Shahbaz Khel and crossed the Katira Algad. From this point onwards the game started in earnest, this was the Tori Khel territory. Track winds through the mountains which are high; terrain becomes difficult and provides ample places for carrying out ambush. It was in this area that Fakir of Ipi had planned to carryout an ambush; he had motivated the tribesmen with the divine intervention, he had promised them that no bullet will hit them if their heart is pure and it produced the desired vigour among the young tribesmen who had a faith in the extra terrestrial powers of the Mirza. Some Tori Khel Maliks who had joined the column confirmed that lashkar had strength of a hundred men, these maliks also gave an insight into the tribal way of warfare, the Lashkar had spent the night in the foot hills rather at the top.

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126 *Ibid*

Captain Victor Wainright acting as right flank guard had to picquet the Zer Mountains

*'A slightly complicated operation with a scratch column, Zer is a pig of a feature, full of great outcrops of rock which made observation difficult. Moreover my gasht was to be a mixture of right & left Wings under Subedar Shawal Dad'. Another platoon was led by Subedar Lal Din a Mohmand popularly known as 'Tank'.<sup>127</sup>*

Wainright had set off early similar to the Razcol for Picquetting which included securing Zer Feature. *'The leading platoons as they cleared the crests saw thirty tribesmen... they were certainly hostiles but we were still observing the rules of not firing until fired upon...I informed the brigade headquarters but getting anything out of them was very difficult'*. The column was ambushed between the Katira Algad and the Zakir Khel, the first to be hit were the two sowars of Tochi Scouts mounted infantry. A general panic ensued with animals running wild and their luggage strewn all over; regular troops took the positions behind the stones and started firing indiscriminately on the uphill. The follow up just glued to their positions and after a short time there was again silence, the tribesmen just move to new positions they had achieved the goal of creating panic amidst the column. *'The leading platoon (Tochi Scouts) killed two tribesmen who shot at them, one a huge fellow, they looked like Mahsuds... on the far side of the nullah I noticed three or four sangars at right angles to the axis of advance of the column, fire from them were holding up the Rajput's who were brave but had not had any clue as to what is happening and shot down in clumps loosing all the British officers of their two forward companies'*. Wainright later approached the same sangars he had Subedar Shawal Dad with two platoons deployed to provide covering fire and with Subedar Lal Din and

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<sup>127</sup> *Ibid*

Akora's two platoons charged with swords on to the sangars in the end seven Mahsuds were killed, Own casualties were one killed and two wounded. One Mahsud was made prisoner.

By 1000 hours opposition was increasing, and by 1430 hours, the Lashkar was putting up a determined resistance. Casualties had been heavy. What little news that had come in from Razcol showed that they also had been held up. The brigade commander decided to press on as he felt that it was important to get more troops from the rear. He halted for a short while at the plain area of Zakir Khel; they had borne the worst because the area is flat. Mounted Infantry was sent back to Khajauri.

A second attempt was made to move on, after a Malik had brought in news that Razcol had reached Biche Kashkai. Advance was resumed at 1830 hours with Tochi Scouts now acting as vanguard, Assistant Political Officer Roy Beatty a Tochi Scouts officer was in the forefront along with Captain Wainwright, Beatty was performing the duties in the absence of the posted political officer and he had no job to be in the front but such is the bondage between the officers and the troops in Tochi Scouts that Beatty could not remained away from his Corps in this time of action; this is what makes Frontier Warfare and Tochi Scouts special. Lal Din's Mohmand were in the front moving in a tight diamond formation. Between 2100 -2130 hours, there was a sudden burst of fire from the far bank of Ghuda Tiza Algad the last one before the comparative plains of Biche, amidst this chaos the Mahsud prisoner broke ropes and ran away. The rear platoons of regular army also started firing and there was again a chaos in which the shouting in Urdu, English & Pashto with muzzle flashes created a scene which lasted for minutes and then again a silence. By 2200 hours it was finally



decided by the Tocol Commander to camp at Urgul Khel area. Tochi Scouts had the responsibility of providing the night protection; two platoon strength picquets were built. It was around midnight that the Captain Wainwright went back to the mess tent to inform the brigade major about the progress ‘ I found him neatly tucked in pyjamas and sleeping bag... I found the mess servant who gave me a large piece of plum cake’.

Being Ramadan the life at the camp started very early with preparation of Sehri for the Scouts, to the regular army and almost all officers of army it was unbelievable to see the Scouts preparing for another hard day of march with a fast. The Tocol finally reached the Biche Kashkai on the bank of Khaisora River. The situation at Biche Kashkai was very far from satisfactory there were many casualties to be evacuated to the hospital as early as possible. The columns had achieved what they came for and as per the original plan they move back on 27<sup>th</sup> November with a minor change, now both columns would be going back to Mir Ali.

Move back was as dangerous as coming in, both columns had to rely upon local maliks for passing on the information. Tochi Scouts were now under the unified command of Major Felix Williams their commandant, he had ten platoons to act as the vanguard and Wainwright was in command of rear guard with four platoons. The job of rear guard was more dangerous as they were likely to come under the attack. Wainwright had to ensure that all the camp picquets are extricated and no danger should come from the rear. *‘I saw an interesting event, the first wave of Northampton’s came off steadily and nice, when the second wave came off there was a lot of shooting and one man rolled over and lay still. Two stretcher bearers went back for him like rockets, but when they got to him, booted him to*

*his feet and down the hill. He was not hit only frightened*'. Subedar Mir Hamza 'Miry' won an Indian Order of Merit when acting as the rear right flank guard he encountered fire from a hill, Miry took the initiative and led his platoon from the both sides, moving under the covering fire and finally encircled the fortified sangar, he was able to convince the hostiles to give up, he joined the main force with six hostile tribesmen. Tochi Scouts were decorated with a Military Cross, one Indian Order of Merit and two Indian Distinguished Service Medals; they suffered twenty six casualties including seven dead.

According to local estimates during these operation almost 20 British officers and '1800 soldiers were killed<sup>128</sup>. Another figure indicates overall casualties of 107 for both brigades.<sup>129</sup> On the other hand Faqir of Ipi lost 50 men. The moral effect was considerable and prestige of the Faqir of Ipi increased enormously. He had achieved the notion of victory so vital in Frontier Warfare. The initiative was now with the Faqir. He had the support of Tori Khel in whose territory the operation was conducted but since it also touched upon the area of Mahsuds thus they also got involved.

The military control of the operation was handed over to the General Officer Commanding the Northern Command General Colarge Narven, the most important and perhaps the fatal step was the handing over of the political control to the army as well, the Resident Waziristan at Tank now became his subservient. Immediately one more infantry brigade along with two tank companies and two batteries of mountain artillery were on the move, it must be remembered that the strength of lashkar or the hostile tribesmen was not more than two hundred in total. This army mentality of calling up

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128 *Frontier Guardians*, p - 147.

129 *Frontier Scouts*, p - 155.

the reinforcement because of an event in which numerical inferiority or superiority was of least matter remained in vogue as long as the British remained in power. The problem with extra reinforcement was an increase in the logistic tail which now presented a bigger target to the tribesmen. Answer was in the better training of already available troops, army in a nut shell is nothing more than firepower and that Tochi Scouts had plenty of them.

### **Biche Kashkai Post**

The immediate step was to start the construction of the pending road from Mir Ali to Biche. It was undertaken under the protection of Razmak Brigade reinforced by two infantry battalions. Tochi Scouts provided advance guard and flank protection. No major battle between Tochi Scouts and Faqir of Ipi took place yet sniping continued which took the life of one British officer and one soldier was wounded. During air strikes many innocent tribesmen were killed. This road construction was opposed by the Tori Khel (some had agreed and others opposed) the army in retaliation started burning the villages overriding the advice of political officers. Captain Grimson of Tochi Scouts recalled *'I was very sick to see small villages where I had been hospitably entertained going up in flames, unfortunately army do not have to gasht in this country as we have. It will be a long time before we are welcome here again'*. Air strikes were conducted in the area and tribes were forced to vacate their villages, Khushali, Raakhi Khel, Urgal Khel, were hit hard but the maximum pounding was taken by the Salimi Khel which forms an important and rather the lone communication junction short of Biche. Id ul Fitr was celebrated on 16<sup>th</sup> December 1936 and there was a peace in the area in respect of the occasion. The Tochi Scouts established a post at Biche Kashkai, the mail was dropped daily depending upon the

weather by the RAF aircraft flying from MiranShah, Captain Victor Wainwright was the lone officer, at times bread was also dropped from the aircraft along with other edible items on a parachute which the small children makes with handkerchief.

Another similar skirmish took place on 22<sup>nd</sup> December, Royal Air Force co-operated closely and efficiently with the troops throughout the day. State's casualties on this day amounted to 16 killed and wounded, while the tribesmen believed to have had 20 killed and 21 seriously wounded.<sup>130</sup> During this period the Faqir of Ipi, moved to Aarsal Kot in the Shaktu Valley and on the 24<sup>th</sup> December, announced that tribesmen from outside were flocking to his banner and that a Mahsud lashkar was collecting on his behalf. Owing to the presence of the Faqir and his immediate supporters at Aarsal Kot, offensive air action was taken against the Kot on 31<sup>st</sup> December and on 1<sup>st</sup> January 1937.

### **Honour & Awards**

King George VI was graciously pleased to approve the awards for distinguished services rendered in the field in connection with the operations in Waziristan to following Scouts of Tochi Scouts.<sup>131</sup> (Parent regiments are also given)

Major Arthur Felix Williams, M.C., 1/13 FF	Distinguished Service Order
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Captain William Alexander Grimson, Guides Cavalry,	Military Cross
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<sup>130</sup> *London Gazette Supplement to the 2<sup>nd</sup> November 1937*, p – 6814.

<sup>131</sup> *London Gazette*, 10<sup>th</sup> December 1937, p-7737, also see 13<sup>th</sup> August 1937, p-5177 issue,

Captain Frederick Ernest Kirkland    Military Cross  
Laman, 5/1 Punjab.

Lieutenant John Hume Prendergast, Military Cross  
4/15 Punjab.

## **1937**

On 7<sup>th</sup> & 8<sup>th</sup> January another expedition was undertaken to evict the intruding tribes from Khaisora Valley, RAF played an important role in this. A combined air and land operation was therefore, carried out on the 8<sup>th</sup> January by Razcol, Tocol and the Royal Air Force. Razcol advance eastwards from Damdil, and Tocol westward from Jaler, along the high ground north of the Khaisora stream. On the 9<sup>th</sup> January, Razcol moved to Zerpezai and camped there, meeting very little opposition. On the same day Tocol moved to Dakai Kalai unopposed, on the 10<sup>th</sup> January both columns met encountering no opposition. On the same day 5,400 Ibs of supplies were dropped from aircraft on the Khaisora camp. Next day, Tocol withdrew to Khaisora camp, Razcol remaining in Zerpezai. During this period further offensive air action was taken against Aarsal Kot to prevent its re-occupation by the Faqir and his supporters. On 10<sup>th</sup> January, a full Jirga of Tori Khel was held at Mir Ali . The main demands of the political agent were the eviction of intruding tribesmen, Tori Khel expressed their inability to do so as the number of intruding tribesmen were in the range of 800, finally an agreement was reached on the terms and fine that the Tori Khel had to pay (100 rifles & 100 hostages) along with allowance from the government, the most important clause was that Tori Khel either control Fakir of Ipi or expel him , on 11<sup>th</sup> January 1937 Jirga accepted the terms.

On 17<sup>th</sup> January 1937, seven platoons of Tochi Scouts were in Biche Kashkai Camp. It was decided to build a Scout Post at

Khaisora Camp and an emergency landing strip. The sniping still continued.

### **War and Peace.**

Fakir of Ipi left lower Khaisora Valley and his whereabouts were not known, but a series of sabotage and sniping took an increase in numbers. The situation became convoluted, the tribesmen from the Khost also started pouring in and an increase in activity in the north of Bannu was noticed. The migratory tribes who descend down to the warm plains of Lower Khaisora where they own grazing lands were taken as mischief. Captain Jimmy Grimson of Tochi Scouts was commanding the post at Dosalli in Wuzi Khel tribe area, it was mid January and temperature below zero. Tochi Scouts now started playing the game other way around by ambushing the tribes. Scouts had to lay still for hours in cold weather waiting for their prey, it was like hunting. Grimson had three nights when he despite waiting in cold had nothing in his bag but on the fourth night when he was about to call off the ‘ Chapao’ (ambush) he saw a flicker of light about quarters of a mile away in the east, he along with his platoon stalked and was able to capture three Mahsuds. The overall effect was more in raising the morale of the scouts, next night Grimson lay the ambush with four and half platoons and was able to shoot three of the hostile tribesmen, the key to success was the patience and physical endurance. Captain Grimson was newly married and he wrote to his wife on 20<sup>th</sup> January ‘war is over’. This was the general perception among all the troops; Tori Khel also brought their families back. Political control of the agency was handed back to the political officers and with this the first phase of the operations against Fakir of Ipi came to an end.

## **Military System and Order of Battle**

Initially there was one normal Waziristan District Force (20,000 regulars and 5000 irregular troops) later additional 12000 Regular troops were inducted. Waziristan Division & 1st Indian Division under General Sir John Coleridge;<sup>132</sup> these divisions had no less than seven brigades including Bannu, Razmak, Wana, Abbottabad, Rawalpindi, Jhelum & Jhansi Brigades. A total of 34 Infantry Battalions, three Cavalry Regiments & five Tank Companies were deployed which included some of the famous names like Probyn's Horse, Scinde's Horse, The Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders, Green Howards, 1<sup>st</sup> Punjab, 10<sup>th</sup> Baluch, Corps of Guides, 1<sup>st</sup> Dogra, 3<sup>rd</sup> 4<sup>th</sup> & 5<sup>th</sup> Gurkha Rifles, Ludhiana Sikhs Artillery Waziristan, 4<sup>th</sup> Field Artillery Brigade, 22<sup>nd</sup> Mountain, 23<sup>rd</sup> Mountain, 25<sup>th</sup> Mountain Brigades along with Cole's Kop, Sphinx, Derajat, Hazara, Bombay, Bengal, Poonch, Jhelum, Nowshehra, Maymo Batteries; only 13<sup>th</sup> Mountain Battery at Dardoni was the permanent artillery unit. Queen Victoria's Own Madras Sappers & Miners, King George's Own Bengal Sappers & Miners, a host of services which included Army Service Corps, Medical, Dental, Remount, Ordnance, Military Grass Farms, Dairies, Accounts, Road Construction and Labour Units. Royal Air Force was also in force in the area, it was under command Wazirforce with No.1 Indian Group at Peshawar having NO.27 & No.60 Bombers squadrons at Kohat and No.3 Indian Wing at MiranShah, it had one squadron at Manzai another at Fort Sandeman and two squadrons No.5 & No.20 at MiranShah. All to hunt just one man and there was not even a picture of him available to identify.

Captain Beatty Murdered. On 6<sup>th</sup> February 1937, the illusion of peace was cut short by the simultaneous murder of two officers in

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<sup>132</sup> *Times of London* , 31<sup>st</sup> May 1939, Page 12 Coloumn 7.

Waziristan, Captain Keogh of South Waziristan Scouts along with his orderly was murdered at Ladha and Captain Roy Beatty of Tochi Scouts performing the duties of assistant political agent North Waziristan was shot dead at Boya. The accused was a Madda Khel Wazir by the name of Zawel. He was taunted earlier for robbing only the Muslims and thus Beatty became a victim of an egoistic killer but under the circumstances, the killing took the form of on-going movement. Major Ambrose the predecessor of Major Felix had taken a strong gasht a year ago right up till Durand Line and was fired upon by the Afghan tribes. Now with the twin murders of officers the situation in Waziristan all of a sudden became hot. This murder took place six days after Fakir of Ipi had left the Lower Khaisora. Madda Khel tribe was indicted in the murder of the Beatty, a fine of Rupees 25,000 (apart from 30,000 rupees stolen from Beatty) along with a deposit of 50 rifles for three years and 50 hostages were imposed. Madda Khel Jirga also agreed to expelled the five principal murderers.<sup>133</sup>

### **Ides of March 1937.**

Fakir of Ipi's next move was to dissuade the government officials, he stressed upon all the native serving in state organizations especially the Khassadars to leave the service otherwise they will become non-Muslim and their last rites will not be performed, eleven Khassadars left their posts on 3<sup>rd</sup> March 1937. The worst was yet to come and it came on 29<sup>th</sup> March near Razmak when a Gurkha Battalion was almost massacred, two British officers, two Gurkha officers along with thirty Gurkha soldiers were killed.

On 21<sup>st</sup> March 1937 the Tori Khel attacked a picquet manned by the Gurkhas (2/5 Gurkha Battalion) some 400 yards outside

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<sup>133</sup> *Times of London*, 31<sup>st</sup> May 1937, Page 14, Coloumn 3.



the Damdil camp which is short of Razmak on the main line of communication from Northern Waziristan towards the Southern Waziristan. The Uthmanzai Wazir Jirga was again summoned, the Tori Khel had given the power of attorney to them to speak on their behalf.

*‘Friendly tribesmen declared their united acceptance of the fact that the Government were not interfering with their religion, they have taken oaths to combine to end the present troubles and have undertaken to fight the irreconcilables if necessary’.*<sup>134</sup>

In a Jirga the political officer does not give orders and neither he stands, rather it is all argumentative in nature, if orders are given then Jirga normally just walks out. The tribes retain their independence and only solid arguments can convince them.

On the very next day the Uthmanzai Wazir Maliks went to meet Fakir of Ipi, who from the outset showed his intention of not getting into any settlement with the government but since the Jirga has approached him so he will consider the options acceptable to all only after consulting his companions. Days later, he rejected the government offer. Majority of Tori Khel tribe from the beginning was not in favour of any settlement with the state authorities and always favoured the warfare. Tori Khel’s answer to the Jirga’s efforts for peace was a deadly attack on Damdil on 29<sup>th</sup> March when 23 British Indian troops were killed and 41 were injured, Tori Khel had attacked the post with a lashkar of 300 men which later increased to 700 as nearby tribesmen also joined in.<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>134</sup> *Times of London*, 27<sup>th</sup> March 1937, Page 11, Coloumn 4.

<sup>135</sup> *Times of London*, 31<sup>st</sup> March 1937, Page 13, Coloumn 3.

*‘Of late he ( Ipi) has been invalid but has caused himself to be carried about in order to incite the tribes against the Government and its supporters’<sup>136</sup>.*

On 6<sup>th</sup> April the resident in Waziristan came to MiranShah and addressed the Wazir Jirga and this time the punitive actions were announced against the Tori Khel, for the reason that they have not complied with earlier agreements of the Jirga, the increase in attacks on the army was demoralising and it had to be stopped before it reaches dangerous level. Fakir of Ipi had requested for more time to frame his answer but in this time the frequency of attacks had increased, apparently Fakir was playing for time. Resident said

*‘Government patience has exhausted...there had been no diminution of the Fakir’s activities since March 24th when the Jirga pledged themselves to end the present trouble...Fakir had tried to extend the dissatisfaction into the Mahsud country...since the Tori Khel were held responsible for the Fakir’s trouble making, all Tori Khel allowances and Khassadars payments(for local levies) would be closed to them, after tomorrow any Tori Khel seen by the government forces would be liable to arrest, except Jirgas coming to interview the authorities’.*<sup>137</sup>

On the same very day (6<sup>th</sup> April 1937) the administration in Bannu gave the warning to the people that *‘an opposing lashkar is using the valleys of Khaisora, Shaktu and Algad and territories around Aarsal Kot for collection, concealment and other illegal purpose, it has been decided to attack those...by aeroplanes ...such attacks to continue day and night until further orders...those desiring to save themselves and their children and animals should leave the area and not return till it is declared safe.’*<sup>138</sup>

136 *Times of London*, 30<sup>th</sup> March 1937, Page 9, Coloumn 3.

137 *Times of London*, 6<sup>th</sup> April 1937, Page 14, Coloumn 4.

138 *Reuters*, 6<sup>th</sup> April 1937 as reported in *Times of London* of same date, also leaflets were dropped, one such leaflet is part of Tochi Museum, MiranShah.

This did not intimidate the tribesmen especially the Tori Khel who after being dismissed from the Levies attacked the loyal Khassadars and killed one. Moslem and Hindu government officials were kidnapped. Resident in Waziristan banned the migration of Bakka Khel and Jani Khel Wazirs towards the Razmak (Shawal) in summer. *‘Press reports from Bannu and other frontier areas indicate a more serious situation than the information available here discloses’.*<sup>139</sup>

The seriousness of the issue became reality after few days when on 10<sup>th</sup> April the tribesmen (Jalal Khel, Abdur Rehman Khel, Nazar Khel, Mahsuds, Bhittanis) led by Khonia Khel Mahsud attacked the British convoy which had left Manzai for Wana via Jandola and Sarwekai. Convoy consisted of 45 vehicles with an escort of 125 infantry and four armoured cars, one aeroplane was also in the air for surveillance, route was picketed by the Khasadars. Eight miles west of Jandola (Shahur Tangi) it was ambushed. It was the deadliest attack in the history of Waziristan, seven British officers were killed and 45 other ranks were wounded.<sup>140</sup>

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139 *Times of London*, 9<sup>th</sup> April 1937, Page 13, Coloumn 6.

140 *Times of London*, 12<sup>th</sup> April 1937, Page 14, Coloumn 3.

141 *Times of London*, 12<sup>th</sup> April 1937, Page 14, Coloumn 3.

On 17<sup>th</sup> April 1937, Fakir of Ipi in his Friday sermon exhorted the Wazirs and Mahsuds to commit offenses against the government. Already on 16<sup>th</sup> April in South Waziristan the post at Tiarza was surrounded by the tribesmen (Umar Khel) led by Mullah Sher Ali, Sher Ali thus emerged as another religious person to lead the tribesmen, slowly and gradually the traditional hold of Maliks was waning. Spinwam remained relatively quiet although kidnapping of Hindus remained unabated. It was reported that Fakir of Ipi intended moving to Aarsal Kot.<sup>142</sup>

Resultantly the political control of the Waziristan was again handed over to the army on 22<sup>nd</sup> April 1937 with all military and political powers vested to General John Coleridge the General Officer Commanding in Chief Northern Command, both Tochi Scouts and South Waziristan Scouts were also put under the army command. Army also failed to suppress the wave of violence therefore it was decided to conduct a military and air operation against Fakir of Ipi. On 22<sup>nd</sup> April, air strikes were conducted in proscribed areas of the Lower Khaisora.

On **23<sup>rd</sup> April**, 1<sup>st</sup> Indian Division under Major General E. De Burgh supported by Royal Air Force started their advance in Khaisora Valley. Elements of Tochi Scouts performed the duties of advance guard and flank protection, the division reached Khaisora River on 25<sup>th</sup> April; Fakir of Ipi was far too clever to offer any battle on unfavourable ground compelling De Burgh to move further and on 27<sup>th</sup> April 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Brigade moved westward to Biche Kashkai

*‘2nd Infantry Brigade advanced without opposition from Jaler Camp through a tumbled waste of bare hills of no great altitude to Khaisora Camp about five miles away...Khaisora Camp has lately*

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<sup>142</sup> Times of London, 20<sup>th</sup> April 1937, Page 15, Column 4.

*been occupied by seven platoons of North Waziristan (Tochi Scouts) and yesterday's operation will have convinced them that they are part of a greater organisation now operating in the neighbourhood'.*

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Fakir struck at night and sniping of the camp started. On 30<sup>th</sup> April the Khaisora Post was abandoned for the reason that it was difficult to sustain this post, an admission of defeat, Captain Gimson was the post commander, in the end a 64 lorry load of post's equipment was sent back most of which was looted enroute. This abandonment of Khaisora post was huge moral victory for Fakir of Ipi. The rumours of British being on the run were so profound that tribesmen from Khost also came down to have a share in the loot. Biche Kashkai was also abandoned and army practically reached the point from where it started i.e. Mir Ali, with Fakir of Ipi still at large governing Aarsal Kot. During the withdrawal operation attempts were made by the tribesmen to lay ambush but it was foiled.

In the withdrawal operation Army suffered five fatal and 54 wounded casualties. Fakir of Ipi suffered approximately 200 killed and 57 wounded casualties.<sup>144</sup>

British Parliament also took notice of the events at Waziristan, Under Secretary of State Mr Butler gave a written reply stating that *'Where air action has been taken since April 6 1937 in a few localities in Waziristan, ample warning has always been given by the dropping of notices and areas of safety have been notified. So far as is known no casualties have been caused to non combatants nor have any been caused by delayed action bombs, no dams or reservoirs have been destroyed and damage to crops is negligible'*.<sup>145</sup>

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143 *Times of London*, 27<sup>th</sup> April 1937, Page 15 Coloumn 2.

144 *Guardian of Frontiers*, p-149.

145 *Times of London*, 4<sup>th</sup> May, 1937, Page 15, Coloumn 7.

## **Iblanke Ridge.**

May has been nostalgic month for the British, the events of 1857 started in May and it seems that same pattern was being observed in North Waziristan

On 2<sup>nd</sup> May a minor operation was conducted five miles south west of MiranShah (present day Amin Post) by the Tochi Scouts, heights were occupied because MiranShah was regularly being sniped by the tribesmen. The suspected compound was encircled and search was carried out, a stiff resistance was encountered in which three scouts were wounded however 11 hostiles were captured; another action took place near Datta Khel on 4<sup>th</sup> May ‘ North Waziristan Scouts has had a brush with an enemy band near Datta Khel, killing three and wounding one’.<sup>146</sup> Fakir of Ipi was rumoured to be near Aarsal Kot, he was busy in motivating the tribesmen to join the movement, he was quite successful in his aim. The convoys were regularly sniped, posts under attack, telegraph lines being cut, officials being kidnapped. On 9<sup>th</sup> May nine Indian soldiers were killed when 150 tribesmen attacked them. The Indian soldiers were part of the Razmak Brigade who were going back to the camp after repairing a road at Razmak Narai, they were attacked by the Mohmit Khel.<sup>147</sup>

In May 1937, Army launched its biggest operations in which two brigades (Bannu & Abbottabad) were involved apart from the Tochi Scouts. It was learnt through the intelligence operators that Fakir of Ipi is having his headquarters at Aarsal Kot, in Shaktu Valley which is ten to fifteen miles south of Dosalli. Major General Hartley assumed the command of Waziristan Division (these operations

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<sup>146</sup> *Times of London*, 5<sup>th</sup> May 1937, Page 15, Coloumn 4.

<sup>147</sup> *Times of London*, 10<sup>th</sup> May 1937, Page 13, Coloumn 4.

were conducted by Waziristan Division) an extensive planning was made in which deception was the key factor. At that time the Central Waziristan Road was under construction which was sabotaged by the tribesmen; engineers, local maliks, contractors and labourers were all cramped at Dosalli. Fakir of Ipi had dispersed the tribesmen on the main route entering into Sham & Shaktu Rivers.

The plan was bold and rather had an element of ingenuity, it revolved around night marching something which the army has not done so far in the area, to reach at the Sham Plain a high plateau located five miles south by morning and then to attack the Aarsal Kot. The only limitation was that there were neither maps nor aerial photographs good enough to allow any worthwhile planning. Captain Grimson words and assurance that it is possible to enter into the Sham Plains by crossing the Iblanke Ridge were the guiding principle for the success of whole operation. In the end it all came down to the Tochi Scouts to guide the whole brigade towards the destination<sup>148</sup>. The plan also envisaged a two-prong advance, one from the south south east of Dosalli and other from south southwest of it and both meeting at Sham Plains, something akin to the earlier plans of taking Biche Kashkai.

Captain Grimson, Captain George Laman and Captain Prendergast were in command of eight Tochi Scouts platoons. Grimson had the responsibility of being the advance guard of the brigade, securing the flanks of the brigade; it all had to be done at night. Grimson wrote

*'We are making a big push tonight, starting off at 8.30 pm and going over the hills to the Sham Plains, I have got eight platoons Scouts...we are all carrying two days ration on the man and apart*

148 *London Gazette* 18<sup>th</sup> February 1938, p-1060.

*from that nothing but a Gasht sheet to sleep on, It is really a big gamble...we are certain to have a battle tomorrow. The responsibility of getting the brigade there and of having said that the mules could get over the very difficult ground was on my shoulders and if the expedition had failed, I would have been for the high jump'*

The operation started on 11<sup>th</sup> May at 2100 hours in full darkness. The route passes through Iblanke Algad, which is often metaphorically described as a lion body, the ridgeline being the spine of the lion and the initial advance from Dosalli just like descending into lion mouth, Grimson had to secure the ears and shoulders of this lion's body. The scouts started their advance after midnight, moon was in first quarter, they wore their grass chaplis instead of normal stud chaplis. Armed only with rifle and ammunition, a water bottle and dry fruit in their pockets. They were able to secure the initial heights not knowing that the tribesmen are within ear shot of each other, a verbal bout ensued but no firing took place, scouts still maintained their custom of not firing the opening round. The brigade was ill prepared for the night march especially as it had to walk on the razor edge ridge line for a mile, the mules got slipped but in the end the brigade made it. The major difference between having the brigade and the Scouts was in term of the firepower, brigade had its artillery with it. But it was this heavy equipment which caused the panic and brought the fire from tribesmen *'We tried to be quiet but our passage boomed indescribably loudly in the silence of night...there was no path on the knife edged spine of the ridge ...any tribesman within five miles must have heard each one. As the night wore on and men and animals grew tired the falls became more frequent, more cataclysmic'*<sup>149</sup>. are the recollection of a Gurkha Officer.

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149 John Masters *Bugles & a Tiger a personal adventure*, (Michael Joseph, London, 1958), p-238.



By 0030 hours Captain Grimson had reached the objective, but the brigade took more time than planned and as a result the attack was delayed but by 0700 hours Tochi Scouts had accomplished their task at a cost of five Scouts lives and now it was up to the brigade to carry on; which arrived at mid day, the very place where Tochi Scouts had secured early in the morning was baptised as coronation camp for the reason that it was the coronation day of new king in England. Bannu Brigade camped four miles south of Coronation Camp; this place today is known as Garioum.

On 18<sup>th</sup> May 1937 the attack was finally launched on the Aarsal Kot, Tochi Scouts four platoons under Captain Prendergast were providing the right flank protection, they came under fire,

*‘As I moved up with four of the leading platoons we were positively and sharply held up along a lip, the tribesmen could cover every movement across a flat piece of bare ground some three hundred yards wide...I found myself very frightened indeed...one thinks fast in moments like this and I thought... I am supposed to be a leader...well lead then... I rose and waving my puny revolver tried to get a forward charge going... I lead them over the edge with a loud Pathan shout of halla, halla. (attack, attack).’<sup>150</sup>*

When the two brigades finally attacked the Aarsal Kot with preparatory artillery bombardment they came to know that the Fakir is not present. He was more wise and tactically sound than the staff corps officers who spent a whole week in planning but when it came to execution they had no control over the inefficiency, incompetency and the inherent training flaws of the army units raised and trained only for conventional warfare in which the enemy was supposed to be as incompetence as the British. ‘A distressing feature of these

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<sup>150</sup> *Frontier Scouts*, p – 175.

operations was the appalling incompetence of a British battalion, a very famous one, it was ambushed, it was surprised, it lost rifles, and it left out its dead and wounded'<sup>151</sup>. By and large these remarks were true for almost every battalion that took part in the operations less Tochi Scouts. The fundamental cause to all these mishaps had been an ignorance of the area, its militant culture, lack of training for mountain warfare and above all the equipment and last but not the least the cumbersome staff corps.

Captain William Alexander Grimson and Lieutenant John Hume Prendergast both were decorated with Military Cross.<sup>152</sup> Grimson was from Guides Cavalry and Prendergast from 4/15 Punjab Regiment. Both were posted in Tochi Scouts.

### **Arsal Kot**

June is a hot month in North Waziristan with temperature reaching to high in day time especially in the mountain tracks; dust storms are frequent and still at night there is always a wind blowing, nights are terrible out side mainly due to mosquitoes. There is always a chance of light shower any time. On 18<sup>th</sup> June 1937, information was received that the Faqir of Ipi is present in the caves of Gul Zamir Kot not far from the Arsal Kot. An exclusive scouts operation was planned. Before going over this operation it is pertinent to highlight that the command of the operations in Shaktu Valley was delegated to the Waziristan Division and Wana Brigade also came under its operational control, previously it was under Wazirforce.

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151 *Frontier Scouts*, p- 174, these are the comments of Captain Grimson the Tochi Scouts officer who saw the action.

152 *London Gazette*, dated 13<sup>th</sup> August 1937, page 5177, and also see *London Gazette* 18<sup>th</sup> February 1938 page 1059.

On 20<sup>th</sup> June a column consisting of eight platoons from Tochi Scouts under their commandant Major Felix Williams and eight platoons from South Waziristan Scouts under their commandant Major Skrine were sent in search of Faqir of Ipi and his arrest. This force supported by light tanks reached Garioum Camp. Tochi Scouts surrounded Aarsal Kot in the North and South Waziristan Scouts surrounded GulzaMirkot, located south of Aarsal Kot. By 0500 hour on 21 June, all the troops were in their positions. the operation started. Tochi Scouts arrested 11 tribesmen including Aarsal Khan MadiKhel who was the owner of Aarsal Kot and handed him over to First Brigade<sup>153</sup>. Later on, the Tochi Scouts came to know from Aarsal Khan that Faqir of Ipi had left the place prior to the arrival of the Scouts as he was informed about the operation.

In the mid of October 1937 (12<sup>th</sup> – 17<sup>th</sup>) a combine tribal lashkar of 150 men comprising of Madda Khel and Tori Khel joined hands and positively blocked the road between the Mir Ali and the Tochi Scouts Post at Spinwam. A strong combined army and Scouts operation was conducted supported by light tanks which came from Peshawar under Brigadier E.P. Quinan. The Spinwam Post which was besieged came under intense sniping. The utility of light tanks was demonstrated when in a set piece battle drill the 9<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade (stationed at MiranShah) supported by the No. 3 Wing of RAF was able to disperse the tribesmen. RAF dropped aerial supplies on the post on 17<sup>th</sup>, 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> October. The aerial dropping of the supplies was very tricky and required great skills, at times it has to be weighed whether to drop ammunition or not because any veering of the wind and it easily could land in the hands of the tribesmen.

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153 *The Northern Evening Post* Wednesday June 23<sup>rd</sup> 1937, page 7. Also see *Frontier Scouts*, p- 175 and *Guardians of Frontier*, p – 149.

In November, Biche Kashkai in the Khaisora Valley again erupted and 9<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade with the help of Tochi Scouts was required to carry out 'as strong gasht as possible'. 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade moved from Mir Ali and 9<sup>th</sup> Brigade from MiranShah to Biche Kashkai via Damdil and Jaler Algad; both brigades concentrated at Biche Kashkai. The tribe's tactics were simple in nature, they avoided pitch battles in the open rather a short hit and run which time and again compelled the British to move their forces and it was during these moves that they present the best target. Between 16<sup>th</sup> – 18<sup>th</sup>, November 1937 series of hard pitch battles took place in ShaktuValley. As a result a road was decided to be built from the Rocha situated on the edge of Khaisora Valley to Karkanwam in the lower Shaktu Valley.

Fakir of Ipi now moved to Madda Khel. For the remaining part of the year the Tochi Scouts were busy in the routine works which included providing protection for the on-going road construction, picquetting and manning the posts. The Tochi Scouts camps at Biche Kashkai and Garioum were upgraded into posts. The construction was done by the sappers and miners, army, the Mahsud battalion and of course by the Tochi Scouts themselves. These were completed in a period of four weeks. The design and layout of both posts were similar, a mud wall of six feet height all around with two belts of double layered concertinas wire, towers on the four corners, a water tank with a capacity of 48000 gallons, magazine, stores spacious enough to hold two months ration for the post or three days for an infantry brigade.

The Tochi Scouts and South Waziristan Scouts had a relationship which amounts to being a regiment, it was unfortunate that no such measures were taken as in regular army to bind this bond; both were raised in same time period both in Waziristan and both had to

carry out similar task and operations. The tribes which they were looking after were relatives. The scouts had advanced in terms of organization only so far so as to have an inspecting officer in the headquarters of the Lieutenant Colonel rank but that was not enough. The question of equipment was a delicate matter and scouts were still relying upon the pigeons and flags which to some extent were quite practicable in the area, it was commandant of SWS who while on leave in London brought home back a wireless set and it was this bondage of Waziristan Scouts that he bought one for Tochi Scouts also.

Relationship with RAF also improved greatly because of the operations, their guard on hangars was from Tochi Scouts and for all administrative purposes they were depended upon the Tochi Officers Mess. On the other hand relationship with army was at their worst and that holds true for both the scouts of Waziristan, the root was in the Aarsal Kot operation. Reports and counter reports were made against each other the matter finally reached the army chief who was at pain to brush aside the allegations against the scouts. Colonel T.E. Lawrence had died in 1935 due to a motor cycle accident and from then onwards he attained a legendary figure, his stay in MiranShah was now a matter of fables, gospels, gossips and so on but it attracted people towards MiranShah. Another officer who was destined to great literary heights Captain John Masters was part of 1937 campaign against Aarsal Kot and he stayed at Tochi Mess.

Fakir of Ipi now had his major activities in the Madda Khel territory close to the Durand Line.

### **Khalifas of Fakir of Ipi**

The religious preachers and patriotic leaders from all the tribes by this time had accepted him (Fakir) as “Amir-e-Jihad. He organized

the hitherto independent tribal forces (lashkar) into an organized out fit with commanders known as Khalifa on the Islamic pattern. Fakir by virtue of his evading the British military might had by now created an aura of invincibility about him and his followers. It was believed that no bullet can hit him. Even now if one asks a local about a particular stone on the Bannu-Mir Ali road the answer is that it was a tank but Fakir turned it into a stone such is his mystique. These generals or Khalifas as appended below were personally nominated by Faqir of Ipi; something no person in the living history of Waziristan has ever been able to achieve.

a. Khalifa Sher Ali Khan	Mahsud
b. Khalifa Khonia Khel	Mahsud
c. Khalifa Din Faqir	Bhittani
d. Khalifa MaharDil	Khattak
e. General Gul Nawaz	
f. General Rab Nawaz Khan	
g. General MashakAlam Khan	
h. General Azal Mir	
j. General Janat Mir	Tori Khel
k. General Malik	Shudi Khel
l. General Gagu	
m. General Gulla Khan	Datta Khel
n. General Ghazi Mir Jan	Tori Khel
o. General Faqira	Punjabi <sup>154</sup>

The nomenclature of Khalifas indicates the Mirza's political acumen as all tribes were given a due share in the leadership, these Khalifas were not religious leaders rather they were tribal strongmen, the people who believed in his cause and his personality.

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<sup>154</sup> *Frontier Guardian*, p-142.

In September 1937 a lashkar of about 300 tribesmen gathered at Razmak which was broken off on 27<sup>th</sup> September by the Bannu Brigade assisted by the two battalions of the Razmak Brigade. The tribesmen dispersed in the wooded area north of Razani. Tochi Scouts were present at the action to capture Khonia Khel in the last week of the September; he was operating in the mountains north of Bhattani area. The Bhattani Tribe which hitherto was relatively calm also broke loose but in different manner their focus was on the abduction of the Hindu girls and carrying out hit and run on the government property. 1<sup>st</sup> Indian Division and RAF No.1 Indian Wing along with Tochi Scouts took part in an operation that started in September and lasted till 17<sup>th</sup> October when all captives were released. Construction of the road to the main Bhattani village of Kot was the natural conclusion, Bhattanis resisted and 1<sup>st</sup> Indian Division and Tochi Scouts carried out another operation which started on 16<sup>th</sup> October. Initially a camp was established at Spalvi in the Rod Algad west of Nungar.

The tribes which seldom are united were now combined in their resistance, Mahsuds, Tori Khel Wazirs and Bhattanis all in all over 300 fighting strength attacked the army and scouts. RAF strafed them Royal Artillery shelled them day and night and finally on 22<sup>nd</sup> October a Jirga was called and peace terms were reached , a new camp at Qalandar Khel Kalai was established<sup>155</sup>.

### **Honour & Awards**

Lieutenant Thomas Sydney Taylor  
5/14<sup>th</sup> F.F awarded

Military Cross.<sup>156</sup>

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<sup>155</sup> *London Gazette* 14<sup>th</sup> June 1938, p- 3820.

<sup>156</sup> *London Gazette*, 21<sup>st</sup> December 1937, p-7998

The name of following scouts of the Tochi Scouts was brought to notice for their distinguished service in the campaign for the year.

Captain Graham, Medical Officer

Lieutenant A.C.S Moore (5<sup>th</sup>/12<sup>th</sup> F.F.R.)

Lieutenant V.L.M. Wainright 2/13<sup>th</sup> F.F.R

Subedar Major Allah Khan I.D.S.M.

Subedar Sherak, I.O.M.

Subedar Shawal Dad, (twice mentioned)

Subedar Kabul Khan, I.D.S.M.

Subedar Makhmad Hussain

Subedar Mir Askan

Subedar Faujoon Bahadur, I.O.M, I.D.S.M

Subedar Jan Bahadur

Jemadar Ghani Shah

Jemadar Khiyal Makhmad

Jemadar Mohib Ali

Havildar Farid Khan (No.2945)

Havildar Lal Muhammad

Havildar Afridi (No.807, name is not given in the gazette)

Naik Khadim Ali No.1906

Naik Sher Afzal No.812.

Lance Naik Adal Shah. No.812.

Driver Habibullah.

### **1938 Kazha Valley**

In the early part of the year the focus was on the South Waziristan where Sher Ali a Khalifa of Fakir of Ipi was active and caused much consternation to the regular army. He originates from Kanigoram in South Waziristan; it seems that sooner or later the centre of gravity had to be among the Mahsuds, they cannot remain in oblivion in



such a war like situation. Sher Ali in typical Mahsud style adopted hit and run tactics, targeting the isolated Scout Posts and the military convoys in the general area Sharawangi Narai and Torwam in South Waziristan, Chaudwan Village in Dera Ismail Khan also borne the brunt of his ferocity. Tochi Scouts took part in the wild chase of Sher Ali being part of Bannu Brigade and more so their own posts were attacked by Sher Ali.

### **Home Made Artillery**

Gagu an another General of Fakir of Ipi, launched a concentrated attack on the Spinwam Post in mid-January, he was in possession of a homemade field gun. On 17<sup>th</sup> January 1938 Gagu leading fifty tribesmen attacked the North Western Picquet, he fired fifty rounds from his home made artillery without causing much of damage. The reinforcement were sent from MirAli and RAF aircraft also flew low, while it was flying slow and low that it also came under fire. Gagu had blocked the road and even the armoured cars part of reinforcement were damaged and one was left on the side of the road; burning. Gagu's house was destroyed in July 1937 by the Scouts and this was more of a revenge from him then being a part of Ipi's offensive. The homemade artillery fired solid projectile at close range, gunpowder being used as the propellant, 'it is frequently more dangerous to those firing it than to those fired attacked'.<sup>157</sup>

Royal United Service Museum in an exhibition on 21<sup>st</sup> January 1938 displayed one such piece, which was presented to it last year.

*'Museum has just received a large iron slug 8-inches in length and weighing 9 pounds which was fired at men of the Razmak Brigade in Waziristan in 1928. Upto that time nothing larger than*

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<sup>157</sup> *Times of London, 19<sup>th</sup> January 1938, page 11, Coloumn 1.*

*a rifle bullet had been used against the troops and it was therefore assumed that the piece from which the slug had been fired was of local manufacture; more particularly as it was observed to blow up immediately after delivering the goods. The statement that field guns of tribal manufacture are now known to be in use strengthens the theory that the gun in question was homemade'.<sup>158</sup>*

The ingenuity of primitive or tribal people in making use of scientific weapons is not restricted to mere Waziristan, in the exhibition. A Remington Carbine captured by Sudanese Camel Corps from the Nuba tribesmen was identified as the one stolen 54 years ago, it was still in working conditions.

Fakir of Ipi had now settled at Gurweikht Valley among the Madda Khel sub section of Ibrahim Khel tribe which spread on both side of Durand Line or in other words he moved into Kazha Valley, here he organised his militia. Sabotage activities of cutting the telephone wires, planting bombs on the roads in which no less than 50 homemade bombs were planted on the roads, laying mines, sniping of posts, polluting drinking water with sulphuric crystal acid and attacks on troops were increased 'a new feature was the planting of bombs of tribal manufacture on roads, parade grounds and tracks'<sup>159</sup> apart from looting of property and kidnapping for ransom. These last mentioned acts were the major source of revenue to feed the militia and for purchase of weapons.

In February 1938 the Madda Khel were warned by the political authorities to evict him (Fakir) within twenty days or to give security for his good behaviour, Madda Khel simply ignored these warnings. Political authorities after ample warning gave go ahead for punitive

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<sup>158</sup> *The Times of London*, 21<sup>st</sup> January 1938, page -15, Coloumn 4.

<sup>159</sup> *London Gazette*, 18<sup>th</sup> August 1939, p-5668.also see *Times of London* 21<sup>st</sup> May 1938 Page 16, Coloumn 1.

air action against three villages.<sup>160</sup> Resultantly punitive air raids were undertaken against the Madda Khel in March without any substantial result. The end results in these operations were not the mere killing of the tribesmen but to dissuade them from violence. Fakir of Ipi now moved to Khare Zhawar among the Saidgi Tribe east of Madda Khel, collected his lashkar obtained arms and ammunition including three guns and then struck at Datta Khel in May.

### **Datta Khel**

Datta Khel Post is at the edge of Wazir Country at the extreme west of British domain in India surrounded by Khaddar Khel, Manzar Khel and Madda Khel tribes less than ten miles from Afghan border, rather the first post east of Durand Line. Datta Khel was a strong post, well stocked to endure a three month siege, had wireless communication with MiranShah above all it had its own water well. In May 1938, Lieutenant Godfrey Lerwill took command of the post with its five platoons of Scouts (150 Scouts) under Subedar Baz Khan Khattak; an assistant surgeon was also part of the fort. The road linking Datta Khel with Boya and MiranShah was blown up and movement restricted but life remained normal in Datta Khel because this was nothing new in terms of Frontier Warfare. Abnormality occurred on 10<sup>th</sup> May( in 1857 the events also started on the same very date)when tribal cannon opened up from about a thousand yards away and fired six solid shots on the Datta Khel Fort; this firing of solid shots was something new. At the same time sniping on the Fort also started, the snipers used to come closer during day and vanish at night. In the Fort was a 4.5 inch howitzer, manned by a gunner of Indian Artillery who was also training scouts for handing over the gun. This was brought into action against the enemy gun and after ten rounds the un-equal artillery duel ceased. The sniping however continued by day and by night for five weeks.

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<sup>160</sup> *Times of London*, 21<sup>st</sup> May 1938, Page 16 Coloumn 1.

The most dangerous weapon in the hand of the Wazirs was the propaganda, at evening and at night they would call upon the scouts to desert the British and join them in the holy cause<sup>161</sup>. Anyhow the force of Datta Khel kept the Lashkar away from the post.

Lieutenant Lerwill a young officer full of heroism was made of the stuff which generally becomes a legend in history, he had that basic ingredient of becoming a hero and a leader of men; he had overcome the fear of mortality. He spent hours in contemplating, initially he like majority of young officers was under the charm of the native subedar, who in any case never preferred an open clash with the Fakir and rather advocate diplomacy and ‘defence is stronger than attack’ philosophy. On 28<sup>th</sup> May Lashkar launched its full hearted attack after dark which remained in action till dawn, cannons were fired, sniping was done and fire bombs thrown inside the post.

Lerwill decided to take the initiative away from the tribesmen by playing the game according to their rules there by attacking the tribes at dawn and at night. His first venture took the tribes by surprise, Scouts caused little damage but the notion of victory was now snatched away from the tribes. Firing from his Vickers and howitzer, Lerwill kept the tribes on toes. He pulled the master piece by laying an ambush on the tribes; he had already planted mines on the track being used by the tribes. Lerwill planned a pre-dawn attack on the tribal lashkar; he and Subedar Bagh Khan along with a platoon slipped from Chigha gate and established themselves on a nearby ridge. Day break gave them a clear target of fifty men of Lashkar engaged in their morning activities. The Scouts took them by surprise, accurate long range fire coupled with machine gun fire was all that was needed to restore balance of power in the area. Tribesmen refused to bow away and another attack was conducted

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161 *Frontier Scout.P-187*.

on the post on 1<sup>st</sup> June and twenty rounds of cannon were fired<sup>162</sup>, but it also failed to achieve its main aim; the submission of the post.

Datta Khel was not the only post assaulted rather on 31<sup>st</sup> May there were three main bodies of tribesmen, 250 tribesmen at Lwargi, 400 tribesmen with one gun at Tut Narai not far from Datta Khel and 600 tribesmen at Drewsta. British Army's two infantry brigades No. 3<sup>rd</sup> (Jhelum) and Razcol were moved to Dosalli and Raznai, which were able to disperse the lashkar.

Datta Khel post was also relieved on 6<sup>th</sup> June 1938. Lieutenant Lerwill received Military Cross<sup>163</sup> for his leadership. Datta Khel operation is important in many aspects, it shows that a determine and aggressive Scout Commander can turn the tables on a tribal lashkar, the fact that lashkar in open is more vulnerable to fire than the fortified Scouts; provided there is a will to fight and lead among the commander. Tochi Scouts built a new post at Lwargi and occupied it on 14<sup>th</sup> June. On 28<sup>th</sup> June Madda Khel Jirga accepted the peace terms.

### **Shami Pir 'Syrian Agitator'<sup>164</sup>**

Not much is known about him and history has yet to pass its judgement on him, was he the biggest farce of all time? a Nazi agent? or a genuine religious person? the last description is the least to be applied on him. Shami Pir hailed from Syria (Sham in Urdu) thus he is known as Shami Pir, let it not be forgotten that Fakir of Ipi had been to Syria and owned property there. Shami Pir came to Waziristan along with another follower and soon established himself among the Mahsuds, who revered as they are in habit of doing so to any one

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162 *London Gazette* 18<sup>th</sup> August 1939, p – 5668.

163 *London Gazette*, 23 August 1938, p- 5415

164 *Times of London* 1<sup>st</sup> July 1938, Page 15, Coloumn 4.

who has any distant claim to divinity. The biggest question is how he managed to unite the tribesmen to accept him as another leader. On 13<sup>th</sup> June he addressed a Jirga in which he not only impressed the Mahsuds but also Ghilzai and Utmanzai Wazir to carry out a Jihad against the Afghan Government under his leadership. On 23<sup>rd</sup> June the Lashkar composed of Mahsuds and Uthmanzai Wazir marched towards the Durand Line. There is a theme that British planted him but that is not true because his lashkar was strafed and bombed by RAF also political pressure was brought on to the tribesmen to refrain from attacking Afghanistan. The plausible reason being that the last thing that British desired was a trouble with Afghanistan. On 27<sup>th</sup> June Shami Pir gave himself up at Wana and was brought to MiranShah in an RAF aircraft. He was interviewed under safe conduct and brought to Tochi Officers Mess and from here, he was sent to Karachi under an escort, he was paid a hefty amount to leave the country. The best part is that Shami Pir at Karachi shaved and put on a smart suit before his flight. The photo copy of the cheque paid to him is still part of Tochi Scouts Scrap book in the Mess. The ease with which he was able to convince the tribesmen to accept him a religious leader speaks volume about the character of the Waziristan. He wanted to be a 'Lawrence of Waziristan' but failed just short of it, had he been more persistent in his conviction the history of the area might have been altered. The Madda Khel Jirga on 23<sup>rd</sup> June came to MiranShah 'declaring that Fakir is no longer among them, surrendered a number of rifles as security for their good behaviour'. Things looked promising for the moment but soon the good dream was broken. The following officers were mentioned in despatches and King was pleased with their performance. Major Sir Benjamin Broom Head (12 FF) and Subedar Mehdi Khan I.O.M.<sup>165</sup>

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165 *London Gazette*, 16<sup>th</sup> August 1938, p- 5288.

## Kharre via Spina Khaisora

Fakir of Ipi was not lagging behind Shami Pir and he also in the mean time struck hard at the convoys with incessant attacks on the post. Authorities now decided to take the bull by horn, there by attacking the very heart of Fakir of Ipi's lashkar at Kharre, an area where no force has ever been before except the North Waziristan Militia. Kharre in true sense is the eagle's den in this case the cave, there are a series of caves surrounded by high mountains reaching an elevation of over 15000 feet; The Tochi Scouts were entrusted the task to be the vanguard; to take the force to the Kharre. There are two routes leading to Kharre one through the Madda Khel territory and other from Degan to Spin Khaisora onwards to Wuzhgai which is one of the few plain tables in the complete area. From Wuzhga there are two tracks that leads to the Kharre caves.

On 1<sup>st</sup> July 1938, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Brigade under Brigadier Maynard supported by Razcol advance via Mamirogha to Degan 'joined by a detachment of Tochi Scouts'.<sup>166</sup> This detachment of Tochi Scouts consisted of 17 platoons who had marched from MiranShah with their Commandant Major Felix and Wing Commander Major Youngman; collectively the force was designated as Wazirforce.

On 7<sup>th</sup> July a mail lorry was fired upon in which one escort (Khassadar) was killed. *'Troops and Scouts from Damdil and MiranShah succeeded with the cooperation of aircraft, in intercepting and engaging the tribesmen, and their action continued till the afternoon, when the Troops and Scouts withdrew towards their camp. The tribesmen are known to have suffered casualties... one Tochi scout was killed and one Indian soldier wounded...gangs persist in sniping at troops in the neighbourhood of Razmak and Razani'*.<sup>167</sup>

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<sup>166</sup> London Gazette, 18<sup>th</sup> August 1939, p- 5668.

<sup>167</sup> Times of London, 8<sup>th</sup> July 1938, page 15 Coloumn 4.

On 11<sup>th</sup> July the Wazirforce was at Degan, a small mud village at the mouth of Tochi Valley and the very first or the last of the Wazir habitat before the Upper Daurs area starts. The area is open and from here the track connects it with Tut Narai, Degan itself is on the southern bank of Tochi River. The Tochi River was crossed, Scouts were in front and this area was not new to them because to reach Wuzhgai one has to pass through Spina Khaisora, the same very place where Tochi Scouts predecessor North Waziristan Militia was decorated with a Victoria Cross in 1915, thus this operation had a nostalgia attached with it. Major Felix had a strong faith that the soul of Captain Eustace will be around to protect them. At Spina Khaisora Tochi Scouts bugler played the 'Auld Lang Sang' they cleared the obstacles and set the pace, which could not be matched by the regular infantry. On 13<sup>th</sup> July Wuzhgai offered little resistance and Wazirforce camped here. The climb to Wuzhgai had been arduous, tiring and separated the men from boys. Heat scorching, dust storms with strong winds blowing at noon and there been little shade on the way up.

RAF ably supported, one major limitation of the force was that it had only two days of ration, which was being carried on mules. For the advance towards the Kharre, the Wazirforce was divided into two, corresponding to the two tracks leading to the caves area. Razmak Brigade on the western track and 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Brigade on the eastern track. Tochi Scouts were also split into two; Major Felix with the western track and Major Youngman with the eastern track. They both were to carry the strong gasht ahead of the main body or in simple words they were the Scouts of the Wazirforce. The plan revolved around the regular infantry gaining foothold on the adjoining heights and Scouts then swooping like an eagle on the lashkar, killing and then getting back.



Major Felix had reached his position well in time and so did the Razmak Brigade but 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade lagged in time, Brigadier Maynard altered his plans and combined the Tochi Scouts for a swooping raid on the lashkar down below. Youngman and his Scouts had now to transgress the hilly mountainous terrain in a diagonal pattern to reach the 7000 feet Mazdak Punga where Major Felix was in position, he managed to do so at 1500 hours, the last time to carry out the raid was 1700 hours.

The lashkar down below had established themselves in a forested gorge, Scouts had to clamber down through the forested slope amidst the fire which was likely to come from the left flank as the 2/1 Gurkha had failed to clear the flanks. Lashkar was in picture of the impending raid and as such had taken up the position.

Scouts went down with a fury and speed, were able to destroy a couple of Fakir's ammunition dump and then retreated swiftly. It must be kept in mind that both Felix and Youngman were decorated Military Cross officers. The Gurkha supported them with fire support and so did the RAF. Scouts managed to reach back the heights and established a perimeter camp at 9000 feet, spent the night and next day the force marched back to the Wushgai with Tochi Scouts now acting as rear guard. Over all the operation achieved nothing in terms of destruction of enemy but Wazirforce had been able to achieved a moral superiority, they did something which the tribesmen never expected them to be capable of doing; to attack them at their home base. 'Fakir of Ipi had not even been disturbed'.<sup>168</sup> Fakir of Ipi again refused to give a pitch battle and left the area, this time he headed towards Wana. In July Major General Hartley assumed the command of Waziristan and another Major General had the command of Waziristan District, this dual control and command was another hindrance in achieving the aim of operation.

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<sup>168</sup> *Frontier scouts*, p – 193.

## Ahmad Khel & Hunt for MehrDil

Bannu's layout is such that it is spread between countless water channels, reason being that Bannu plains are the first plains where all the alga and river conflux, Garai Alga, Khalbol Khawara, Tangai Alga in the east but Bannu proper is between Kurram and Lora Nala. There is a salient almost seven miles west of Bannu from where Kurram burst into the plains of Bannu. The salient with sides fifteen miles long is like a broad dagger wedged into the heart of British territory, it also marks the Frontier Region boundary; none has ever entered it before not even the Scouts or the constabulary. The mountainous region west of the salient is the home of Ahmad Khel and one of the Ahmed Khel by the name of MehrDil was the Khalifa in Fakir of Ipi's lashkar, Mehr had been an army deserter. He conducted his activities against the Bannu and environs; he paralysed the road movement of the troops between Bannu and Kohat.

On the night of 23/24<sup>th</sup> July 1938 he played hell with the Hindu population of Bannu, he burnt, looted, killed and kidnapped a host of Hindus. *'gangs men estimated at 200 strong attacked the railway station at 10.30 p.m...entered the city and set to fire to a number of houses...four miles of telephone line had been destroyed during the night... bombs have also been found near Lowargi and Datta Khel... two bombs laid near the MiranShah have caused slight damage to aircraft'*<sup>169</sup>. The damage inflicted was in the tune of 22,500£. The Daur were interviewed at MiranShah and asked to produce the culprit responsible for causing damage to the culvert near MiranShah or failing to do so pay the fine and borne the cost of

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<sup>169</sup> *Times of London*, 26<sup>th</sup> July 1938, page 11 Coloumn 5. Also see Telegram From Government of India, External Affairs Department, to the Secretary of State for India, dated 24<sup>th</sup> January 1940.

repair of culvert. Furthermore they have to bear the responsibility in case any future bomb is found near MiranShah or for that matter any sniping that takes place at MiranShah, MirAli and Khajauri.<sup>170</sup> In an incident Lieutenant G.P.V. Sanders of Tochi Scouts was injured when a homemade bomb exploded in the parade ground. It was not the last time that such events took place.<sup>171</sup>

Meanwhile Fakir of Ipi was believed to be in Afghanistan and his followers in the Madda Khel territory. The question of their logistics was answered in August when a caravan of camels was captured (13 camels and eight men) laden with rations for them.<sup>172</sup>

Tochi Scouts were given the responsibility of clearing the salient, a force known as SALICOM(Salim Column) was formed under the command of Commandant Tochi Scouts Major Felix in which Tochi Scouts, South Waziristan Scouts, Kurram Militia and Frontier Constabulary formed the fighting element, it was an exclusive scouts campaign, it highlights the Scouts way of Frontier Warfare. Not many operations were conducted in which all the Militia & Scouts were combined and there was no army control or staff to direct. This was Frontier Warfare's best definition. For students and followers of military history in general and Frontier Military Warfare in particular it offers a classic study. In a way it is also a tribute to Major Arthur Felix William (Military Cross & Distinguished Service Order) and Tochi Scouts, it was an honour for Tochi Scouts to be the leader, planner and executioner of this historic moment in frontier history.

The Scarlet Thread of the operation was based upon the lessons of tribal warfare and experienced gathered in almost half a century

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170 *Times of London*, July 27<sup>th</sup> 1938, Page 13 Coloumn 7.

171 *Times of London*, 13<sup>th</sup> August 1938, Page 9, Coloumn 6.

172 *Times of London*, August 5<sup>th</sup> 1938, Page 11, Coloumn 4. Also see *Cabinet Papers*, dated 27<sup>th</sup> January 1940

of warfare, the force has to be lightly equipped, every man to be an independent scout having a two days dry ration on body, making full use of the ground. Small fighting bodies moving and supporting each other, not to be pinned down by the individual sniping of the tribesmen and above all knowing when to retreat.

This does not mean that administrative matters were over looked rather 47 camels were employed for carrying the luggage, that gave flexibility in terms of animal water and fodder supply. Frontier Constabulary and Khassadars were tasked to probe the valley.

Three forces were composed, YOCOL (Young Coloumn) was under Tochi Scouts Major Youngman M.C., having 16 platoons under his command, it was stationed at Shewa & Spinwam, covering the western out let of the salient and acting as reserve.

WILCOL (William Coloumn), 12 platoons of South Waziristan Scouts with two pack-borne Vickers machine gun, two platoons of Kurram Militia with 2.75-inch mountain artillery piece under Major David Williams of SWS, this scout force had to carry out strong gasht northwards of the Bannu. This was the main axis of Gasht through Gumati and to explore till the very end of Daryobe Valley almost ten miles north of Bannu.

FITZCOL(Fitz Coloumn), 12 platoons of Tochi Scouts under Major Fitz Maurice the newly posted Wing Commander, it had to gasht in the parallel Nullah Bargantu, it had to cover an additional distance of nine miles reaching Domel first and then in darkness into the unknown valley.

Headquarters Salimcol was mobile on horses carrying mule pack wireless but it required high ground for establishing communication

with all the Scout forces. SWS had its own walkie - talkie sets for inter platoon communication. On 20<sup>th</sup> September 1938 gasht started, going was rough and tough, each Scout covering other, alert and ready to fire, they were now fighting for the honour of their Qaum. They were sniped, the immediate action was to take cover and form a small group supported by fire and observation. identifying the spot from where fire has come but moving on. The night was spent in open establishing a camp with 'sangar posts'. On 21<sup>st</sup> September both the 'Wilcol & Fitzcol' reached the end of narrow valleys. The overall aim was to bring out the lashkar for a battle or to compel them to migrate towards the west where Yocol was waiting. Wilcol the central force acted with speed and did not allowed the lashkar to manoeuvre. The right wing force Fitzcol, combed the area and after a gruelling trek was able to join the Wilcol. This was made possible only due to light equipment of the force.

On 23<sup>rd</sup> September Wilcol also moved towards west but there was no trace of enemy, although a lashkar of fifty was spotted but they offered no resistance. The gasht was gruesome; shortage of water was an important factor. The force reached Kurram River traversing an area which had never before been reconnoitred, the hostile lashkar dispersed. On 25<sup>th</sup> September the operation culminated with a 31 hours Gasht by Fitzcol'.<sup>173</sup> Operation was successfully carried out and for the time being raiding across the Kohat-Bannu Road practically ceased.'<sup>174</sup>

Names of following were mentioned in despatches for their services in the campaign<sup>175</sup>.

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173 *Frontier Scouts*, p- 196.

174 *London Gazette*, 18<sup>th</sup> August 1939, p- 5669.

175 *London Gazette*, 17<sup>th</sup> October 1939, 7021.

Major Felix Williams, D.S.O, M.C.,  
Major Youngman, M.C.  
Major Atwell (1<sup>st</sup> Punjab)  
Lieutenant Boulter 1/12<sup>th</sup> F.F.R  
Subedar Kabul Khan, I.D.S.M.  
Lance Naik Sobat Khan  
Sepoy Abdul Rakhman

## 1939

In May 1939 the general perception among the higher command and policy makers regarding the situation in Waziristan was that the worst is over .

*‘Fakir of Ipi’s agitation against the Government of India has fizzled out, Fakir himself is a fugitive somewhere near the Afghan border and the Tori Khel and Madda Khel ...have made their peace with the Government of India...resistance of the tribesmen finally broke down under the strain of the air blockade which forced them to leave their cultivation and seek refuge in the surrounding barren hills... there is now no organised resistance to the Government... gangs of hostile tribesmen are still moving about the mountains, bridges are being blown up and other Government property damaged’<sup>176</sup>*

How true the assessment was that only time will tell. But the signs were promising, Tori Khel in May 1939 return six of the kidnapped persons, they still had 15 more in their custody thus the optimism was not based upon sand castle. ‘Frontier Policy should be subjected to a fresh examination by military and political experts

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<sup>176</sup> *Times of London* 30<sup>th</sup> May 1939, Page 12, Coloumn 7. Also see Sir Cassels’s Report For 1938 on Waziristan, *London Times*, 19<sup>th</sup> August 1939, Page 9 Coloumn 6.

have aroused considerable interest in official circles in Simla<sup>177</sup>. The fighting strength of the various tribes was as under, they all were armed with rifles but only Ibrahim Khel had one cannon.

Mohmit Khel	2700
Ibrahim Khel (Including Madda Khel)	3500
Tori Khel	3400
Manzar Khel	600
Wali Khel (Kabul Khel)	5350
Saidgi & Kharsin	550
Daur	12290

Imparting education in Agency remained an uphill task, ‘for generations literacy has been considered unworthy of a Pathan’. There were eight primary schools in the agency with 340 pupils and 211 middle school pupils; a new school was opened at Spalga. In October 1939 the teacher of MiranShah Middle School was kidnapped, tortured and killed for ransom. Agency was giving Rs 2000 as scholarship to students which works out as Rs 40/. per student per year. Annual athletic moot was held at MiranShah for the students, slowly and gradually the schools were becoming part of the agency life. Preservation of timber was also taken by forbidding export of it without permit. There was a transport company which was plying the Lorries, it was owned by the tribesmen and they on a contract were carrying the government goods. This step was taken after the ShahurTangi ambush, now the protection of the Lorries was also the tribesmen responsibility. The Lorries made camels redundant as the lorry owner made a profit of Rs 20/ on a load. The arms and ammunition business was a flourishing trade with black smiths of Hassu Khel in great demand.

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177 *Times of London* 2<sup>nd</sup> June 1939, Page 14, Coloumn 2.

In early 1939 a new camp was built at Khar Kamar to fill the gap between Datta Khel and Boya. It was an un-lovely place. The accommodation was built of puddle mud and stone with no windows, which meant one had to choose between light and warmth, if the door was shut no light comes in; if it was opened the savage cold wind gusted in.

Fakir of Ipi appeared openly at Birzal near Kharre, on the other hand Tori Khel finally accepted the terms of the government. '3000 tribesmen walked to the MiranShah to swear on the Holy Koran in the presence of the political agent that the government enemies were their enemy'.<sup>178</sup>

In July 1939, six platoons of Tochi Scouts occupied a Crocus Camp on the Razmak plateau where almost all the hostile elements had collected with the idea of harassing the regular troops; Tochi Scouts supported by Razmak Brigade surrounded the villages of Mirkhon Khel and Kharsin, which were the harbouring nests of marauders sniping the regular troops. Tochi Scouts carried out the operation and the primary difference between the operation of regular army which had no soldier or seldom an officer speaking the native language and understanding the culture is obvious from the fact that 'very villages which were rounded up have approached the political authorities with the request that the Scouts should again occupy the camp on the plateau in the summer of 1940'.<sup>179</sup>

In 1939 the very first merry go round was introduced in Miranshah on the occasion of Eid –ul- Fitr, there was a lot of excitement among the Wazirs over this , it did not last long because it broke down under the weight of grown up tribesmen who were as excited as young kids to have a ride on it.

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<sup>178</sup> *Times of London* 16<sup>th</sup> June 1939, page 13, Coloumn 6.

<sup>179</sup> *Political Agent Administrative Report for North Waziristan Agency, Part Three. No.5054/G/212. Dated 9.7.1940 Miran shah.*



Tori Khel and Madda Khel remained true to their words and abided by the clauses of the agreement but it did not helped in bringing the situation to normalcy. The prestige of Fakir of Ipi was so high that he was not confined to the help of only these two tribes. Raiding, sniping, sabotage, cutting of telegraph lines, highway robberies even the political agent was fired upon while travelling on road to Razmak. That was the general situation in Waziristan on the outbreak of war in Europe.<sup>180</sup>

On 1<sup>st</sup> September 1939 the Second Great War started, with Britain , France in one camp(Allies) and Germany later joined by Italy in 1940 in another(Axis). This war had its impact on India and also on the Frontier. The provincial Congress government resigned in line with party policy. British now could not afford to loose the Muslim popular support. Afghanistan remained neutral, on the military side British regular units were more required on European Front than at the Frontier. Russia had a peace treaty with Germany thus the apprehensions about its move towards Afghanistan were still very much there, in 1941 German attack on Russia partially removed this concern. One major difference from First Great War was the absence of any Muslim power in the conflict.

The casualties among regular troops and civil armed forces during 1939 amounted to 77 Killed and 195 wounded while in the last seven months there were 1,075 offenses committed by the tribesmen including 166 kidnapping and 7 air operation were carried out.<sup>181</sup>

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180 *Times of London*, 10<sup>th</sup> August 1939, Page 9, Coloumn 7.

181 *Telegram from External Department Government of India to Secretary of State for India*, p-261. *War Cabinet Papers, United Kingdom W.P.(G)(40) 23. Copy No 13.*

**1940**

On 2<sup>nd</sup> January the Idak & Kaitu bridges were damaged by the tribesmen by planting bombs. Tochi Scouts with assistance from regular troops from Mir Ali successfully rounded up the village of Zerraki the most suspected in the crime. It forced the Daur elders from Tappi to protest their loyalty and paid revenue arrears as a token. Tori Khel and Mahsuds raided the Daur village of Hakim Khel loyal to the government. ‘Shortly after a patrol of Tochi Scouts was heavily sniped by a hostile gang’ but Scouts rounded up the villages of Haider Khel and Ali Khel. This resulted in the maliks of the Drepalari Tori Khel aiding the Scouts in removing the road block erected by hostile gang between MirAli & Spinwam. On 10<sup>th</sup> April the civil authorities were again placed in political control. On the same very day Madda Khel accepted government peace terms and deposited 54 hostages, 9000 rounds of ammunition and 100 rifles as Brampatta. Malik Khandan Khan was the chief of Madda Khel and imprisoned in Peshawar Jail. The political agent has an interesting story regarding this aspect. All was agreed with the tribe and they came to MiranShah with 11 Rifles which they had to deposit as a Barampta, at eleventh hour another tribe put the words of wisdom in the Madda Khel that they should insist in having Malik Khandan Khan release first; and all negotiations came to ground zero. It was later revealed that the other tribe wanted to stall the peace talks by injecting last minutes details. Malik Khandan Khan was finally released after the Madda Khel fulfilled the Barampta at Peshawar. They met the governor first.

On 22<sup>nd</sup> February 1940 it was announced that government will soon take military measures to control Ahmedzai Salient (one of the Wazir tribe). Ahmedzai Salient is a triangle east of Kurram River

lying between Thal-Bannu-Dargai Shahidan, it was also the home of Mehr Dil, Gul Nawaz and Gagu. The operation was conducted under the General Officer Commanding in Waziristan. It was purely a military operation as 'sympathisers with the hostile factions in the administrated districts' were kept out. Tochi Scouts secured the Road MirAli-Bannu. The operation was a partial success.<sup>182</sup>

On 13<sup>th</sup> March 1940 seven Khaddar Khel Scouts being part of the Garioum Post, while being on a nearby picquet along with seven Khattak scouts; the Khaddar Khel not only defected but they also took with them fourteen rifles and ammunition. It jolted the Tochi Scouts, the fear of 1919 started looming again. It must be remembered that Khaddar Khel are a trans frontier tribe and as such the pattern of defection since 1915 remained the same that it were always the trans frontier tribes in which this conduct unbecoming was common, however the command cannot be absolved of being ignorant and non-functional so as not to be aware of the general feeling among the troops.

Tochi Scouts had been the centre of controversy since the beginning of the year. The earlier raised eye brows about the low casualty rates of the Tochi Scouts now became whispers they were attributed of being soft on the enemy. They had been the darling of the army during the preceding two years of relentless operations. This was the beginning; the Commandant Major Fitz Maurice was told by his superiors without any mincing of words that his corps has connived in blowing off the bridges also. Army took all the frustration of failure on the Tochi Scouts.

The Scouts on the other hand were not happy with the intrusion of army and their being under the command of Khaki, the army officers in any case regarded them as an infantry in fancy dress. It was

182 *The Times of London*, 21<sup>st</sup> February 1940, Page 10, Coloumn -2

clash of two military cultures, the army bred in conventional manner where there is a clear definition of enemy and concept of victory lies in the annihilation of him, Scouts or Frontier Militias do not share this definition of warfare or about the enemy, for them a tribe is not an enemy, it is not to be destroyed, annihilated, humiliated, exterminated and subjugated in totality. The Riway of the area has to be respected; only the miscreants are to be dealt severely. The opening round has to be fired by the tribesmen to convince the whole Qaum on the justification of the action. Women and old have to be respected; destruction has to be in relation to the crime and above all the Scouts have to live here and army only a guest. Resultantly the tribes look upon army as soft target and hit them hard and with vengeance, they too had a soft corner for the Tochi Scouts.

## **Boya**

In April, the routine relief of Datta Khel Post was undertaken. The ten platoons who formed an advance guard were under the command of the Captain Reford and Subedar Miry Hamza. They left MiranShah early morning on 6<sup>th</sup> April and reached Khatti Killi by noon. The normal procedure of having picquets on the move and under their protection the rest leapfrogging was adopted. It was at Khatti Killi that the point scouts came under fire from the surrounding area. The road to Boya was nothing more than a track which passes through the villages. The terrain on the right of the track from MiranShah till Boya is flanked by hills and on the left the Tochi river flows the distance between the track and the river bed is about half a mile which is cultivated, green and populated. Similar is the pattern on the other side of the river bank. The water flow was low and river can be easily crossed on foot.

Captain Reford soon called the RAF in support and decided to take the bull by the horn, he crossed the river with five platoons where as Miry remained on the home bank and provided fire support. Meanwhile the main body of another ten platoons under command of the Commandant reached the spot from MiranShah and passed through to Boya where the Reford & Miry also joined him with a bag of one tribesman killed and twenty seven injured. The tribesmen attacked Boya at night and it was here that Fitz Maurice was hit on the knee by a bullet. Relief was carried on, Reford was decorated with a Military Cross and Miry with an Indian Order of Merit First Class.

In April Tochi Scouts Commandant Fitz Maurice was still in hospital at Peshawar recovering from the bullet hit he received at Boya and now Major Boob Young a South African who was commanding the Right Wing became officiating commandant, it was not just a routine change rather these two came from varying background. Fitz Maurice was an Irish and as such had a more sympathetic view of the tribesmen, Boob on the other hand had an opposite view point. The British or rather the European officers posted in Tochi Scouts mainly came from three ethnic groups English, Irish & Scottish. In 1938 seven hundred new scouts were inducted who were trained on the job, new platoons came from Kurram Militia and South Waziristan Scouts and in late 1939 another batch of four hundred fresh recruits were enrolled, a new wing No.3 Wing was raised thus the over all strength of the Tochi Scouts was almost more than an infantry brigade. With the raising of new wing the old nomenclature of Right & Left Wing was replaced with No.1 Wing, No.2 Wing & No.3 Wing. At MiranShah the No.1 Wing was deployed looking after the Kazha & Upper Daur Valley, No.2 & No.3 Wings were at Mir Ali. The construction of new fort for No.3 Wing was initiated at Khajauri.

## **Tappi Fiasco**

Tappi is a Daur village on the left bank of Tochi river between Thal on Tochi and Idak, it is almost fifteen miles south east of MiranShah and 4 miles south west of Idak, in 1940 the population of the village was not more than 400. It is not situated on the Mir Ali-MiranShah road rather the road is approximately two miles away in north but a track links it passing through for a mile amidst cliffs and narrow defiles, all potential ambush sites. Tappi is a beautiful village with mud houses and green orchards, fields although small yet they adore golden colour of wheat in summer, one of the many Daur villages which have benefitted from the economic opportunities afforded by the political administration of the agency. It has never cause any serious problem but in the summer of 1940 it became a needle of a storm. Fakir of Ipi was still at large untraceable and his movement was gaining foot hold. There were reports that the Tappi village is harbouring the hostiles who are involved in sabotage activities; these hostiles were now called as Ghazis. There were confirmed reports that tribesmen hostile to the government and loyal to Fakir of Ipi have shifted here. In the recent waves of sabotage the bombs were planted on the road and one bomb was also planted on the drill ground of the Tochi Scouts. A purely Tochi Scouts operation was planned and launched on the advice of the political agent with disastrous consequences. The political agent was on leave thus assistant political agent was in command and so were Tochi Scouts under the officiating command of Boob Youngman. The role which these acting and officiating appointments play in war are quite delirious in nature, on one hand they feel that they can also assert their potential and on the other hand it provides them an opportunity to mark their own stamp; unfortunately victory has many fathers but defeat is an orphan.

Thirteen platoons of No.3 Wing were earmarked for this Baramptas, Lieutenant G.V.P. Sanders was the adjutant, Lieutenant Mike Gardiner an experienced officer, newly posted Lieutenant Desmond Cable and Lieutenant Finch from Gurkha Rifles who was on a probationary period were part of force. The command was with Major Boob Youngman but he had severe headache hours before the operation so it was handed over to the Captain Reford. The last officer to join in was Captain H.L.V. Russel. He was sick in the hospital and only an hour before the verbal orders he volunteered to join in the action for no specific reason other than that since all the lieutenants are going for the operation thus I should also join in. Major Youngman took the operation very lightly and instructed that recruits should also be taken along as this will provide them the real training. Drill Havildar Amir Shah was also ordered to go with the recruits. The native officers included Subedar Ali Mast Khattak, also in charge of recruits training, Subedar Wilayat Shah Bangash, and Jemadar Nadir Shah Afridi. The organisation of the wing was based upon four companies each having four platoons, each platoon having four sections out of which three were rifle sections and fourth section carried the light machine gun, a Jemadar commanded the platoon thus in this action three companies took part. Strength of a company was around 160 all ranks. Tochi Scouts had been issued with the motor lorries a total of ten, communication was still primitive relying heavily upon flag and Helios although there were few walkie talkie sets but not many knew their functions thoroughly.

At half past the midnight the Lorries started at Miranshah and after half an hour of journey the scouts were debussed at Thal on Tochi. There is a graveyard at the very base of the bridge and path is narrow thus a single file has to be adopted for quarter of a mile. The Scouts marched past the Malik Azadar Ziarat and followed

the track. There are compounds consisting of three or four houses scattered with high mud walls and towers. Keeping direction was not that difficult but maintaining secrecy was a paramount issue. Tappi village is a scattered habitation, a track passing on its northern edge a grave yard away from the village a standard custom in the area for centuries, another track originates from the Tappi and leads to the neighbouring villages of Mir Khan Khel, Palolai and GhundiKalle. The most important feature of the village is the 784 feet relatively high knoll which over looks the area; on the northern direction there are several high features before the road is reached.

Captain Reford ordered Lieutenant Sanders on the right flank (towards the river side) and Captain Russell on the left flank (northern side, towards the hill side) each with four platoons; Reford himself kept the rest of force with him with bias towards the south. At 0530 the Khassadars and political officer went into the village after the Fajr prayers to announce that a search will be carried out. The conventional style of raiding into the houses with troops just banging in and taking out the doors and pulling the male population which was practiced in Boer War does not hold true in the North Waziristan. The local customs of women's purdah and modesty has to be upheld and same hold true for the sanctity of mosque. By 0615 hours the search was over and political officer started sorting out the suspects, after some time the shots were heard and it was reported that tribesmen are approaching from the north; from the area of responsibility of Captain Russell. Two sections of Subedar Nadir Khan were also sent towards the north they occupied the grave yard which are always on high ground. There were further shots being fired from the village on the searching parties, Lieutenant Sander was about to throw a grenade on the suspected building when the Khassadar pointed out that it is a mosque, Sander's refrained from doing so.



By 0800 Hours the initiative was taken away from the Tochi Scouts, Wazirs now swarmed around the village, sniping from the northern hills, wisely Reford called off the search and sent the signals for the withdrawal, and this is where the whole drama started. The signals went astray, initially there was green vary light for Russel and flag for the Sanders but now it revealed that there are no green vary light with the force. Thus whereas Sander managed to reach the bridge with the prisoners, Captain Russell remained at the northern knoll; he was hit in the knee.

Captain Reford now took the remaining platoons back towards the knoll to extricate Captain Russell and duly managed that, putting Russell on a stretcher and ordering the stretcher bearers to take him back to the bridge; Russell was sixteen stone in weight and it was difficult for the stretcher bearers to take him in one go, thus they managed to creep towards the bridge when Wazirs further tightened the noose around the Tochi Scouts. The fighting was now taking place in three different places with Wazirs trying to complete a ring around the scouts and Reford was bent upon not to let it happen. A ground signal was given to the RAF aircraft, which was flown by Lieutenant Mukherjee (later Indian Air Force Chief) who came back with .303 ammunition and dropped them using his flying shoes; he also strafed the hostile tribesmen. Reford efforts to get the reinforcement from the army road protection party through a runner and Helios also failed, he sent one of the lorry towards Dosalli where Lieutenant Bill Moberley was there, luckily the lorry was intercepted by Captain S.I. Hassan formerly an assistant political agent at Wana but now posted to Tochi Scouts, he intercepted the lorry and soon he arrived at the Tappi with two platoons followed by Bill Moberley with another five.

Captain Russell was left with in the protection custody of eight riflemen and two stretcher bearers along with his orderly Lal Jan,

soon the riflemen dispersed to take up positions to counter the fire of Wazirs and Russell in the end was left only with his orderly Lal Jan. He had been placed under a boulder and in the end it was only Lal Jan who remained with him Lal Jan stated '*Captain Russell told me to go and find Captain Reford, I said, I shall not desert you. Captain Russell insisted on my going. I asked for his pistol, as I was afraid that if the Ghazis arrived they would take it. He said; Go off, do not worry about the pistol, I have two men to protect me*'.<sup>183</sup> After an hour of pitch fighting with reinforcements also joining in the force was able to extricate it self, Captain Hassan was the first one to saw the headless body of Russell. One of the stretcher bearers Khan Badshah Khattak later narrated.

*'I was one of the four men who carried Captain Russell. The other three were Adam Khel from Nadir Shah's platoon. They and Captain Russell's orderly deserted us. I was then left alone and unarmed with Captain Russell. I heard Subedar Ali Mast telling these people to take up position covering us, but no body paid him any attention, they all went on, including Ali Mast. I sat beside the stretcher and saw three Ghazis coming up the nullah. One came quite close to us; he had a short clipped beard. Captain Russell said they are Khassadars, but I said no. I think he said that to keep my spirits up. He then told me to go and find Subedar Ali Mast or Captain Reford and ask for men to save him, so I set off, the last time I saw Captain Russell he was sitting on the stretcher smoking a cigarette, his hand on the pistol*'.<sup>184</sup>

A court of inquiry was held very next day in which the whole episode was threadbare sorted out. Reford was absolved of all his actions; Boob Young was not rectified for the command of Tochi

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<sup>183</sup> *Frontier Scouts*, pp., 231 -233.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid*.

Scouts. *Captain Finch was decorated with a Military Cross, Wilayat Shah with the Indian Order of Merit, and Havildar Yar Shah with an Indian Distinguished Service Medal.* Jemadar Nadir Shah was permitted to proceed on leave and not to report back, Russell's orderly was sacked and sentenced to imprisonment and so were the stretcher bearers. Not only for running away but also for lying to the court of inquiry.

Captain Russell's head was chopped by the Fakir of Ipi's General Shudi Khel Hamzoni and taken by the Lashkar. Later with the efforts of political authorities, the head of Captain Russell was retrieved. After few days Tochi Scouts as part of Tocol again marched into the Tappi, the boundary walls and the houses of all anti government tribesmen were destroyed.

## 1941

In February, the deteriorating law and order was mainly confined to lower Khaisora where joint Scouts and army action was conducted. An entirely wrong impression would have been given if it were thought that the Scouts whole work consisted in operations of military or semi oppressive character. The Scouts, in fact being Pathans themselves tend to be on good terms with the local people and maintain the friendly relations between government and the tribes which are the foundation of any advance on the frontier, 'remarkable oasis of peace round Dosalli and Garioum'<sup>185</sup> the primary issue was that tribesmen regarded army as an enemy and not only that but a soft prey as well.

There was a silent and sometimes vocal complaint that Tochi Scouts is not carrying out Gasht as much as they should. The

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<sup>185</sup> *Border & Administrative Report North Waziristan 1939-1940.*

political agent's report highlights *'Ideally the Scouts gasht every hill in Waziristan at all times of the year day and night. In fact the most remarkable achievement of the Scouts this year has been the fact that their gashts have been almost as extensive and frequent as they were in the piping days of peace four years ago'*.<sup>186</sup> Between 1<sup>st</sup> October 1940-31<sup>st</sup> December 1940, 216 foot gashts were carried out and a total of 850 for the year.<sup>187</sup> In 1943-44 Army in order to avoid trouble with natives forbid Tochi Scouts gashts for the reason that they wanted manpower in Burma. Major Ralph Venning (he later commanded SWS) was not the type to take orders from army, *'He took a strong gasht of Tochi Scouts in the mid of night to the top of an isolated peak VezadaSar and early in the morning lined up all his Helios on to Gardai, knowing that district commander is there with the signal 'good morning from Tochi Scouts on Vezada Sar... I was not going to have a General telling Scout where they could go and not go'*.<sup>188</sup>

Mir Shah Jan was the outlaw star of the year, he destroyed water channel, burnt Khassadar picquet No.28. Kidnapped Zarif Khan of Darpa Khel, looted the mail lorry of retired Tochi Scouts Subedar Rasul Khan. On 5<sup>th</sup> March he kidnapped a Hindu girl near Idak and on 11<sup>th</sup> April kidnapped two Hindu students along with one Muslim student; He was hunted by the Tochi Scouts successfully. Lieutenant Desmond Cable was the hunter; he caught him with the lorry just before dark near Idak. Cable found the dead body of Tochi Scouts Hindu contractor inside the lorry stabbed. Mir Shah Jan's gang had taken away the two wheels of the lorry, Cable returned to Idak with his gasht and informed Miranshah about the situation which

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186 *Border & Administrative Report, 1941 – 1942. NWA, MiranShah.*

187 *Frontier Scouts, p – 225, referring to the letter written by Adjutant Tochi Scouts to former officers of the Tochi Corps.*

188 *Frontier Scouts, p- 258.*

promised to send the two wheels in the morning, however in the morning Cable's informers brought the news that the gang had put on the two wheels and driven the lorry further four miles up north where due to technical fault they have left the lorry. Cable along with the reinforcement marched to the place; the scouts came under heavy sniping, 'the colonel (of a regular battalion supporting Cable) turned down the offer of a combined assault...Cable assaulted with his Tochi Scouts'.<sup>189</sup> In the end six outlaws were killed and the gang leader was captured, Scouts suffered three wounded casualties.

Lieutenant Colonel Rupert Taylor who had served in the Tochi Scouts in early 1930s assumed the command; he was serving in Gilgit Scouts. He thus became the first Lieutenant Colonel to become the commandant of Tochi Scouts; it was in 1998 that the rank was upgraded to Colonel. Tochi Scouts now had three Wings each commanded by a field officer. The blue prints for Khajauri Fort were ready in 1940 but financial constraints did not permitted its immediate construction, the Fort was ready by end 1947.

### **Qalandra Sar**

Captain John Lowe was posted in Tochi Scouts in the summer of 1941 and by June he was commanding the post at Datta Khel. There is psyche which prevails among all newly posted young officers; to take part in action, they want to prove first of all to themselves that they are men, they are brave, they can face danger and can lead the Scouts. This is different from regular army where the British officers have company of fellow officers but in Tochi Scouts at the posts they were all alone. They took time to learn the language and the customs of the Pathans. Lowe had very little to do at the post, there was not much of work other than to fight, he spend many days just staring,

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<sup>189</sup> *Frontier Scouts*, p – 237.

glaring and contemplating at the mountainous terrain listening to the tales of past. One night he simply decided that enough is enough and next day early in the morning he took the gasht. He led the gasht on the northern track, there is a proper motor able track that links the Datta Khel with Boya, however a track on which Lowe marched is a foot track that bisects the motor able track and then Lowe took the gasht to the peak of Qalandrasar. Down below he had a full view of the Tang Village (Khaddar Khel Tribe) situated on the bank of River Tochi; Lowe saw the village swarming with tribesmen definitely not with good intention. Captain Lowe aimed and fired, his bullet hit the tribesman, the shot echoed and then deathly silence. The rest of the gasht was not in picture that Lowe intends doing this; they were outnumbered. The gasht was spread over the precipice ridge with thin conifers below. Jemadar Khattak realised the implication of this precipitous action and took appropriate positions. The tribesmen now started climbing the hill from multi direction. Captain Lowe was unnerved and kept on firing accurate rounds onto the hostiles keeping them at bay. The platoon had sent a signal to the Akhtar picquets close to the Qalandra Sar. Tribesmen retreated but Jemadar Khattak was dead because of a bullet wound, his orderly Hussein Shah remained with him till the end and was able to lob two grenades on the approaching tribesmen who finally retreated.

Captain Lowe was also wounded and so were two other scouts who were taken by the tribesmen to the Tang. The two wounded scouts were tortured ‘the torture was supervised by the Malik whose son was killed that day...they were scorched and flayed with boiling water’. There mutilated bodies were later handed over by the Tang lashkar to Maizal a local Khaddar Khel who was the contractor of water supply for Datta Khel post.

## **Muslim Officers**

Also from 1940 onwards Muslim Officers were also posted in Tochi Scouts, Lieutenant Mohammad Sharif Khan (Pakistan Army No. 69, 10 Baluch Regiment) joined Tochi Scouts on 13<sup>th</sup> December 1940, and he remained with Tochi Scouts till 1946. Lieutenant Syed Iftikhar-ud-din (PA No. 67) from armoured corps was posted in on 1<sup>st</sup> November 1941; he remained in Tochi Scouts for a year. Lieutenant Aziz ud Din (PA No. 82) joined Tochi Scouts in 1942 and served as wing officer, adjutant and wing commander before his reversion in 1946; he came back in 1951 as Commandant. Lieutenant Rahim Khan ( PA No 101, 2 FF) also came at the end of 1942 and served in Tochi Scouts for four years, the last officer to join in before the independence was Captain Khurshid Alam Khan ( PA 243, 15 Punjab) he came in April 1947 and was posted out in January 1948.

## **Boya under Attack**

Captain Terrence Phillips was the post commander at Boya, which also came under attack in the fresh wave of violence on the scouts and army during the summer; with Terrence at Boya the senior Subedar was Lal Muhammad and Jemadar Jamdad Yousafzai. Boya had no field artillery gun, only Vickers Machine Gun. The fort made of mud with high walls, on the northern side was the Tochi River and on western side there were orchards, the mud houses of the village it self had mushroomed all round yet the southern side was comparatively open; the mud track leading to Degan- Khar Kamar- Datta Khel passes a hundred yards in the south. Within the fort which had over hundred scouts the life was confined, unlike Datta Khel they had not much space to carry out any gardening to pass time. Layout was primitive, an open space in the middle which serves as a parade ground and also as a play ground. There was

water well rather two in the fort. The nerve centre of the fort was the wireless room which had communication with MiranShah, the pigeons were also there. The news of Tang Affair had reached the Boya and it was expected that sooner or later some action is bound to happen and it did. On a sleepless August night the whole fort shook with the explosion followed by cracking noise of machine gun and shortly lit by the vary light and fire. Captain Terrence Phillips narrate.

*‘As I reached for my chaplis...the Vickers gun on the roof fired a long burst, the retreating explosions echoing through the fort, there were running feet on the cat walk and opened doors showed the yellow gleam of oil lamps and the moving shadows of men struggling into their equipment. In the well of the fort everyone was milling around in dense dust from the bursting of a shell inside the walls. It had passed through the wireless room and burst against a verandah support, severely wounding in the head JemadarJamdad and blowing off his hand, he thought he was dying and impressed upon me that Havildar Jalal ud Din Yousafzai should have the vacancy. Even others had been wounded, but the sub-assistant Surgeon worked quickly and well’.*<sup>190</sup>

The firing duel continued all night, with fort holding the ground, luckily there were no more heavy artillery shells fired( it was later revealed that Fakir’s gun had a mechanical fault). The fire was coming from the western side, RAF was alerted but it was not possible to provide support at night, the adjoin low hills on the northern side made low flying almost suicidal; it was early morning that the first aircraft came. Musa Khan post also provided fire support at night, by Fajr prayers the main thrust had died down.

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<sup>190</sup> *Frontier Scouts*, p-138.



Next morning it seems as nothing had happened, the Daur villagers came to see if the fort is intact or do they have any chance of carrying out the loot, they brought fruit. Daur generally remained neutral in such conflicts always looking for their long term survival and interest.

### **Biche Kashkai 1941**

In the same summer of 1941, Sepoy Nazar Gul a Tarakzai Mohmand while on night guard duty tried to kill the three officers including Lieutenant Sharif who was the post commander and Lieutenant Lowe accompanying the garrison engineer who was on the inspection visit of the post. At night while all three officers were sleeping outside the mess with mosquito nets over head, their charpoyes were few feet apart. Lieutenant Sharif was awakened by a fire shot, he narrates

*‘There was another shot I saw the flash, then a third flash and Lowe disengaged himself from the mosquito net, yelled ‘stand to’ and ran to his quarter for his revolver. As the fourth and fifth shots rang out, I ran for mine. We came out together. There was a great hallagullah, people shouting ‘stand to’, Vary lights going up and a few shots. I thought a Ghazi knife-party had got into the officers quarters and we would soon be split open. I ordered Subedar Lal Din to take a roll call’*

Garrison Engineer was struck with two bullets but he miraculously escaped, the white mosquito nets saved the officers as the assassin was unable to take a right shot. Later it was revealed that the Sepoy Nazar after firing the shots had ran away with the rifle as well; he belonged to the Qaum of Subedar Lal Din. Commandant Lieutenant Colonel Rupert was adamant that all Tarakzai in the Tochi Corps

should be discharged. Lieutenant Sharif & Lowe risked their own career by threatening to resign if this action is taken on the ground that whole tribe should not be penalised for the act of a single man.

It will be a misconception to think that there was nothing else going on in the agency other than the war, on the contrary, a total of 16523 plant saplings were distributed during the year in the agency for plantation and tribesmen showed keen interest in forestation.<sup>191</sup>

### **Summer of 1942**

Summer of 1942 is regarded as one of the decisive history making season, it has been made more famous with classic movie of same name, and it was the summer when Hitler launched ‘Operation Barbarossa’ the attack on Russia. Fakir of Ipi also launched his main attack in the same summer. In Tochi Scouts Major Jan Janson and Major Ralph Venning were the Wing Commanders

In the summer of 1942, the Faqir of Ipi once again made a supreme effort to capture this most exposed Tochi Scouts Fort, The Datta Khel. At that time, it was commanded by Lieutenant Sharif Khan and its post Subedar was Muhammad Lal Din. The Lashkar closed around it on 1<sup>st</sup> May 1942, beginning a siege, which was to last just over three months. The harsh reality was that neither in Razmak nor in Bannu there were enough trained troops to relieve Datta Khel. Fakir in his lashkar had many deserters from army and scouts; one such deserter was Zamir an Afridi who tried to convince Lieutenant Sharif on desertion but failed.

Lieutenant Sharif was not much worried. He was aware of the fact that Datta Khel had been besieged before for five to six weeks,

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<sup>191</sup> *Border & Administrative Report, 1940-1941, MiranShah.*

and he had three months supplies, also he had two Vickers guns and a 2.75 inch mountain gun, he also had plenty of ammunition.

### **Rescue of RAF Pilots**

The usual tactics were employed on the Datta Khel, initially shelling coupled with propaganda. The lashkar later intensified their shelling. Sharif answered with his three inch mortar. Tochi Corps Headquarters urged Sharif to replicate Lieutenant Lerwill's action of 1938 but in Sharif's opinion the things have changed and as such he preferred being inside the fort 'Qilaband'. Sharif's other worry was the malaria; his twenty five scouts were down with it.

A plan of action was formulated in which an attack on the lashkar was planned; Sharif was to carry out the attack or the gasht early in the morning with RAF aircraft supporting it with fire power. Sharif was out with his three platoons after the Fajr prayers and two aircraft of RAF also appeared on the horizon approaching from the east at low altitude. Suddenly the lead aircraft had a smoke coming out, he pitched his nose up in order to gain height, able to execute a turn and during the turn lost height and disappeared from the sight seconds later a loud bang was heard. The second aircraft headed back to MiranShah

Tochi Scouts decided to rescue the downed pilots not even knowing whether they are alive or dead. They could see the wreckage which was closer to them than the lashkar. Sharif, Lal Din and a platoon ran as they are participating in Khad Race. They left one platoon to provide them the cover and to hold back the lashkar. A pilot was an expensive commodity for the lashkar, they in past (in 1928) had mutilated one and there was no reason to believe that same will not happen to these in case they are alive. Lieutenant Sharif

finally beat the lashkar in reaching the aircraft; it was smoking, wings broken and fuselage still intact. With difficulty Tochi Scouts were able to get the two pilots out from the shattered cockpit amidst shooting of lashkar. Pilots were badly burnt but alive. Lieutenant Sharif arranged a stretcher party which carried both the pilots.

*‘We were in a dangerous plight, Lal Din had got both the platoons in defensive positions, but the enemy was coming up in overwhelming numbers and would soon be all around us. I told Lal Din we must withdraw while we could...Lal Din stood in the open to signal the platoons with his flag to withdraw. A lot of lead was flying around and I thought, this is all wrong, me in cover while he stands in the open, so I stood beside him. He actually smiled at me and said “No sahib, you are the gasht commander, this is no place for you”. I thought that if I did take cover, he would never talk of it, but others would. So I stayed beside him, he flagged out his orders...platoon number, withdrew signal, then pointing with his flag to the lay back position, each signal duly acknowledged. I was very frightened, thinking I was certain to be hit and wondering where the bullet would strike. Above all I feared being taken alive, for mutilation was certain. The enemy was so close that we could hear their threats to castrate us and so on, I saw one man chewing his beard as Mahsuds and Wazirs do to frighten you’.*

The Sharif’s force was saved by the arrival on the spot of two RAF aircraft which strafed and bombed the tribes, pinning them down there by allowing the Tochi Scouts to withdraw. Scouts were retreating in an orderly manner, the rear platoon now provided the fire support and cover and as they move back they came under the protective umbrella fire of Datta Khel’s machine gun; finally every one entered the safe heaven. There were seven dead and as many

wounded. The lone medical cover was the Hindu sub assistant surgeon, who worked his heart out and saved many precious lives. Aircrew consisted of Anglo Indian Christians, pilot Moses and Larive the observer were in critical conditions, Larive narrated that aircraft had a technical fault and he sustain burnt mainly in evacuation of Moses. On the other hand Moses was certain that he is not going to survive, his last words were of love for his wife. There were seven dead bodies which had to be buried; there was deathly stink in the fort air. Burial has to be done outside the fort wall, possible only in hours of darkness. Lieutenant Sharif conducted the ceremony in graceful manner, separating the lone Christian Moses from the Muslims.

Next day, Commandant Lieutenant Colonel Rupert Taylor marched from MiranShah along with Lieutenant Andrew Downess at the head of a 16 platoon Star Gasht, they stayed the night at Boya and reached Datta Khel two days after the incident. Next morning Tochi Scouts moved out from the Datta Khel, it was a classic encounter of the medieval era, the force marching out from the fort and from the other side the tribes also lined up; only the braves will survive the day, no place for a weak heart. The night before few had sound sleep especially the young ones including Downess, he hailed from Paisley (Scotland).

### **Wucha Shaga-Datta Khel**

The scouts marched out of the fort with bugler sounding the bugles, at five miles south of the fort plateau near Wucha Shaga, both forces met each other at a distance, firing on each other. Lieutenant Sharif narrates

*'It was an indecisive action, both sides shooting at one another from parallel ridges, neither able to gain any advantage. I saw one Scout wounded far down the forward slope. One of his tribe ran down to rescue him. It was terribly hot day and the hill side was very steep. He slung the wounded man across his shoulder and staggered up the hill, but soon had to put him down, rest and have a drink. Then he picked up his friend and struggled up a few more yards before again putting him down. He eventually reached the top with two bullets in him...there was an ilex tree on our ridge and some crack shot on the other side knew the range to a yard. Every man who went near it was shot. Andrew came up and I said, 'you keep clear of that tree'. He laughed and replied (he had a slight stammer) "I am all r-r-right I am too big b-b-big to be hit". At that moment a bullet got him in the chest and in a few seconds he was dead'.*

By early afternoon Rupert broke off the action and retreated towards the fort in a leap frog action. Havildar Karrar Shah an Aka Khel Afridi was also the qaum commander. He noticed one of his newly trained sepoy without his rifle, on inquiry the sepoy replied and also showed his broken wrist which had taken a bullet. Karrar was furious 'I am not going to have these Khattaks laughing at us Afridis because we drop our rifles. Go back and get it'. The boy went down the hill under cover of fire and fetches the rifle amidst tribesmen fire, in the process his puggri was shot off his head. Havildar Karrar was not satisfied and inquired about his puggri, emphasizing that how important it is for the pride of his qaum that he should fetch back his puggri. 'As he picked up his puggri one bullet grazed his stomach and another hit him in the ankle but somehow he wobbled back, a stick in his sound hand, rifle slung over his shoulder, puggri jauntily cocked'.

To puritans it may look eccentric but then this is what Scouts are made of, the role of qaum is paramount, a Scout will fight for the honour of his qaum more than what he will give for the national cause. When a recruit is inducted and he is recruited on the basis of the qaum, the senior qaum officers engrave this concept of nothing is more important than the qaum, they live and die for it. In regular army the regiments and colours play the same role but qaum is much stronger than any thing else. In other tribal societies the same concept of tribal affiliation has acted in garnering the fighting spirit among the men.

Lieutenant Sharif again had to act as pall bearer; planks from Officers Mess were used to make a coffin and a cross for the Andrew. *‘Andrew was lowered into the ground and I threw some earth on him, which is our custom too. I did not know what to say, so I repeated the Lord’s Prayer, ‘Our Father which art in Heaven’, which I remembered from my schooldays at Bishop Cotton’s school in Simla’.* As the last rites were being performed a fusillade came which forced them to cut short the ceremony. Commandant left Datta Khel next day, disappointed and broken in spirit. He had failed to achieve any thing worthwhile and above all the death of Andrew was heavy on his heart.

### **Attack on Datta Khel**

After a week lapse Sharif and his native officers sensed that Ipi is planning to launch an attack either on Datta Khel or at Akhtar Piquet.<sup>192</sup>

*‘ at around 0030 hours I went to bed after planning for all eventualities and having a final round of the watch towers, at around*

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<sup>192</sup> The archives at Miran Shah had a copy of a hand written note which was sent by a spy on the pay roll of political agent regarding the activities of the Ipi’s lashkar.

*0110 hours I was awakened by mighty crashes, one after the other, both shells having blown my bed room sky high. I leapt out and saw the bombardment of the fort by three guns at an estimated range of 1000 yards. Myriads of fire volley were flying in our direction. The Junior Commissioned Officers Mess, the pigeon loft and hospital cook house simply disappeared while other parts of the fort were only grazed and a good number of rounds were only 'duds'. The fearful 'whoosh' of the approaching shells at less than 500 yards range from blazing battery of guns terribly frightening. The machine guns from the north and south towers of the fort fired belt after belt to boost the morale of the troops positioned on the parquet even Akhtar piquet also joined in from extreme range. I also ordered to fire 50 rounds rapid by three inch mortars. As I came down the steps I saw Larive hobbling about and yelling for help, he was fast asleep when the shell hit the hospital cook house, he narrowly escaped.'*

Tochi Scouts were besieged for six more weeks, hoping everyday for reinforcement but there was none. After three months the siege was suspended, once Sharif got a message that Tochi gasht is leading the Razmak Brigade and heading towards them for rescue. Faqir of Ipi failed to capture Datta Khel garrison. His failure to take Datta Khel marked the beginning of decline in Fakir's power.

Special correspondent of Times of London was fortunate enough to visit the Datta Khel with the relieving column led by Major General R.B. Deeds .

*'the column has just relieved the fort of Datta Khel...whose supplies have been cut off for three months by a crude almost indolent sabotage of road communications...it was manned by a detachment of Tochi Scouts a tough mobile body of irregulars recruited among the Pathans, the corps like similar formations in tribal territory is*



*commanded by British and Indian officers seconded from army and their fame has spread far. The manner in which they lope across difficult country and when in danger melt, as it were into the stones has to be seen to be believed...The garrison of Datta Khel is commanded by an Indian Officer ( Lieutenant Sharif) who has distinguished itself for the daring of some of its sorties against gangs concealed in surrounding hills, not without losses to it self...it would be a mistake to exaggerate the prestige of supposedly fanatical Fakir of Ipi...he has gathered around him a few gangs of irreconcilable brigands...attempts by the Axis propagandists to foment trouble among the tribes have failed...amid their wild forbidding hills slashed with deep stony gorges and winding nullahs where snipers may lurk for days and never be seen you come under the spell of the virile tradition built up by the generations of British soldiers. Except for a measure of mechanisation and the now familiar patrols of the RAF flying under extremely hazardous conditions frontier warfare is very much what it was 50 years ago... General Deeds's plan was to follow a shorter road over the hills...if there could be an element of surprise in a land where so little can be kept secret, it was this thrust through hostile country...the first phase was to advance with all mechanised transport to a perimeter camp at Mami Rogha. Next day troops went forward to occupy the plateau and the surrounding heights at Lwargi Pass...a strong body of Tochi Scouts converged along the crests to head off any tribesmen threatening the column's right flank...everything succeeded admirably despite difficult country...road to MiranShah was cleared of obstacles and reopened to motor vehicles'.<sup>193</sup>*

### **Jemadar Said Gul**

Jemadar Said Gul a Kuki Khel Afridi has the distinction of being the first Scout Jemadar to be decorated with Military Cross, before

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<sup>193</sup> *Times of London*, 13<sup>th</sup> August 1942, Page 5 Coloumn 6.

him this award was given by the King only to King's Commissioned Officers. Tochi Scouts also have the honour of being the first Scouts to have Victoria Cross in 1915.

It was a cold Friday night and regular gasht had gone out from MiranShah towards the Boya when the Morse Code operator received a message from a Gurkha Battalion on road protection had one of its patrol under fire at Tappi. Captain Dick Corfield was at the mess and he volunteered for the gasht. Gasht was an improvised gasht, it was almost a repetition of Tappi Gasht few years back, any observer observing would have been astonished at this historical resemblance. Gasht was comprised of cooks, drivers, recruits, drill instructors all under Jemadar Said Gul. Commandant Lieutenant Colonel Janson was on leave other wise he would have never approved this venture. Dick Corfield was newly posted and as such he was exuberant to see the action. The platoon went by bus and debussed at the same place where Tappi gasht had debussed, only difference this time was that there was no political officer along and command was singular. It was fifteenth of moon thus there was a lime light available. The platoon moved under the command of Said Gul as Dick Cornfield had no idea about what all is happening. Said Gul knew that he has to train the officer as well in the fine art of frontier warfare. The ridge on which the platoon had to walk was narrow although not as sharp as Iblanke Ridge, they walked towards the Tappi. Fire came heavily and unexpected from a crest. This was Cornfield's first experience of Frontier and Tochi Scouts

*'I took cover two feet from a young Khattak, my arrival being greeted by a burst of fire and a bullet kicking up the dust between us. We both looked at the spot where it had landed and I shall always remember the look of pure joy and amusement in his face before he fired back. He was actually enjoying it'*<sup>194</sup>

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194 *Frontier Scouts*, p - 259

Jemadar Said Gul moved around the platoon knowing fully well that these scouts are not battle hardened as yet. It was his leadership and fearless display and disregard of danger which lifted the morale of the platoon, he positioned them and regulated fire. Hostile fire was coming from the crest and before moving forward it has to be neutralised. Said Gul told Corfield to provide him the covering fire and he himself along with four other scouts stealthily walked up the crest amidst a volley of hostile fire, at the crest Said Gul practically charged at the miscreants and in a hand to hand battle thrust his bayonet into the heart of a miscreant. Jemadar Said Gul also received a thrust of dagger in his thigh; he remained at the crest which allowed the rest of platoon to climb up. The fires from the platoon enable the Gurkha to carry out a safe exit.

### **Murder of Darim Khan.**

Lieutenant Colonel Sandy Sandison was the last of British Commandants he took over in end 1946; he took over from Lieutenant Colonel Janson who remained in command from 1943 -1946. Sandy Sandison came from South Waziristan Scouts; he was the first commandant to have his family at MiranShah.

There was desertion at Idak where seven scouts deserted with rifles and later four recruits also deserted without weapons.<sup>195</sup> Sher Ali was one of the deserters rather he was the gang leader and now he started looting and sniping the convoys on the road. Idak became his base; Sandy Sandison was adamant to hunt him. A strong gash with Sandy himself leading with Major Alec Moore his second in command leading another gasht from Miranshah to close the trap. Captain Benjie BroomHead & Captain Dick Corfield were at Thal – in – Tochi with covering force. Keeping in mind the Tappi fiasco

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<sup>195</sup> *Border & Administrative Report 1945-1946 and also see Frontier Scouts, p-261.*

Sandy Sandison was not taking any chance. Major Sharif was the Wing Commander at Idak and accompanying the force as this was his area of responsibility. Sher Ali's tactics were to hide among the Zer mountains close to Idak after carrying out a raid. Sandy had laid a Chapao for him with Moorehead forcing the Sher Ali to move into the Chapao. At the end Sher Ali was trapped in caves and surrendered only on one condition that he will give up the arms only to Subedar Wilayat Shah. Tochi Scouts had no major casualty only Subedar Ramzan was shot in the back which damaged his spinal cord.

Frontier Warfare is strange and Sher Ali was no exception, he was given long punishment (ten years) which was reduced by Governor Cunningham to eighteen months; Sher Ali was later employed by the Commandant Sandy Sandison for the protection of his wife. 'I had some very interesting talks walking round the garden, when he recounted his exploits and the mistakes I had made'.<sup>196</sup>

Second Great War was over in Europe in May and in Asia in August 1945, both events are celebrated as Victory in Europe Day (VE) & Victory over Japan Day (VJ) but there was no such day to celebrate in Waziristan. In the year there were 1165 incidents of sniping in North Waziristan. One fine morning in October 1945 when the newly inducted recruits were carrying out the drill at the parade ground out side the fort, a bomb exploded blowing up the right leg of the Sepoy Dil Bahadur. The parade ground later had a heavy roller rolled from one end to the other by the suspected tribe under the supervision of the recruit's tribe havildar.

Fakir of Ipi remained a thorn in the otherwise peaceful end to an era. The year opened with Ipi's opposition to the construction of

<sup>196</sup> *Frontier Scouts*, p- 263.

posts in Datta Khel. On 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1946 his followers demolished Khat Pani Piquet. In April he summoned the leading hostiles including Mullah Zawahir Shah to plan further actions, at the end a 'Konra' expedition was planned against the tribes who were soft on government. This was a major success of the political administration that they were able to wow certain tribes away from the Fakir; the most notable among these tribes was Manzar Khel.

Fakir and his followers also discussed starting 'Ghaza' or a holy war but tribes could not reach a joint agreement as from where to start this holy war as no tribe was willing that it should start from their area. In the end it was decided to continue attacking the scouts & Khassadars posts and road. Fakir left Gurweikht for Tandi Kot in Shawal accompanied by Khawaja Wali Macha, aim was to gather the support of Mahsuds in his campaign, he was unsuccessful and came back to Gurweikht on 10<sup>th</sup> April 1945.

The cumulative impact of all these movements was an attack on 28<sup>th</sup> April at the Gardaí Camp, similar attack was launched on Razmak on 30<sup>th</sup> May and on 4<sup>th</sup> July MiranShah was attacked. In all these attacks the rockets and artillery was used. At MiranShah on Tochi Scouts five shells were fired at evening. The regular games were going on, scouts were playing football and officers were playing tennis. One shell hit the hangar at the northern end without causing any major damage materially but these shelling had a morale value also. Scouts by this time were immune to these nuisance and their daily routine maintained it's routine. Recruits training in the morning which started with the Fajr prayers, a period of physical training then breakfast. After breakfast there were training classes for machine gunners, artillery, mine lying, wireless and so on. Recruits training maintained its own flair in which drill was given the highest priority.

Routine office work with a time for tea-break, inspection of magazines, cleaning of weapons, maintenance of military transport, issue and repair of uniforms, leave, sick reports and every thing that goes with the 3000 man power. Tochi Scouts had three self contained wings, their administrative issues, pursuing the construction of the Khajauri Fort, dealing with pension issues, taking care of the next of kin's of deceased scouts, ration, ammunition, weapon; all in all an unending but an satisfying and enjoyable life pattern. What makes this life exciting was the element of inherent risk in it, as the undirected shell has displayed. It could land anywhere so there was no fear and life went as nothing has happened at all. Tochi Scouts was relieved of the duties of protecting the RAF hangars and airfield, two Khassadar havildars and seventeen sepoys were enrolled for this purpose.

In 1944 MiranShah and Tochi Scouts were visited by the Commander in Chief General Wavell, he also visited Datta Khel.

Manzar Khel tribe made peace with the government by producing 11 of their hostiles; this was resented by Fakir and abetted by Khandan Khan. On 7<sup>th</sup> June 1945 a large tribal lashkar of Madda Khel headed by Mian Saleh and Khawaja Wali entered into Mamirogha Manzar Khel territory, they were met by Manzar Khel maliks headed by Subedar Darim Khan (retired) he had the backing of Malik Arsala Khan & Sherjan Madda Khel. They gave their own reasons and logics for not being a party to Fakir of Ipi. The issue of Konra was the main point, Fakir was bent upon taking Konra from Manzar Khel and Darim Khan was not willing to do so, thus a plan was devised with the backing of Fakir of Ipi to eliminate Darim Khan. Manzar Khel was united under Darim Khan and they repulsed another intrusion of Madda Khel on 14<sup>th</sup> July 1945.

The giving of hostiles to the government was an unacceptable and Madda Khel under Malik Khandan Khan wanted to make an example out of Manzar Khel for other tribes. Political administration stood for the commitment made to the Manzar Khel; Tochi Scouts were detailed to occupy Tut Narai on 27<sup>th</sup> July 1945. Captain Aziz ud Din was the scout's officer in command with six platoons, more than hundred Khassadars from Tori Khel, Khaddar Khel apart from Manzar Khel own Khassadars were sent as reinforcements.

Manzar Khel and the Konra Lashkar were equal in force, Madda Khel made the first move and on the night of 23<sup>rd</sup> July sporadic sniping attacks were carried out on Mamirogha Village, these shots were answered by the villagers and Khassadars. Darim Khan was the main target and on 27<sup>th</sup> July the hostile lashkar employed a gun, light machine gun and medium machine gun on his mud fort without causing any serious damage. A mysterious weapon 'Shabal-baz' was employed by the lashkar it was a gun which fired anti aircraft shells. On 28<sup>th</sup> July Lashkar occupied the outlying hamlets of Om & Wala. Tochi Scouts acted as a referee and with its presence gave the moral support to Darim Khan.

Sher Jan of Madda Khel tried to affect a compromise by which it was suggested that Manzar Khel should at least make token Nanawati and lashkar made suggestions to the Manzar Khel to pay a nominal Konra; both suggestions were rejected, turned down indignantly by Manzar Khel. The presence of Tochi Scouts kept the lashkar in reins, in the end lashkar in frustration attacked an outlying Khel (Bariam Khel) looted all the livestock, a boy name Zawata Khan was killed, women's jewellery was looted and in the end lashkar dispersed. Fakir lost his face because tribes resented looting of women jewellery 'act of lashkar had been strongly vilified by many

Wazirs who had declared it to be far from Ghazwa'.<sup>197</sup> Ramadan fell in August and later Eid ul Fitr gave a much needed break but Fakir of Ipi was now bent in attacking the Manzar Khel, the tribesmen belonging to Manzar Khel were robbed and looted.

Fakir of Ipi had declared the shariah in the area but what constitute shariah was not clear to the tribes, Fakir had imposed Konra on certain tribes but they refused to pay citing their own maulvi verdict in support. Mullah Zawahir Khan who had been an ally of Fakir also refused to do so. Fakir of Ipi made another trip to Jani Khel Shawal to unite Wazir- Mahsud but failed. Fakir now made his move to disunite the Manzar Khel by stating that he intends taking Konra only from Darim Khan and not from the whole tribe. Fakir wrote letters, distributed leaflets, and used his maulvi and other persons of influence to hammer his message and threat to all that no one should allow any government employee in the villages. Villages of Mir Ali, Palali and Tappi were focused.

In November 1945 Abdullah Khan Madda Khel planned the murder of Darim Khan on the instigation of Fakir of Ipi. On 30<sup>th</sup> November 1945 at around noon, Darim Khan was waiting out side a Hindu shop at Mamirogha while his eldest son Gingat Khan was making some purchases. Khassadars Sarwar a trusted man of Darim Khan shot him in the back and later killed his son on the spot too.<sup>198</sup>

Major Sharif now commanding No.1 Wing was at Datta Khel when he received the news of Darim Khan's murder, immediate action was required to instill the confidence among the Manzar Khel and above all Darim Khan was an icon, a personal friend of Tochi Scouts, a man of honour, a man who had faith in himself and he stood

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197 *Border & Administrative Report, 1945-1946, North Waziristan Agency, MiranShah.*

198 *Border & Administrative Report 1945-46 also see Frontier Scouts, p- 258.*



for that. His principal stance against Fakir of Ipi over the cooperation with the government was in line with the tribal Riway, where every tribe is independent and free to look after its own interest. Darim Khan was not impressed with the Fakir of Ipi's version of Islam. Major Sharif on his way to Mamirogha was able to borrow a gun from the army brigade at Gardaí. The two assailants of Darim Khan had taken shelter in a village mud tower

*‘We arrived at Mamirogha to find the village Jirga surrounding the tower. There was a lot of shooting going on, but when we positioned 25 pounder guns, it all stopped. A grey beard man shouted up, “come down or the gun will fire”.*

One man came down, and said the other had been killed by a bullet through a loophole. He said he and his friend had been promised by the Fakir of Ipi a rifle, a wife and 1000 Rupees for killing Darim. Another account gives the amount as Rupees 7000 and two rifles each.

The old grey man offered the solution; survivor must die in the hands of the Darim's surviving son or there will be endless blood shed. Murderer took this decision without displaying any weakness of emotions, Darim's sons had a little conference among themselves and accepted the decision of the Jirga, Darim's son took a couple of steps backward, the murderer remained emotionless and then a single shot went through his forehead and he died on the spot.

In 1946 the general elections were held in India and Mr Jawaharlal Nehru was elected as premier, in NWFP it was the Congress which formed the government. The rays of independence now became clearer and tribesmen sensed it. Nehru visited Waziristan to muster tribesmen support in independence. He first visited MiranShah but

received a cold shoulder and later the same attitude was shown at Razmak also. There is an unconfirmed story circulating in the area that Nehru was slapped by a Mahsud<sup>199</sup>. From March onwards the communal riots started in Waziristan with Bhattanis and Mahsuds leading the foray. However Tochi Scouts were able to prevent the same massacre in Bannu.

In July 1947 British parliament passed the Transfer of Power bill under which British India was to be divided into two dominions Pakistan & India on 14<sup>th</sup> August 1947, Muhammad Ali Jinnah ‘Quaid Azam’ was the Governor General of Pakistan and Lord Mountbatten that of India.

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199      *Narrated by Brigadier Qayyum Sher Mahsud, a former deputy inspector general of Frontier Corps, event took place at his grand father’s residence. Also see Times of London 18<sup>th</sup> October 1946, Page 4 Coloumn 4.*

## TOCHI SCOUTS 1947 - 1960

Indian Act Of Independence 1947, was passed by the British Parliament on 18<sup>th</sup> July 1947, it had an impact on the Tochi Valley and Tochi Scouts because of clauses dealing with tribes & Durand Line issue, it states.

*‘There lapse also any treaties or agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and any persons having authority in the tribal areas, any obligations of His Majesty existing at that date to any such persons or with respect to the tribal areas, and all powers, rights, authority or jurisdiction exercisable at that date by His Majesty in or in relation to the tribal areas by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or otherwise’.*<sup>200</sup>

In simple words all the obligations and treaties including the payment of allowances in North Waziristan ceased to exist, the treaty with Daur Tribes of 1895 also terminated, there was nothing clear regarding the status of Durand Line and this fog remains in air for some time. The International Law in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention, on the Law of Treaties states, *“It is accepted by all that whenever a new country or state is carved out of an existing colonial dominion; all the international agreements and undertakings that the previous ruler of the region had entered into would be transferred to the new independent national government.”*<sup>201</sup>

Communal riots had already started in India from 1946 onwards but from March – April 1947 they erupted in Frontier Region, the

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200 <http://www.legislation.gov.uk> Indian Independence Act 1947. Also see The Times, 4th July 1947.

201 Treaties”. United Nations. Accessed on 26th January 2011. <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm>

most affected town was Tank, where Mahsuds & Bhittanis had a field day, city was put under curfew. Tochi Scouts saved Bannu City from the wrath of tribesmen. Tochi Scouts provided refuge to all Hindus, Tochi Scouts had Hindus as canteen contractor and as transport contractor since inception.

The British officers present in Sub Continent were given a choice of either joining the Pakistan or the India.<sup>202</sup> Both dominions had a shortage of trained manpower and administrators to run the new dominions. The number of British officers who opted for service with Pakistan was far more than those who opted for India. There is a general theory that British favoured Hindus more than the Muslims, it is unfounded and not based upon the facts and reality. The hard fact is that British had much more cordial relations with Muslims than with Hindus; one key factor for this is the fact that both are believers of books. In North Waziristan and for that matter everywhere in India it were Muslims who were the martial race, the fighting men, men of status, people who readily gave their blood for their own honour, straight forward simple, neat and clean.

### **Independence Day**

On independence day a ceremony was held in which the Union Jack was lower down for the last time from the quarter guard and from the commandant's office flag mast and Pakistan's Flag was hoisted, Commandant Lieutenant Colonel Sandison gave a short and brief speech congratulating the Tochi Scouts for this honour and pledging to work with the same zeal as before. None knew what will happen next, Tochi Scouts unlike Gilgit Scouts had never been involved in politics.<sup>203</sup> Being Ramadan the coming Eid ul Fitr was

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202 ShaukatRiza Major General the Pakistan Army 1947 – 1949, pp., 145 -175.

203 Gilgit Scouts in November 1947 staged a coup and initially declared independence and later annexation to Pakistan was announced.

celebrated with a festive look. In MiranShah the festivities took place for days; a lull before the storm.

### **Tribesmen & Kashmir**

There were over 550 states in India and majority of them had sign the accession to the India and Pakistan. The independent states that included state of Kashmir and Jammu had the option of joining either dominion or remain independent; however the last option was never seriously considered. There were no conditions on the ruler regarding his choice of accession, it was presumed that logic would prevail upon all and these rajas will follow the rule of majority thus Muslim majority state of J&K to join Pakistan and Hindu majority states of Hyderabad and Junagarh to join India; in the end they all defied logic. For the demarcation of the area (Punjab and Bengal) a boundary commission was set up under Sir Cyril Radcliffe a prominent lawyer, his mandate was ‘to demarcate the boundaries on the general principles of Muslim and non Muslim population and keeping other factors’.<sup>204</sup>

Radcliffe Award was announced on 17<sup>th</sup> August 1947 a Muslim majority district Gurdaspur was awarded to India, immediately it further fuelled the already explosive communal atmosphere, trains of Muslim refugees were burnt, looted, raped, killed and abducted in Sikh states adjoining the Pakistan in East Punjab especially the Patiala.<sup>205</sup> The tribes of Waziristan rushed to the help of their brethren; they were helped by the Tochi Scouts in term of logistics.

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204 [http://www.legislation.gov.uk/Indian Independence Act 1947](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/Indian%20Independence%20Act%201947) (accessed on 3<sup>rd</sup> November 2010) also see PervaizIqbalCheema*The Politics of the Punjab Boundary Award working Paper No 1, September 2000, (University of Heidelberg)*

205 Discussions of the Kashmir Dispute in The Security Council *Security Council Official Records Third Year 6th January 1948-29<sup>th</sup> December 1949* (Lake Success, New York) p.43.

Pakistan Army<sup>206</sup> at that time had following share of military assets. No.6 Bahawalpur Division, No.7 Division (Rawalpindi) No.8 Division (Karachi) No.9 *Frontier* Peshawar Division No.10 Division (Lahore) and Waziristan Area which had four brigades namely Wana, Razmak, Bannu & Gardaí. Lone 3<sup>rd</sup> Armoured Brigade (it had six regiments) formed the punch of Pakistan Army. In artillery Pakistan had one heavy anti aircraft regiment, one light anti aircraft, one mountain, two field, one medium and a mountain regiment were the share. Lone Air Observation Post was also under artillery. Just for the record the No.12 Division was raised in November 1948 at Peshawar, the very first division raised after independence.

### **Chain of Events**

Two events simultaneously took place, the Kashmir and the withdrawal of army from Frontier ‘Operation Curzon’ and they both created chaos. From the tribesmen perspective both seems to be an extension of each other, from the state point of view both were separate. But this was the first time in modern period that tribesmen’s strategic value for Pakistan was highlighted.

Pakistan relied upon the tribesmen to capture the Srinagar; on 4<sup>th</sup> October 1947 a Republic of Kashmir<sup>207</sup> was proclaimed at Rawalpindi’s Hotel Paris. On 23<sup>rd</sup> October 1947 the tribesmen were twenty odd miles away from the capital Srinagar, the lone power house was destroyed, the Wazir tribesmen were as savage on the non Muslim population of Kashmir as they were on them in Tochi Valley, killing European women; they were nuns.<sup>208</sup> On 26<sup>th</sup> October

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206 ShaukatRiza Major General, *Pakistan Army 1947 – 1949* (Services Book Club, 1989) pp. 176 – 188.

207 Alastair, Lamb. *Incomplete Partition the Genesis of the Kashmir Conflict 1947-1948*(Services Book Club, 1999) p, 135.

208 *The Times*, Saturday 25<sup>th</sup> October 1947.also see *The New York Times*, November 24<sup>th</sup> 1948.

Maharaja signed his accession agreement with India which was accepted conditionally by the Mountbatten. Indian Forces started pouring in the Valley<sup>209</sup> Tribesmen acted true to their nature and left the Kashmir, they acted the way they wanted but their military skills and exploits gave leverage to the Kashmiris.

### **Operation Curzon**

Government of India had principally decided in February 1947 to withdraw all the regular forces from Waziristan,<sup>210</sup> later Quaid I Azam as a sign of goodwill gesture towards the tribes also endorsed the same policy. Warning Orders for Operation Curzon were issued on 1<sup>st</sup> October 1947 and all regular army posts were vacated by the end of the year, which included Mir Ali, Razmak, Wana, Gardaí and Damdil. For the tribes this was a god send opportunity to carry out the loot. Withdrawal of the army was not an easy affair and it was performed with a professional incision. Tochi Scouts provided the road protection and acted as rear guard. Tochi Scouts also had to abandon the posts at Datta Khel, Khar Kamar, Tut Narai, Razmak and Boya; which were burnt and stripped by the tribesmen, taking away everything and anything that they could lay their hands on. Even today while travelling on road MiranShah to Datta Khel one comes across many old houses which have steel girders stolen from these posts. RPAF aircraft were used for evacuation of casualties and for guiding the army guns in a rear guard action.<sup>211</sup> Field Marshall Ayub Khan who remained President of Pakistan (1958-1969) was commanding a brigade at Gardaí and said '*that but for an odd attempt*

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209 *The Times*, Tuesday, October 28<sup>th</sup> 1947.

210 Douglas Marsh *Ramparts of Empire, India North Western Frontier 1919-1947* , unpublished Thesis, University of Austin, 2009, p- 263., also see Lieutenant Colonel H.E.M.Cotton, *Operation Curzon-Evacuation of Waziristan, Royal Engineers Journal*, 62,(1948),pp.183-196. Also see Pakistan Army 1947-1949, p- 257.

211 Azam, Cheema, Madni, *History of Pakistan Army Aviation 1947-2007*(Army Press, Islamabad, 2007) pp. 2-13.

*or two to 'booby trap' his men here and there by Ipi's hostile men the operation went off smoothly as planned.*<sup>212</sup>RPAF came to the rescue of army, two squadrons were in support, and No.5 Squadron flew 47 sorties, carrying out strafing over the tribesmen.

Thus independence changed the things very little in the Tochi Valley and for Tochi Scouts the life went as it was before. 'No one who has ever read a page of Indian History will prophesy about the Frontier'. (Lord Curzon)

Fakir of Ipi was the now thorn in the bouquet of Pakistan because of his interpretation of the independence, his attention was towards the political issue regarding the Durand Line. He now became a tool in the hands of the Afghanistan, which wanted to repudiate the Durand Line.

Forward Policy was another cause, the policies do not simply die down with transfer of power rather they are a living thing because they affects the lives of living humans, Russian fear was a reality and a genuine thing, cold war had started and British could not leave the area just like that. Pakistan from its inception or even before that was a pro western country, in other words it was anti communist. Quaid I Azam read the congratulatory message of the American President in the constituent assembly, the very first country to send its felicitations. Pakistan was part of an international conglomerate which was pro democratic and anti communist. From Pakistan's perspective the country has not only inherited the treaties signed by the British but also the undeclared and unsigned Great Game; it became Pakistan's game now.

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212 *Captain A.R. Siddiqui (correspondent of Civil & Military Gazette) quoting Brigadier Ayub Khan, article published on 5<sup>th</sup> February 2005, in Dawn Newspaper.*



## **Operation Datta Khel**

Tochi Scouts had this unique honour that the very operation which changed the geo-strategic position of Kashmir for ever was carried out by an officer who had served in Tochi Scouts and aptly named as ‘Operation Datta Khel.’<sup>213</sup> Captain William Brown served in Tochi Scouts 1946-1947 in No.2 & No.1. Wing, he spent almost a month at Datta Khel. Brown was commissioned in a Frontier Force Regiment in 1941, transferred to SWS, served in Gilgit Scouts, came back to Tochi Scouts and then to Chitral Scouts and finally took the command of Gilgit Scouts after resigning his King’s Commission. He planned the operation on the instigation of Lieutenant Colonel Bacon who remained as Political Agent in NWA and was the Inspecting Officer of Frontier Corps in 1947, the Governor of NWFP George Cunningham also served as the political agent at NWA and the very first political agent at Gilgit after the accession to Pakistan was Mr.Aslam who was assistant political agent at NWA in 1940.

### **Lieutenant Colonel Sadiqullah Khan, M.C.**

Colonel Sadiqullah Khan, M.C.,(6/13 FFR) the first Muslim Commandant of Tochi Scouts took over the command in January 1948. A ‘newly promoted captain to lieutenant colonel’<sup>214</sup> he was promoted directly from the rank of captain commanding an infantry unit for only few days. Sadiq was an experienced Scout having served in SWS for three years. Tochi Scouts was the first of the Scouts to have a Muslim and native commandant (SWS had it in June 1948, Khyber in June 1949, Chitral in 1949 & Kurram in 1950). The

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213 *Major William Brown, the Gilgit Rebellion, (Ibex, Rawalpindi, 1998) p- 117. Also Victoria Schofield Kashmir in Conflict; India, Pakistan & the unending War (London, Taurus, 2010) p-63.*

214 *Guardians of Frontier, p- 158.also see Major Nawaz Khan Valiant Scouts (Frontier Corps, Peshawar, 1997) p.19.*

move was aimed at pacifying the Fakir of Ipi but it failed to achieve the aims as Fakir was too stubborn. Sadiquallah did move many steps forward and to some extent he achieved his aims. The mess & fort was opened to the tribesmen, Sadiquallah himself a Pathan and Orakzai was a fresh change and natives were finally convinced that British had left.<sup>215</sup> Sadiq later rose to the rank of brigadier and Inspector General of Frontier Corps as well. Wing Commanders of Tochi Scouts at independence included.

Major Jobre Penrely	Second in Command
Major Sam Samman	Wing Commander & later Second in Command also
Major Dick Corfield	Wing Commander
Major K.M. Chambers	Wing Commander
Major Khurshid Alam Khan	Wing Commander from 16 <sup>th</sup> August 1947.
Captain Jimmy Green	Adjutant

Deployment of the Tochi Scouts was as under

No.1 Wing & Headquarters at MiranShah,

No.2 Wing at Mir Ali; recruits were also stationed at Mir Ali, two officers, 14 Junior Commissioned Officers and 618 other ranks<sup>216</sup>

No. 3 Wing at Khajauri

No.4 Wing at Thall on Kurram

No.5 & No.9 Squadrons detachment were also stationed at MiranShah in support of Tochi Scouts. These were the only RPAF squadrons which were in direct support of Scouts. An armoured

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<sup>215</sup> *Guardian Frontiers*, p-164, *Frontier Scouts*, p-228

<sup>216</sup> *Tochi Scouts Letter No.110/10/6/38 Dated 27<sup>th</sup> April 1964*

squadron of Guides Cavalry was also placed at Mir Ali because of its strategic location. Tochi Scouts formed a mobile force by integrating the armoured and own Scouts. A battery of artillery was also placed in direct support of the Tochi Scouts located at MiranShah.

### Special Purpose & Short Service Regular Commission Officers

In 1947 due to shortage of army officers the above mentioned scheme was introduced exclusively for the Frontier Corps, a total of 39 officers were granted the commission, the scheme was discontinued in 1951. In Tochi Scouts almost ten officers including Lieutenants Taj Gul, Wilayat Shah, Muhammad Ibrahim, Kush Ahmad UlMulk, Sher Ahmad Khan, HidayatUllah Khan, Mahboob Shah, Feroze Khan, Maud Ali Khan, Akbar Gul Afridi, Rehmatullah Durrani and Khawaja Muhammad Ali Khan served in Tochi Scouts commanding Wings and performing other regular duties. They all were Pathan and remained on General List and acting as Pool Officers. It was a good concept but somehow it was discontinued in 1951 but officers remained in Scouts till 1955.<sup>217</sup> It would have been more appropriate had more junior commissioned officers serving in the corps be promoted to this position but lack of education was the major hindrance in this regard.

Captain (PA 911) A. I. Akram, 1/13 FF. joined Tochi Scouts in July 1947 and remained here till August 1948( he later retired as lieutenant general and also colonel commandant of FF Regiment). Lieutenant (PEC 12948) I.A.K. Lodhi was the very first Education Corps officer, he also served for a year. Lieutenant Tor Khan of Guides Cavalry, he belonged to Campbellpur, a fine wing officer he remained for almost five years starting from July 1947. On 19<sup>th</sup>

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<sup>217</sup> *Head Quarters Tochi Scouts Long Roll of Officers Serial No.1 -500; also see Valiant Scouts, p.22.*

July Lieutenant Muhammad Sher of PAVO Cavalry also reported with Tor Khan, he went on to command a wing and departed in 1950. Captain Usman Ali Khan of 8<sup>th</sup> Punjab reported in last week of July 1947 and performed the duties of quarter master for a year. Lieutenant Wilayat Shah I.D.S.M (Tappi veteran) has the distinction of being the very first officer of the Tochi Scouts after the Independence; he was already present in the Tochi Scouts as Subedar, he was given the commission on the same very day. He served as wing officer till 1954 when he went on pension from Tochi Scouts. Major Saifullah Khan (PA 166) was the very first field officer posted as wing commander after independence he reported at Tochi Scouts on 24<sup>th</sup> September 1947. Lieutenant Taj Gul (PSP 530) also reported at Tochi Scouts in October 1947 and assumed the command of a wing in April 1948. Another interesting officer was Captain Muhammad Aslam of 12 FFR, he joined in March 1951 as wing second-in-command, he remained Adjutant of Thall Scouts, as Adjutant Tochi Scouts, in charge of training, commanded No.3 Wing at MirAli, reverted back to army in 1954, and he came back to Tochi Scouts as commandant in 1965.

### **Tochi Scouts & Kashmir War**

Kashmir War was a convoluted affair, in which Pakistan Army was not taking part officially because of international law and the fact that all the services were being commanded by the British Officers and Kashmir issue was already put in Security Council on 3<sup>rd</sup> January 1948. However a covert operation was planned and put into action under the leadership of ‘General Tariq’ his Nome de plume, he was Colonel Akbar Khan.<sup>218</sup> General Messervy the commander-in- chief was in picture and held the similar view. Tariq was a unit officer of

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<sup>218</sup> Shuja Nawaz, *the First Kashmir War Revisited*, India Review, Vol 7, No.2, April-June 2008, pp.115-154.

Sadiqullah Khan and both met accidentally at General Headquarters Rawalpindi<sup>219</sup>. The end result was that Tochi Scouts were committed to the Kashmir Cause for the reason that they being a civil armed force did not come under the international law of intervention. Commandant offered a strong company of 200 Tochi Scouts. This Scouts company was the first Scout assistance that was rendered to the cause of Kashmir by the Pakistan .Tochi Company went via Peshawar to Rawalpindi and from there one contingent of two platoons under Havildar Mardan were transported to the Muzaffargarh-Chakoti-Uri-Srinagar Axis. The rest of the contingent under Subedar Hamid Gul was transported to Jhelum from where they entered into foray, sniping the road Naoshehra-Rajaori which was the first contour of communication moving up from the plains towards Srinagar, where Indians were threatening to concentrate.

*'Indian forces had fought a pitched battle against the raiders (Pakistani) at Naoshehra, who gave the Indians an opportunity to use their heavy weapons and thereby inflict heavy casualties...2000 dead out of tribal force of 15000'.*<sup>220</sup>

Subedar Hamid Gul was happy to be here, it was the first time in his service where the enemy was not shrouded and it was the enemy which he has been looking for. Infidel, idol worshipper, men not worthy of being called as men, a culture corrupt to the core, Hindu women who are slave of phallus, worshipper of Shiva. Hamid Gul had no mercy for such a race, he was blood thirsty. 15 years of service in Tochi Scouts he had been a gentleman, abiding by the Riway and laws of warfare. Frontier Warfare was not based upon ideology at least from the Tochi Scouts perspective, the force was never used more than what was required, extermination of people or conquest of territory on which the warfare revolves around are

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<sup>219</sup> *Guardian of Frontier*, p-163.

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid*, p-17.

not applicable in North Waziristan. This point was misunderstood during the 1919 and 1936 campaigns. Tochi Scouts had to live with the tribes and to make them also live in peace thus force is selective in nature but here it was an open war; Hamid Gul was free to hunt the Hindus.

Tochi Scouts were employed for conducting ambushes which they preferred to call it 'Chapao' on the Naoshehra – Bhimber and Naoshehra – Rajaori road and in March 1948 were involved in the defence of Jhangar.

Hamid Gul had two successful 'Chapao' one at Pir Badesar and other near Chingas. He avoided pitch battle, mere hit and run and hit again. Causing delay and fear among the Hindus. He once had to wait for over four hours in cold to snipe at a Hindu soldier. He is credited with making home made mines which he planted on the road.

In April 1948 new Pakistan Army Chief General Douglas Gracey committed Pakistan Army to the defence of the country and to put a stop to the Indian threat towards the Jhelum Bridges, by stopping the Indian advance not beyond Uri-Poonch-Naoshehra line. His appreciation even today stands as the fundamental of Pakistan's military strategy

*'If Pakistan is not to face another serious refugee problem...if India is not to be allowed to sit on the doorsteps of Pakistan to the rear and on the flank...if the civilian and military morale is not to be affected to an dangerous extent and if subversive political forces are not to be encouraged and let loose within Pakistan itself, it is imperative that the Indian Army is not allowed to advance beyond the general line Uri – Punch – Naoshehra'*<sup>221</sup>

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221 *Pakistan Army 1947-49*, p – 275.

Tochi Scouts company was transferred to the defence of Chakoti, as part of 101 Infantry Brigade which was responsible for the defence of Jhelum Valley. Tochi company was attached with 5/12 FF, 4/10 Baluch and also with 1/13 FF . In May 1948 the Indians had two infantry divisions, No.19 Infantry Division which was the old Srinagar Division & No.26 Infantry Division the old Jammu Division. Tochi Scouts had the No.19 Division as the opponent with its two brigades No.161 & 163 Brigade but mainly it was the latter. The Pakistani commander was Brigadier Akbar Khan (Brigadier Sher Khan had now assumed the Nomen de Plume of General Tariq).

From 20<sup>th</sup> May 1948 the action starts when Indian launched their attack. Subedar Gul along with twenty other sepoy was on a patrol rather 'Gasht'. On 25<sup>th</sup> May 1948, between Chakoti and Urusa, Hamid Gul and his platoon encountered the Indians; after a pitch battle Subedar Hamid Gul and Sepoys Arsala Khan, Muhammad Khan, Naik Jamroz & Lance Naik Fazal Shah all embraced shahadat. On 31<sup>st</sup> May, Havildar Mardan & Sepoy Mirza Mir also attained shahadat due to enemy artillery fire, on 27<sup>th</sup> /28<sup>th</sup> June Sepoy Mahboob Shah also expired due to battle wounds. Sepoy Said Hassan died due to mine blast in 1949 days before the cease fire.<sup>222</sup>.

Tochi Scouts fought vigorously shoulder to shoulder along with other liberators. Detail of Shaheeds are:-

Subedar	Hamid Gul
Havildar	Muhammad Khan
„	Mardan
Naik	Jamroz
Lance Naik	Fazal Shah
„	Tawab Shah

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<sup>222</sup> Tochi Scouts, Official Record, MiranShah.

Sepoy	Haider Hussain
„	Mirza Mir
„	Mehboob Shah
„	Said Hussain
„	Arsala Khan
„	Muhammad Khan

### **May-July MiranShah; 1948**

On the morning of 3<sup>rd</sup> May 1948 when the Tochi Scouts had fallen at the parade ground on the southern side of the fort, the commandant had taken the parade when the first burst of the machine gun rattled the air, scouts hit the ground and protective detachment fired back, there were only two scouts who were injured; with this burst the peace bubble also burst and reality dawned that nothing has changed much. Lieutenant Colonel Sadiqullah was confident that he has been able to create an atmosphere in the agency in which the old feuds of the British Raj has been settled. He had sent a message of good will to Fakir of Ipi and also invited him to the MiranShah; the invitation was turned down.

By mid May Miran Shah was practically cut off from the Mir Ali because a hostile lashkar had occupied the ridge overlooking the road MiranShah-MirAli. RPAF was called for assistance and lashkar partially retreated and road was opened but three days later on 8<sup>th</sup> May they came back numbering 400. One of the causes of such hostility was the newly built and occupied post at Isha. The battle lasted for well over eleven hours with RPAF carrying out nine sorties. Tochi Scouts had the support of Guides Cavalry squadron and artillery fire. The road was opened but violence again erupted in the agency.



Datta Khel which was vacated by the Tochi Scouts and occupied by Khassadars was finally captured by the Fakir of Ipi, Boya came under attack and recruits at Khajauri were fired. Thal on Kurram was surrounded by the Fakir of Ipi. Fort was relieved on 15<sup>th</sup> June 1949<sup>223</sup> with a combined action of RPAF and Tochi Scouts. Boya was attacked on 21<sup>st</sup> June and capitulated. Fakir now controlled all the area west of MiranShah till Durand Line. Punitive action was taken and expedition was carried out which lasted till 8<sup>th</sup> July 1949. Severity of action can be gauged from the fact that RPAF expended 72 bombs, 108 rockets & 4600 rounds of ammunition, 500 pounds bombs were used for the first time in this conflict.

### **Ipi Village Operation**

On 6<sup>th</sup> July 1948 an operation was conducted against the Ipi Village the home base of Fakir of Ipi. Thirty followers of him were captured including his Khalifa Said Emir. The operation was conducted by the No.3 Wing at Khajauri, officers who took part in this operation included Major Taj Gul, Lieutenant Tor Khan, Lieutenant Muhammad Ibrahim, Captain Muhammad Iqbal Khan was the artillery officer, Lieutenant M.U.K. Khalil was responsible for the provision of military transport and Lieutenant Muhammad Sher as adjutant coordinated the operation. On the night of 5/6 July the village was surrounded, there were confirm intelligence reports that Fakir's followers are gathering to carry out an attack on the Tochi Scouts. More than 400 Scouts surrounded the village. In an act similar to Tappi the political agent and Khassadars were taken along who informed the inhabitants to vacate the village, which they refused.

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<sup>223</sup> *Times of London* 16<sup>th</sup> June 1949, Page 3 Coloumn 4. Also see *Times of London* 10<sup>th</sup> July 1948, Page 5, Coloumn 3.

Ipi village has Mulligan Suleiman Village on its east which is as big as Ipi Village itself and on its west is a small village by the name of Alam Kot with Idar Khel lying two miles in south which is the biggest of all the habitats. The area west of Ipi is relatively higher than the east.

Tochi Scouts along with the armoured squadron surrounded the Ipi Village, the relatively higher ground was also occupied and artillery observer placed himself here. The miscreants were housed in a compound south-southwest of the village and they gave up without much of fight. Twenty rounds of artillery were fired to subdue the hostiles. Said Emir tried to escape under the guise of a woman wearing burqa but was killed in cross firing a mile away.

*‘The Fakir of Ipi’s village in North Waziristan was surrounded by Tochi Scouts yesterday and 31 tribesmen who were members of an Ipi band were captured. Later the house of Said Emir another notorious rebel was also surrounded and he was killed in attempting to force his way through the cordon.’*<sup>224</sup>

### **1948-Thal Scouts**

In March 1948 the No.4 Wing was transferred to Thall on Kurram, the strength that went to Thall were three officers, 26 Junior Commissioned Officers and 853 Other Ranks. The Scarlet Thread was to have a reserve force directly under command of Inspector General Frontier Corps, later this Wing was evolved into the full fledged Scouts in April 1948 as one wing Corps. Tochi Scouts thus have the distinction of nursing the Thall Scouts.<sup>225</sup>

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<sup>224</sup> *Times of London*, 7<sup>th</sup> July 1948, Page 3, Coloumn 5.

<sup>225</sup> *Tochi Scouts Letter No.5457/Hist/14/A Dated 23<sup>rd</sup> April 1964.*

## **Area of Responsibility**

After raising of Thall Scouts the revised area of responsibility of Tochi Scouts included, On Longitudinal Axis, Tochi Valley from Khajauri-Datta Khel and on Latitudinal Axis, from Spinwam (Kaitu River, Bannu City) in the East & South East to Razmak (Dossali in Khaisora Valley).

## **1949-Reoccupation of Boya**

In 1949 it was principally decided that the previous posts should be reoccupied and as a first step Boya was reoccupied, 8 Platoons of Tochi Scouts including 12 Junior Commissioned Officers and 443 Other Ranks under the command of Major Amanullah Khan( he later commanded Tochi Scouts 1958 -1961) & Captain Muhammad Iqbal Khan were embarked on this venture. Boya had sustained serious damages, it was stripped from inside to bare bone and outside the damage to outer wall and tower was mammoth. It was made functional within a fortnight and this led to another skirmish with Fakir of Ipi.

## **1950-Tarakai**

On 20<sup>th</sup> January 1950, the RPAF was again summoned to aid the Tochi Scouts against a large lashkar in Tara Gharai area near Spinwam scouts post, and again on 17<sup>th</sup> March but this time at the Tarakai feature near Khajauri Post. In these operations Flight Lieutenants Bokhari and F. S. Hussein made repeated low flying rocket and cannon attacks on the hostile hordes that were retaliating with accurate small arms fire. Thus, a concentrated effort was launched by Fakir & Afghanistan to intimidate Pakistan. In 1951 Pakistan & Afghan forces clashed at Chamman (Balochistan)

where RPAF strafed the Afghan forces which were nothing more than tribes. It was a very critical period for Pakistan with both India & Afghanistan threatening on its borders. Tarakai Feature engagement was the fiercest and had far reaching impact. Tarakai Feature (Trigonometric Height 997Feet) lies almost ten miles south of Khajauri in the area of Tori Khel tribe. Khajauri and surrounding area is the home base of Fakir of Ipi. The sniping and ambushes made the road journey a perilous affair, further more it also endangered the MirAli-Biche Kashkai road. Major Nisar Ahmed Khan lead the operation, he had joined the Tochi Scouts in October 1949 with him were Lieutenant Tor Khan and Second Lieutenant Khush Ahmadul Mulk.

The starking difference between the operations of Tochi Scouts now and before independence was the low casualty rate and effectiveness of the operation itself. Reasons are multiple, the command of Tochi Scouts in the hands of the native officers is one factor the other being the freedom of action. Tochi Scouts have finally reached that zenith for which it was conceived, a local force commanded by natives, light, swift, mobile and having integral armoured and artillery. The presence of RPAF at MiranShah was an icing on cake; it gave the cutting edge to the force. All the elements of the force were located at one place, under one command which had no lengthy bureaucratic procedures. Commandant Tochi Scouts and Political Agent of North Waziristan were the decision makers, station commander RPAF at MiranShah was the other part of this triangle. Tochi Scouts had to face the similar opposition as they were facing in the past, enemy was the same so was the area yet the efficiency was increased and with it the lethality. Absence of army units and headquarters was another factor as they have the inherent ability of making a simple operation complicated due to their built

in staff procedures which are good for a lengthy campaign but a drag in Frontier Warfare.

### **Lieutenant Colonel Aziz Ud Din**

In April 1951 the routine change of command took place, Lieutenant Colonel Sadiqullah had a turbulent time and credit goes to him for riding the harsh waves, the problem of Fakir of Ipi still remained the centre of all the misfortunes. Fakir was unable to foresee the grand design of the Russia. His demands for a unification of Waziristan with Afghanistan and repudiation of Durand Line were not practical. Aziz first served with Tochi Scouts from July 1942 till 1946; during which he was appointed as wing officer, wing second in command, adjutant and finally commanded No.3 Wing for three months (June 1946-September 1946). His parent regiment was Frontier Force; Aziz thus was the best choice. He had served in Tochi Scouts in all possible ranks; as a subaltern, captain, major and finally as commandant, a feat which no other officer has been able to surpass, neither before him nor after him.

### **Auld Lang Syne**

With independence a chapter came to an end, the British officers started departing, the last one had his dine out in 1950 (Captain J.N. Ellis). Almost 35 British officers served in Tochi Scouts in the fifty years since its raising as Levies. Some like lieutenant Youngman, Captain R.P. Taylor and Lieutenant A.C.S. Moore served twice in various ranks, only Taylor came back to command it, Janson was promoted here and took over the command. These 35 officers won one Victoria Cross, 13 Military Crosses, one Distinguished Service Order, one Order of British Empire and dozen other decorations which is a testimony to their dedication to the Tochi Scouts, it also

highlights the environments in which Tochi Scouts operated. These awards and decorations are the highest among all Frontier Militias, Rifles or Scouts outfits of Sub Continent. The closest in terms of awards is South Waziristan Scouts with eight Military Crosses.<sup>226</sup>

It was not an easy challenge to train, lead and command militant tribesmen with little in common, their language, customs, religion, rites, culture, colour, dress code, habits were different, yet they were able to create a harmony. There were incidents like when Captain Keene was shot but that was an exception. In 1919 when there was a genuine fear and apprehension of mass defection and murders, it was the native soldiers and native officers who stood by with their foreign officers; this by itself speaks volume of the character of natives also. What made this possible? Was it pay and allowances? Was it the good living environments? Fear of punishment? Or was it that mutual trust that binds men of character, men of honour, men who value values above everything else. No answer can satisfy every one's query but history by itself is the best judge. It will be wrong to assume that Subedar Lal Din stood in the open ground at Datta Khel when fire was going all around because Lieutenant Sharif was Muslim, Subedar 'Miry' a second generation Scout officer did the same for Reeve at Razmak, Havildar Gul Jan also displayed the similar spirit for Captain Prendergast at Lower Khaisora. Subedar Bagh Khan also stood with Captain Lerwil at Datta Khel in 1938, Subedar Darim Khan put his own life at peril to provide covering fire for Captain Jotham at Spina Khaisora, and Sepoy Gul Bahadur at Boya faced the bullet so his officer can have breath of life. All these men came from various tribes, Orakzais, Bangash, Khattak, Wazir, Turi and Afridi to name few. British officers (Muslims came late in 1940) who join Tochi Scouts were not average rather they

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<sup>226</sup> *Balahaisar Yearly Magazine of Frontier Scouts, 1994, p.35 also see Frontier Scouts appendix A, also see Frontier Guardian, p.171.*

were the adventurer, the men for whom military life was the way of life, who admired the fathomless courage of these Pathans. British officers were composed of three distinct regions the English, Irish and Scottish; as such they could understand the tribal system. Captain Lowe despite having a narrow escape from the assassination still pleaded for the retention of the tribe even at the cost of his own career, Captain Smith in 1922 fought hard to have the native tribes within the Tochi Corps.

That was a different era, the aircraft made its debut in this era, motor car came, wireless replaced pigeons, and armoured cars replaced cavalry. Yet that fundamental thread that scarlet thread of military life; 'courage' remain the guiding principle of the Tochi Corps. British introduced shorts which were a novelty in the area and it was accepted, breeches, long boots, cross belt all became part of the dress code of the tribes. The reunion picture of 1931 conveys thousand words about that camaraderie, the British officers lying on the grass arms in arms with native officers speaks volume for it self. Sher Ali was trusted with the safety of his wife by the commandant.

Initially apart from MiranShah at all the posts which could have resident British Officers the life was difficult. Loneliness, extreme discomfort in mud-huts, protected by dry stone walls, sleeping on heaps of straw. However there was compensation for officers. They were given generous local leave for spending much of the time in the messes. The administration was very simple and virtually there used to be no office work. No pay audit, a lump sum was drawn to pay the corps and its full establishment. If the Corps happened to be over-strengthened the extra needs were provided by the Political Administration. There was no shortage of eccentric characters, Major D.H. Moneile Commandant North Waziristan Militia (1909-

1911) had a passion for playing violin and designing steam engines, he had a whole train set in his room and would spend the Sunday running trains between London & Glasgow as per the original time table. Major F.H. Mordall Commandant (1930-1932) had a passion for books. Lieutenant Barlow (1920) was interested in training Pigeons to an extent that he wanted to send messages to Edinburgh, Lieutenant Hawkins (1943-1945) was a keen Tennis player, Captain Dewar (1927-1930) was into cooking, his favourite dish was 'Mary Biscuit Fruit Cake', Mary was the name of his girlfriend who had married his best friend. Captain French (1933-1936) had a snake as pet, list can go on. Lieutenant Boulter (1935-1938) had a pair of Owls in his room; his logic was that their mere presence increases his intelligence. Tochi Scouts was famous for the quality of Tennis; it was something out of MiranShah. They had grass and clay courts and during Wimbledon a parallel tournament used to be held at MiranShah. Officer of the Tochi Scouts regarded themselves as the hardest fighting, longest gashting and deepest drinking Corps. It used to be said that they had a very different style of living as regards to other Scouts officers. They were famous for drinking their beer out of quart size silver tankards. While on leave in Peshawar Club, one would see Tochi officers in flannels roaming bazar, the usual dress used to be sleeveless shirt in summer and in winter, a tweed coat, cap or a slouch hat. Tochi officers were more relaxed and they had more social contacts with the tribesmen. The Tochi Scouts on the whole had a more varied social life than that of any other scouts organization. There was one thing common among all the officers irrespective of the ranks; they all remained in debt,<sup>227</sup> something which was taken as a proof of being a good Scout officer.

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<sup>227</sup> *Tochi Officers Mess old record, MiranShah Archive.*



## **King Saud of Arabia**

Fifties was an exciting time for the Tochi Scouts. In 1954 King Saud of Saudi Arabia was the guest at Tochi Mess, he was paying an official visit to Pakistan and he spent a day at MiranShah. This was the first ever visit of any head of state to Waziristan and to Tochi Scouts. There was a political aim behind having King Saud in North Waziristan and especially among the Tochi Scouts; to blunt the Afghanistan & Fakir of Ipi's propaganda about the Pakistan. What proof bigger than the guardian of holy places of Muslims himself being present at Waziristan to validate the Islamic values of newly born state. King Saud was presented with the shield of Tochi Scouts; the guard of honour was smartly turned out in traditional dress. King was impressed. In the same year a leading Khalifa of Fakir of Ipi handed over himself to the authorities. It must be kept in mind that Government of Pakistan had already given a general amnesty to the Fakir of Ipi in 1948. Thus the graph of violence started coming down and Tochi Scouts reverted to peace time activities after almost a decade and half of constant and continuous Scouting. Gasht was conducted twice a week including night gasht. Training of recruits was given the top priority. A Boys Company was started in 1946 with an aim to provide a steady flow of recruits who are groomed into the Tochi Scouts culture from an early age apart from offering a welfare step to the deceased and retired Tochi Scouts. The interaction with natives also increased with regular football matches with local teams; budding native players were enrolled into the Tochi Scouts purely for sports.

## **Major Zia Ul Haq**

The old pattern of officers from regular army coming for attachment with scouts including Tochi Scouts was still in vogue.

One such officer was Major Zia Ul Haq who remain attached with Tochi Scouts for three months in 1954; he later rose to become the Chief of Army Staff, Martial Law Administrator and President of Pakistan (1977-1988). Zia learnt Tennis at Tochi Scouts courts, he was keen on learning Pashto but somehow linguistics was not his forte, he was an ardent reader of military history. Zia again visited Tochi Scouts in 1961 while he was Commandant Chitral Scouts as part of Frontier Week. Another visitor who rose to distinction is Captain Gohar Ayub Khan (former Foreign Minister of Pakistan) he was in Tochi Mess in 1953.

At national level there was a drive to embrace the tribesmen into national stream. Army relaxed the rules for tribesmen induction, the age limit was between 17-25 years, height five feet six inches, weight 113 pounds and education 4<sup>th</sup> level; same rules were applicable for Scouts also.<sup>228</sup> In 1954 a boy from MiranShah was sent on a scholarship to Australia. Uplift of the agency was another priority; there was a regular mobile cinema which used to tour the agency. More and more land was brought under agricultural use. In 1954 the total acreage under cultivation for fruit was 494 acres which increased to 611 acres in 1956-57. The number of official holidays in 1952 were on ten occasions, including Good Friday, New Year, Shaab Baraat and Nauroze (for Shias only). 14<sup>th</sup> August was celebrated as Pakistan Day, the working hours on Friday were between 0900 -1230 hours. It was in 1955 that Frontier Corps initiated a programme to preserve the history of all Corps. In Tochi Scouts the project to build a stadium started in 1955. MiranShah Fort was expanded.

On international level the Afghan Government still refused to even recognise Pakistan as an independent state, they did so in 1957.

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<sup>228</sup> Secret Letter 4315/4/111/AG/PA dated 24<sup>th</sup> June 1959. MiranShah Archives

In 1956 they conducted a campaign in British Media by writing letters and articles to question the legality of the Durand Line<sup>229</sup> but it was answered promptly by the former Frontier Officers; stating clearly that Durand Line was always regarded as the International Border even during their time. On national level a ministry of states and frontier was created in 1948, the tussle between the central government and the politicians raising the Pakhtun issue remained in forefront. It was bit unwise and against the democratic norms to put these politicians including Ghaffar Khan behind the bars for dissidence.

### **1957-Frontier Corps Week**

The Frontier Corps Week was held at MiranShah, General Ayub Khan the Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army was the Chief Guest. General Ayub had been a regular visitor to the Tochi Mess when he was the brigade commander at Gardaí, one advantage of having the airfield at MiranShah. The preparation of the Frontier Week starts weeks ahead. The Mess and all buildings were given fresh coat of paint. Sports, festivities, food, ‘gupshup’ hullagulla’. Most important and coveted is the ‘Deane Cup’ given for firing, ‘Khad Race’ a ten miles cross country race, Basketball, Football, and Volley Ball matches. It gives the colour and funfair to the Scouts life. Time to meet and revive old memories, time to acquaint with new faces, time to ‘Pass it on’ a time to meet old foes who are always part of Frontier Week wherever it is held and there was no dearth of them in North Waziristan.

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<sup>229</sup> *Times of London*

## **1958-Deployment of Tochi Scouts & Organization**

### **Upper Daur. No.1 Wing**

Torghundi	Picquet
Akl	Picquet
Boya	Company strength, one artillery gun
Pawani	Boya Fort Picquet
Musa Khan	Boya Fort Picquet
Centre, MiranShah.	27 Platoons, Corps Headquarters, No.1 Wing HQ, RPAF, PA

### **Lower Daur.**

MirAli	No.2 Wing 15 Platoons
Spinwam	Company Strength
Tabbi	Platoon Post
Ahmed Khel	5 Platoons
Khajauri, No.3 Wing	9 Platoons.
Chinarob	Picquet
Kamar	Picquet
Gosh Narai	Platoon Post
Kani	Picquet
Tal on Tochi	Two Platoons.

## **Organisation & Culture**

Three Rifle Wings each having four companies, each company having four platoons, each platoon consist of 45 Scouts commanded by a havildar, it had four sections. Company was commanded by subedar, wing by major with two more captains as wing officers. Guns were deployed in piece meal. One gun at Boya, one at MirAli, one at Khajauri and balance of three at MiranShah. In April 1947 the

Boys Company was raised, it had 100 boys being given education with a staff of 25 Scouts. From 1948 onwards the Mounted Infantry was disbanded and a squadron of armoured cars was placed under command stationed at Mir Ali. Promotion of soldiers was based upon the vacancy of their 'Qaum'. There were two parallel laws, codes, customs, prevailing in the Tochi Scouts which were there from inception but now had matured; The Qaum system and Scout system. A soldier was more careful about his standing in the qaum, his loyalty to the qaum, his rallying point, his basis of morale, his fighting spirit all stems from Qaum. Thus platoons were composed entirely of a single Qaum, if platoon has to be augmented than it has to be from the same Qaum.

In the headquarters a lieutenant colonel acted as the commandant with a major as second in command and captains performing as adjutant, quartermaster, military transport officer, gun/signals officer, education officer with one officer as a pool officer. They formed the nerve centre and acted as establishment. purchasing & disposing of equipment.

The Headquarters Wing had a strength of 411 Scouts, with 100 trained in as signallers, 74 as weapon trainers, 38 as drivers, 70 as gunners and amazingly 62 for imparting education to the scouts especially the recruits. There was a simple rule; you cannot be promoted to the next rank till you pass the requisite educational standards which included map reading and geography. Five religious teachers were authorised for the corps. Within the Tochi Scouts there was a strong emphasis on the history. Recruits were imparted with the glorious past the role and tasks the social history in short a peep into the world. Topics were highlighted in the training programme. As it happened the Commandant one day had a round of the classes,

he would not interrupt the proceedings rather just remained on listening end, shortly an explanation was issued to the officer for not knowing the history himself.

### **Specialist Company**

Religious teachers, carpenters, cooks, sweepers, tailors, mochis, bahishtis, ward orderlies, officers orderlies, assistant veterinary surgeon, all formed a Specialist Company. The number of cooks '61' vindicates the point of Captain Fergusson which he pointed in 1902 regarding the absence of cooks in the authorisation manifest. Also the 69 Sweepers on the strength of Tochi Scouts is a testimony to the hygienic debate that was taken with Punjab Government in early days of raising in 1902.

Light machine guns were the platoon weapon; Medium machine gun, Two inch mortars, Three inch mortars, 81 millimetre rocket launcher and Six Pounder anti tank gun were the Wing weapons. Artillery was Commandant's weapon. .303 rifles was the standard weapon with officers having .380 & .450 revolvers.

### *Subedar Muhammad Ali Orakzai*

1957 is a mile stone year for the Tochi Scouts, they won the Deane Cup (they had this winning streak till 1960), new sports stadium was inaugurated at MiranShah, the Frontier Week was celebrated at MiranShah, Tochi Scouts were honoured by the Commander-in-Chief Pakistan Army, General Ayub Khan by presenting the Deane Cup and also being the chief guest of the Frontier week. 1957 was also the first year of Pakistan being a republic and above all it was the year when Tochi Scouts became the first Scouts to be decorated with Sitara-i-Jurrat., Pakistan's second highest gallantry award.

In 1957 a Lashkar tried to overrun the Tochi Scouts post at Boya but attack was repulsed. In this skirmish, the post Junior Commissioned Officer Subedar Muhammad Ali Orakzai embraced shahadat and awarded Sitara-i-Jurrah.

Ipi was not the only one having claim to the religious supremacy, Pir of Shewa & Pir of Karbogha been other two. But Ipi had that stamp of having been to Mecca thus his knowledge was taken more seriously and above all he had that militant backing to enforce his claim which the other two pirs lacked. Mullah Dindar was the most aspiring of all; he had the strategic advantage of being close to Gurweikht. Malik Niaz Ali Khan the nephew of Ipi represents the non religious group, the one which claimed their right to inheritance by virtue of his having a blood line with Ipi; he was the establishment, mixing Religion and Riway.

Fakir of Ipi was the sole authority for making a decision on the campaign and its tactics. Here Ipi would go into mediation 'Khilwat' in the caves for days while his select band of followers stood by on guard, they were good enough to stop a divisional advance, as it happened at Kharre.

Subedar Muhammad Ali was a tall and a lean scout the most prominent thing about him was his cheekbones, he has been observing the change in air. Call it sixth sense but in reality a common sense which starts invigorating in the mind of scouts and with passage of years becomes second nature. The line adopted by Dindar was the religion; it was an extension of Fakir of Ipi's warfare against British. In mid May 1957 the activities of Fakir of Ipi were focused on the upper Daur. Degan became the centre of all kind of activities. Fakir of Ipi considered the Tochi Scouts as the main thorn in his puritan

ideas. Madda Khel and Ibrahim Khel tribes gathered at Pai Khel and moved towards the Boya, then on the morning of 21<sup>st</sup> May 1957 the lashkar encircled the Boya Fort but there were gaps among the tribes which Subedar Muhammad Ali intend exploiting.

Boya Fort was cut off from MiranShah for nine days and on tenth the lashkar tried to assault the fort from north western perimeter, the assault started after Isha prayers. Artillery fire and mortars were employed by the tribesmen obviously supplied by the Afghan Government. There was a breach in the wall but Subedar Muhammad Ali steadfast and in the morning the gap was strengthened. Muhammad Ali knew that best way to ensure the safety of the Fort is through the intimidation of the tribes and by keeping the initiative in his hand. A tribal courier brought the message for a meeting on which Muhammad Ali agreed and it took place on the evening of 1<sup>st</sup> June and after an hour of negotiations the wounded were allowed to leave the fort and conflict to resume again at night. The tribes moved stealthily around the Pawani picquet and overnight occupied the southern ridge line and started sniping on the fort. From the west the Madda Khel started advancing with an aim to join hands with the Hammonzai tribes.

Sun was not set fully when the first volley of bullets came down pouring over the fort from the southern edge this sniping continued for another hour, when all of a sudden a group of tribesmen appeared from the north eastern and western side with ladders and tried to climb the walls; on the other hand the artillery piece of Tribesmen kept firing at gate but it was repulsed by the scouts. Muhammad Ali along with six other scouts was on the rampart when the second wave of tribesmen came near the walls and started shouting and urging the scouts to leave the post and join them. Muhammad Ali



came out of the fort and physically attacked the tribesmen and this act of his raised the morale of other scouts.

Muhammad Ali had his last encounter with tribesmen at the algad next to the western edge of the fort, he was attacked by a tribesman which Muhammad Ali blunted and killed him but then two more tribesmen encircled him and this is where Muhammad Ali died of wounds but his leadership and valour saved the day.

## 1960-1971

### Death of Fakir of Ipi

On 20<sup>th</sup> April 1960<sup>230</sup> the most noble, the most gallant opponent of the Tochi Scouts, son of the soil, Mirza Ali Khan alias Fakir of Ipi had his last breath at Gurweikht, he was suffering from asthma. In modern history no man stands as high as Mirza does. He singlehandedly changed the military history of the region. He with the force of his conviction kept the British Empire on the toes, he was able to achieve something which no other man has been able to do so in the area, he united the tribes especially the Mahsud and many Utmanzai Wazir sub clans or 'Khel's'. He led them. Being himself a Wazir of Tochi Valley his influence was more among them as compared to higher altitude Southern Waziristan Mahsuds. His brilliance was in the tactics which he employed. He was a scholar not a militant yet his plans were much superior to the Generals of regular army. He built an aura of invincibility and divinity around him and also among all those who followed him. Terror was his trademark. His legacy can be gauged from the fact that even today educated men believes that he had the power to turn tanks into stones. His grave at Gurweikht is now a place of holiness where tribes pray. His grave is a mystery.

He is the right saint for the right area; he is the father of modern guerrilla warfare. Today political agents spend monthly over 1, 50,000 rupees to maintain Langar at his shrine.<sup>231</sup> There is a road in Islamabad dedicated to his memory. After his death his nephew Niaz

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<sup>230</sup> *Times of London*, 20<sup>th</sup> April 1960, Page 15<sup>th</sup> Coloumn 3.

<sup>231</sup> *Interview with assistant political agent NWA*, May 2012.

Ali Khan became a puppet in the hands of Afghanistan and Tochi Scouts battle continued.

### **Electricity & Elections**

Sixties were an exciting era for Pakistan and Tochi Scouts, 'Dawn over Frontier' was a movie produced by the publicity department of Government of Pakistan, Tochi Scouts took part in it; it was shoot in MiranShah between 7<sup>th</sup> October-10th October 1959. There were four civilian hospitals, 12 dispensaries in the agency apart from Tochi Scouts hospitals at Boya, Mir Ali, Khajauri, Spinwam and MiranShah. There were four veterinary hospitals in the agency where 6100 animals were given the treatment. The Bulls of MiranShah won the second prize in National Horse and Cattle Show. Electricity came to MiranShah in 1961; it was as heavens have come to the earth. Officers had the experience of living in electricity in regular army but for the innocent Scouts it was amazing. They could not sleep for nights, playing games, laughing, running and simply being exuberant. The Basic Democracy concept was also implemented in the Tochi Valley in which Malik Jahangir Khan a Wazir from Madda Khel was returned unopposed as member of provincial assembly where as Malik Darya Khan a Wazir Tori Khel became member of central parliament.<sup>232</sup> This by itself is a manifestation of the power politics in the valley, Subedar Akbar Khan a Daur also competed for the elections but his papers were rejected. Malik Jahangir Khan in later years presented Tochi Officers Mess Library with a complete set of Encyclopaedia Britannica. The Armed Forces Day used to be celebrated on 8th of January; Tochi Scouts held sports matches in which civilians were invited and political agent distributed the prizes.

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<sup>232</sup> *Border & Administrative Report NWA, 1961-1962.*

## **Good Bye Pakistan Air Force**

PAF contingent had a farewell sortie before leaving MiranShah for good in 1961. Air Force came here at MiranShah in 1922 and for next almost forty years remained an integral part of the Tochi Valley. Tochi Scouts had a special relationship with flyers being the only permanent militia the bond among the scouts and flyers was bound to nurture. A grand farewell dinner and Bara Khana was given for PAF. The social pattern of MiranShah had been conservative in nature since 1900 when militia was raised, however it were the air forces that brought a lively change although temporarily in the society. They arranged weekly movies for soldiers and officers in their area, ticket cost were an Anna and half. Pakistan Air Force used to run the lone cinema at MiranShah, the Scouts posts at Boya, Mir Ali, Khajauri, Spinwam and also at Scouts Serai at MiranShah had a movie once in a month. Present day Tochi Scouts Commandant's residence used to be the PAF Mess; they had their own Tennis Courts.

## **Dir-Bajaur Operation**

Khan of Jandole with the support of the Afghanistan government was hatching anti-Pakistan designs. The reports were unconfirmed; for verification initially a two man Special Services Group team was sent, on confirmation 7 Infantry Division was committed for eradication of the rebels. Tochi Scouts contingent under Lieutenant Colonel Amanullah Khan, the Commandant with Captain Mosam Ali Khan SBT as company commander, Captain Abdul Hamid Khan as quarter master & signal officer, Captain Feroze Alam Khan as adjutant reached Peshawar in August 1960. One rifle company with two, twenty pounder guns, four; three inch mortars and four; .303 medium machine guns were the fire and man power. Tochi Scouts contingent was initially attached with the Headquarters Frontier

Corps, later they moved into the operational area. On 1<sup>st</sup> April 1961 The Bajaur Scouts were raised and the major operation took place in January 1962.<sup>233</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Amanullah Khan was awarded with Tamgha-i- Pakistan on Republic Day (23<sup>rd</sup> March 1961).

From Tochi Scouts initially two Barak Khattak Platoons were transferred and later three more platoons were transferred but their replacements were authorised in the Tochi Scouts. 294 Scouts were transferred from Tochi Scouts to Bajaur Scouts. Detail as under:

Three Barak Khattak Platoons	133 Scouts
One Akora Khattak Platoon	46 Scouts
One Seni Khattak Platoon	46 Scouts
Specialist Mixed	69 Scouts.

### **Corps of Tochi Scouts**

First and foremost from 1<sup>st</sup> October 1960, free ration was introduced in the Tochi Scouts (also in Frontier Corps) the old system where Scouts had to pay for his food was finally replaced. In 1964 the strength was as follow. Officers seventeen, Junior Commissioned Officers numbered 99, Other Ranks were 2315 along with 100 Boys who were part of Boys Company, making a grand total of 3288. Non Combatants Enrolled were 275. Thus all in all there were 56 platoons. There were 27 Cis Frontier Platoons and 29 Trans Frontier Platoons.

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<sup>233</sup> *Guardian of Frontiers*, pp. 319 – 327. Also see *Tochi Scouts annual report for 1960-1961*, p-51.

## Cis Frontier Platoons

## Trans Frontier Platoons

## Khattak;

Barak	6
Bhangi Khel	4
Seni	2
Akora	4
Wazir Jani Khel	2

## Afridi;

Adam Khel	2
Aka Khel	4
Qambar Khel	2
Kuki Khel	4
Orakzai Sunni	6
Shia	2

## Mohmand

Tarakzai	4
Halimzai	2
Bangash Sunni	4
Shia	4
Yusafzai	1
Ranizai	1
Turi	2

1960-61 were years of peace by the standards of yester years. Tochi Corps not only won the Deane Cup for fourth consecutive years but also won Carnatic Gold Cup and unit Team Championship at the annual PARA meet. Tochi Scouts had five forts. Boya,

Spinwam, Mir Ali, Khajauri with MiranShah in the centre. They had a buffer zone of Khassadars between them and the Durand Line. There were 2164 Khassadars, in 1960 two picquets were handed over to them near Isha Post and in 1964 another two near Khajauri were given to them. They were to look after the daily affairs of the Tochi Valley, keeping the roads safe, solving the petty issue. A fine of 878/ Rupees was collected from the drivers on traffic violations in the agency.

Tochi Scouts by composition and firepower was a modern day version of Frontier Brigade formed by Sir John Lawrence in 1846-1849. It had eight guns of 25 pounder calibre, although two were detached with Bajaur Scouts. All the guns were upgraded in 1961. In 1964, four, six pounder anti tank guns were issued rather transferred from Thall Scouts. A squadron of armoured cars, three wings having a strength and organisation of a regular infantry battalion. Intelligence system was operated by the political agent which was efficient. Role was ambiguous, it was not to keep the integrity of Durand Line neither to act as the police man of the area, all these decisions were the prerogative of the political agent and Tochi Scouts was the force in his hand to implement his decisions which in fact were the policies of the Central Government regarding Frontier. The Durand Line and relations with Afghanistan remained sour since 1895 and all the militias and scouts were raised for this purpose. The Brown leather started replacing the Black leather kit from 1962 onwards; it was a financial drain without having any significant outcome but it started giving a classic look to the Scout's impression. The Armoured squadron now belonged to Thall Scouts but remaining under operational and administrative control of Tochi Scouts. For communication Set No.19 and set No.31 were used but Gasht used to rely upon the Flag, Mirror and Aladis Lamp and

Vary Light pistol. Pigeons remained in use. Telephone & Telegraph remained the fastest means of communication.

Recruits training were given special attention despite shortage of officers. In a year (1963) thirteen officers were posted out and eleven joined in, a far cry from early days when two-three officers were posted in/out in a year. In a two years time cycle 214 recruits were enlisted, trained and posted out to the Wings. On the subject of training, only 54 men in Tochi Scouts failed to fire in the annual range classification, 2799 scouts did fire. Out of these 2799 scouts, only 18 failed, 1816 achieved standard shot proficiency, 746 were declared 1<sup>st</sup> Class Shot and 219 became marksmen. It is worth noting that 68 rounds of mortar were fired by the mortar platoon specialists. Drill continued to be given top priority with no less than 23 Drill Instructors trained in own run cadres. 165 sepoy were due for promotion to lance naik after appearing and passing the cadre. There were only nine scouts qualified in English standards three. All scouts eager to serve in Gun and Signal platoons had to undergo an 'umeedawar cadre'. Regular army courses were also available for training in wide range of variety including physical training at Kakul, Education at Murree, Field Engineering at Risalpur, Gun fitter course at Electric and Mechanical Engineering School at Quetta, Basic Infantry weapons courses also at Infantry School Quetta. Boys Company which was initiated in April 1947 had an authorised strength of 100 Boys, out of them 32 Boys were remustered as recruits in January 1964 they also underwent firing classification and 12 Boys achieved a level of marksmanship. The corps annual requirement of Mazri cloth for uniform was 80,000 yards. Station Supply Depot Bannu was responsible for provision of rations. For five months in early 1964 the issue of Vanaspati Ghee was discontinued due to shortage. Corps at its own started the dairy



farm in 1960 at Mir Ali. Tochi Scouts had 45 vehicles of varying load capability.

On medical grounds the idea of recruiting civilian doctors was put forward as there was serious deficiency of trained medical staff. The induction of trained laboratory assistant in lieu of one of the compounder was stressed in 1963. The hurdle was the old pay and accounting system.

The Bannu gate was replaced at MiranShah in 1964, tailor shop was repaired and the woodenballies in officer quarters were also replaced apart from constructing two additional bathrooms at MiranShah for troops. Tochi Scouts gardens were famous in the area and in the year 1964 these gardens alone credited Rs 14, 879 through the sales of vegetables to the fresh contractor for onward supply to men.

### **Discipline**

In 1964 Short sentence in scouts custody was awarded to 54 Scouts, 11 were awarded imprisonment ranging from one year to two months, nine Scouts were dismissed from service and 7 were reduced in ranks. But there was no desertion. In 1961 35 Scouts were awarded short sentences, one was discharge from service with dismissal, six were reprimanded, two were awarded hard labour imprisonment, there were five desertions without arms.

Rifle No. Mark -111/1 and Rifle No. Mark Z 1/1 & 11 were the standard small arms weapons, Officers were authorized with Revolver .380 Smith & Wesson. Light machine Gun 303 was the standard machine gun.

## **Baramptas**

Ten instances of wire cutting took place in 1960 and 24 other incidents of sniping on the Scouts camps. In 1964 the incidents dropped considerably yet there were over twenty acts of sniping on the Scouts, most of the sniping took place at night but no casualties were incurred. MiranShah was hit by a homemade bomb on 23<sup>rd</sup> February 1961. MiranShah hospital was partially damaged through a bomb planted at the north eastern corner. At Mir Ali on 18/19<sup>th</sup> May 1961 a homemade bomb was planted at bus stop but it did not exploded, on 28<sup>th</sup> May, 26 rifle rounds were fired at Goshnarai Picquet, on the same night two bombs were thrown at the Scouts Picquet but they failed to reach even the Picquet. On 29<sup>th</sup> Bannu Bridge was damaged due to bomb explosion, on 3<sup>rd</sup> June, 160 rounds were fired at Spinwam Post. There were two major Baramptas which were conducted in 1960-1961. In the first instance on 14<sup>th</sup> December 1960, Niaz Ali Khan was involved. He gathered a Jirga at Koli Khel to show his dissident over the visit of commissioner to Mama Ziarat a month ago. An emergency telephone message was received (Tochi Scouts telephone number was 10 MiranShah) from the Commissioner Dera Ismail Khan, resultantly the commandant took out a Star Gasht of six platoons, a troop of armoured cars. The political administration was taken on board. Liaison with PAF was also carried out and they were in the air. The Gasht surrounded the hostiles, keeping a safe distance and negotiations started but Niaz Ali Khan was bent upon showing his strength. Commandant soon ran out of patience and ordered harassing fire, 17 shells were fired by the armoured cars which took the air out of Niaz's balloon. The Gasht returned by evening, mission accomplished.

Other incident is bit different from the previous, on 7<sup>th</sup> April 1961; after the Friday prayers the Daur Maulvi instigated the

faithful under the pretext of protesting the Haj quota for the agency (there was only one seat for the agency, which was unfair). However the political administration was pushed to the limits by this repeated agitation, they all tend to further the cause of Pakhtoonistan. A Gasht was taken out and all leading maulvi were arrested, later they were released with an understanding that quota will be increased and they will not carry out any more agitation on Friday sermon. Sectarianism was another key factor; Daur raised a lashkar to help their Sunni brethren in Kurram because of the rumours that mass killing had taken place in Kurram agency. They were intercepted by the Tochi Scouts and turned back.

Third incident was an old feud of over sixty years, between the sub-sections of Bora Khel Wazirs over the division of Sheratalai Plains near Mir Ali, the area under concern is not more than eight square miles but it had taken over 44 lives from both sides

These different and varying incidents highlight the normal pattern of Tochi Scouts way of conduct. Not much different from the past.

### **Tribal Affairs**

In 1961 the very first crisis appeared in the Tochi Valley when government imposed duty on timber export. A Jirga at Datta Khel gave a call for a grand Jirga which was held at Razmak; however government withdrew the duties on 30<sup>th</sup> June 1961. The Jirga in progress applauded the government action the Mahsuds now demanded a free access to the Bannu from Razmak which the Utmanzai Wazir did not agree. The idea of having a grand Jirga every year to look into the tribal affairs floated by Utmanzai Wazirs was overruled by Mahsuds; in the end tribes dispersed without reaching any agreement with government or between themselves.

Wazir numbered 91239 Daurs were 54528, Saidgi 5040, Kharsin 500 and Hindus 635 in North Waziristan according to census of 1961.<sup>234</sup> The high number of Hindus in North Waziristan defies the popular mind set about these tribes as a bloodthirsty savages. It throws light into the tribal culture where despite taking part in First Kashmir War purely on the basis of anti Hinduism the co – idol worshippers in North Waziristan remained safe. These Hindus were mainly concentrated around Bannu District and shop keeping was their main profession.

The social pattern of the valley remained unchange since the time when North Waziristan Militia was raised. The fruits of civilisation which first interacted in 1900 now started bearing result. Few of the Wazir Maliks were involved in public transport they were given 27 road permits in the year 1960-1961. Daurs who are more industrious and business minded as compare to any other tribe were rich, its orchards full of fruits and taking full advantage of trade permits given by the government. In early sixties the numbers of Bus Route Permits allocated by the agency were 61. Handloom industry was started in the MiranShah and Mir Ali.

In 1961 the Frontier Week was held at MiranShah in which Governor West Pakistan Nawab of Kalabagh was the chief guest, the festivities were marred by the sudden death in an aircrash by the Commissioner Dera Ismail Khan Mr Attaullah Jan. There were a total of 63 schools within the agency but no high school for girls. Out of a total of 2176 students only 13 girls were in middle school and 34 in primary education. There were scholarships for the students, a student of primary school was given one rupee to five rupees and boy of high school was given maximum of rupees

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<sup>234</sup> *Border & Administrative Report, NWA, 1961-1962, also see Tochi Scouts History Draft 1977, p-3.*

20 as scholarship. There were a total of 42 Mullah Teachers and 77 under trainee teachers excluding three drawing masters. 'Following functions were celebrated regularly among all the schools, Id-e-Milad-UI-Nabi, Quaid Azam's birth and anniversary days, Pakistan Day, Revolution Day, Health Day and Treeplantation Day'.<sup>235</sup>

A silk and cotton weaving factory was established at MiranShah apart from half a dozen handlooms at MiranShah & MirAli, all the labour came from Punjab. A one year course was run at MiranShah for trainees in woollen industry. Tribesmen were also selected for Sericulture training in which again stipends were lavishly bestowed upon. A Field Collector collecting minerals started working in the agency; at Degan Chromite was discovered, white limestone at Khajauri, Gypsum at Isha, and Calcite at Datta Khel and Magnesium at Sarsi Datta Khel. Hindu shop keepers were running shops at MiranShah, being hamsaay of certain Daur Maliks *'there now exists a flourishing bazaar at MiranShah which is taking the shape of town sharply...wheat and sugar (468 tons) was imported into the agency where as wool, timber, fresh & dry fruit including grapes, Chalgoozha and pomegranates being exported. A sum of rupees 2200 was credited from the lorry drivers as Tochi Fee and 1260 Rupees were collected as traffic violation fine. Other major offenses committed in the agency were murder; cattle lifting, burglary and wire cutting coupled with damaging the government property. Daur preferred litigation and Wazirs settling the affairs privately'*.<sup>236</sup>

The numbers of outlaws in the North Waziristan officially declared Badmash by the deputy commissioners of Bannu and Kohat were 33 in 1957 and only five among them were allowed

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<sup>235</sup> Report of assistant District Inspector of schools, North Waziristan, 523/ 13/ADI, dated 30<sup>th</sup> October 1961.

<sup>236</sup> Border and Administrative Report 1961, remarks of Political Agent North Waziristan

to stay in the agency that to only uptill June 1961. Tribes were usually fined in accordance with standard procedure of litigation, a combination of judicial and executive fines along with Frontier Crimes Regulation touched a figure of 16831/ Rupees out of which Rs 12081 was recovered.

Powindahs were not allowed to enter North Waziristan Agency as part of overall directives which resulted in their being stranded at the Khost and few of them dying of cold weather. Two picquets each of platoon strength were established near Dardoni in September 1963 which were closed in January 1964.

Tribes do create feuds and also settle them; in 1961, Khaddar Kabul Khel patched up their differences with Kiani Kabul Khel the final agreement allowed Kabul Khel to construct three mud huts (Kots) on Buddin Killi and 13 shops at Qaum Serai at Khaddar Khel in lieu for freedom to utilise Qaum Serai for their live stocks. On the other hand the patch up negotiations between Achar&Jumbi Khel the two sub sections of Madda Khel failed despite efforts of Malik Muhammad Jan, Malik Abdullah Khan Madda Khel and Malik Khandan Khan. Nature of the tribes disputes vary for instance an old dispute of 1957 between the two sub sections of Manzar Khel over the proprietary rights of hillock erupted again but was handled amicably by the political officer with the display of force in the form of Tochi Scouts.

In 1963 funds amounting to Rs. 1, 50,000 were sanctioned for the construction of bridge on Kaitu River but no firm was willing to undertake the project in piece meal and asked for complete payment in advance, the amount was surrendered.

## 1965-Year to Remember

1965 will always go down in the history of Pakistan, Pakistan Armed Forces, in the perspective of sub continent history and also in the annals of Tochi Scouts as a golden year. Pakistan and Pakistan Army challenged the right of hegemony to the sub continent by virtue of its millennium old history in which Indus Valley had always remained the masters of the sub continent. Chain of events started From April 1965 onwards from the Rann of Kutch and by August 1965 Pakistan in a masterly move invoked Kashmir into the liberation war. 'Operation Gibraltar' in August 1965 followed by 'Operation Grand Slam' (1-5 September 1965) which led to the 'September War 1965'.<sup>237</sup> This military activities remained focus on the Kasur- Lahore- Sialkot- Gujrat-Lipa areas.

In February 1965 Lieutenant Colonel (PA 1769) Muhammad Aslam took over the command, he is a landmark in many aspects. He was the first Commandant who was qualified from Pakistan Staff College and this indicates the importance which the Frontier Warfare in general and Tochi Scouts in particular had at the army circle.

Captain Rahim Baksh Nasar a gunner was the longest serving officer having joined Tochi Scouts in 1962 and remained as artillery/ signal officer till 1966. Major Ahmad Khan was commanding the No.1 Wing, Major Mahboob Shah was commanding the No.2 Wing since February 1964, Major Habibullah Khan Bazai was in command of No.3 Wing since November 1964. Major Khizar Hayat Awan was commanding the No.4 Wing at Thall Scouts. Major HidayatUllah Khan was another field officer who joined Tochi Scouts in April 1965. Even the wing second in commands (Captains) were all

new , in the first quarter no less then seven officers were reverted back to army and fresh faces were posted in; there was no old hand of frontier warfare present in the Tochi Scouts. Likes of Captain Wilayat Shah were badly missed. In such a scenario the importance of native officers in understanding the tribal perspective increases manifold.

### **Raising of No.5 Wing**

On 3<sup>rd</sup> March 1965, Headquarters Frontier Corps authorised the raising of a new wing, No.5 Wing (No4 Wing of Tochi Scouts had been the nucleus of Thall Scouts, thus continuity was retained). The Wing was not raised rather it was formed from the existing establishment of the Tochi Scouts. Major Qamar Uz Zaman (PA 4522, he is now settled in Karachi) who had joined the Tochi Scouts in September 1963 not only raised it but also commanded it for a year. Captain Amanullah Khan as an adjutant worked around the clock for the purpose. Captain Akram another Piffer was recently posted and appointed as Wing Second in Command. It had strength of 700 all ranks.

### **Subedar Nazarband Shah**

In June 1965 when the Indians had launched ‘Operation Ablaze’ and all attention was on the eastern borders another incident took place at Tochi Valley. Both acts are not interlinked but the events at Tochi Valley if allowed to go out of hand would had disastrous impact on the overall picture, as they used to have it from 1915-1919 & again in 1936, other recent events at frontier having strategic implication was 1960 Bajaur Operation.

Mullah Dindar by the end of 1964 had emerged as a strong man of the Tochi Valley; his general reputation was ‘good’ among the



tribes and was taken as the successor of Fakir of Ipi. He was given the title of Mujahaid-e- Shariah. 'His ambitions have been given impetus by the Afghan agents and other hostile elements in the area, his position is being exploited... thus coaxing (him) and sometimes threatening him to start his activities lest he loses his title'.<sup>238</sup>

Mullah was countered by the political agent by forming a committee of six ulemas of the agency to tour the Tochi Valley delivering Friday Sermon and countering Mullah Dindar. These six mullahs formed a Majlis-i-Shura. The issues were minor and of theological debate rather than something as strong as the British Raj or the non Muslim officers being present in the area. It was a preference of Riway against the self interpretation of the Islam by the Mullah; in Riway there is no mercy for an enemy where as the Shariah is full of mercy, in Shariah there is portion of inheritance for the girl also but in Riway it is absence. In Tochi Valley the sectarianism was not the issue as all the inhabitants were adherent of Sunni sect, within which the Wahhabi sect of Saudi Arabia became more prominent; that was the impact of King Saud's visit in 1954 in Tochi Valley. Upper Tochi Valley was more inclined towards the Wahhabi than the lower valley. Majlis-i-Shura's efforts resulted in the flag of Mullah Dindar being stolen from Tappi Village.

Malik Niaz Ali Khan was the other war lord of the Tochi Valley; he had a lashkar of around 500 with him. Niaz was a complex character he was playing a double game, getting money and privileges for him and his followers from both Afghan Government & North Waziristan Political Agent. He had a style; buglers used to march in front of the lashkar announcing their arrival, Malik Niaz was always properly escorted, he was the political rebel echoing Pakhtoonistan where as

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<sup>238</sup> *Political Agents Dr Humayun C.S.P's remarks in Border & Administrative report 1964. Miran Shah Archives.*

Mullah Dindar was the religious fire brand and by 1965 both had joined hands, Tochi Valley was ripe for another season of campaign.

## **Boya**

In June 1965 the flag issue became serious with Mullah Dindar supported by Afghan Agents marching towards the MiranShah, he was joined by the Malik Niaz 'Lashkar playing the Dhols marched towards the destination, passing along the Boya Fort...On reaching near the Boya Post the tribal did not stop but tried to overrun the post'.<sup>239</sup>

Nothing much had changed at Boya in last sixty five years or for that matter in last thousand years. Mud huts, mud compounds with mud towers enclosed in a high mud wall. Tree plantation had brought shade, green colour, prosperity and good camouflage to the warring tribesmen. Daur lives here and by nature, necessity and culture are peaceful; racially the Wazirs will not introduce Daur as one among themselves. Both are Aryan tribes and with classic Aryan class classification; Daur looking after business, agricultural and official jobs. Saidgi as a religious class and Wazir as the warrior class. Wazir takes it as a birth right to move at will all along the Tochi Valley but a Daur is not given that freedom. At Boya the tribesmen have to undertake a crossing of Tochi River; not that he is bounded by nature but for transport and trade. Degan is strategically important in the context of Tochi Valley, over years it became a hub of education and trade in a tribal manner; it is Wazir land.

The life was going fairly normal at Boya, The mail used to come daily on the tribal bus which ply between MiranShah and Boya and

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<sup>239</sup> Political Agents Dr Humayun C.S.P's remarks in Border & Administrative report 1965. MiranShah Archives.

onward to Datta Khel. This was a rarity but a peace prevailed in the valley. The Scouts would be relaxing around the Tochi River taking shower and catching fish through the camouflage nets; even this catching of fish was a risky affair as any one tribe can claim the rights over the fish. Boya is a small valley the ground opens up here like a broad funnel. The Musa Khan post is over looking Boya from North and Pawani Post from South. Supply of fresh water to them was complicated; the routine being that every morning a team of two donkeys carried drinking water to these posts. Scouts would also descend daily for taking a shower in the river which is between the Boya Fort and the hill on which Musa Khan Post is located.

Weather in June is hot but there is freshness, fear, uncertainty, dryness, harmony in the air which makes it pleasant. The usual squadron of pigeons would fly every (there were twelve of them in 1965 at Boya) day early in the morning just for the sheer fun of flying. Diving, flapping, hovering, practising, and carrying out formation flying all around their landing post. They too like the inhabitants of the fort were bounded within a short radius of freedom, seldom they embarked on a long flight other than on road operating days.

The things started simmering in June 1965 when on the very first Friday sermon the call for Jihad was given by the Mullah Dindar and his followers pressed the other mosques to follow the suit. Kanirogha, Mamirogha, Dosalli, Muskakki, Biche Kashkai, Asad Khel, Razani and Manzer Khel, Wuzzi Khel and Zindai's mosques all gave call for Jihad. There was another background to this episode. In 1963, the dispute between the Mahsud and Uthmanzais Wazirs over lands in Razmak and Shawal reached a deadlock with a tribal war among them almost inevitable. Utmanzai gathered at Razmak in strength and also at Shawal. In the end Mahsuds reluctantly accepted

the Jirga's decision to solve the matter according to Shariah. Pir of Karbogha gave the verdict which was accepted by both parties. Mahsuds surrendered all land lying north of Shora Algad but will continue holding land in South, but both clans were allowed to share the water of Shora Algad. These were interim steps and it was decided that in July 1964 these will be again reconsidered in light of shariah. This is another insight into tribal way of settling the differences, both tribes also agreed to maintain peace and not to resort to firing on this score or any other till July 1964, defaulter to pay rupees 20,000/-. 'However it seems that Mahsuds are not very keen/willing to have this dispute settled/or referred to shariah. Their efforts have always been to delay and prolong it which process they feel is advantageous to them'.<sup>240</sup> In another move the political agent started a rural works programme scheme out of development funds. Maccha Madda Khel tribe broke 'Tinga'<sup>241</sup> from Madda Khel and asked for an irrigation scheme in their area. At Pai Khel (another Wazir clan) 400 acres of barren land was made fertile.

Malik Jahantab now over eighty years old recalls *'the Jirga was called upon and it was decided to support the Mullah Dindar from every house the riflemen were called upon to join, I myself was part of it, we walked towards the Degan and joined Dindar's Lashkar, the food was taken among the tribesmen and not collectively, the villagers would arrange the food which consisted of nothing but bread. We all had around 100 rounds each with us and rest we were sure to fill the deficiency through loot of the scouts armoury. To me and I think it stands good for all others there was nothing new in this affair rather just a part of our life this was my first outing with lashkar and as such I was excited and keen to leave my mark. Among the young tribesmen there was nothing more illustrious and*

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240 Political Agent's remarks North Waziristan Agency, January 1964.

241 Tribal bond between the sub – clans, to act collectively.

*honourable than to take part in warfare. We took position on the river side which is northern edge of the fort almost hundred meters away. Denying the water to the scouts was the part of our strategy. No one teaches us but it is through the logic and common sense that these fundamentals of warfare are understood. I had my position behind a Pawani the wild growth in the area also there was stone cover; I dug the soil and lay down in ambush waiting for any scout to venture out for water. Night went by and nothing happened and neither in the day when I got up and went to little bit behind for sleep'.*

Subedar Nazarband was a tall and a muscular scout, he has been observing the change in air. Desertion of scouts in the name of religion is not something un common feature of frontier warfare especially when men of same tribe are standing eyeball to eyeball. The art of persuasion which is more commonly known as propaganda warfare is an integral element of tribal conflicts. The line adopted by Malik Dindar was the religion; it was an extension of Fakir of Ipi's warfare against British. On 15<sup>th</sup> June at evening time there was a shower of rain which brought the temperature down and improved the visibility, it was the fourth day of Boya being besieged and no link with MiranShah other than the Morse Code.

On 21<sup>st</sup> June 1965, the tribes moved stealthily around the Subedar Nazrband collected all the Qaums and addressed them in front of quarter guard. 'Friends and fellow tribesmen tonight we are under attack which can come at any moment. We are sons of Tochi Scouts, Tochi is our tribe, our honour our izzat our ghairat is for the Tochi Scouts, we have to defend this fort at any cost, the gates will be opened only over my dead body'. All four corner watchtowers and posts were manned and Nazr himself positioned over the main

gate edges with a Bren gun. Moon was in second quarter and after midnight the first shell of the Dindar's artillery hit the southern wall and fire on the parquets. The artillery duel continued for some time and then came the shadows of tribesmen stalking towards the fort. Effective fire discipline forced the tribesmen to call it a day and at Fajr prayers both ceased fire for prayers. This continued for another three days and finally Nazarband resolved to carry out a Gasht and silence the artillery piece which was creating nuisance with a persistent danger of exploding a shell in magazines.

On the morning of 24<sup>th</sup> June 1965 after Fajr prayers Subedar Nazarband came out of the Boya Fort with ten more scouts and before the sunlight occupied the ridge parallel to the fort and from there he sniped at the tribesmen and within an hour cleared the ridge, at this point the tribesmen started firing from the Musa Khan Post direction. The firing volleys were exchanged till mid day. Subedar Nazr then went all alone to silence the tribesmen lonely machine gun and the artillery piece, he crawled through the stones and Pawani, took a shot at the firing tribesman, hit him on the thigh and his next bullet silenced him. Nazr then signalled his fellow scouts to follow him, which they did and then took the machine gun and retreated towards the Fort. Nazr provided them with cover; on the other side, Havildar Qamar held the fort. Tribesmen were keen bent on getting their machine gun back and to stop the scouts from entering back into the gate. Nazr was the wall between their aims, he was brave to an extent where he stood as rock and ensure that everybody has gone back into safety and then when he himself wanted to come back he was encircled by the tribesmen who made his every move worthy of living. Nazr was hit twice in the chest but he held his nerve and challenged the tribesmen to come out in open, Nazr managed to walk back into the gate but he was bleeding profusely and died same night.

Subedar Nazarband delaying and courageous action gave the important time for the Gasht of seven platoons to reach on the spot. Boy Bridge was saved.

Tribesmen suffered 25 Killed and 12 wounded above all they lost the impetus and soon agreed to a peace pact and paid the fine.

### **Kashmir War-1965**

During the September War the fear of Para-Troopers reached an epic level. It started accidentally.<sup>242</sup> Brigadier SalimUllah then a major was a grade two officer in the GHQ and on the night of 4/5<sup>th</sup> September while in GHQ a telephone call came which was picked up by the General Musa Khan the army chief, who had come to the Major's office while leaving, the caller informed him about the possible Indian Para Troopers landing near Kharian. A stage reached where all the vehicles moving on Grand Trunk Road were halted and search was made for the Para troopers. People in Rawalpindi and other stations started reporting about the Para troopers. Rumours were in abundance and anybody that had any resemblance with Hindu features was taken to the task. Villagers established their lookout parties. It shows the spirit of the people and also how quickly rumours travel in war.

No.6 Wing was raised in this background in September 1965 with strength of 453 all ranks. Captain Abdul Habib Khan was the first commander. The Wing moved overnight from MiranShah and by early morning was placed around Kharian purely as anti airborne force. The fear of Para troopers subsided after few days and Wing was moved few miles towards the east to guard the important railway

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<sup>242</sup> Azam, Cheema, Madni, *History of Pakistan Army Aviation, unpublished draft.* Aviation Archives. Rawalpindi.

bridge at Wazirabad, a very correct deployment and use of Scouts. Three platoons (100 men) were detached and attached to Lahore Sector with 11 & 15 Frontier Force Regiments in area DeraChal (Burki). The Wing was later sent to Chamb-Jaurian also, where it remained till November 1965 when Mahsud Scouts relieved.

### **Raising of No.4 Wing**

This Wing existed on papers but in reality it was a Thall Scouts Wing, in September 1965 apart from No.6 Wing, the No.4 Wing was also raised with strength of 716 Scouts. It went through only one month training and was attached with Zulfiqar Force in November 1965. There was minor action going on along the Durand Line, Wing relieved Zhob Militia at Samani. It arrived back at MiranShah in March 1966.

### **Subedar Behram Gul Wazir**

On 11<sup>th</sup> May 1965 the newly raised No.5 Wing under command of Captain Qamar with Subedar Behram Shah as the company commander departed from MiranShah with a fanfare, the Corps band played favourite tunes, two goats were given as 'Sadqa'. Transport was inadequate and so was the equipment. Political Agent made the arrangements for the transport. Convoy moved towards the Bhimber via Bannu- Kohat-Rawalpindi-Kharian. Wing was placed under command No.4 Sector which further deployed the No.5 Wing in area Bagsar-Patni-Thub & Padhar.<sup>243</sup> The situation at that period was of uncertainty, Operation Gibraltar started in August 1965 in the No.4 Sector. The whole of ceasefire line of 1948 from north till Bhimber was divided into sectors, for instance Sector No.3 was looking after the Murree area. In May 1965 it was principally decided to support

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<sup>243</sup> Tochi Scouts letter, date not given but year is 1966. Historical Archive, Tochi Museum. MiranShah.



the Kashmiris by providing them arms, ammunition and training in Azad Area. No.5 Wing also provided training to the freedom fighters but at that time zeal among Kashmiris was not as much as displayed at the end of millennium. Wings from other Scouts Corps were also inducted in the operation.

No.5 Wing remained deployed till October 1965 and suffered eleven casualties including one subedar, two havildars and ten scouts. It was awarded one Sitara-i-Jurat, two Tamgha-i-Jurat and six Imtiaz-i-Sanads.

Lance Naik Khan Baz Khattak was the first one to embrace shahadat , he was performing duty at Batala Post in Azad Kashmir and died due to Indian small arms fire on 6<sup>th</sup> June 1965, he was the sentry at post. Baz was fired upon and in order to return the fire he had to exposed himself which he did and was hit with two bullets. Baz Khan was born on 1<sup>st</sup> January 1932 at Village Chashmai in Mianwali District and joined Tochi Scouts in January 1950. He left behind a widow and a five years old son.

From August 1965 onwards the sector became hot with artillery duels No 5 Wing was dispersed and utilised to relieve the regular army units from internal security duties. Guards at cantonments, filling the gap between the battalion, protecting the headquarters were their main role. Army aviation flights were dispersed and Tochi Scouts among the Scouts are the only one which had a long association with aircraft. Usually two platoons were employed for these duties. Scouts wore their kameez shalwar (Mazri) uniform. Wing did not had any heavy weapons especially the artillery gun and neither they required it. Scouts were good in patrolling and protecting own lines. By virtue of their light equipment they moved much quicker than the regular army soldiers.

Sepoy Sharbat Ali Bangash was deployed at Bandola Post alongwith his platoon, on the night of 10<sup>th</sup> July 1965, Indian mortar shelling took his life. Sharbat had joined Tochi Scouts at the very young age of seventeen in 1957, he belongs to the Usterzai Village in Kohat District, he was survived by a widow and three minor children.

Bandola Post came under heavy enemy fire in August. It must be kept in mind that no open war was going on between Pakistan & India, these fire duels were part of Opeartion Gibraltar. There were two important posts, Batala and Ghauri. Tochi Scouts one platoon was deployed at Batala and remaining company was task to capture the Ghauri. All casualties took place in these two posts.

### **Ghauri Post**

On the night of 15<sup>th</sup> August 1965 Tochi Scouts were ordered to capture Ghauri Post. Post was well defended, on a high ground with anti person mines all around. Naib Subedar Behram Gul Wazir led this attack. Tochi Scouts moved out at latter part of night with an aim to offer Fajr prayers at the captured post. H-hour was 2359, post was engaged by own artillery and mortars through out the day. Indian Post after coming under attack made desperate attempts to hold back the attack and it looked as they might pull off the attack.

In this action Sepoy Imam Ghulam Orakzai was awarded Tamgha-i-Jurat (posthumous) for his act of valour, he rushed towards the gate of the post through the mine field and lost his life in the act. He was born in 1932 at Tarangai a small village in Kohat District, a well disciplined soldier who had joined Tochi Scouts in 1948. He left behind a widow and his only child a daughter was born after his shahadat.

Post was captured and Indians now attacked the post with an aim to retake it, two such attacks were blunted. In order to retain the initiative aggressive patrolling was required and carried out. Sepoy Wazir Mohammad Bangash a young eighteen years old scout who had married a month before, he was killed on 17<sup>th</sup> August while defending the Ghauri Post; he was hit by a stray bullet. This post was attacked frequently by the Indians mostly through artillery. Sepoy Safdar Khan Mohmand also embraced shahadat on 21<sup>st</sup> August 1965 at this post due to medium artillery fire.

On 1<sup>st</sup> September Operation Grand Slam was launched by the Pakistan Army. Subedar Behram was deployed at Padhar and he witnessed the first aerial dog fight between PAF and the Indian Air Force in which IAF lost four aircraft. Padhar is a flat ground but broken. Subedar Behram Shah also indirectly helped the Lieutenant Colonel NaseerUlah Babar's capture of Sikh company same very day. On the same day Havildar Gul Rehman Orakzai a cheerful and hardworking scout with lot of guts and stamina was hit by an enemy artillery shell while he was standing in his trench. He left behind a widow and two daughters. Gul Rehman was born in Labi Khel Village in District Kohat, he became a scout in June 1949.

Sepoy Libas Khan Bangash was part of one such patrol which came under enemy fire on the night of 2/3 September when Operation Grand Slam had started, one mortar shell exploded close to him and he laid his life for the motherland. He had only two years of service. He was born on 16<sup>th</sup> December 1946 at Village Nasrat Khel in Kohat District.

Sepoy Sardar Khan Afridi who hailed from Village Vochawana near Jamrud also embraced shahadat in similar pattern while carrying

out patrolling on the night of 5<sup>th</sup> September 1965. He was a dashing soldier who became a Tochiet on 24<sup>th</sup> April 1954 when he was only seventeen years old. Sardar was always a volunteer for any thing which involves exposing himself to danger, he enjoyed danger. He left behind a widow, two sons and a daughter.

On 6<sup>th</sup> September when all out war broke out, a fighting patrol was sent from Ghauri Post to gather information. 14 Azad Kashmir Infantry Battalion was in the process of attacking an adjoining hill known as Hill Observation Post.

Near Point 665 Tochi had their first check point and from hence on they stalked and found the Indian heavy machine gun which was holding the advance. Behram Shah with presence of mind and displaying a superior degree of leadership, stalked and there is no stalker better than a Tochi Scout, years of hard scouting in the mountains have made them almost perfect in this art. Behram with three scouts moved from left of the Indian machine gun and other four from the other side with remaining holding the position and ready to act as reserve. Havildar Azam Khan Khattak spotted the Indian machine gun, crawled towards it and silenced it with two hand grenades, he himself was wounded and succumbed to his injuries. He was awarded Tamghah-i-Jurat (posthumous). Sepoy Raza Khan Khattak was hit with a burst of machine gun before it was silenced, Sepoy Fazal Manan Orakzai was also with Raza and he also received bullets from the same machine gun; both died. Thus Havildar Azam Khan's action is to be seen in the light of damage which this machine gun was causing. Naib Subedar Behram Khan knew that as long as the machine gun is firing and remains intact the life of his undercommand will not be safe. He charged, Kartar Singh an Indian Naik had no chance when Behram lunged forward with

his bayonet charge, his face contorting in anger and he yelled the Tochi Scouts battle cry ‘Da Toro Shrunk’.

‘Subedar Behram Khan Wazir, alongwith his platoon attacked an Indian post and captured it by suffering three casualties. On the other hand, Indian losses were 18 killed, six injured and six prisoners including one JCO. In this action the company commander Major Bulran Singh was also killed’.<sup>244</sup>

## **Post-1965**

Strength was temporarily decreased to 48 platoons and later increased to the 56, good aspect was the inclusion of 15 Chitralise Platoons, Afridis, Khattaks, and Bangash all had six platoons each where as Yusufzai and Wazir had 4 platoons each, Turi & Mohmand had two platoons each and Orakzai had three platoons. Agency was divided into six tehsils namely MiranShah, Datta Khel, MirAli, Spinwam, Dosalli & Razmak. Metalled roads existed between Bannu-MirAli-Isha Corner & Razmak and also Isha Corner-MiranShah. From MiranShah to Boya and onwards Datta Khel-Gardaí via Lwargi were dirt road. The road protection and majority of the picquets were manned by Khassadars which numbered 2034 with Manzar Khel having the largest number of 1616 with Tori Khel & Daur both having over 425 as next largest group where as Madda Khel, Wuzzi Khel, Bora Khel having least numbers of Khassadars which are in fact a barometer of tribal peace of mind in the entire agency collectively.

MiranShah town had flourished with three hospitals, one Sanatorium and seventeen dispensaries. Agency finally got an Intermediate College apart from two high schools, ten middle &

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<sup>244</sup> Official Citation , General Headquarters, Pakistan.

lower schools and 58 primary schools; these include an exclusive girl's primary and middle school. Bulldozers came for the first in agency. There were three Woollen Centres operating in the MiranShah

### **Tochi Scouts at Tehran-1970**

Drill has been a strong forte of Tochi Scouts, it has a history behind it, let it not be forgotten that Captain Fergusson had a hard time in convincing the account department in 1901 as to why he wants more drill instructors in Tochi Scouts. In 1969 the Frontier Corps week was held in Tochi Scouts at Miranshah. The President of Pakistan General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan was the chief guest. The President was so impressed by the guard of honour presented to him by the Tochi Scouts that he took the whole guard along with him on his visit to Iran on the occasion of the birthday of his Imperial Highness Prince Raza Pahlavi the Crown Prince of Iran. Earlier an army contingent had been detailed for the purpose.

### **Tochi Scouts in East Pakistan-1971**

East Pakistan or Bengal had a different culture and history, Islam binds them together with the Indus Valley. They played a leading role in the Pakistan Movement yet the cultural barriers could not be overcome. East Pakistan had more population 54% but had only 15% of the total area of Pakistan. In 1948 their plea to include Bangla as a national language was overturned and then in later years the numerical superiority against the geographical superiority remained a cause of disagreement between the West & East Pakistan. Things reached to a point where after the 1970 elections on the basis of democratic principles the power was to be handed over to them. Historically the Indus Valley has never been

subversive to any of the other two riparian civilisations (Ganges & Brahmaputra). In March 1971 the East Pakistan was on the brink of civil war. The Bengal Rifles have not only revolted but murdered their Punjabi army commanding officer. It seems all too familiar with the accounts of Tochi Valley in 1915-1919 and the desertion of the scouts. Seen in the context of East Pakistan's desertion the desertion of native tribes and platoons were quite insignificant.

In March 1971, similar to 1965 pattern another Wing<sup>245</sup> was raised from the existing resources of Tochi Scouts which after a 600 miles train journey reached Karachi and then sailed another thousand miles to disembark at Chittagong, from where the Wing travelled by road to Dacca and from Dacca it practically travelled all over East Pakistan but majority of the Wing remained at Dacca for the protection of the airfield. Major Sarwar Khan (PA 6851) was the Wing Commander and with him was Captain Dalel Khan of Baluch regiment.

Scouts brought up, bred, trained and hardened in the rugged mountains of North Waziristan found themselves in an alien place. Mosquitoes, incessant rain, humidity and snakes. Food was different, in Tochi Scouts at MiranShah rice was served twice a week but in East Pakistan it was the staple diet. Quarter of the Wing's strength was suffering from malaria. Scouts were not used to this humidity and rain but they adjusted and it took time. It was the similar story with the regular army units when they used to have a tour of duty in North Waziristan from the plains.

The military action 'Operation Searchlight' that took place on 25<sup>th</sup> March 1971 at Dacca was the starting point of civil war, 8<sup>th</sup> East Bengal Regiment revolted next day killing his commanding

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245 5 & 6 Wings were disbanded in 1967, thus East Wing was raised. It was understrength.

officer Lieutenant Colonel Rashid Janjua. Rashid had served in Tochi Scouts as a Captain. Killer was Major Zia Ur Rehman the second in command of the regiment, Zia later rose to the rank of General and became President of Bangladesh in 1982; he was also in the end assassinated.

Tochi Scouts had their first taste of action when as part of 34 Brigade they took part in the Bhairab Bazaar operation (15<sup>th</sup> April 1971). Sepoy Ali Gul Bangash was the first Tochi Scout to embrace shahadat in East Pakistan, he was killed in an ambush on 11<sup>th</sup> April 1971, his dead body is still buried in District Sylhet.

Tochi Scouts were also part of Belonia Operation (10<sup>th</sup>-20<sup>th</sup> June 1971) as part of 24<sup>th</sup> Frontier Force & 20<sup>th</sup> Baluch Regiment. Till November 1971 the pattern of the war was primarily small actions. Protection of railway bridges, headquarters and air field were the primary task of Tochi Scouts contingent. Sepoy Khewa Khan Afridi, Sepoy Noor Bahadur Khattak and Sepoy Gul Afzal Afridi all embraced shahadat on 6<sup>th</sup> August 1971 when their vehicle was ambushed.

Two Scouts embraced shahadat on 4<sup>th</sup> December 1971 when the Dacca Airfield came under intense Indian Air Force attack. On 9/10<sup>th</sup> December the contingent was part of the anti heliborne force that fought against the Indian Para troopers, unlike 1965 War, this time it actually took place. Tochi Scouts had wounded casualties.

On 16<sup>th</sup> Tochi Scouts like the rest of army also surrendered and were later repatriated from India in 1973.

There are ten shaheeds of Tochi Scouts still buried in East Pakistan. Sepoy Amir Jan Khattak died in an action on 18<sup>th</sup> September 1971 at



Khadimnagar in District Sylhet. Lance Naik Abdul Sattar Mohmand was drowned in Sonanganj on 28<sup>th</sup> August 1971 his dead body was never found, Sepoy Muhammad Hafiz Orakzai was another scout to be drowned on 27<sup>th</sup> July 1971, his remains were found and buried at Sylhet. Sepoy Mehboob Shah Khattak and Sepoy Khanawas Khan Khattak both embraced shahadat in an ambush laid on 22 June 1971 in District Sylhet. Khanawas Khan died at the spot where as Mehboob Shah succumb to his wounds on 29<sup>th</sup> June both were buried at District Sylhet.

### **Lipa ‘Valley of Blood’**

Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Azam (PA 4513) from FF Regiment commanded the Tochi Scouts during the war, he was posted in September 1971 and handed over the command in February 1972. Major Hidayat Ullah (PS 2633) was the Tochi Scouts contingent commander designated as ‘Ghazi Commander’ as he had few elements of Mujahid Force under his command as well. He had Captain Sher Badshah as the second in command. Other Wing Commanders at Tochi Scouts includes Major Abdul Khaliq Mirza (Engineers) he remained in command till April 1972, Major Maqbool Ahmad also from Engineers remained till September 1972, the third Wing Commander Major Syed Asad Abbas Zaidi was also from Engineers, he took over on 10<sup>th</sup> December 1971. The overwhelming majority of engineer officers indicate the shortage of infantry officers during the war. Captain Daud Humayun Beg and Captain Javed Anwar reported at Tochi Scouts on 8<sup>th</sup> December 1971. Captain Doctor Ghulam Nabi the medical officer joined in on 18<sup>th</sup> December 1971 and he later joined the contingent at Lipa. Before the end of the year Captain Abdul Ghaffar and Captain Masoud Ahmad also joined in.

Pakistan Army plan in Kashmir necessitated reduction of troops in Lipa Valley with an intention of launching attack from Poonch Sector. Scouts from Frontier Corps were amalgamated under Major Akbar Khan Afridi of 2 FF Regiment.<sup>246</sup> Tochi Scouts were part of this force. A company of 2 FF (C Company) was deployed in Shisha–Ladi Sector. Major Afridi and the company left the sector on 11<sup>th</sup> December 1971.

Tochi Scouts contingent of Wing strength was deployed in the Lipa Valley from September 1971 it remained here till January 1973. Captain Muhammad Aslam Chaudhry was the commander of Tochi Scouts contingent. Lipa remains the finest hour of Tochi Scouts in the annals of its history, they by their sacrifices brought the only Silver Lining of Pakistan Army in the 1971 War. Havildar Painsa Khan Orakzai, Naik Abdul Khan Mohmand and Lance Naik Hayat Gul were decorated with Tamgha-i- Juraat for their acts of valour. ***Tochi Scouts lost over 30 Scouts in Lipa Valley in a period of six months from December 1971–June 1972.*** Contingents from other Scouts were also employed in the Kashmir but only Tochi Scouts were at Lipa.<sup>247</sup>

Lipa is a beautiful vale very similar to Razmak in Wazir territory; it is much higher than Khost. High juniper trees, small ravines, green fields and isolated plateaus, sharp bends, narrow tracks for foot movement, mule tracks for luggage movement, fruit trees, fresh water, fast flowing river, low clouds and rain all makes Lipa a heaven on earth. The culture of the area is peaceful and open minded with women performing all chores in open without much of ‘Purda’.

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246 AttiqurRahman, the Wardens of the Marches, A History of the Piffers 1947 – 1971, (WajidAli, Lahore, 1980) p – 151. Also see K.V. Krishna Rao Prepare or Perish; A Study of National Security, p- 222, also see K.C. Praval Indian Army after Independence (lancer, New Delhi), p- 485.

247 Frontier Guardian, see the history of the Scout Corps, SWS was at Poonch – Bagh.

Isolated population very thin in numbers, there is no political or tribal culture in existence. Lipa Valley is a small vale not more than twenty miles in length which primarily links and affords one of the few openings towards Srinagar.

Lipa Valley is Pakistan's bulge in Indian held Kashmir, on the southern edge of the bulge is Uri an Indian held town and within the valley moving from south upwards Nankot, Wanjal, Shisha-Ladi, Gasla Top and Ring Contours made headlines in the 1971 War. Lipa Valley is in Tangdhar Sector, leads to Neelum River (Kishen Ganga) Indian 9<sup>th</sup> Sikh Regiment part of 104 Brigade was operating in this sector.<sup>248</sup> Lipa Valley threatens the Srinagar Valley through the Nastachum Pass over which lies the communication lines going to Tanghidar and Titwal, Tutmari Gali offers important infiltration routes towards the Srinagar from Lipa Valley.

1971 War from the beginning took off on a wrong footing. The war had started in East Pakistan from 21<sup>st</sup> November; on 3<sup>rd</sup> December 1971 the Western Front was opened up when PAF struck hard at the IAF bases. Lieutenant General Gul Hassan was the Chief of General Staff (he later became army chief for brief period). He explained Pakistan Army's strategy for the 1971 War. 'First formations other than those in reserves were to launch limited offensives, secondly a major counter offensive was to be launched concurrently in to India'.<sup>249</sup> The first part of limited offensives went as per plan however the master stroke of counter offensive never materialised.

No major offensive from both sides took place in Northern Sector mainly because of the extreme cold weather. Indians wanted

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248 Bhaskar Sarkar, Kargil War , past present and future, p-58

249 Azan, Cheema Pakistan Army Aviation,

to eliminate the bulge and for this purpose the (19 Indian Division) attacks were launched from Uri and TutmariGali. Bravery is part of army life and it is the battle field where it has to be displayed. it is not must that bravery has to take place only in a large scale battle. Tochi Scouts Wing was under command 12 Infantry Division and further placed under Brigades in Tangdhar Sector, an important approach into Srinagar Valley. Nastachum (Sadhna) Pass was an important tactical feature as it cuts the Indian Line of Communication to Tangdhar and Titwal. On the Indian side 104 Infantry Brigade part of 19 Infantry Division was deployed. Indian 19 Division mounted three operations, only one succeeded in Lipa Valley.

On 4/5<sup>th</sup> December the first Indian assault came all along the sector aiming at Gasla Top and Ring Contour and on Points 10175, 9747 and 10944. All heights held by Tochi Scouts. Captain Aslam had two platoons, the Orakzai platoon was deployed on the Gasla Top and Tarakzai Mohmand platoon at Ring Contour.<sup>250</sup> It was attacked by 7<sup>th</sup> Sikh light infantry on the night of 4/5<sup>th</sup> December from the northern side ‘Pakistanis (Tochi Scouts) held the position in depth’<sup>251</sup> next attack came on 7/8<sup>th</sup> December ‘but could not succeed’.<sup>252</sup> Kayian came under attack on 6<sup>th</sup> December.

Along with Lipa Valley another attack was launched on the Shisha-Ladi feature, part of the extension of Titwal Bulge, a post stands on the summit of this rocky feature jutting out of Gasla Top, ‘it was at first reported to be held by a company of Tochi Scouts’. No wonder the Indian historians accepts that

*‘8<sup>th</sup> Rajputtana Rifles had suffered the heaviest casualties here...*

250 Major Muhammad Nawaz , Valiant Scouts , (HQ Frontier Corps Peshawar, 1997), p- 55.

251 Sukhwant Singh *India's War since Independence*, p-223.

252 K.V.Krishnarao. *Prepare or Perish; A study of national security* , p- 222

*Pakistani troops displayed good fire discipline in that they did not open up till the attackers were within 70 yards ( experience of tribal warfare came handy)...the defending Pakistani turned the concentrated fire of automatic and other weapons on the attackers, this hail of fire held up the assault and inflicted heavy casualties on the troops...All efforts to get it going failed...Two more companies were launched from north...they gained small lodgement. The attack was called off very reluctantly at 1000 hours on 8<sup>th</sup> December 1971, losses amounts to 35 soldiers, two JCO's killed with 65 soldiers and four officers wounded.*<sup>253</sup>

On 11<sup>th</sup> December they again attacked with 3<sup>rd</sup> Bihar regiment leading, at Wanjal which is an oblong feature of a kilometre in length, east of Ghasla Top and Shisha-Ladi feature, A company of Tochi Scouts (four platoons) held the Wanjal Complex. Indian attacked 'with 3.7 inch Howitzers firing direct on enemy bunkers'.<sup>254</sup>

On the very first day of war Havildar Painda Khan the platoon commander and Naik Amin Khan at Gasla Top were caught in a hailstorm of bullets, the war has started. Painda Khan led a patrol or in his term Gasht at evening to keep an eye on the any intruder in the hilly green mountainous valley now capped under snow with temperature dropping below zero and visibility too. Painda was leading the Gasht, as they crossed one sharp turn, the fire opened up, killing Sepoy Miran Shah and Hakim Jan instantly. Painda took the cover behind a tree and duelled opened up, which lasted for well an hour. Sepoy Hawaz Khan was hit by a bullet and he slipped down, his silhouette leaving a trace on the white outline of snow. Painda also jumped behind him and took care of fainted sepoy, while trying

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253 Gautamsharma, *Valour, and sacrifices, Famous Regiments of India*, p- 118.also see Indian Gunners at War, Western Front, and p- 45.

254 Ibid,

to rescue him he too was hit with the splinters of a shell, he managed to pull Hawaz Khan to safety, and took up position again despite being injured, he told Naik Amin Khan to take the injured back, while he preferred to remain where he was happy in giving fire cover. Only three survived, Painsa Khan, Amin Khan & Hawaz Khan all died, but Painsa Khan's sacrifice was admired and decorated with Tamgha-i-Jurat.

On 7<sup>th</sup> December 1971, Subedar Malal Shah, Sepoy Muhammad Hanif and Lance Naik Chinar Gul's bunker received a direct hit, they all perished. On 10<sup>th</sup> December 1971, Havildar Zar Mast and Havildar Baqir Jan along with Havildar Taj Muhammad were fatally hit by a machine gun fire while these three senior Scouts were carrying out reconnaissance. The Wing all of a sudden was deprived of all senior & experienced officers. The responsibility now fell upon the shoulders of junior non commissioned officers and they responded. On 11<sup>th</sup> December Lance Naik Hassan Shah and Sepoys Sher Mast, Khial Bat Khan, Iqdar Khan, Sher Ali, Syed Yusuf Hussain and Taqseem Khan all embraced shahadat. On 14<sup>th</sup> December, Naik Abdul Khan & Lance Naik Hayat Gul planned to attack an Indian post at their own initiative. They were behaving like the Tochi Scouts eager to exercise the initiative especially when it involves fighting & firing. Abdul Khan as the post commander had been observing the enemy deployment pattern his eyes trained in the hunt of Wazirs soon picked the Indian artillery observation post; they both attacked it with another six Scouts that included Muhammad Hussain, Niamat Ali, Rizwan Ali and Mirji Khan. They successfully disrupted the artillery observation and as they were withdrawing, they came under enemy fire, they put up valiant fight, for three hours they remained engaged with the enemy but refused to surrender; in the end all perished. *Naik Abdul Khan & Lance Naik Hayat*

***Gul were decorated with Tamgha-i- Jurat for this brave display of leadership.***

An Indian General records following about Lipa Operations’.

*‘After the cease fire, it was found that the Pakistanis’ had suffered 18 Killed, with a possible 24 more whose bodies could not be found, and ten prisoners, their losses totalling about 50. Only 14 rifles and two automatics were captured along with a radio set. All dead and prisoners belonged to the Tochi Scouts... it appears that the Lipa Valley was held no more than a couple of Scouts companies.’<sup>255</sup>*

### **Kayian-May 1972**

Pakistan Army or more specific Tochi Scouts was holding onto an isolated post in Kayian Bowl amidst the Indian held area.<sup>256</sup> It was maintained through a track along Jinjar Nullah which the Indians held on sides, Indians or Major General D Souza thought that he can eliminate this post at will; he was in for a big surprise from Tochi Scouts.

Mr. Bhutto and Mrs Indira Gandhi (Indian Premier) agreed to have a summit at Simla in July 1972, before that the boundary and land marks on ground especially in Kashmir (Line of Control) had to be identified. From March 1972 onwards delineation talks between Pakistan Army and Indian counterpart initiated.

Kayian is a depression surrounded by high hills in Lipa, from three sides it was controlled physically, by observation and through fire by the Indian Army. Initially only a section of Tochi Scouts held

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<sup>255</sup> Sukhwantsingh Major General *India’s War Since Independence*, p.225

<sup>256</sup> Mohan Bhandari , Lieutenant General, *Solving Kashmir*(Lancer, New Delhi, 2006), p - 80

that post. Since it was in the rear when war started thus Scouts were given the responsibility, it was only after the setbacks in forward localities which made this post important. It had no value other than the psychological. It became a matter of pride for both armies.

On the Indian side a controversy erupted where the brigade commander Brigadier Ghai and Major General E.D Souza both passed on the information earlier that Kayian Bowl is under their control now they tried to cover up by the earlier lie<sup>257</sup> by launching an attack on Kayian Bowl. Pakistan in the meanwhile had built up battalion strength with a company of Tochi Scouts within Kayian Bowl.

In May 1972 the Indian attacked with two companies of 2 Guards to eliminate this post but their attack failed and foiled by Tochi Scouts. Another attack was launched with 9<sup>th</sup> Sikhs it also felt back.<sup>258</sup> 16 Tochi Scouts embraced shahadat in the month of May alone. Sepoy Sharif Khan, Wali Subhan and Amir Khajan died due to mine blast, Sepoy Noor Zaman, Muhammad Sarwar, Mahsood Gul were hit by enemy rockets. Lance Naik Aqal Marjan Turi was newly married; he was killed by a sniper. Lance Naik Luqman, Umar Hayat, and Sepoy Khan Bahadur, Amin Shah & Sharif Khan embraced shahadat while launching a local counter attack, Sepoy Noor Islam died in hand to hand battle, Abdul Jabbar died while rescuing him, Sepoy Juma Khan died with a hand grenade which he exploded while jumping onto an enemy. Their sacrifices were not wasted the post was held and Indian attacks foiled. Lipa remains the Silver Lining of Tochi Scouts.

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257 Sukhwant Singh Major General *India's War Since Independence* (Lancer, New Delhi, 2009).p. 228

258 Shankar Prasad *the Gallant Dogras; an Illustrated History of the Dogra Regiment*, (Dogra Regimental Centre, 2005) p, 359. Also see Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report (Pakistan Official Document) p - 212.



Sepoy Qat Ali Khan was blessed with a son few days ago, he died due to artillery splinters in July 1972.

### **ChakMukam-1972**

The village of ChakMukam across the Neelum River was within small arms fire range of Pakistani post on the homebank, located at the extreme edge of the Indian posts, nearest was 'Amar Singh Ki Tekri' almost five hours of marching. Located at the tip of 'Sari' ridge line, taking off from Nastachum Pass (Indian soldiers called it Sadhna Pass after an Indian actress), moving south east over the Samshabari Range as part of a spur, jutting out of the Nagian some eight-ten kilometres amidst Indian Posts like Ghasla Top, Brown Patch, Left Shoulder, Ring Contour, and finally Amar Singh Tekri.

From June 1972 onwards the Indians started probing and influencing the village with a view to include it within their side of the Line of Control. They made two concentrated and determined attacks in last week of July but failed both times. Tochi Scouts were holding the isolated post 'Nagina' overlooking the Village 'Two patrols had miserably failed due to heavy firing from Lugrian post of Pakistan across the Neelum River just opposite Village ChakMukam.'<sup>259</sup> It was a period of intense 'Gasht' and 'Chapao'.

Tochi Scouts contingent was now deployed for over a year, leave was given on rotation and men were also rotated from other wings which were stationed at MiranShah. Commandant visited the contingent twice and so did the second in command and other staff officers. The only requirement not fulfilled by the regular army was lack of 'Niswar'. It was the duty of the subedar major to provide the

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<sup>259</sup> Captain Rajindir Singh, *8<sup>th</sup> Rajputana Rifles account*, [www.suleikha.com](http://www.suleikha.com) accessed 15<sup>th</sup> July 2012.

finest quality of Niswar, which he did. On 7<sup>th</sup> October 1972, a small post of scouts came under attack; it was an Indian Patrol which had sneaked in. Few men at the post instantly took the positions and chased the Patrol, Bahishti Masri Khan was in the forefront of this assault and he received the first bullets as well. Lance Naik Waris Khan ably handled the situation and died while firing on the enemy. Sepoy Dost Muhammad was the driver he died due to a mine explosion.

In November Sepoy Muhammad Ali Khan was hit fatally by a splinter and in the last week Naik Kach Kul was wounded fatally while on a night duty, Naik Hakim Khan was the last casualty of 1971 War when on 9<sup>th</sup> December 1972, he was hit on the chest by a bullet while having a round of the area.

Simla Agreement was signed on 2<sup>nd</sup> July 1972 at 1240 Hours; India was to vacate over 10,000 square kilometres of Pakistan territory while Pakistan would continue occupying the 600 square kilometres of Indian Territory in Kashmir. Pakistan did not have to pay for any war damages also. The Cease Fire Line of 1948 was replaced with Line of Control.

## **1972-2000**

In the aftermath of 1971 War, Pakistan emerged out with a new look, confident, forward looking and looking forward as well. Parting of ways with Bengalis was sad especially the way it ended because Pakistan movement was equally and actively participated by the Bengalis also. However in the end the cultural differences and variation between Indus Valley and Brahmaputra proved too strong to be subdued under pressure of patriotism or religion

### **1972-Babar's Thrust**

Brigadier Nasser Ullah Khan Babar (HSt, SJ & Bar, SBt) was Frontier Corps Inspecting Officer (1972-1974) and Governor of the NWFP (1974-1977). Babar's legacy is in his being bold, brave and having a selfless attitude. He was a gunner, earned his flying brevet in army air observation post in 1952. He raised and commanded the very first helicopter squadron of the army. He came to limelight on 1<sup>st</sup> September 1965 when he made a company of Sikhs to surrender in Operation Grand Slam; Lieutenant Colonel Babar was unarmed. He was awarded Sitara-i-Jurat for this. In 1971 War Brigadier Babar was commanding the artillery brigade when the commander of 111 Independent Brigade became a casualty. Brigadier Babar led that brigade from the front. He was awarded a bar to his Sitara-i-Jurat. Brigadier Babar came to FC with this reputation and soon brought a change in the overall look of the Frontier Corps.

Major General Babar is a national hero, however in the context of Frontier Warfare his main contribution is the 'Forward Thrust'.

He believed that the Frontier Corps has all the legitimate right to Gasht right up till the Durand Line. Post 1971 era was a period of heightened friction between the Pakistan and Afghanistan; there were regular explosions in the Pakistan held territory and responsibility was openly confessed by the Afghan supported tribes.

*'I had no doubt that this bombing is supported by the Afghan government, I also indicated tribes loyal to Pakistan to carry out bombing in Afghanistan, only then it reduced...I believe that if the territory on the east of Durand Line belongs to us then we have all the right to march up till it... it was important that the Frontier Scouts should reoccupy the old traditional posts and picquets that were vacated and handed over to the Khassadars in 1947... Road with electricity were bound to change the mind-set of the tribes'*<sup>260</sup>

In 1973 Brigadier Babar alongwith Prime Minister Bhutto took a whirl wind tour of the Durand Line travelling by Puma they visited all the corps headquarters, met the tribal leaders and tried to ingress forward towards the Durand Line. Bhutto had a flair for public relation and he amply displayed that with the tribes. Shaking hands, embracing them and promising them electricity and roads; majority of these promises were fulfilled. Bhutto also visited Tochi Scouts, present day Civilian Colony was sanctioned along with a Boys College by him.

### **Expansion of Frontier Corps**

New scouts corps like Shawal and Mohmand Rifles<sup>261</sup> were raised but more important was the raising rather the separation of Balochistan Frontier Corps from the North Western Frontier,

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<sup>260</sup> Interview with Major General NaseerUlah Babar, Peshawar, 2005/2006

<sup>261</sup> Muhammad Nawaz Valiant Scouts, p – 35.

in 1973 the Baluchistan Frontier Corps was raised with headquarters at Quetta, it was a good move. From Waziristan's perspective the separation of Zhob which geographically is part of Wazir territory but administratively under Balochistan Government since 1890. However presence of Zhob Militia being part of the single Frontier Corps still maintained a link, with Zhob Militia becoming part of Baluchistan Frontier Corps; this last thread was also taken away. It would have been much better from the Frontier Warfare point of view if the cultural and geographical layout of the Waziristan was retained. Kurram Militia and Thall Scouts in the north, Shawal Rifles and South Waziristan Scouts in the south were all separate but they were part of single Frontier Corps with officers inter posted among them, but now with two different chain of commands emerging this became a rather difficult and time consuming exercise.

From 1973 the focus of attention shifted towards South in Balochistan where an insurgency had started (1973-1977) and military was called in. The geographical layout of Balochistan is much different from the North Waziristan and so does the tribal system. A Wing of Tochi Scouts remained deployed in Balochistan (1973-1974) operating with Zhob Militia. Relations with Afghanistan and tribal areas remained unchanged as they were almost hundred years ago in term of militancy and social pattern.

### **North Waziristan Scouts**

As a first step the North Waziristan Scouts were raised on 1<sup>st</sup> September 1972 at Landi Kotal under the guardian ship of Khyber Rifles. In mid April 1973. Major Akbar Gul Afridi , a scout commissioned officer who have been a wing commander at Tochi Scouts for four years (1964-1968 ) raised the North Waziristan

Scouts. Soon one wing moved to MirAli and MiranShah under Lieutenant Colonel Amanullah Niazi. NWS prepared itself for the final occupation of the Razmak and Tochi Scouts was to be the launching pad for the final stage'.<sup>262</sup> Tochi Scouts parted with one Wing and by virtue of new raising the area of responsibility also reduced which invariably resulted in reduced platoons, they were reduced to the 48. Tochi Scouts trained the North Waziristan Scouts in the art of the tribal warfare, since it was a three wing composition thus the other two wings were rather new in the area. The physical move of North Waziristan Scouts took some times as the tribes were not willing to let scouts reoccupy the Razmak plateau; it was occupied by the khassadars. In September 1973 the command of NWS was change consequently Amanullah was posted to Kurram Militia and Lieutenant Colonel Fakir Gul was posted in from Kurram Militia. Fakir did not like this posting/transfer and requested for reversion to army. At this stage old frontier hand Lieutenant Colonel Amanullh Khan Orakzai was posted in and Razmak was occupied. Amanullah Orakzai had been in Tochi Scouts (1964-1967) as adjutant and wing commander. Brigadier Babar and Political Agent North Waziristan Mr. Suleiman Saleem also accompanied the Shawal Rifles. The nomenclature was change in August (1973) to Shawal Rifles.

The redefined area of Tochi Scouts was now confined to the Tochi Valley. Razmak, Gardaí, Damdil, Ghariousm, all part of the Tochi Scouts folk lore were transferred to Shawal Rifles.

These new raisings caused considerable number of officers postings and attachments. From late 1970 the pattern of officers posting remained erratic with very few officers staying for duration beyond six months, the escalation on eastern borders was the main cause.

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<sup>262</sup> Major Muhammad Nawaz Valiant Scouts The Frontier Corps , 1997, p. 36

Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Ashiq Shah (PA 4544) took over the command in such turbulent time, with one wing deployed at Kashmir, one already in India as prisoners of war and other demoralised due to uncertainty and heavy casualties. This was not helped by the frequent postings of officers which did not allow to build that bond among the Scouts so vital for survival in Frontier Warfare. Ashiq was the right person for this reconstruction; he in the very first month of his command demoted his adjutant Captain Zia Ul Hasnain (Baluch) for inefficiency. Next week the Wing Commander Major Kazi Muhammad Afzal was reverted back to army after one month stay with Tochi scouts that sets the pace and tone of the Tochi Scouts. Ashiq remained in command for three years and left his mark. In his team of officers, Captain Ashfaq Ahmed, Major Taimour Afzal Khan, Captain Karim Nawaz Khan, Captain Muhammad Sharif, Major Ashraf remained part for substantial portion of time.

Rapid raisings resulted in Major Raghat Latif Shah the wing commander in being posted to Sibi Scouts in May 1973 after a year of command, Captain Riaz Ahmed also being posted to Sibi Scouts. Captain Ashfaq going to Mohmand Rifles in January 1973, Major Ghulam Nabi going to Mahsud Scouts after six months of stay at Tochi Scouts, Captain Karim also following him but he had his full quota of two years of service with Tochi Scouts. Major Aurangzeb also went to Mahsud Scouts abruptly. Major Muhammad Zamer was transferred to Dir Scouts.

### **Datta Khel-1973**

Datta Khel which was vacated in 1947 was reoccupied in April 1973 as part of Forward Thrust. Commandant Lieutenant Colonel

Ashiq Husain led the operation. The road was metalled, uptill 18 kilometres from MiranShah-Datta Khel and electricity also extended till this point thus road and electricity went hand in hand. The two major weapons in the hand of the government to change the tribal mind-set, these were the only two things that distinguished the area from past. A shingle ten kilometres road was extended from Datta Khel to Mama Ziarat, beyond this another twelve kilometres of camel and mule track leads to Tochi Pass. Major Aurangzeb Khan as Wing Commander was incharge of the operation supported by Major Muhammad Afzal Durrani. Captain Nasser Hussain was the Wing second in command.

In 1976 a dispute erupted between two sections of Wazirs over the Timber trade which dragged on for three months. The bombs of British era which were ‘dud’ were used by these tribes. These bombs were dragged through underground tunnels and blasted with naked fuse ‘surprisingly there were very few casualties.’<sup>263</sup> In the end political administration utilised the Tochi wing which took the positions and carried strong as possible gasht. Major Aziz Ahmed was the wing commander with Captain FakhreYousaf as the second in command.

### **1974-Ghulam Hasan Khan**

Ghulam Hasan Khan (GHK) is a small mountainous hamlet, eight miles north of MiranShah and is in visual contact with the fort on a good visibility day, it is located right next to the Durand Line and one of the routes to enter Waziristan from Matun and Khost. The Saidgi area just south of the GHK offers another route for cross Durand Line movement. It is interesting to note that Durand Line runs fairly close to the MiranShah and it is only in this sector

<sup>263</sup> *Annual Report Tochi Scouts for the year 1976 – 1977*, p – 4.



that major towns on both sides of the Durand Line are located and this holds true more for Pakistan. GHK dominates Saidgai and if Saidgi is compromised GHK stands by passed. In 1919 the major Afghan offensive came through this area. As part of Forward Thrust the GHK was occupied in 1974. Major Bahramand Shah, Captain Abdul Sattar Shahid, Captain Abdul Rauf were instrumental in the occupation of the GHK.

From 1974 onwards the things stabilised and life went back to the hay day, routine training, gasht, looking after the tribal affairs. The forward thrust had resulted in additional duties and responsibilities. It was a classic period of Forward Policy, more and more interaction with the tribes, the situation with Afghanistan also stabilised after the Islamic summit at Lahore in 1974. The increase export of manpower to the Gulf region brought an unparalleled economic prosperity in the overall country and tribes were not lagging behind in this economic boom. Kabul became a favourite tourist spot and stop, people from the Lahore and Rawalpindi would visit Kabul to have a taste of western world. Indian movies were openly screened, drug and alcohol was part of the society. This all resulted in an increase flow of traffic which traditionally remained a hallmark of tribal enterprise. Increase in demand for timber was another mean of business.

Niaz Ali Khan maintained his anti-Pakistani, pro Pakhtunistan stance in the area and instigated the tribes on the Afghan side in Paktika, Paktiya and Urgan (Khost) provinces.

## **CORPS OF TOCHI SCOUTS**

In 1977 the corps had 48 platoons distributed among four Wings which now numbered as 5, 6, 7 and 8 Wing instead of traditional

numbering starting from No.1. Its task remained the same that is to maintain law and order in the agency, to stop incursion from across the border (Durand Line) and to support the army in operations. There was one additional duty which had long and deep impact not only on the Tochi Scouts but also on all the other scouts that was addition of 'Anti-Smuggling Duties'. This last duty was ambiguous in nature, the tribes were moving in their own areas and as such the traditional concept of smuggling does not apply here in North Waziristan in strict sense. It should have been the duty of Khassadars and Levies or for that matter of Police and Constabulary but not that of Scouts, it did not achieved its purpose other than tarnishing the overall image of Scouts which were now depicted as money making machines among the military circles; an absolutely wrong concept which fermented because of lack of knowledge about the Scouts and tribal way of living.

Lieutenant Colonel Bashir Ahmed (PA 5821) of FF took over command in the last month of 1975 and remained in command till March 1978. Major Zafar Shah was the adjutant, Major Mahboob Shah was his second in command, Major Aziz Ahmed, Major Ejaz Zakria, Major Akhtar Ahmed, Major Khizar Hussain, Major Imtiaz Khan, Major Fazil Khan, Major Saeed Iqbal, Major Safdar Mahmood and Major Muhammad Salim remained as wing commanders under him.

### **Deployment**

5 Wing was deployed at Datta Khel with two companies at Datta Khel, one platoon at Akhtar picquet, a company at Khar Kamar, a company at Boya which was also maintaining sections strength picquets at Musa Khan, Pawani and Ahmed Khel.

6 Wing was at Spinwam having two companies at Spinwam, a platoon at Tabbi and a section at Athroza. Two more companies of the Wing were deployed at Shewa having one section each at Tabbi, TeraTakka, Char Khanna, Sandona and Tangi. The Shewa Post was deployed since 1976 for the protection of Army Engineers constructing road Shewa–Zarwan.

7 Wing was deployed at MirAli where Frontier Corps Training Centre was also operating, this wing provided perimeters guard for the training centre, it had two companies at MirAli with picquets at Chinarob, Kamar and Goshnari. Company strength was deployed at Khajauri Fort with a platoon strength picquet at Thall on Tochi, another company was at Bichi Khel Post

8 Wing was at Miranshah. There were three companies at MiranShah with picquets at Torgundi, Kani and Isha, the last was mainly an anti-smuggling post. A company at Ghulam Hasan Khan. The Wing was raised on 5<sup>th</sup> November 1975.

## **Training**

A record number of 612 recruits were trained in first half of year (January-July 1976). Another 128 recruits were trained between September 1976-April 1977 with another batch of 80 recruits passing out between May–September 1977. Despite having the training centre at MirAli only 218 recruits were trained rest all were trained within the corps. There was a shortage of 400 Scouts and it was planned to train them on the same footing.

Out of 48 platoons, Mohmand, Yusafzai and Ranizai had two platoons each, Orakzai had three, Wazir had four, Turi having five, Bangash six, Afridi eleven and Khattak remained the most populous

with 13 platoons. Later these platoons also underwent certain amendments and by end 1977 there were 15 Khattak platoons with Afridi having nine and Bangash having seven. Ranizai were transferred from the corps thus only these eight qaums remained at Tochi scouts. This strength was the same as after the 1965 war in terms of platoons but now the major difference was the absence of 15 Chitralis platoons, also the number of Khattak was increased from six platoons to present strength. This strength of platoons remained in vogue till 1994; the only notable addition was the inclusion of Marwat Qaum with a single platoon.

## **Weapons**

Corps now had six field guns, six 75 mm Recoilless Rifles, 15 mortars of 81 mm calibre against an authorisation of 24, 40 mortars of 60 mm against an authorisation of 48 and only 16 rocket launchers against an authorisation of 48. Medium machine guns were 24 present with the corps against an authorisation of 32.

## **Organisation**

The four wings and a headquarters wing was the outline organisation. Each wing had strength of 698 all ranks commanded by major, it had four companies each company having strength of 134 all ranks, it had three platoons of 39 scouts each sub divided into three section of ten scouts each. A medium Machine Gun section had two machine guns. Companies were commanded by subedar and platoons by naib subedar. Each wing had a Headquarters Company as well having strength of 129 scouts; it had one platoon each of mortars, signals and administration apart from civilian clerical staff. In the headquarters wing there were platoons dealing with artillery having strength of 55 scout gunners, an anti-tank platoon

armed with RRs, a pioneer platoon (21), signal section (22) and intelligence section (3). There was separate mess staff (13) Non-combatant enrolled (83) Medical (7) Military transport (20) and workshop manned by 30 scouts, administration platoon had the maximum strength of 66 Scouts. There is not much of change in the sixties organisation and this seventies , the major change took place in the Headquarters Wing where the education platoon was disbanded mainly because of raising of training centre at MirAli in 1970, another reduction took place in the wireless platoon, in MT platoon the strength was decreased by 18 scouts.

### **5<sup>th</sup> July-1977**

The year 1977 is an important year in the history of Pakistan and events of 1977 had direct impact on the Frontier. Army under General Zia Ul Haq took over the reins of the country, Iran underwent an Islamic revolution under Imam Khomeini and in 1979 the Russians finally entered into Afghanistan.

General Zia is the only example of a Scout officer becoming head of the state, before him Iskander Mirza the very first President of Pakistan had been a political agent in frontier and later Field Marshall Ayub Khan also commanded a brigade in Tochi Valley, Churchill was not an active scout officer rather a correspondent. Tochi Scouts naturally have a pride with Zia, because he had been part of us in 1953, a regular visitor in early sixties. He was fully aware of the Forward Policy and the Frontier Warfare and all this came handy in the forthcoming decade of insurgency and freedom movement against the Communist Russia which in true sense was Jihad.

## **Tochi Scouts and Afghan War 1978-1989**

Afghanistan have an area that equals to that of France, Holland, Belgium and Denmark combined or it is five times bigger than Vietnam, it had a population of 17 million in 1979, which is 99% Muslim (90% Sunni, 10 % Shia) and 85% of this population lived in rural area having a literacy rate of 10%, there are no railways in Afghanistan, 80% of area is mountainous, it had 19000 kilometres of road out of which only 25% was paved. Afghanistan shares a 2,348 Kilometres of border with Russia on west and north, 2,180 Kilometres with Pakistan on east, 820 kilometres with Iran in south and 73 Kilometres with China in north<sup>264</sup>

In April 1978 the Russian backed left wing coup in Afghanistan resulted in a wide spread social reforms that included education of women as well, soon the tribal society took up arms as it was against their customs. By 1979 the rebels had captured major town and even regular Afghan army started defecting, in line with 'Brezhnev Doctrine' the Russian army came into Afghanistan on the request of state.

### **Soviet Union**

Russian 40<sup>th</sup> Army with a strength of 81,800 troops having two motorized divisions, one airborne division, one air assault brigade, two motorised regiments, under the name of Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces(LCOS) all in all having over hundred combat units supported by requisite number of aircraft and gunships<sup>265</sup> crossed over the international border at 1200 GMT 25<sup>th</sup> December 1979 and was in position by mid January 1980. Its primary aim was to relieve

264 *Lester Grauand,MichaelGress ,eds, The Soviet Afghan War; How a superpower fought and lost a war*(,Kansas university press,2002),p,1-5

265 *Ibid* p.17-18

the Afghan army of garrison duties and to push them and support them in fighting the insurgency.

### **Great Game; Final Round**

With the military coup in Afghanistan (27<sup>th</sup> April 1978) the final round of Great Game started. In August 1978, General Zia decided that conditions in the tribal areas are favourable for the pursuance of Forward Policy. In December 1978 Afghanistan signed a peace pact with Russians. In February 1979 The Iranian Revolution took place and Shah of Iran had to flee the country. In April 1979 the American offer of aid was rejected by the President Zia as ‘peanut’. The threat of Russia which was perceived almost 150 years ago and around which all the subsequent events including Anglo-Afghan Wars took place now became a reality, Great Game was not a fantasy game it was a real game and stakes were high.

### **Forward Thrust**

Pakistan’s response ‘It was therefore decided to move up to the border in those areas which would be of military significance... we have moved forward in over a dozen areas the most significant of these areas are Nawa Pass, Kaitu Valley and Danday Saidgi.’<sup>266</sup> As a first step it was decided to occupy the approaches that lead from Afghanistan into North Waziristan. Much has been done under the British regarding establishing of posts and picquets and later under Brigadier NaseerUlah Babar the ‘Forward Push’ has been quite effective still there were many areas which needed attention. The only worthwhile change in post 1971 era from the past was the occupation of Ghulam Hasan Khan. On the military side the raising of Corps headquarters at Peshawar, infantry division at Kohat,

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<sup>266</sup> Lieutenant General Governor NWFP, FazleHaq’s remarks, in foreword of *Forward Thrust*, a secret document of 1980, Frontier Corps NWFP.

infantry brigade at Thall on Kurram provided the necessary military support.

Frontier Corps own appreciation highlighted the importance of area Saidgi south of Ghulam Hasan Khan. Thus within Tochi Scouts area of responsibility Saidgi became important 'A strong mobile force can rush into Tochi Valley quite unhindered.'<sup>267</sup> On 2<sup>nd</sup> July 1978 the Frontier Corps appreciation of the frontier was approved by the Chief Martial Law Administrator in a high level meeting at Rawalpindi.

### **Saidgi**

On 25<sup>th</sup> July 1978 the very first reconnaissance party comprising of Commandant Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Akram Khan, Political Agent Muhammad Rafiq Afridi and Adjutant Major Rahim Zad Khan went to Saidgi and they selected an area (Pt 4688) for a company strength occupation. It was again reconnaissance on 8<sup>th</sup> August by the adjutant and Captain Zia Seraj. The very first attack on the Afghan territory was launched in the June 1978 from here by the tribes on the Afghan Lalezai Post. In retaliation the Afghan forces with mobile elements gathered at the border and shelled the Saidgi. This incident had a much more impact than mere shelling. It brought the tribes to a sense of reality; no more they could stop a tank or an armoured car with their old fashioned, out dated rifles.

On 14<sup>th</sup> September two companies of Tochi Scouts were deployed at Danday Plains in connection with the decision of political agent, the tribes concerned were Darpa Khel Daur and Bora Khel having a dispute over the land.

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<sup>267</sup> *The Forward Thrust, First Report, Frontier Corps, NWFP, January 1980. (Declassified Document, original classification, Secret)*



On 5<sup>th</sup> November 1978, Tochi Scouts had the honour to take an army reconnaissance party through Kaitu River and went upto the Durand Line. The purpose of the party was to reconnoitre the main approaches from Afghanistan. It was the first time that the Durand Line had been approached in this Valley. (Kaitu Valley). Commander Corps Engineers (Brigadier Waheed), Commander 117 Infantry Brigade, brigade major and few officers from the brigade comprised the party. From Tochi Scouts, the commandant, adjutant and two wing commanders (Major Imtiaz Ahmed, Major Mushtaq Ahmed) made the contingent. 'It was a great success as the move of the party went through the river uninterrupted from the natives and was received with lavish tea at various places by the locals'<sup>268</sup>. The traditional migration of Powindahs took place as usual in winter but instead of going back they preferred to stay here.

Through the efforts of the political agents the Wazirs were convinced and after extracting an agreement useful to them they consented. On 18<sup>th</sup> April 1979 Tochi Scouts occupied Danday and Saidgi heights in a well-planned dawn operation. Both shoulders of the defile on the Durand Line were occupied and picquets established to monitor the whole valley area in order to block the main approaches from Afghanistan. The task of occupation in the area was completed before the target time given by Inspector General Frontier Corps. Temporary accommodation was constructed on selfhelp basis for over two companies strength in about six weeks time. The commendable task was the construction of road (4 Miles) from Saidgi Village to Sassai Top which is at a height of 5298 feet. It was constructed on self help basis in a record time of three weeks. 'MiranShah and indeed the Lower Tochi Valley are now well guarded from any land based incursion'<sup>269</sup> was the opinion

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<sup>268</sup> *Digest of Service, Tochi Scouts.*

<sup>269</sup> *Forward Thrust, p -13.*

of higher headquarters. On the organisational aspect the Kohistan Scouts which were deployed in the rear were move forward and they occupied the Spinwam Fort and carrying out duties of road protection which the Tochi Scouts wing was performing thus relieving the wing for occupation of Saidgi.

### **Kaitu Valley**

Kaitu River rises in Afghanistan on the South West border of Khost. Above Spinwam, Its valley is broad and cultivated. Leaving Spinwam, it winds through narrow gorges to its junction with the Kurram River at Zarwam. The total length in North Waziristan area being about 30 miles. It is an important pass and Nadir Shah used it during the 1919 attack on North Waziristan, it is also known as Shamal. Spinwam is on the northern bank of Kaitu and the 24 kilometres approach from the Durand Line on a shingle track remains unprotected. It was decided to strengthen this approach. Kaitu valley is inhabited by a number of Wazir Tribes among which Hassan Khel, Dreplari and Titi Madda Khel are more important. ‘After many lengthy and tedious parleys the tribes concerned agreed to the extension of a road on the left bank of Kaitu River’.<sup>270</sup> Within four months the road was constructed to some extent. In a joint operation by the Tochi Scouts (No.5 Wing) and Kohistan Scouts on 13<sup>th</sup> November 1979 the heights on the Kaitu at Durand Line were secured. The political up-heavel from the tribes was pacified by the governor in a Jirga that was held six days after the occupation of the Kaitu.

### **Niaz Ali Khan**

Niaz Ali Khan controlled the Gurweikht territory and without his consent the Forward Thrust could not proceed through that area

<sup>270</sup> *Forward Thrust*, p – 14.

without bloodshed and who knows where it might lead in such circumstances. The upsurge of anti communist activities in the Afghan provinces of Paktiya, Paktika and Urgan brought around some unexpected changes in the mindset of Niaz. In early 1979 he migrated back to his ancestral village Spalga near MiranShah and issued Fatwas against the Afghan and Soviet. In the summer of 1979 he raised lashkar against the Afghan and attacked the Bari-Lalezai Post.

## **Eighties**

Eighties was a monumental decade for the region, for Pakistan and for Tochi Scouts as well. The scenario which was perceived by the British almost a century and half ago became a reality, the full fledged war against the Russia in Afghanistan. Pakistan responded strongly and rose to the occasion, the very presence of General Zia an old hand of Great Game was a great help. In the same decade Pakistan underwent a transition from purely military state to controlled democracy. At the end of decade, General Zia died in an air crash; Russians had to leave Afghanistan in a disgrace. The influence and friendship with Americans reached new zenith something not seen before or at least not after 1963.

Within the North Waziristan Agency the life changed little, there were similar lashkar, bombing, destruction of bridges, kidnapping, killing, Baramptas, Chiga, Gasht and Tochi Scouts actions against the hostiles.

Within the Tochi Scouts the technology changed life to a great extent; there were more frequent road trips to Peshawar and Bannu than in the past. Similarly the number of guests on official visits increased manifold, in the period between 1901-1947 there were

only two visits of the governor, in eighties there were half a dozen, all related to Afghan issue and more importantly in connection with the Agency affairs. The life quality of troops improved, new family quarters were made, sports grounds constructed, new posts occupied and few handed over to Khassadars as well. Tochi Scouts main attention was on the firing and sports. Both these events in turn produce great scouts. The winning of an event was a matter of pride. Culturally there was a transition, in line with the overall change in army. Junior commissioned officers and subedar majors on posting were invited in officers mess and given farewell breakfast, Subedar Major was also invited to the commandants house with family for a cup of tea. Sectarian riots in Kurram Agency remained a permanent deployment for the Tochi Scouts. The situation within the MiranShah also remained turbulent with arms dealer, students, timber dealers, transporters and even Khassadars going on strikes.

Tochi Scouts relations and attachment with the Air remained paramount, on no less than five occasions Tochi Scouts hit the world headlines due to incidents involving aircraft, thrice the Russian aircraft landed here at MiranShah asking for political asylum and on two other occasions Tochi Scouts had to find the pilots and wreckage before being taken away by the Afghans. Families started living at MiranShah, there were numerous Iftaar, dinner and dine outs. Prime Minister stayed a night at Tochi Mess and so did a host of officers, some from past and others destined for new heights.

New weapons and equipment was inducted (120 mm Mortars) training of recruits was streamline and made an event where even President of Pakistan grace the occasion and presented the prizes to the recruits. New doctrines were analysed and practiced. Tribes remain busy in their past time of fighting; Wazirs finally brought a lashkar to attack the Dauris.

By 1980 Tochi Scouts were stretched over 192 kilometres of road protection apart from the occupation of the posts at Durand Line. 44<sup>th</sup> Frontier Corps Week was celebrated at Razmak (part of it was held at MiranShah); Tochi Scouts retained the FC volleyball championship for second consecutive year. The refugees had started pouring in. Mr. Walter Klosser the chief and co-ordination of refugee's commissioner UNO visited MiranShah and was entertained by the Tochi Scouts. On the administrative grounds Tochi Scouts constructed eight rooms with attach bathrooms for junior commissioned officers at MiranShah, eighteen family quarters were also constructed for scouts, another two rooms were constructed for Officers Mess staff, a barrack was constructed for troops at Miranshah. At Ghulam Hasan Khan a temporary accommodation was constructed to accommodate an additional company, similarly one big room each was constructed at Biche Kashkai and Torghundi Posts. At the end of 1979 Tochi Scouts had eight majors on its strength, the remaining two officers were captains, one dealing with artillery and other as a medical officer. In November 1979 following posts were temporarily taken over by the Tochi Scouts from Kohistan Scouts, they included Shewa, Tabi, Kaitu Bridge and Spinwam itself.

In 1980 the Young Soldiers Football competition was held at Miranshah. PAF showed an interest in activating the MiranShah airfield and for this Air Chief Marshall Anwar Shamim visited the place.

On 24<sup>th</sup> October 1980 the Afghan Gunships attacked the area north of Madda Khel ( Maizar) resultantly a strong Gasht of Tochi scouts comprising of a Wing supported by two armoured personal carriers (APC) and two 12. 7 Machine Guns moved from MiranShah

but they were called back. The routine affairs of Agency went as usual, Timber trade from 1961 onwards have been a constant source of irritation and even in 1980 the pattern remained the same. On 14/15<sup>th</sup> December the Timber dealers of Datta Khel came to MiranShah in 57 trucks carrying almost 600 tribesmen, they wanted to lodge protest with the governor of the province who was visiting the place. Tochi Scouts had to deploy two companies to ensure law and order. Political Agent was able to handle the situation peacefully.

Change of Command. In September 1980 the regular change of command took place, Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Akram Khan handed over it to Lieutenant Colonel Nabi Ahmed of Baluch. Major Asghar, Major Fayyaz and Major Abdul Ghaffar were also posted in. The importance of Afghan War in relation to the Tochi Scouts was also felt by the military secretary branch of army, there were two officers who were qualified from Pakistan Staff College, one the commandant himself and other was Major Asghar. Lieutenant Colonel Akram carried out quite a number of constructions in his tenure, his last act was the construction of additional 11 family quarters for the soldiers and keeping in view the increased number of guests he also constructed a reception room near the main gate. Kurram remained a permanent deployment for Tochi Scouts on regular basis for duration ranging fifteen days to one month. The Tochi Scouts would be called for reinforcement in relations to the sectarian clashes in the Kurram Valley. The construction of road in Zerraki became a hot issue between the Daur and Bora Khel Wazirs; it necessitated a deployment of company strength of Scouts on quite a regular basis. Another issue which erupted was the Tochi Valley Woollen Mill and Tochi Valley Match Factory, both located on the Northern side of the MiranShah, the workers would go on strike on regular basis.

The commando platoon competition was held at Wana (7 June-14 June 1981) it was won by the Tochi Scouts. Whenever any team won any competition held outside the MiranShah, on return a royal welcome always awaits them. Tea break with the commandant, garlands, music and general hulla-gulla. The posting dilemma of officers still remained the same, no less than nine officers were posted out in the first six months of 1981 and seven new officers were posted in. In short in last one year fifteen officers were posted out thus a new team had to learn the all-important skills from the beginning and by the time they reach any standard they would be posted out. From the early 1910 and then in 1930 the pattern was that officers to Scouts and Militias were posted from the Piffers, who had a fair idea of Frontier warfare but now the officers coming to Tochi Scouts or for that matter in any of the Scouts Corps were from all arms and for majority of them it was their first experience, the draw back was not in their being naïve but in the duration of stay which did not allowed any positive outcome.

Inter wing competition in all fields including sports and firing were part of training schedule and cycle. They were held with great enthusiasm and spirit. These events also provided a nursery of sportsmen to represent the Tochi Scouts at higher level.

## **1981**

Anti- Afghan movement was taking roots but still it was not matured. The refugees were camped around the MiranShah; it was difficult to say whether they were genuine refugees or just powindahs. The time had changed the old animosity or apprehension between the Tochi Scouts and the native tribes was now slowly and gradually warming up. It was the first time in the history of the tribes that

they were fighting against the Kabul regime; previously the power struggles in Kabul always had some sympathy among the Wazirs; but no more. Within the agency the Tochi Scout was busy in the routine affairs. In October 1981, one person by the name of Haji Mirza Ali Khan was kidnapped by the Izzat Khan Shuggi Tori Khel and taken to Biche Kashkai area. A joint scout team comprising of Shawal Rifles, Thall Scouts and Tochi Scouts carried out the operation and the abductee was release. The reason for having reinforcement from the other scout corps was the fact that in the same time period (October 1981) no less than three companies were sent to Kurram for taking part in anti-sectarian riots.

### **1982- Karkanwam**

In July 1982 the change of command took place, Lieutenant Colonel Anwar Khan (22 Cavalry) took over the command; he was commanding a training-regiment at the armoured corps centre. He thus became the first officer from Armoured Corps to command the Tochi Scouts, he brought along the Armoured Culture of pomp and show which is so important in tribal society.

### **Eid**

Eid and Ramadan are very special occasions for Muslims. They are celebrated and observed with religious zeal and rites. On Eid day the main prayers were held at the Scouts Mosque inside the Fort, the civilians from the MiranShah at their own used to have the Eid congregation at the runway. Commandant after the Eid prayers would visit the posts and picquets. In 1982, Commandant went to Boya and attended the 'Bara Khana', another Bara Khana was held at MiranShah. Leave is an issue on such occasion as majority rather every one desires to be with his family on such days.



During Ramadan the timings were 0630-1030 hours. No games & no physical training. The issue of separate Eid have been a part of Pakistan history even before the independence. In the Agency despite observing the Ramadan on two different days (In 1983 the Ramadan was observed by the locals on 12<sup>th</sup> June while the Tochi Scouts observed it on 13<sup>th</sup> June) yet the Eid was observed on a single day . That was the Political Agent's advise, it was a good advice.

Another event of importance is the National Day, under General Zia this event was given due respect. Bara Khana, sports festivities, hoisting of flag ceremony were part of it. Illumination of the buildings and decoration with buntings added extra flavour and colour to it. In the evening on 14<sup>th</sup> August 1982, a football match was played between the Political Agent XI and Tochi Scouts XI; Tochi lost it by a solitary goal. Defence Day (6<sup>th</sup> September) was another day of prayers and festivities.

There was and still is a considerable population of Christians living and being part of Tochi Scouts, Christmas is celebrated with them, being always winter, warm clothing is given to children, cake and sweets distributed among them. Commandant and officers visiting family quarters of sweepers where tea is always arranged. This tradition is still being followed.

### **Governor's Visit**

Governor's visit to Tochi Scouts after the Afghan coup became regular, the troops were used to it and the procedures were well rehearsed. A signal was received on 15<sup>th</sup> August 1983 regarding the forthcoming visit. The commandant ordered stitching of new uniform. Major Bashir the adjutant was made responsible for the guard of honour and he started practising also. Band from 17 FF

was transported from Kohat and meanwhile other items were also borrowed from the sister scout organisation (Shawal and Thall). Many hours were spent in making the menu and getting the right ingredients from the Peshawar. Gardener instructed to preserve the flowers for the garland, sweepers working day and night, fresh lime paint applied to the trees and everything that was static. On 20<sup>th</sup> August the signal was received from Kurram Militia that visit is postponed. Later it transpired that one officer in Kurram Militia just over heard that Governor might be visiting the Tochi Scouts and he in an informal manner told another friend in Tochi Scouts and none checked officially about the visit and just started preparing for it.

Frontier has its own pace of life and one thing is assured that it is far from monotonous and boring. The under mentioned incident highlights how an ordinary incident can turn very ugly more importantly it also highlights that nothing much had change in the North Waziristan till early eighties.

### **Kidnapping of a Wing Commander**

On 23 September 1982, Major Abdul Hamid Butt the Wing Commander at Khajauri, Captain Iftikhar Durrani (Tochi Scouts Doctor) and subedar major of the corps along with a non commissioned officer and a jeep driver went to Biche Kashkai from MirAli, to inquire the circumstance under which a soldier got injured. Enroute while coming back, they were stopped by eight armed outlaws and were taken on gun point to a place which was six miles away from the road. In the meantime the Wing Senior Subedar who got worried due to non-arrival of the party reached the spot. On checking from the patient who had been left by the outlaws in the jeep, he found that the officers and the driver had been kidnapped by

the outlaws. Appreciating that the kidnappers were heading towards Qamar Killi, he took a detour in his jeep and established a check point on the track being used by them. On seeing this, the gang released the hostages but took one rifle, 60 round and three wrist watches. Commandant at that time was on a visit at Ghulam Hasan Khan, he was informed on wireless. He came back to MiranShah and with a force of 300 Scouts accompanied by the Political Agent Mr Hameed Khan move towards the place of incident. They were met in the way by the wing commander who informed about all the happening.

Commandant and PA along with the force reached the site, PA got hold of the Maliks of the areas and gave them the task of finding the names of the culprits, after carrying a strong Gasht the force and all officials came back to MiranShah. In the meantime Captain Durrani at 1700 hours took out a Gasht from Khajauri and soon after there was no communication with him, Major Bashir the Adjutant took another Gasht to find Durrani and soon he was also not traceable. Commandant too went in search of these two officers with his quartermaster. At 1900 hours it was found that Durrani has reached Rocha Post of Frontier Constabulary, still the adjutant was missing, he was found ahead of Khajauri.

On 24<sup>th</sup> September, it was confirmed by the Political Agent that the gang was led by a notorious outlaw named Manwali Shogi Khel who was required by law enforcing agencies in many cases. Whole gang belonged to Tori Khel Wazirs. An operation was planned to teach a lesson to the outlaws, who were hiding in Karkanwam village. A strong Tochi Scouts force of 210 persons with three APCs, one 75 mm RR and Mortars started moving from MiranShah towards the Jani Khel. At 1515 hours the force was two miles short of the Karkanwam Village.

The plan was simple, one part of scouts to secure the left flank of village, other to secure the right and remaining under Adjutant Major Bashir to enter into the village accompanied by the commandant and the PA. *'Village look absolutely deserted there was no movement, there were 30-40 mud houses, each having a high tower, walls of the houses very thick...when the troops were 300 yards short of the village, an old lady and an old man came out, there were two young men also fully armed...the old lady spoke of peace and informed the authorities that the hostiles have gone into the hills...the people of the village were afraid of Manwali and refused to indicate his house....at this stage (1730 hours)the fire was opened up on the Scouts... Commandant ordered the RR to open fire on the house, six rounds were fired without causing any damage although the RR was only 250 yards away...commandant now ordered the APC to move in, Subedar Naubat Shah himself took the APC and fired at the house hitting four hostiles with machine gun fire...dark light was looming...all of a sudden the fire started to come from three direction'.*<sup>271</sup>

All this sounds familiar, it had happened at Tappi in 1940. This time the Scouts managed to extricate themselves. The same very old women and men who were the first one to come out of the village pleading for mercy had intentionally kept quiet and misguided the Scouts, the house which they acknowledged as empty was the fire base of the hostiles. Political Agent Mr Abdul Hameed Qasuria's last words before he was hit in the chest were 'get out of here, it is a death trap'. One of the Sepoy of Tochi Scouts picked up the dead body of Political Agent and retrieved it to a safe place. In this operation Lance Naik Sultan Khel Afridi also lost his life due to fire of hostiles, four other Scouts were wounded. Tochi Scouts fall back to the MiranShah.

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25<sup>th</sup> September, 2000 hours. A force of about 1100 personnel was assigned the task to capture the hostiles and demolish Karkanwam village. The force also had the support of 116 Brigade at Bannu and 82 Medium Regiment Artillery stationed at Kohat. Following was the breakdown of the force:-

Tochi Scouts. Four Companies ( seven officers, 24 JCO's and 520 scouts, led by Major Imdad, Major Bashir, Major Khalid Masood Butt, Captain Iftikhar Durrani, Captain Khalid Sultan, Captain Ehtisham Tiwana, Captain Sardar Ali Shah, Captain Jan Muhammad) and the Field Battery

Thall Scouts	-	3 x Companies
Shawal Rifles	-	3 x Companies
Mahsud Scouts	-	3 x Companies
Khyber Rifles	-	2 x Companies
82 Medium Regiment	-	1 x Battery
A Squadron of APCs		
101 Engineering Battalion	-	1 x Section

#### **4<sup>th</sup> October-1982**

Whole force was concentrated at Bannu and on 4<sup>th</sup> October 1982, moved to the Karkanwam village. In between these two weeks a hectic political activity was observed. First of all the Wazir and Daur Jirga was assembled at Miran Shah which was attended by over fifty Maliks, it was addressed by the Commissioner, after day long negotiations, nothing solid was reached and it was pended for another day. Some of the big names of the area were in attendance, Malik Khandan Khan, Malik Jahangir Khan both Madder Khel

Wazirs, Darya Khan Haibati Tori Khel, Hajji Sarwar Jan Bora Khel Wazir, Hajji Milawar Khan Bora Khel Wazir, Malik Ajab Khan Kabul Khel. From Daur, Haji Sultan Muhammad Khan Muhammad Khel, Subedar Akram Khan Darpa Khel was in attendance. 'They responded sincerely and intelligently to maintain the prestige of the government'. Jirga intelligently postponed the matter as the Eid Ul Azha was approaching. Next date fixed was 2<sup>nd</sup> October 1982; Eid was celebrated sombrely on 28<sup>th</sup> September 'atmosphere seems to be gloomy due to incident of 24<sup>th</sup> September'.<sup>272</sup>

Although not directly concerned with Tochi Scouts yet it had a link with the overall situation, on 30<sup>th</sup> September a bomb was exploded at Razmak Cinema Hall in which 17 scouts were wounded.

On 2<sup>nd</sup> October at 1000 hours the grand Jirga again assembled and gave complete 'Waak' to the government. After two hours of consultation in which IGFC was also present the terms of government were announced.

*'A fine of Rupees Fifteen Lacs, demolition of hostiles houses with provision to confiscate their property anywhere else in the province, demolition of the houses involved in firing on the scouts, establishment of Scouts Fort at Karkanwam, right to carry the Gasht, return of rifle snatched along with ten more foreign make rifles, handing over of the eight hostiles.'*<sup>273</sup>

Jirga accepted all the terms but Manwali was never handed over.

In light of the Jirga decision, the force now assembled at Bannu move towards the Jani Khel. On 2<sup>nd</sup> October at 1700 hours the Verbal Orders were given and the whole force was divided into two.

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Force 1 had Thall Scouts three companies, four companies of Tochi Scouts, three companies of Shawal Rifles, battery of 83 Medium Regiment, six 106 mm RRs, section of Engineers (101 Battalion) and recovery vehicles, Air Contact Team was also present.

Force 2 had three companies of Mahsud Scouts, two companies of Khyber Rifles, three APCs of Thall Scouts along with mortars.

On 3<sup>rd</sup> October the force moved towards the Jani Khel, medium battery remained deployed at Jani Khel and meanwhile the political agent contacted the Maliks of the area, a Jirga was again held to sort out the last minute issues, again the Maliks were able to gain time as the day light hours were fading and operation was postponed for next day. The camp was established with tight security cordon. Next day at 0600 hours the operation started.

Thall Scouts secured the left flank of the village by establishing picquets at the heights. Force 2 secured the right flank by reaching to the top of heights (2000-3000 feet high). Main Force now moved forward from Nikori, it composed entirely of Tochi Scouts as the Shawal Rifles were left to protect the Nikori. Tochi Scouts got deployed 600 meters short of the village and Maliks were told to destroy the houses of the hostiles which they were reluctant to do so. Subedar Ali Mast of Tochi Scouts then led the pioneer platoon and Engineers section for demolition of the houses. *‘Subedar Ali Mast moved into the village, it was a complete and quiet moment, only the sound of two vehicles moving could be heard, all eyes were on Ali Mast, one bullet was enough for him because he was carrying 560 Kilograms of TNT in the vehicle...at 0930 hours the first explosion went off, three more explosions were heard and the houses and towers of the hostiles were seen crumbling into dust...at 1120 hours.*

*Subedar Ali Mast came out of the village and reported that eleven houses have been destroyed'.<sup>274</sup>*

Troops stayed another night at Nikori and improved the defences of the post, next day IGFC came along with the commissioner at Nikori and gave 'Shabash' to the troops. Three companies of Tochi Scouts under Major Imdad and one company of Thall Scouts stayed at Nikori and rest of the force moved back to Bannu and the operation ended. Later in April 1983 the Nikori was handed over to the Frontier Constabulary.

Reorganisation of Frontier Corps. In 1982 the Frontier Corps was reorganised, the post of Wing Subedar Major was created and three subedars of Tochi Scouts were promoted, they were Subedar Arbab Khan Orakzai, Subedar Nobat Shah Khattak and Subedar Mumtaz Khan Wazir. Another salient feature of the reorganisation was the emphasis on 'Commandant being more accessible' thus open days concept was introduced.

### **Athletic Team**

The inter corps athletic competition was held at Peshawar in December 1982, Tochi Scouts achieved fourth position, importantly following Tochi Scouts were selected for the Civil Armed Forces Athletic Team. Captain Saif urRehman, Naib Subedar Zabar Dast Khan, Naib Subedar Yusuf, Havildar Sherin Jan, Lance Naiks Inayatullah, Muhammad Shah, Muhammad Abbas and Sepoy Aziz Khan.

### **Biche and Rain**

The post at Biche was visited by commandant thrice in two months and every time he visited it, there were rain thus he stopped

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<sup>274</sup> Digest of Service Tochi Scouts.



going there and there were no rain for a year, he went again after few months and it rain.

## 1983

The year started with annual fitness for war inspection commonly known as 'Adm Inspection'. *'Our administrative inspection began today, it was very disheartening to see own Tochi boys unable to climb the rope, they had not practised it, we were so so in firing and good in the one mile, documents were well maintained and team was happy.'*<sup>275</sup>

### First Billiard Competition.

In 1962 there was a mess waiter by the name of Mehrban. One day a newly posted officer who have been dined in a month ago was killing his time by playing billiard alone but it lacked zest thus he decided to teach Mehrban billiard. *'initially he would get the score of twenty but he was quick learner rather too sharp but still he would not cross 60 marks, in order to make it interesting I initiated the bets of "charga" and expectedly he lost. I felt rather bad over this but he offered to fetch a wild fowl instead on which I agreed as it would cause him no financial loss other than to get up early and hunt which I mentally accepted as a fair deal. He lost two and then came closer to 90 and then after losing three fowls he won straight nine and then lost two and won an amazing eleven, it was at this time an old Tochites officer came for visit and narrated me how Mehrban is a professional and has already 'taught' three officers winning close to hundred Chargas.'*<sup>276</sup>

In May 1983 the first FC Billiard competition was held at MiranShah, it was won by the Tochi Scouts, Captain Dr Jan

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Shinwari stood first and Major Tariq Amin Gilani was second, both from Tochi Scouts.

Later in 1996 the Billiard table was renovated and repaired from Lahore at a cost of Rs 18000/.

### **Reception of Victors**

In May 1983 the Tochi Scouts firing team won the Frontier Corps championship, the team was escorted from Isha Post till MiranShah by the two APCs. Officers and commandant received the team at Idak Gate with garlands. Machine Gun fired at their arrival. All the winning members were given an additional one month leave, local stripes and Rupees One Thousand as prize, above all the complete Tochi Scouts was given two days off, such is the reception for victors. It is worth noting that the promotion criteria for a havildar to become a naib subedar included obtaining a firing standard where a group of six inch was the minimum prerequisite. Captain Saif Ur Rehman and Naib Subedar Yusuf both of Tochi Scouts were selected in October 1983 with a team to participate in a firing competition at USA.

Summer of 1983 was tough, the water shortage was acute, three out of four Fort tubewells were not working and electricity was scare. It was in June that the very first Russian Fridge was bought for the JCO's Mess and a 26 inch Coloured Television was also purchased 'Commandant and officers went to see the articles'. Time has changed now every barrack have latest television and almost every post has its own deep freezer, their purchase and arrival in the Fort does not even make an eye brow rise.

There was no dearth of events, it happened every day. One night a scout at night duty at Datta Khel fell from the wall and broke his

both wrists and sustained head injuries, he was evacuated at night from the Datta Khel to MiranShah. But evacuation at night is not as simple as it looks; one has to pass the information to the tribes as well.

### **Kiln & Movies**

In July 1983 Tochi Scouts started its own kiln to make bricks; Subedar Ali Mast (retired) was given the responsibility. On 26<sup>th</sup> July it was lighted and on 4<sup>th</sup> August the very first bricks were ready and taken out. In September 1983 after a lapse of almost twenty years the movies were again screened in the Fort, the Public Relation Department sent its mobile cinema van along with publicity movies, the movies were shown in the sports stadium, the van as per programme remained with Tochi Scouts for a period of ten days every month.

### **Handing over the Posts**

In September 1983, Kani, Goshnarai, Tor Gundi, Qamar and Dardoni posts were handed over to the Khassadars.

### **Father and Son**

Among the junior commissioned and non-commissioned officers the instances of father and son serving in Tochi Scouts are quite in numbers. The recruitment policy of the Tochi Scouts also encourages the next of kin to join the Tochi Scouts; the first preference is always given to the boy of the shaheed and then retired or serving Scout. However in case of officers it is very rare that son should also be serving in the Tochi Scouts. It is matter of luck and it happened in 1983, Major Sardar Durrani (PSP 3964) had reported in Tochi

Scouts as lieutenant on 16<sup>th</sup> November 1956 and remained here till July 1960, serving as adjutant, wing officer and later commanded the Wing also, he was later posted to Zhob Militia in 1960. His son Captain Sardar Iftikhar Durrani (PSS 15433) also served in Tochi Scouts (1982–1985). Captain Iftikhar stood first in FC Officers firing competition (pistol) in 1983.

### **North Waziristan Sports Stadium**

On 19<sup>th</sup> November 1983 the ground breaking ceremony of the sports stadium at the eastern side of the Fort was performed. Commandant Tochi Scouts made a barter trade with the political agent, giving him some land for the stadium and getting some lands near the own gardens, thus increasing the overall area of the gardens.

### **1984-Hunt for Nasibi & Rasheedi**

Nasibi and his friend Rasheedi were the two most wanted outlaws of the Agency and as long as they were roaming free the prestige of the state was tarnished. Many attempts were made but every time these two will escape.

On 15 July 1984, Major General Muhammad Arif Bangash visited Tochi Scouts and it was decided in a conference by Inspector General Frontier Corps, Commandant and Political Agent North Waziristan Agency, to eliminate proclaimed offenders Nasibi and Rasheed Haider Khan from North Waziristan Agency. Both criminals had been at large since very long and wanted in many crimes and recently been found involved in anti-state activities. On the orders of Inspector General Frontier Corps the preparations for operation were started. Whole intelligence set up of North Waziristan Agency and Tochi Scouts was mobilized to know the location and presence

of these criminals. Later it was decided to capture both targets one by one instead of going for them simultaneously. Nasibi was to be taken first. For the operation following force was concentrated at MirAli:-

- a. Tochi Scouts - 4 x Wings, Filed Battery  
Pioneer Platoon 3 x APCs.
- b. Kurram Militia, Shawal Rifles - 1 x Company each  
and Thall Scouts
- c. 41 FF - 1 x Company
- d. 45 Baloch R& S - 1 x Platoon
- e. Integral Mortars and RR's

On 15 August 1984 at about 2100 hours the presence of Nasibi was confirmed at his house near village Mirali where he had invited a number of friends on a "Gud Party". At 2345 hours on the same day, the Commandant Tochi Scouts, Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Anwar Khan Amir gave his final orders for the operations. Commander Force 1-Major Wahab was task to attack Nasibi's house.

It was a dark and rainy night, the Scouts drenched move towards target, alongwith Assistant Political Agent MirAli Azmat Hanif Khan, who also wore the uniform of Tochi Scouts. At the same time another Force-II under command Major Khalid Sultan moved from Bichi Kashkai post of Tochi Scouts towards the village of Rasheedi. As it was raining heavily, the H hour was extended from 0430 hours to 0530 hours on 16 August 1984. At 0525 hours a Datsun Pick up was seen coming from Nasibi's house and heading towards MirAli. The vehicle was stopped without any difficulty and all seven persons were arrested including Tor Khan elder brother of Nasibi. The force 1 moved to the target on stipulated time but was pinned down due

to the firing from Nasibi's houses. Two jawans of Tochi Scouts got minor injuries and were evacuated to MirAli Camp. In the meantime, Assistant Political Agent MirAli sent two mediators to Nasibi's house asking him to surrender himself to the authorities which he refused. On failure of negotiations Acting Political Agent Mr. Abdul Qadir Khan ordered Assistant Political Agent MirAli to blow up the house of the criminal. Last warning was given to Nasibi and he was told to move the ladies and children out of the house. After five minutes few ladies came out of Nasibi's house but the Scouts noticed that Nasibi and another man clad in ladies dress also tried to get away but on suspicion ran back to the house. At 0700 hours all available weapons on the scene started firing which continued till 1130 hours. Commandant Tochi Scouts then phased his final attack on the target adopting fire and move tactics. It was conducted by two groups of forty two persons each. The target was also divided into two and each group was given one portion, moving behind two APCs in leap frog method. The mission was great success and nine hostiles were killed including Nasibi and Rasheed Khan Haider Khel who was supposed to be captured in another operation. Tochi Scouts had no casualties except three wounded. For the brave action of Tochi Scouts, it was said that Tochi Scouts had lived upto their traditions and had completed the mission successfully. Brampta against Nasibi and his gang was meticulously planned and very well executed. On this the local inhabitants of MirAli and surrounding area were also satisfied as the offenders had also made their lives miserable.<sup>277</sup>

## **AN-26**

22<sup>nd</sup> September 1984 was an ordinary quiet day at MiranShah. Commandant Lieutenant Colonel Anwar was in his office when he heard the noise of an aircraft over heard, he thought as some

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<sup>277</sup> Digest of Service Tochi Scouts.

visitor is coming unplanned so he rang up his Adjutant Major Hameed Butt, but there was no such visit planned. Commandant as a precaution went to the airfield in his jeep, He was hardly out of the eastern gate when the aircraft flared from southern direction and touched down in the mid of runway, taxied till the northern end and taxied back towards the tarmac. It was a Russian built Afghan Air Force transport aircraft AN-24. Officer Commanding Inter Services Intelligence detachment Captain Uzair also reached the spot. Tochi Scouts encircled the aircraft and soon the door of the aircraft opened and one by one eight persons in uniform disembark. They asked for political asylum. Five members were not the flying crew but they all had hatched a plan to escape to Pakistan. On a routine flight from Kabul – Matun, they just switched off their radio sets and landed at MiranShah.

A flurry of telephone calls now starting coming from HQ FC, from corps hq, from ISI, 9 Division, 116 Brigade, Commissioner D.I.Khan. Commandant took the Afghan Pilot in his jeep to the political agent's office, all other were put under armed guard and offered tea and snacks. Tochi Scouts was put on full alert, meanwhile a PAF helicopter came to assess the type and make of the aircraft then a team of PAF pilots and technicians came in a Cessna Aircraft, Wing Commander Ghafoor was heading it. Orders were given and countermanded from higher headquarters and finally it was decided that aircraft will be flown early in the morning to Peshawar. At 1945 hours the Afghan Refugees for reasons better known to them started firing on the aircraft from the outer perimeter and own scouts replied in the same kind. The Fort was put on high alert, all troops families were also shifted inside.

Next day (23<sup>rd</sup> September) the aircraft was flown to Peshawar, the rest of the Afghan personnel were taken by road under escort by Captain Iftikhar Durrani.<sup>278</sup>

## **Hind MI- 24**

The most dreaded and fearful Russian Helicopter of Cold War era was the Hind. On the afternoon of 13<sup>th</sup> July 1985 at 1120 hours two Hind landed at the tarmac of MiranShah. These helicopters flew nap of the earth avoiding any hostile ground fire , they just pop-up close to Saidgi and before anyone could react they were over head the Tochi Scouts Fort and after brief hovering they both landed, fully armed. The similar precautions of cordoning the airfield were adopted. Information was passed on to the higher headquarters and pilots from army aviation were flown. Pakistan Army Aviation has been operating the Russian helicopters since 1969 (MI-8). The beauty of Russian equipment as far as flying machines are concerned is that they all have similar engines, flying controls and gauges. Both helicopters remained park overnight at Tochi Scouts, there was fear of Russian commando attack on the airfield for the destruction of their helicopters lest they fall into Western hands. Strict security measures were adopted. In the morning the first incident was that the helicopters after they were started fired few rounds accidentally, it created panic. To cut a long story short, both helicopters were safely flown away. One of the helicopters is still on flying status.

## **Fighting Falcon Search**

*The above mentioned two incidents of Afghan aircraft intruding into Pakistan air space and landing without any hassle at MiranShah exposed the fragile air defence state of Pakistan. Resultantly the F-16*

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<sup>278</sup> Tochi Scouts Digest of Service, also see daily Dawn and daily Mashraq (Urdu) of 23<sup>rd</sup> September 1984.



*aircraft were purchased from USA; it was the most technologically advanced aircraft of its time.*

On 29<sup>th</sup> April 1987 at about 1235 hours, while intercepting intruding Afghan aircraft in North Waziristan, one PAF F-16 met with an accident. The pilot of the aircraft, Flight Lieutenant Shahid Sikandar bailed out and landed in Afghan territory in Saidgi Sector. The wreckage of the aircraft also fell inside Afghan territory near village Boran Tangi Narai.

The Tochi Scouts at Ghulam Hasan Khan and Saidgi witnessed the whole scene but they were not sure about the nationality of the aircraft and since the debris had fallen inside the Afghan territory, thus they were content with being just as mere spectators. Major Muzzaffar Raza was the Wing Commander at GHK and he identified the fallen aircraft as F-16 but still he could not just walk into Afghan territory. Meanwhile within ten minutes it was confirmed that the aircraft is ours and pilot has to be found and brought back immediately, at all cost before any Russian or Afghan could reach it. Thus a race against time started.

The Afghan Mujahedeen were the greatest help, Major Raza, Captain Nasir Zaidi and later Major Raja Zahoor and Corps Subedar Major Malang Shah conducted the search. Flight Lieutenant Sikander was lucky to land close to an Afghan Mujahedeen village and was safely brought back, he had suffered minor injuries. Tochi Scouts took out a special gasht and search parties. The parties located the pilot and brought him back to Ghulam Khan within one hour of the accident. It is worth mentioning that the Afghan border was infested with Afghan troops and regularly being patrolled by Afghan aircraft and gunships. Therefore search operation by own troops was quite

risky and difficult. The wreckage was spread over an area of two kilometres and despite the heavy odds, the search party succeeded in retrieving the wreckage and bringing it to Miranshah within twenty-four hours. The Mujahedeen cordoned the area and engaged the Afghan border security troops who were also searching the pilot and the wreckage.

## SU-25

On 5<sup>th</sup> August 1988 at 2010 hours, a Russian SU-25 that had intruded into Pakistan was shot down by an F-16 of PAF. The wreckage fell in general area of Khar Kamar. Subedar Sardar Shah was the post commander at Khar Kamar, *'I had just taken the all correct report from all the platoons and was standing at the parapet when I saw a streaking flame coming down fast and then a big boom... I instantly knew it is an aircraft, I had taken part in the F-16 rescue last year also so I thought it is another accident... I immediately informed my Wing Commander Major Tariq Iqbal at Datta Khel... I took out the Chigha party and reached the wreckage area, after some time Major Tariq and Captain Jan Muhammad also joined in with more strength'*.<sup>279</sup>

The area was cordoned off and search operation started for locating the whereabouts of the Russian Pilot. Next day Commandant Lieutenant Colonel Hazrat Ghulam Afridi also arrived alongwith Captain Lal Shahzad in command of a company. Tochi Scouts spread all over the area and search for the pilot was started; Captain Younis with another Scout company also joined in the search. Commandant knowing the area and culture announced an award of Rs. 20000/- for the capture and Rupees 5000 for any information about Russian Pilot. A PAF team also visited the site of crash headed by Air

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<sup>279</sup> Digest of Service Tochi Scouts.

Vice Marshall Bahar Ul Haq, Air Officer Commanding, Northern Air Command and later supervised the shifting of wreckage to Miranshah.

On 07<sup>th</sup> August 1988 at 0530 hours the parachute was recovered from Muhammad Khel area and by mid noon the pilot was also recovered from the village Kharsin , with the help of villagers. He was taken to Miranshah put up for a night stay in the Tochi Mess under guard and next day taken to Rawalpindi on a helicopter. Major Tariq Iqbal and Captain Jan Mohammad Khattak were awarded Chief of Army Staff's Commendation Card. Electricity was extended to the Kharsin Village as a reward.

## **1990**

Nineties was surprisingly a very peaceful decade not only for the Tochi Scouts but also for the Agency as a whole, in over a century of scouting in North Waziristan this was the lest trouble decade , reasons are unexplainable because even the tribal disputes were less menacing. One reason is that long Afghan issue was over or in other words the 'Game was Over'. The Frontier as a whole remained troublesome but for a change the focus was not in North Waziristan rather in Khyber, Mohmand, Malakand and settled areas like Mianwali. Tochi Scouts participated in almost all of the operation. The most important change was the rank of commandant; it was elevated to Colonel (1998). The posting pattern of officers also underwent a transition with more and more captains being posted in and out and field officers were rare. Frontier has always been affected by the new technology, in 1938 it was the walkie-talkie which were purchased from open market in London, in 1992 the mobile telephone made its debut, satellite receivers also came in

1990 and these two have change the overall concept, culture and dynamics of Tochi Scouts and Frontier Warfare. The change of uniform in 1994 from traditional Mazari to Khaki kameez shalwar, mark the end of an era.

Officers who were present at the turn of decade included

Commandant Lieutenant Colonel Hazarat Gul Afridi

Major	Imtiaz Shah	(Baluch)
Major	Ghulam Arshad	(FF)
Major	Parweez Choudhri	
Captain	Zahid Alam Raja	(Punjab)
Captain	Attaullah Khan	(Sind)
Captain	Khalid Iqbal Khan	(Artillery)
Captain	Muhammad Younis	(Artillery)
Captain	Zafar Iqbal	(Artillery)
Captain	Zulfiqar Ali Khan	(AMC)
Captain	Inam Bukhari	(AMC)
Captain	Rahim Khan	
Captain	Imran Sadiq	

### **Dara Adam Khel**

On 18<sup>th</sup> December 1989 the Peshawar-Kohat Road was blocked by the miscreants and they also detained the political agent who went for negotiations. Resultantly a strong contingent of Frontier Corps was sent for the opening of the road. The contingent comprised of Tochi Scouts, Mohmand, Khyber, Kurram, Chitral, Mahsud and Thall Scouts. The force was split into northern and southern groups, Commandant Khyber Rifles was commanding the northern and

Commandant Thall Scouts was commanding the southern group. Tochi Scouts comprised of 419 Scouts, 10 subedars, three captains and led by Major Imtiaz Shah. Between 23 – 26<sup>th</sup> December 1989 the operation was successfully completed and road was opened for public. Tochi Scouts contingent returned home on 3<sup>rd</sup> January 1990.

### **Mianwali-February 1990**

The very first operation of the decade was carried out in Mianwali, it was a dispute between the Nawab of Kalabagh and the Banni Afghan . The issue was political in nature but with the death of a boy Taj Rasul of Banni Afghan the matter became ugly with law and order situation deteriorating to an extent that police action became a necessity (October 1988) resultantly 27 policemen were taken as hostage by the Banni Afghan. To recover the police officers an army action was carried out. Turning point came when Nawab of Kalabagh Nawab Muzzaffar Khan was murdered by the Banni Afghan on 19<sup>th</sup> August 1989. In January 1990 on the request of Punjab Government, the Frontier Corps was deployed.

Tochi Scouts were led by the Commandant, four majors, four captains, one subedar major, 17 subedars, 13 naib subedars and 631 Scouts arrived at Daud Khel ( Mianwali). Both Banni Afghan and Nawab were armed to teeth and both adversaries were in control of heights surrounding the area. The seriousness of the issue can be gauged from the fact that not only Tochi Scouts but also Scouts from SWS, Khyber Rifles, Shawal Rifles, Mohmand Rifles and Mahsud Scouts were present; IGFC Major General Ghazi-ud-Rana was himself conducting the operation. Troops of regular army in the shape of armoured and artillery were also present.

Major Zahid leading a company of Tochi Scouts supported by

four armoured cars ex Mahsud Scouts were the first to occupy the heights surrounding the Nawab of Kalabagh's Meat factory. Another company of Tochi Scouts along with the Field Battery of Tochi were task to force an outer cordon around the Banni Afghan villages, Ghulab Khel, Jalabi and Nagar Khel. On 4<sup>th</sup> February, the search of these villages was carried out but surprisingly there was no male found, they all fled a night before in the adjoining heights along with their weapons.

Commandant Tochi Scouts was made responsible to carry out the search of the adjoining areas, which he did on 5<sup>th</sup> February. On 6<sup>th</sup> February all remaining Scout Corps were pulled out of the area, only Tochi Scouts and Shawal Rifles remained in the area till 14<sup>th</sup> February 1990, carrying out Gasht and search of the area. On 15<sup>th</sup> these scouts corps were also ordered to return to their base.

This was the major operation which was carried out by the Frontier Corps out side the Frontier and it highlights the after effects of Afghan War on the social and cultural aspect of local society. The amount of force that was utilised was unprecedented and it was employed to quell a minor issue that arose between two warring groups living in settled areas. This is a fair scale to gauge the kind of issues that erupts in the tribal areas.

## **Muharram**

One of the most sacred month of Islamic calendar remained a permanent month for Tochi Scouts deployment in Thall and Kurram area. Contingents ranging from a coy strength to wing strength were always present in the troubled areas. The officers being rotated after fifteen days. In the Muharram of 1990 a contingent of 292 Scouts, three officers and 13 junior commissioned officers were deployed at Thall.

## **MiranShah-1990**

MiranShah in 1990s was a trade centre for the tribes; the city had developed onto the cosmopolitan pattern. There was a regular coaster service between MiranShah and Sargodha, which highlights its importance. The guests would come from far off places for shopping. There were standing orders in the Tochi Mess on weekends to prepare the food for eight to ten families because this was the average frequency of guests coming for shopping. There was another side of the Miranshah where it had emerged as a den of arms and drugs. The Arms dealer cartel was so strong that occasionally even they would give a call for strike.

In July 1990 the situation in the city became tense due to these unwarranted activities and political agent requested for Gasht. It was carried out in last week of May 1990 and again in June and also in July. Same procedure was adopted in MirAli. On 9<sup>th</sup> July 1990 a major operation was launched to apprehend the narcotics dealers. Two companies strength Gasht was conducted and 25 narcotics addicts were apprehended. 10 kilogram Charas, few weapons, eight kilogram Heroin, 112 video cassette tapes all pornographic in nature and seven bottles of wine were the catch. This haul also indicates the decaying nature of social fibre in the city and agency. In the past only weapons were the main trade item or the hashish because culturally it has never been considered as bad or evil, but sale of alcohol was seldom done in the past. Another action was taken on 19<sup>th</sup> July but it was costly in terms of human lives, two addicts were killed in a gun shootout and one Scout was wounded in the thigh due to bullet fire. The whole summer of 1990 was spent in Gashts at various places to apprehend the drug dealers and addicts. Houses were demolished, watch towers destroyed, weapons and narcotics seized. Over all the

quantity was not much but deterrent effect was quite strong on the locality. In 1991 the political agent kept the same vigil on the drug and related issues. In the summer of 1991 the captured material included weapons also but insignificant in numbers. Russian Vodka was quite cheap in those days and was not that popular but it was gaining popularity, a bottle was costing Rupees 100, hashish was Rupees 75/for ten grams, Opium was sold on the same rates. There were many qualities of the Charas, the lowest quality was being sold for rupees 1000/ per kilogram. Counterfeit American and local currency was another objectionable item, which was sold openly. LSD capsules were making their way, so was Codeine Cough syrup, which was used, in making heroin. The lighter side was that most of the people when arrested were always in a state of intoxication and it was quite fun to have a discussion with them, at times they would be very intellectual in conduct quoting the laws and authorities under which they have the right to carry on smoking hashish and then at times they would be crying. Nevertheless, largely the hashish smokers were always harmless.

Sports Standards were declining in the Tochi Scouts, they seem to be going through a lean period unable to lift major sports trophy in last three years. In 1990, they stood second in their traditional strong forte of volleyball, fifth in football. However, they retained their strong hold in shooting winning the first prize in shooting competition. In 1992 Tochi stood third in basketball, in football it hit the all-time low when it stood sixth and even volleyball also remained dormant in 1992 with a third position, same was the case with athletics. The standards instead of recovering went further down when in 1993 the position table showed Tochi Scouts at number fifth in volleyball, eighth in football and fourth in basketball. In 1994-second position was secured in basketball, fourth in football and sixth in volleyball.



In 1995 Tochi Scouts bagged four top competitions in firing, they stood first in inter unit small arms and heavy arms firing, inter unit small arms 'Young Soldiers' firing , 82 and 60 millimetres mortars firing. The tide turned in 1998 when first position was secured in basketball, followed by winning the football trophy in 1999.

There is an interesting story behind all this. Almost all Scout Corps have a patron saint whose blessings are more important than the skills of the players for winning a trophy. SWS have strong faith in the shrine of Michin Baba and the sports contingent prays there and as a sign of charm carry the light blue flag from the shrine *'legend goes that it has turned the tables on many a strong opponents at very critical moments of the competitions, the flag is returned to the Ziarat when the convoy returns along with the trophy...bags of rice are cooked and distributed at the Ziarat'*<sup>280</sup> Thus this losing streak of Tochi Scouts can be attributed to the gods rather than the sportsmen.

### **1992-Wargara**

Lower Tochi Valley has produced some of the most notorious outlaws of the agency; in 1992, another outlaw by the name of Muhammad Sharif alias Askari hit the headlines. He was a patron in chief of kidnappers and other wanted persons. In March 1992 a strong contingent of Tochi Scouts comprising of some eight officers leading eight companies supplemented by a company of Thall Scouts moved into Wargara near Nikori. 23 civilians were caught, three houses were demolished and one outlaw was killed in the encounter but the big fish Sharif slipped away. Captain Sami ullah Jan chased the outlaw for an hour or so but in the end Sharif was too cunning to be caught.

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<sup>280</sup> Lieutenant colonel Javed Younis SJ, *The Lighter side of It, Balahisar Yearly Magazine of FC (1987) p – 60/*

At the end of the year, Tochi Scouts participated in battle inoculation with over 150 Scouts at Nowshehra artillery firing ranges.

One minor tribal issue was the long land dispute between the Wazirs and the Daurs, a company strength under Captain Sami Ullah Jan was sent to keep the tempers cool of both warring tribes,

### **Karkanwam**

On 31<sup>st</sup> December 1992, the IGFC Major General Mumtaz Gul laid the foundation stone of the Karkanwam Fort. In last seventy years the most notorious tribe had been Tori Khel occupying the general area Bichi Kaskai and Karkanwam. Since the killing of Political Agent North Waziristan Agency, Mr Abdul Hameed Qasuria in 1982 in Karkanwam village, it had become necessary to construct a post overlooking the village. The purpose was to keep an eye on the village where outlaws, criminals and kidnappers from all over Pakistan used to take refuge. Another aspect of blocking this area was its location, a tri-junction of three administrative areas, North Waziristan Agency, Frontier Region Bannu and South Waziristan Agency. Whereas administration of any particular area used to consume time in taking action, criminals would cross over to another administrative area without any difficulty. Though the decision to construct a fort overlooking the village had been taken since long but no efforts were made to establish a scouts post on the contention that enough funds were not available with Government. With the arrival of Mr Muhammad Amin Khattak, the new Political Agent North Waziristan Agency in April 1992, the bold decision for establishing a post in the area was taken and preparation for occupation of Karkanwam were geared up. Due to the untiring

efforts of the Political Agent Mr Amin Khattak, finally in August 1992, clearance was given to Tochi Scouts for the occupation of Karkanwam. It was also decided that Tochi Scouts would construct the fort on a ridge dominating Karkanwam village. The Political Agent committed to provide all the necessary funds required for the construction of the fort. By October 1992, the reconnaissance and other formalities were completed and two wings of Tochi Scouts were deployed to secure the heights. The heights were captured without any obstruction and construction work started. It was a gigantic task of constructing the track to the top and shifting of construction material from foothill to the top. Great Tochites were the sentries, labours, mason and water carriers. The civilian labour refused to go to such a far-flung area and the Tochi Scouts carried out all construction work. Thus on the last day of 1992, Major General Mumtaz Gul laid the foundation stone of the fort for a company size strength. It was the sheer determination and will power displayed by PA-10092 Lieutenant Colonel Nowsher Muhammad who personally supervised the construction work that the fort was completed in short period of four months in such an inaccessible area where even the proper vehicular track was non existent and all the construction material was transported from Bannu and water was transported from Shaktu River. All the expenses were met by the Political Agent Mr Amin Khattak from his own sources. Off course without the efforts and financial and moral assistance from the Political Authorities this gigantic task could not have been accomplished. Undoubtedly this achievement is another addition in glorious history of the Tochi Scouts.

### **Lieutenant Colonel Nowsher Muhammad**

On 30 April 1993, the Governor North West Frontier Province Amir Gulistan Janjua inaugurated the fort. Thus the unfortunate

death of the ex Political Mr Abdul Hameed Qasuria was avenged up to some extent but the absence of another person was also very heavily felt and that was PA10092 Lieutenant Colonel Nowsher Muhammad who unfortunately died in a road accident near Nowshera on 16 April 1993. The Fort was thus named after the commandant.

Occupation of this area, the Karkanwam village resulted in a purge of all outlaws. After the creation of Pakistan, this is the biggest achievement for the Government of Pakistan in general and Frontier Corps in particular in this area.

Naib Subedar Sher Alam was a recruit then and he recalls *'we were living in the tents and the construction was mainly done by us, there was shortage of water, the weather was hot and plenty of mosquitoes as well... Commandant used to come almost every week and his personality was such that he inspired confidence among us, he would take the food with us sitting on the floor, ration was in plenty...we have to give the night duties as well...at that time it looked as this fort will never be completed, it looked so gigantic task but in the end we all did it'*.<sup>281</sup>

## 1994

In 1994 the following officers were posted in , Major Liaqat Ali, Captains included Javed Gondal, Asad Ullah Khan, Muhammad Khalid Rafique and after a long time a field officer was posted as medical officer Major Nasrullah Khan. From early seventies the posting from regular army to scouts was considered as a low profile posting, the officers posted in FC were considered bottom case in terms of career profile. It was a most damaging perception, it was not

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<sup>281</sup> Interview with Subedar Sher Alam, 25<sup>th</sup> June 2012 , MiranShah.

help by the fact that majority of officers posted in or out were having low officers efficiency record, the annual confidential reports gained in FC were not taken at par with the reports given in regular army. Digest of service reveals that seldom was an officer able to pass the entrance examination for Command & Staff College, furthermore even the results in captain to major were not very encouraging.

With the posting pattern that was in vogue in early part of twentieth century when only the very best of the best were posted in Scouts and that too after a probation period is compared with the existing pattern; then it hurts the old timers.

Some of the very shining officers of Pakistan Army have gone through the grind of frontier, Tochi Scouts had among its galaxy stalwarts like Captain Iqbal in 1954 ( Later General and chairman joint chief of staff ) Captain A. I. Akram (Later lieutenant General and author of Sword of Allah).

#### **Dhodak Oil Field July-1994**

Dhodak Oil Fields are in D.G Khan, Balochistan and since 1974 have been a source of agitation, the Qaisrani Tribe claims the fields to be a part of their area and as such the dispute is over the royalty. In June 1994, the matter became serious with the tribe surrounding the adjoining mountains and blocking the Kacha Khaka road that leads to the oil fields, camp and oil rigs also became ineffective. One wing of Tochi Scouts, three field artillery guns, two armoured cars and one armoured personnel carrier reached Dhodak on 30th July. The command of the operation was vested in Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Rehman, commandant of divisional battle school at Mir Ali. Tochi Scouts remained deployed for a fortnight but need to fire never arises, matter was resolved.

## 1994-Malakand and Bajaur

Old soldiers never die they just fade away , is a famous military quotation, it is easily applicable in frontier warfare, where old outlaws never die and neither they fade away, like a chameleon they reappear again and again. Malakand and Bajaur were hot beds of sedition in 1960 and in the past, in 1994 the trouble again surfaced in the same area. Unique aspect was that this time it was countered and suppressed by the FC purely relying upon its own resources, over 14 Wings took part supported by four field artillery batteries of FC. The infected area spread over seven districts having an area of six thousand square kilometres.

Malakand Operation (5-10 November 1994).

Most of the present day insurgency has its roots in this period when Tanzeem-e-Nifaz-e-Shariah Muhammadi (TNSM) under Maulana Sufi Muhammad having black turban as their trademark initiated a mass protest pressing for shariah. The uprising started in Swat and later spread to Malakand, FC posts at Fazal, Kitkot, Inayat Qila and Khar were besieged and one officer was taken as hostage. A Wing of Tochi Scouts under Major Liaqat Ali Abbasi was deployed in the area, from 25<sup>th</sup> October, 1994 it was part of a force, which comprised of a Wing of Mohmand Rifles also, Lieutenant Colonel Aslam Khattak of Mohmand Rifles was in command. The force was task to capture the Kanju Bridge in the first phase, which was the key to an advance towards the airport, the attack failed.

*‘Colonel Aslam Khattak launched his operation as per plan but failed to employ the artillery...he underestimated the strength of the opposition...this proved fatal... own five dead and 13 wounded... darkness created command and control problems ...IGFC and his*

*deputy went forward at 0235 hours to push the troops...sniping, firing, mortar fire, occasional firing of rocket launchers by hostiles.*<sup>282</sup>

In the second phase the Tochi Scouts went forward and captured the Airport 'after a pitched battle using all types of weapons, guns and mortars, airport was captured by 0400 hours'.<sup>283</sup> The insurgency was not over rather it spread even more.

Bajaur Operation (11-17 November 1994) was a fall out of the Swat Operation, Maulvi Sher Bahadur a disciple of Maulana Sufi Muhammad led this uprising, initially one officer and seven other ranks of FC were taken as hostage, posts and picquets sieged and civil life along with writ of government was paralysed. Sniping was an integral part of this agitation and road communication Chakdara-Munda-Khar were disrupted, the group also blocked Ghallanai-Mohmand Ghat-Nawagai-Khar Road. FC was already stretched to the limits but it was determined to resolve the issue without support of army. In a classical pattern the Maulana Sufi Muhammad was diplomatically handled and time was gain during which additional wings were move forward and also wings from Swat were shifted. Nine wings along with additional artillery were the minimum requirement in Bajaur, four wings were shifted from Swat and rest were called from the Scout Corps. Thus, another wing of Tochi Scouts arrived in Bajaur on 6<sup>th</sup> November 1994. Tochi Scouts were part of Abid Force (Lieutenant Colonel Abid Nawaz Commandant Battle School). Operation was launched on the morning of 11<sup>th</sup> November 1994. Commencing from Timurgara on Torghundi-Khar Axis. The resistance was stiff and hard pitched battles were fought at Alizai, Khar Bridge, Commerce College, Haji Lawang Village. On 12<sup>th</sup> November at 1600 hours, Tochi Scouts Wing cleared the bridge on Khar and linked up with the Khar Fort at 2100 hours.

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<sup>282</sup> *Valiant Scouts*, page – 106 also see *Tochi Scouts Digest of Service*, p – 243.

<sup>283</sup> *Ibid*, p – 107.

The operation lasted until 16<sup>th</sup> November and Tochi Scouts Wing remained deployed until the end of month.

### **1995-Appointments**

The appointments in Tochi Scouts in 1995 ranged from Commandant, DAA & QMG, Wing Commanders, Accounts Officer, DADMS, Officer Commanding Field Battery, Intelligence officer, Regimental Medical Officer, Signal Officer, Military Transport Officer. Within the wings, there was wing second in command and wing adjutants. The major change from 1990 was the absence of Education Officer's appointment. In 1994, there were only seven appointments apart from the Commandant in Tochi scouts. At headquarters, only MTO/RMO/Intelligence Officer and DAA & QMG were the appointments. From 1998 the appointment of Gun Position Officer and wing quartermaster were also introduced.

### **Baramptta**

A string of Baramptta were carried out in 1995, there was an over all efforts in the country to get rid of narcotics and Tochi Scouts under political agent's directive remained active in the agency. Over all, there were four major FC operations against narcotics (none in NWA).

The very first Baramptta was conducted on January 1995 at MiranShah, second in MirAli in April and the last one was conducted on 12<sup>th</sup> June 1995 at MiranShah. The first one was purely in relation to the drugs, large quantity of hashish, charas and heroin was seized. The last Baramptta was to apprehend an outlaw Kalam Rasool from Thall Village (on Razmak Road). Kalam was involved in mainly kidnapping and giving protection to the proclaim offenders. Kalam



gave himself up to Tochi Scouts without offering any resistance, his accomplice Majid was also arrested. Similarly, a Baramptta was also carried on 1<sup>st</sup> April in MirAli to apprehend Idak Daurs who were involved in kidnapping and murders of Bora Khel Wazirs, eleven persons were handed over by the tribe as Baramptta.

Outside the agency, one wing of Tochi Scouts participated in Tirah Operations for destruction of heroin factories; the operation was conducted in January 1995 at Alam Gudar in Khyber Agency. Commandant Mahsud Scouts (Colonel Sikander Lodhi) was in charge of the operation. Total force comprised of four wings of FC. There were 21 factories operating in the area churning out heroin. These factories were clustered in wide spread areas but two main hub close to the road were the initial target, other factories were in areas, which were difficult to approach. The raid commenced on the night of 27/28 January 1995 and was over by 0700 hours. There was no casualty on both sides. Over three ton of hashish, 480 kilograms of heroin and 33 individuals were apprehended.

Following officers were posted in the Tochi Scouts in the year 1995. Majors included Khalid Mahmood, Asjid Sharif, Qais Muhammad, Tariq Javed and Mukhtar Ahmed. Captains included Riaz Ahmed, Aslam Pervaiz, Nisar Ahmed, Asim Zafar, Raza Zaidi and Saifullah Khan were posted in. In the same period, Field officers including Ghulam Abbas, Ajmal Khan, Nasirullah Khan, Shahid Hussain and Ashraf Masroor were posted out. Captains who were posted out included Taj Mali Khan, Rahim Khan, Shahid Iqbal, Manzoor Ahmed, Fida Gardezi and Waqar Ahmed.

Subedar Majors Sami ullah , Iqbal Khan and Havildar Musa Jan were awarded with Tamgha Khidmat (Military) on 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1996.

On 14<sup>th</sup> August 1996 Subedar Major Muhammad Iqbal was awarded Tamgha Khidmat Class 1, whereas tailor Fazal Rehman, Carpenter Ali Rehman and Khalasi Habib Khan were awarded class 3 medals.

### **96<sup>th</sup> Raising Day**

On 16<sup>th</sup> May 1996, Tochi Scouts celebrated their 96<sup>th</sup> Raising Day. Lieutenant Colonel Khursheed Alam had taken over the command in December 1995, he in an informal gathering over a cup of tea put forward his concept of celebrating the Raising Day to the officers in February, it was overwhelmingly accepted. Celebrating a Raising Day is not an easy task especially in tribal area. Nevertheless, hats off to the commandant and his team, which included Major Abdul Khaliq Malik, Major Khalid Mahmood, Captain Saadat Ali Khan, Captain Akbar Shah and all other officers junior commissioned officers and scouts who made this a grand affair. Aftab Sherpao the Chief Minister of NWFP, IGFC Major General Fazle Ghafoor, Mr Ehsanullah Khan Commissioner Bannu, former commandants including Lieutennat Colonel (Retired) Amanullah and Zahid Pervaiz graced the occasion. Almost two months were spent in the preparation; whole fort was given a new look. It is not the major issues, which are frightening rather the small issues, are the one, which are time consuming. Making of souvenir is an integral part of any raising day, its design, writing and packing took a lot of time. The fear of Murphy Law always looms over any occasion but it was through sheer hard work and luck that it was avoided; not completely.

### **1999 Operational Reconnaissance**

In October 1998, army took over the country again in a bloodless coup. The situation on Eastern Border started deteriorating with war

clouds looming large on the horizon. Tochi Scouts in all these years have been carrying out border reconnaissance but they were of little use as the officers hardly stayed in the scouts for more than two years but it was very helpful for JCO;s and other ranks. In June 1999 the reconnaissance of 12 Division area was carried out by a party of seven officers and two JCOs. On 23<sup>rd</sup> June, Tochi Scouts had a briefing in Headquarters 12 Division. On 24<sup>th</sup> June, they visited 2 Azad Kashmir Brigade at Rawalakot, M. N. Gali and spent the night at Chiri Kot with 33 Punjab. 25<sup>th</sup> June was utilised for Wing Commanders reconnaissance of the respective areas in Chiri Kot, Chand Tekri and Neeza Pir. Next day was spent in the area of 6 Azad Kashmir Brigade. 27<sup>th</sup> June was spent in Satwal and Hajira area. The whole party which included the commandant Colonel Ghulam Hussain reached back MiranShah on 28<sup>th</sup> June 1999.

## 2000-2004

At the dawn of new millennium there was little change in Tochi Valley from the previous millennium other than the electricity and roads which brought certain fragments of civilisation. The most visible signs of civilisations seen in the agency were the new weapons; AK-47 Kalashnikov automatic light machine gun being the most favourite followed by shoulder fire Rocket Propelled Grenade Launcher-7.

### North Waziristan Agency

North Waziristan Agency (NWA) have an area of 4,707 square kilometres with a population of 3, 61,246 (1998 census) thus an annual growth rate of 2.46%. There were 192,432 males and 168,814 females in the agency, literacy rate being 13% among males and 0.5% among females. Population density was 77 persons per square kilometres only South Waziristan Agency had a lower density rate then NWA among the seven agencies (SWA have an area of 6,620 square kilometres with a population of 429,841).<sup>284</sup> The Uthmanzai Wazir still formed 59% of population, Daur 39% with Mahsuds forming the remainder. There were 73000 Afghan refugees still living in the agency. Ibrahim Khel, Wali Khel and Mamit Khel were the three major Wazir Tribes with sub clans which included Madda Khel, Manzar Khel, Tori Khel and Macha Khel of Ibrahim clan, Bakka Khel, Jani Khel, and Kabul Khel being part of Wali Khel clan, Hassan Khel, Khaddar Khel, Bora Khel and Wuzzi Khel were integral part of Mamit Khel; all in all there are 42 sub clans of Uthmanzai Wazir in NWA.

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<sup>284</sup> 103 Infantry Brigade analysis of the FATA, 2011.

Daur tribe composed of four main clans namely Dangar Khel Sayyids, Ozhi Khel Sayyids, Malizad and Tappizad. The last two are most populous and important. Malizad alone has 67 subclans. There was not much of change in the areas of their occupation, they were living between Tanghrai Tangi near Tal on Tochi to halfway between Boya and Datta Khel; on the lower end of Tochi Valley they are known as Lower Daurs and occupy the area from Shinkai Defile to Tanghrai Tangi. In upper Daur area (Malizad) their main clans are at Degan, Malakh, Boya, Hamzoni, Darpa Khel and at MiranShah where as in lower Daur they are at Idak, Tappi, Khaddi, Hurmaz, Mausaki, Hassu Khel and Haider Khel. Major difference between the Daurs and Wazir remain in the fact that Daur do not migrate.

There were 250<sup>285</sup> Malakans in NWA. In Datta Khel out of 38 malaks 27 were Wazir, at MiranShah there were 46 malaks in which 32 were Daur and rest Wazir, at Ghulam Khan there were 17 malaks out of which 4 belonged to Saiyidgi Tribe and 4 were Gurbuz, at MirAli out of 45 malaks 14 were Wazir, at Spinwam all the 10 malaks were Wazir same was the case at Shewa where all the 11 malaks were Kabul Khel Wazir, at Razmak out of 20 malaks only two were Daur rest all Wazir with Tori Khel having 13, at Dosalli there were 10 malaks all Wazir and at Garioum there were four malaks all belonging to Tori Khel. Before 1997 these malaks used to elect the member of national assembly however now people elect them through votes. After Malak Jahangir Khan's (the one who presented Tochi Library with Encyclopaedia Britannica) death his son Malak Ajmal Khan became senator, Maulana Dindar (Boya fame) was the very first MNA to be elected by the people through votes (he died in 2010). In 2002 Maulana Nek Zaman was elected from Boya and in 2008 Muhammad Kamran a graduate of

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285 103 Infantry Brigade Study, p – 114.

Gomal University was elected MNA. FATA had no representation in the provincial assembly. Article 247 of constitution provides the legal cover to the fact that no act of parliament can be applied in the agencies without desires of President of Pakistan.

NWA surprisingly had 705 educational institutions out of which there were 405 primary, 67 middle, 31 high and 149 community based schools and one degree college at MiranShah having 814 students; there was one vocational college without having any classes, one commerce college, one commercial college, one teachers training centre with 14 students. There were 20,000 boys and 8,000 female students in NWA. MirAli had the highest number of schools for girls. The number of teachers in NWA exceeded over 800 with 458 male and 401 female teachers imparting education.<sup>286</sup>

Telecommunication had taken its roots in the agency with MiranShah having 2582 telephone subscribers, Razmak 585, Datta Khel 398, Boya 200 and Tappi 100. In terms of medical facilities it had improved tremendously there was one Agency Headquarters Hospital at MiranShah having 120 beds, a tehsil hospital at MirAli with 60 beds, one rural health centre at Spinwam with 70 beds and apart from these there were seven civil hospitals with 70 beds capacity, 14 basic health units, 49 mother-child health centres, 59 dispensaries and three sub-health centres. Animal care was not lagging behind, NWA is famous for its bulls, by the turn of millennium there were one million cattle, four million sheep and goats, five million poultry and only 331 horses and 1500 camels but mules were over 14000 in numbers. There were 23 veterinary dispensaries, four veterinary hospitals, 12 centres and eight animal insemination centres. There was no specific shop for the sale of hashish but almost all charsis were found near Noor Medical Plaza.<sup>287</sup>

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<sup>286</sup> Political Agent report for the year 2000-01

<sup>287</sup> Ibid

Interestingly there were two serais in MiranShah, one was known as Tochi Serai where the family quarters of Tochi Scouts were constructed in 1922, few of the quarters were demolished in 1992 with an aim to reconstruct them again but then it kept on pending. Other was known as Murghi Serai, located close to the General Hospital it was called Murghi Serai instead of its proper name of Hajji Saad Ullah Serai and market for the reason that Hajji Saad Ullah had been supplying chicken (Murghi) to Tochi Scouts since 1930's and as such is known as Hajji Murghi.

There were only four check posts of Tochi Scouts in the city, No 1 at Sargardan, No.2 at Khawarsa Chowk, the chowk was named after the murdered political assistant who was assassinated here in mid-nineties, another check post was at Tochi Cemetery, then Amin No.1. For a short time a check post was established close to Amin No.1 but the very next day one scout Havildar Rab Nawaz was killed by unknown assassin. There were separate anti-smuggling posts also for instance Saeed Post and Tol Khel.

On the western side of the fort the runway was the limit, there was a tubewell across it but overall the area was a jungle and runway was use by the civilians for teaching driving to the novice, a ride at the end and back would constitute as one lesson costing Rupees 5/. There was a political agent nursery at the northern end of runway and a post of khassadars as well which is known as Pakistan Post. There was no fence around the airport and natives were using it as a short cut. The Eid prayers were held at the runway for which scouts would make the arrangement and all the population of the city would offer the Eid congregation here.

Area on the east of Idak Gate was the designated training area and also the Tochi Memorial, in late nineties Al-Azhar High School

was established and next to it the political agent's colony. Tarmac on the west of fort was the parade ground. Area on the south east and south west was all barren and jungle with very few fruit trees.

Inside the fort the life was comfortable however there was shortage of water and overall majority of the living accommodation of all ranks needed repair and uplifting. It goes to the credit of all commandants from the turn of millennium that they have brought such drastic, radical and far reaching changes in every compartment of scout's life that the life span of fort has been enhanced for another hundred years but that will be covered later.

### **Organisation and Deployment**

At the turn of millennium the Tochi Scouts had four wings and one field battery. No. 1 Wing was deployed at MiranShah, No. 2 at Ghulam Khan, No. 3 at Boya and No. 4 at MirAli. These wings were rotated after one year replacing each other thus every wing and every scout had the opportunity to serve at each post thus ensuring that the hard and soft areas are shared by each one, an excellent arrangement indeed. The organisational structure of all wings remained identical, each wing having strength of 696 men (it had been reduced from 730 all ranks) being commanded by a lieutenant colonel or a major, having four rifle companies and a headquarters company. Each rifle company had a company headquarters; three rifle platoons consisting of 37 men and a machine gun section, each platoon had three sections of ten scouts each. The overall strength of the rifle company was 130 men. The Headquarters Company had 145 men and it comprised of mortar platoon, signal platoon and administrative platoon which had 75 men.

Every wing was authorised one subedar major, 12 subedars, 11 naib subedars, 39 havildars, 78 naiks, 104 lance naiks, 395 sepoy



and 41 non-combatant enrolled were authorised but No 2 Wing had deficiency of 101 all ranks. It may be reminded that in early days of NWM the importance was given on every post having a sweeper and cook thus each wing had 20 sweepers, 21 cooks, seven water carriers, two cobblers one ferrier, carpenter, blacksmith, khalasi, Tindal and tailor but surprisingly no dhobi was authorised to any wing although headquarters had four. The provision of cooks and sweepers was rather stretched to the imagination with football players, painters, dancers, teachers, tractor drivers and khateebis enrolled in cook/sweeper vacancy. The Corps had 48 platoons comprising of Khattak (14 platoons) Afridi (nine platoons) Bangash (seven platoons) Wazir (five platoons) Orakzai (four platoons) Turi (three platoons) Yusufzai (two platoons) and Marwat having one platoon which was inducted in 1995. Every wing did not have all the Qaums for instance No. 2 Wing had only four Qaums distributed in 12 platoons.

The variation in every wing was in terms of weapons it was holding. Each wing was authorised 482 Rifle G-3, 73 SMG, eight MG1A3 in machine gun role and 36 MG1A3 in LMG role, 12 rocket launchers of 40mm, 60 mm Mortars eight in number and 3 inch Mortar six in number were authorised, however the wings had 14.5 and 12.7 in varying numbers ranging from one - four on their strength which were not authorised in the original authorisation. In terms of ammunition 58000 rounds of G-3 and 1, 30,000 rounds of MG1A3 in machine gun role and 24000 rounds in LMG role were authorised as first line ammunition. However every wing had serious deficiency especially for practice ammunition and MG1A3, No 2 Wing had a deficiency of 96000 rounds in this aspect. On the other hand the wing had 400 rounds surplus of mortar rounds; 377 hand grenades were also surplus. Transport was the Achilles

heel with wing having deficiency of eight vehicles. Each wing was authorised one ambulance and one water bowzer, five trucks, four pickups and one jeep. For communication each wing was authorised 28 wireless sets SC 130 but No 2 Wing had only two but it was more than rectified by having ten PRC-77 Sets. Each wing was also authorised 40 miles of telephone wire. No 2 Wing was looking after 18 posts (by October 2001 the corps was manning 83 posts). Another important issue was the deficiency in terms of tents, each wing was supposed to have 45 tents of 40 pound and 10 tents of 180 pound but No 2 Wing was having only 16 tents of 40 pounder category and five in other category. The requirement of petroleum varied with each wing but on the average each wing required 500 litres of diesel every month and overall the corps had a consumption of 4000 litres per month.

Corps was authorised a strength of 3310 all ranks including 32 officers, 134 Junior commissioned officers and 3144 other ranks which included 234 havildars, 405 naiks and 2256 lance naiks/sepoys and 55 clerks. On ground the strength was 3018 all ranks which included only 20 officers, 106 JCO's, 187 havildars, 323 naiks and 2039 sepoys. It was covering a frontage of 60 kilometres out of which 36 kilometres were inaccessible areas.

All ranks except officers and member of the ministerial staff (Clerks) for the purpose of discipline comes under Frontier Corps Ordinance 1959 while the latter two categories are governed by MPML and government servants (Efficiency & Discipline) rules 1973 respectively. Promotion of all tribes is control by unit commandant up to the rank of havildar. Promotion of naib subedar and above was being control by Record Wing for which promotion roll is forward to Record Wing for approval of IGFC. Commandant was empowered

to give one year rigorous imprisonment in civil jail and up to 89 days in unit quarter guard to any sepoy and severe reprimand to any JCO. He can also delegate this power to his wing commanders but they still had the limitation of giving maximum of 28 days rigorous imprisonment within unit quarter guard similarly a major can also give reprimand to the JCO and 28 days of confinement to any sepoy within the unit quarter guard, a captain can give maximum of 14 days confinement to any sepoy but no powers to reprimand any JCO.

A JCO had a service limit of 21 years or completion of three years in present rank, an NCO had 18 years of service limit with similar restriction of having completion of three years of service where as a sepoy had the service limit of 15 years. Forty five days paid leave in year was the limit and anything more than that can result in forfeiture of pay. On retirement a leave pending retirement was also given. Commandant Tochi Scouts had the power of discharging any sepoy on his request and he can also enrolled cooks, animal transport, barbers, dhobi, on the other hand enrolment of all general duty soldiers was the prerogative of the HQFC. EME, signals, medical, education and military transport were treated as specialist trades and their promotion rolls were maintained by the HQFC. Discipline state was good, in year 2003 only seventeen reprimands were awarded and only one sepoy was given 89 days RI, two were given 60 days, six were given 28 days and four were given 14 days rigorous imprisonment within unit quarter guard. The most remarkable difference from past was in the higher education standards among the scouts especially in the sepoy category. In No.4 Wing having 622 all ranks (less officers) there were 178 matriculates out of which 117 were sepoys, 23 were lance naiks, 18 were naiks, 10 were havildars and 10 were JCO's

Tochi Scouts was running a number of welfare projects which included bakery, public call office, dairy, poultry and garden or agriculture. The total area of Tochi Scouts including the camp area was 663 kanals or 30 acres out of which only 122 kanals of land was under cultivation, corps had its own tractor. Main crops were wheat, barley, maize and vegetables. In the year 2000 the net profit was 1, 88,000 rupees which increased to 3, 80,000 in 2001 and almost 7, 00,000 in year 2002. Name of Subedar Majors Arbab Khan and Mumtaz Khan Orakzai stands out who in 1984-85 brought 50 kanals of land under cultivation. Bakery also gave a profit of 2, 00,000 in year 2000, Cold drinks bottling plant was giving a profit of Rs 50,000 per season. Poultry had a capacity of churning out a flock of 4000 chicks yielding a profit of Rs 15,000-20,000 per flock thus in year 2001 it gave a profit of Rs 1, 00,000. Dairy Farm had four buffaloes and five cows with ten calves among them. The price of milk in open market was Rs 24 per litre whereas the corps was providing the milk to its troops at a cost of Rs 12/ per litre. Despite this the dairy farm gave a profit of Rs 111,517. in year 2000 and double next year however the best season in terms of profit was 1993 when it gave a profit of Rs 3,53,564. Anti-smuggling was the main component of charter of duty and in this regards the corps confiscated goods that included vehicles, ammunition, contraband items and narcotics worth 44.7 million Rupees; surprisingly the value of vehicles (66 in numbers) top the revenue chart amounting to 41.0 million followed by contraband items (2.1 million), arms valued at .2 million and narcotics worth 0.1 million Rupees only. It gives a fair and clear picture of the social and cultural values of the valley itself.

### **Role & Tasks**

Tochi Scouts role and task in peace and war was simple, clear and concise, they included in peace, to assist the political administration

in maintaining law and order in the North Waziristan Agency. To protect the lines of communication in the area of responsibility. To conduct “Baramptta” to recover property or proclaimed offenders from North Waziristan Agency. To conduct anti-smuggling duties in the area of responsibilities and to aid the civil law enforcing agencies in other tribal areas and settled area when called.

In war it was to collect and disseminate border intelligence and provide early warning of any impending hostilities. To remain operationally deployed along the Durand Line by occupying post and piquet of tactical importance. To protect and if necessary clear the lines of communication during war and emergency. To conduct defensive and limited offensive operations under the command of regular army and to assist the regular army in the formation of ‘Tribal Lashkar’ during war. As done in 1948 Kashmir War and also in 1965 and 1971 War.

### **Goglay Hunt**

At the dawn of new millennium Tochi Scouts were on the hunt for a notorious out law Gul Ahmad alias Goglay, the hunt had started on 1<sup>st</sup> November 1999 when Goglay kidnapped two persons from Bannu and reportedly took them away to a village Khara Khula almost 3 miles north of Bannu main town on Bannu-Kohat Road. Goglay and his partner in crime Amir Sultan (Bizen Khel, Wazir) became a by word in the underground world and as such attracted a host of similar characters around them. Their network spread to Spinwam, Thall, Shewa, Datta Khel, Karkanwam and Shawal in short they were the underworld king of North Waziristan Agency. Initially the Frontier Constabulary was given the task but later Tochi Scouts was assigned the same from 10<sup>th</sup> December

1999 onwards with an aim to apprehend the outlaws and demolish their houses in Khara Khula. Colonel Ghulam Hassan planned to employ one company of Tochi Scouts along with one company of Frontier Constabulary in the first phase to secure the eastern and western flanks, a fire base was established comprising of two field artillery guns, six mortars, four machine guns, four 12.7 mm guns and four recoilless rifles with an aim to soften up the target. In the next phase one company of Tochi Scouts was to secure the objective by assaulting from the left using armoured personal carriers, last but not the least was the demolishing of the houses which was left to the pioneer platoon. Chigha was the code word for the move back to concentration area .The operation went as per plan but the outlaws were able to outwit the scouts and escaped. Thus the morning of 1<sup>st</sup> January 2000 found the Tochi Scouts in the open and in hunt for the Goglay; he remained absconder for another six months before he was caught accidentally.

### **Hajira-April 2000**

The very first operational deployment came in the spring of 2000 when Tochi Scouts field artillery battery was sent to Hajira (Azad Kashmir) under command 12 Infantry Division to carry out construction of bunkers and battery position. They had a brief exchange of artillery fire with Indians. Battery returned back to MiranShah in July 2001.

### **Dande Dispute. Wazir & Daur clash again.**

Tabiwal Toll Khel Wazir and Darpa Khel Daur have a dispute over a 40 square miles of flat territory north of MiranShah and extending uptill the Ghulam Khan or in simple words the only flat area that is in the north of the MiranShah till the foothills (Durand

Line) which allows vehicular movement between MiranShah and Afghanistan. In August 1998 the warring tribes took up arms and occupied the morchas. Wazirs have the advantage of calling up their brethern tribe of Gurbuz which inhabits the area on both sides of Durand Line in this part of the agency. A Barampta was taken but despite this in April 1999 the situation again worsened over cultivation of 10 kanals of land and even scouts movement on the road leading towards the Ghulam Khan was restricted. In the end Darpa Khel agreed to the government demands and vacated the morchas and also paid a Barampta of 3 million rupees but Tabiwal made excuses resultantly their allowances were stopped and elders were arrested. Political Agent was able to resolve the issue and all elders were released and Barampta of Darpa Khel was also returned with interest (yes tribes do take interest over their money.)<sup>288</sup>

In October 2000 a Tabiwal was killed by a Darpa Khel resultantly the two tribes occupied the heights around Dande Plain and started firing upon each other. Darpa Khel blocked the road MiranShah-Boya and Tabiwal also created blocks on the road leading towards the Ghulam Khan. Tochi Scouts carried out operation in the area between 3-5 November 2000 with three wings, they were supported by additional wings from Shawal, Kurram and Thall Scouts; field battery was also used. No.4 Wing of Tochi Scouts commanded by Major Mudassar Baig was in the forefront it encircled the Darpa Khel from the northern side where as No.2 Wing supported by the wing ex Shawal Rifles under the command of Major Shafa Ullah (Tochi Scouts) approached from southern and eastern sides. Major Mudassar came down with his wing from Darduni and reached Dande facing eye ball to eye ball with Darpa Khel. Major Shafa Ullah initially had to climb over the high ground as he approached

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<sup>288</sup> Political Agent North Waziristan Letter to Home Secretary NWFP, No.7310/S?153  
Dated 19/10/2002

from Ahmed Khel but he was able to threaten the Darpa Khel village. Tochi field battery had the rounds in the breech block, now it was a game of nerves, Darpa Khel's nerves broke down and they asked for peace agreement. Ex-Senator Malik Faridullah and former minister Mr Ajmal played a key role in hammering the gravity of situation to the Darpa Khel. Scouts later occupied the evicted positions of the Darpa Khel with a dual purpose of training as well as ascendancy over the area.

The dispute did not ended then and there rather in October 2002 it again erupted when third tribe Darduni also joined in the conflict, resultantly the Darpa Khel made few Darduni as hostage this in the end caused 14 people to die and further 22 were injured. The matter was referred to the court after the Jirga failed. Political Agent handed over the area to Tochi Scouts and from now onwards the Tochi Scouts became a direct party in the conflict. Darpa Khel Malaks now threatened the Tochi Scouts to vacate the area but Scouts stance is that they have got nothing to do with the dispute; the area has been handed over by the political agent thus all complaints should be addressed to him. The dispute is still going on.

### **Hangu and Parachinar February-April 2001**

In February 2001 the sectarian clashes at Hangu erupted (a regular feature), Tochi Scouts kept a company in readiness at Kohat and despatched four APC's to Hangu. In Parachinar a water dispute between Turi and Mengal tribes started in April 2001 which soon took the shape of sectarian colour, two companies under the command of Captain Nadeem Haider were moved into the area and they remained there till 17<sup>th</sup> June 2001. The sectarian clashes in the area are not that grave provided if the religious organisations



from settled areas keep their hands away. Tochi Scouts have been performing the security duty at Parachinar since 1948 intermittently. Generally the duty revolves around carrying Gasht in the Parachinar Bazaar. The security is tight during the Muharram that none (civilian) is allowed to carry even knife in the bazaar. In the Bazaar ahead of militia market is another bazaar known as Punjabi Bazaar where a mosque of Ahle Sunna is located which has a very high minaret and almost hundred yards west of it is an old Imam Bargah having two minarets but considerably less in height. On 10<sup>th</sup> Muharram the Tazia normally starts at 0900 and after procession through the bazaar ends up at noon. In 1996 one of the scout sepoy on duty simply collapsed, later he admitted that he had never seen so many people drenched in blood in his life and as such he fainted such is the atmosphere on this particular day when almost every man professing Shia faith in Parachinar replicates the martyr of Holy Prophet's (Pbuh) grandson in the hand of Yazid by cutting himself with sharp blades, razor edge chains or merely striking his chest with hands. After Muharram comes month of Rabi Al Awal in which Sunni faith adherents takes out a procession to celebrate the birthday of Holy Prophet (Pbuh), if there has been violence in Muharram then this month is bound to have the same repetition. The Mengal brings out a big procession from Teri Mengal which is on the west of the city and scouts thus have to provide protection throughout the entire distance of over ten miles. This tour of duty is mentally very tough.

### **War of Wazirs**

The land dispute is quite common among the tribes mainly it revolves around agricultural area but in Datta Khel the dispute is over the commercial land in the Datta Khel Bazaar, the size of the piece of land is not much but for last five decades it has been a constant

source of violence, in 1976 the first serious series of violence started among the two factions of Wazir which raged for three months. The area west of Datta Khel was again on fire from summer of 2000. Madda Khel tribe occupies the area on the north of Tochi River while Khaddar Khel lives on the south of the river but at places this is not strictly followed. The Wazir territory in true sense starts ahead of Khar Kamar with Manzar Khel, Dare Wasta, Khaddar Khel, Datta Khel, Madda Khel, Kani Rogha, Manzar Khel (Tut Narai) as main built up areas. The main clans of Wazir inhabiting the area include, Manzar Khel, Khaddar Khel, Madda Khel, Girh Madda Khel, Zai Saidgi, Kharsin and Bromeni.

Madda Khel is sub divided into Macha Madda Khel, Mati Khel and Khizar Khel. Malik Ajmal Khan Madda Khel ex Deputy Commissioner Karak and former federal minister used to be the leading malak but he was ousted by Malik Qadir Khan mainly because Ajmal had a soft attitude towards the government. The uplift in communication infra-structure have resulted in having a metallic road between Datta Khel-MiranShah on which regular commercial transport in the form of pick-up, trucks and buses plied, this was the only road, other were mainly tracks which included Datta Khel–Dwa Toi, Datta Khel–Tut Narai-Dosalli. The two main communication hubs were Khar Kamar and Datta Khel, numerous tracks leads to almost all direction from these two places.

In November 2000 both the tribes closed their shops in Datta Khel Bazaar and resorted to a Jirga, the political agent also intervened but to no avail resultantly on 17<sup>th</sup> November 2000 Madda Khel fired rockets on the Khaddar Khel and in retaliation the Khaddar Khel burnt the rival tribe shops.

On 1<sup>st</sup> July 2001 at 0350 hours the truce was broken and firing between two tribes started, on 2<sup>nd</sup> July Khaddar Khel captured Krum Sar, Speraghar and pushed back the Madda Khel. The Mahsuds from Razmak approximately hundred in number arrived in the area in support of the Madda Khel and Pir Kithi a tribe from Afghanistan also intervened.

On 25<sup>th</sup> July situation became volatile, when Madda Khel fired two missiles over Datta Khel Fort which landed 800 yards east of fort; target was a village in BalaPathar area. In retaliation the Khaddar Khel malaks came to Datta Khel and threatened that if this continued then they will burn down the bazaar. Tochi Scouts had vacated the piquet in the bazaar meant for the protection of Madda Khel Serai in accordance with the Jirga almost a month ago thus on 8<sup>th</sup> August the Khaddar Khel attacked the bazar and started looting and burning the serai.

On 11<sup>th</sup> August 2001 Madda Khel again fired five rockets. 13<sup>th</sup> August was a bloody day when indiscriminate firing took place between rival factions, Madda Khel suffered two casualties and they fired rockets from Kamkispera which after passing over the Tochi Fort and its field battery landed two kilometres south east. Tribes used multi barrel rocket launchers, 75 mm recoilless rifle, 14.5 mm gun, 12.7 mm gun, 3inch mortar and SPG-9 rockets. On 24<sup>th</sup> August almost 82 rounds of heavy weapons were fired by both tribes.

Political Agent intervened and requested Tochi Scouts to establish the writ of the government in the area; which came into force from 1730 hours when road Khar Kamar- Datta Khel was put out of bound for the tribes by Tochi Scouts. As a first step both tribes were approached to enter into a cease fire, remove all weapon from

the firing position especially in the near vicinity of the Datta Khel Bazar. Two companies of Tochi Scouts, two companies of Kurram Militia, two companies of Thall Scouts, two companies of Shawal Rifles apart from integral field battery of Tochi Scouts and medium battery of Thall Scouts were concentrated in Boya and Datta Khel.

Speragarh Range is the most dominating in the area which is in a horse shoe pattern on the southern side of the Tochi River and it was occupied by the both tribes; for any long lasting peace it was essential that this ridge be vacated by them. The area of the ridge occupied by the Khaddar Khel is known as Stara Spera and Kamki Spera was under the Madda Khel control. Both tribes refused to vacate the ridge. On 26th August Tochi Artillery started punishing from 0930 onwards in which 15 rounds of field artillery were used, aim was to force the tribes to raise the White Flag. Madda Khel temporarily suspended the firing and elders of Khaddar Khel also promised to find a way out but nothing conclusive came out of this and firing between these two blood thirsty tribes continued on 26<sup>th</sup> as well. Khaddar Khel took the initiative and made another daring raid on the bazaar looting the shops of Madda Khel, political agent now imposed a ban on all kind of movement on the Khaddar Khel tribe. Chief of Khaddar Khel tribe now approached Commandant Tochi Scouts and offered his cooperation on the condition that his tribe will be provided protection from the Madda Khel, it was accepted. Khaddar Khel thus vacated the Stara Spera ridge on 28<sup>th</sup> August and Pakistan flag was hoisted on its top by Major Mudassar Alam Baig of Tochi Scouts. On the other hand political agent was able to bargain a cease fire from Madda Khel till 30<sup>th</sup> August, Madda Khel tribe however remained defiant and refused to vacate the Kamki Spera. On 29<sup>th</sup> August the cease fire was shattered into pieces when Madda Khel opened up its heavy weapons on the Khaddar Khel from

morning till 1430 hours from Spera Ghar position. On 31<sup>st</sup> August Tochi Scouts shelled the positions of Madda Khel in which nine rounds were fired from 130mm ex Thall Scouts, 19 rounds from 25 pounder field guns ex Tochi Scouts.

The major reason of this failure of cease fire was that whereas the elders of both tribes understood the gravity of situation and agreed to a truce the young colts were not ready to listen and one of the tribe would fire on the others and that would be the end of the truce and political agent and elders were then back to square zero. This lasted till 5<sup>th</sup> September and on 6<sup>th</sup> new development took place when new firing positions were made functional by the tribes, Madda Khel position at Gharlamai fired about ten rockets of MBRL at Khaddar Khel village near Stara Spera close to Akhtar Piquet and out came the reply from Bajauri. The worst came on 13<sup>th</sup> September when Madda Khel started firing missiles from Gharlamai and four of these dropped near the Thall Scouts Battery at about 1300 hours.

On 14<sup>th</sup> September 2001 Kamki Spera was punished with 62 rounds of field artillery and 30 rounds of medium artillery, simultaneously Gharlamai a small mountainous hamlet north east of Datta Khel was also punished with eight rounds of field and 16 rounds of medium artillery. On 16<sup>th</sup> September 2001 Madda Khel raised the white flag and handed over the Kamki Spera to Tochi Scouts which occupied it on 16<sup>th</sup> September after clearing the mines laid by the Madda Khel.

On 21<sup>st</sup> October 2001 at 1915 hours Khaddar Khel exploded six rounds in Datta Khel Bazaar, burnt the shops of Madda Khel and took away the raw material in trucks and tractors. Again on 26<sup>th</sup> October Khaddar Khel attacked the shops of Madda Khel and burnt

down one shop. Madda Khel also retaliated by firing three missiles on Khaddar Khel village, exchange of fire took place between these two warring tribes on 27<sup>th</sup> October again. This inter tribe rivalry erupted at MiranShah also when on 2<sup>nd</sup> December 2001 at 1820 hours firing was exchanged near Qari mosque in which two tribesmen died, free use of hand grenades was demonstrated by both tribes. On 9<sup>th</sup> December these two tribes again resorted to violence at Datta Khel Bazaar in which 12.7 & 14.5 mm Guns were used by both tribes.

### **September - December 2001**

There was peace and harmony in the valley and agency. Scouts travelled at all times of day and night without any escort throughout the valley, agency, and province. It was common for the officers to come to MiranShah from Razmak, Jandola, and Wana and even from Zhob for a peaceful evening tea. Major Anwar narrates how he used to travel from Zhob Militia to Tochi Mess in four hours just to spend a day and then go back. Major General Ali Abbas recalls when he and Major Zafar Java both course-mates and both performing the duties of brigade majors at Kashmir travelled from Rawalpindi to MiranShah in public transport, had their meal in the city, spent the night in the mess and next day after spending hours in the arms market touching and appreciating new weapons they departed for Razmak in a Toyota Hiace, spent the weekend there and went back following the same pattern. All this shattered on the night of 11 September 2001 when a gory attack brought havoc on the Americans killing over 3000 innocent people particularly in New York City.<sup>289</sup> It was one of the most bizarre, daring, meticulous and devastating attack in terms of historical impact that world has ever seen, heard or experienced in its modern, medieval and past history.

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<sup>289</sup> *Newsweek*, 24<sup>th</sup> September 2001

There seems to be no parallel in history to describe its full entity, lone super power of the modern world was humiliated and made a laughing stock right in its own alley, it was a plot which would have baffled the Ian Flemings, David Lean and the very best directors of Hollywood. Any person would have been declared insane to even think that it is possible. Yet it was made possible and whole world saw with its own eyes the Twin Towers of World Trade Centre going down in heap of ashes and fire when Boeing aircraft one after the other rammed themselves into them. Minutes later the very symbol of world military the Pentagon was also hit when a Boeing crashed into its perimeter. The only plausible explanation that came to the majority of minds was that aliens had attacked the earth; it was not the case, attackers were human.

The attackers were identified as Saudi nationals who were alleged to be financed and trained by none other than Osama Bin Laden himself a Saudi national and believed to be residing in Afghanistan

Osama Bin Laden, ‘Mesmeriser’,<sup>290</sup> no man in modern history other than Adolf Hitler is hated, debated, loathed, followed and adored more than Osama. As a young man in 1986 he came to Pakistan to take part in Afghan Jihad, he stood out from the rest of Arabs fighters because he was the richest among them apart from his height. Initially he settled in Peshawar and helped the mujahedeen through his wealth but soon the sense of adventure took him into the heat of the battle and he along with his Arab followers took active part in the fighting against the Russian more notably in Khost area along with Wazir tribesmen, it is here that he developed the intimate bond with Wazirs who were impressed with his fighting valour. Not much was heard about him for many years, he hit the headlines when in May 1998 American fired cruise missiles on his suspected

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290 *Newsweek* 24 September 2001, article by Rod Nordland & Jeffrey Bartholet.

hideout in Afghanistan, one of the missile landed at Saidgi in North Waziristan not far from Tochi Scouts Post. *‘It was a hot May day, I was on duty at Ghulam Khan, few of us scouts were sitting outside on chairs when all of a sudden a thunderous noise and fire ball was seen at Saidgi area, after half an hour we came to know that the Americans have fired missiles at Zawara Markaz being run by Jalal Ud Din Haqqani’s followers, it was opposite our Girgit Post. At that time the markaz’s in charge was Maulana Obaidullah, from Saidgi Post at a distance of 3-4 Kilometres there was a Taliban Post. Later when I was at Faqiran Post there I saw a small boy who had collected the scrap of that cruise missile, I inspected it, the manufacturing date was 1984, and the parts were still movable’.*<sup>291</sup>

Operation Enduring Freedom<sup>292</sup> is the code name of American efforts to get even with the terrorists who launched the successful and most lethal attack on American soil in its living memory and also in written history.

Repercussions had to be there and they had to be quick and a lesson for all to know. ‘We may be the only one left in this war, that’s ok with me, we are Americans’ President George Bush after the attacks commented<sup>293</sup>, this much Bush was sure that Osama Bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda is behind this attack but he did not had the proof and neither he needed one at this time, he wanted him out dead or alive. Osama was in Afghanistan a land locked country; barren, desolate about the size of Bush home state Texas. Mullah Omar the Taliban leader of the Afghanistan demanded proof from Bush later however Omar agreed to put Osama on an open court of international justice, both demands were rejected by Bush.

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291 Interview with Naib Subedar Sher Alam Khattak, July 2012 at MiranShah

292 Also known as Operation Infinite Justice, the Operation Enduring Justice began on 7<sup>th</sup> October 2001.

293 Bob Woodward, *Bush at War*, (New York, Simon & Schuster, 2002), p, 81.



Something very similar was done by the Viceroy of India before declaring the Second Afghan War on 21<sup>st</sup> November 1878, the events leading to this war also started in the month of September 1878<sup>294</sup>. Between 11<sup>th</sup> September- 7<sup>th</sup> October 2001 the Central Command of America (Centcom) under whose area of operation Afghanistan falls carried out appreciation and put forward three plans<sup>295</sup>, the first one calls for destruction through air power only but finally the presence of ground troops and destruction using air power was approved.

Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld admitted ‘the hard fact was that America could not operate in Afghanistan without having allies’<sup>296</sup>. The fact is Afghanistan was not a country at all; there were no target to be hit as in conventional states or as in Iraq. President Bush remarked ‘what is the fun in hitting a \$10 tent with \$ 200 million worth cruise missile’<sup>297</sup>. There was no electricity, command and control centres, air defence weapons, telecommunication etc. What little was there, it was not affecting anything, what was present on ground were 60,000 Taliban, a thousand of Osama’s Arab warriors and potential million Pashtun in tribes all ready to wage another war. To these tribes there was no difference in fighting against the Americans as from Russians.

The air campaign or rather bombing started on 7<sup>th</sup> October 2001, in the first 76 days of operations till 23 December 2001, when sustained air operations slowed; the US flew about 6,500 strike missions over Afghanistan. About 17,500 munitions were expended on over 120 fixed target complexes and over 400 vehicles and artillery guns. A total of 57% of the weapons delivered were precision guided. Navy

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294 *The Second Afghan War 1878 – 80, Pakistan Army Education Press 1975, p – 2.*

295 *Michael Delong, Inside Centcom, The Unvarnished Truth About the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington, Regency, 2004, pp, 27-39*

296 *Bob Woodward, Plan of attack, London, Simon & Schuster, pp, 6-14,*

297 *Ibid*

carrier-based planes flew 4,900 of the 6,500 strike sorties or 75% of the total. The Air Force, flying 25% of the sorties, delivered 12,900 weapons or over 70% of the total delivered.<sup>298</sup>

Pakistan had to deploy almost two corps along the border to stop the Taliban fleeing and from this point onward an intricate and delicate situation took birth. Pakistan denied Americans right to cross into its territory in hot pursuit of Taliban and rather took itself to hunt them down but Americans were not satisfied with these arrangements yet they conceded to Pakistan. This was the most difficult period in the history of Pakistan because not only a war was raging on its western borders but simultaneously lava erupted on the eastern borders as well when a terrorist attack at the Indian Parliament on 13<sup>th</sup> December 2001 again pointed the fingers at Pakistan. India amassed her forces on the border and a nuclear war seemed imminent.<sup>299</sup>

## **January-2002**

In the aftermath of terrorist attack on Indian national assembly almost whole of Pakistan Army was deployed on eastern borders, No.3 Wing was moved from MirAli to Peshawar where it reached by last light 1<sup>st</sup> January 2002 and from there with other elements of Frontier Corps it was placed under command 30 Corps. Wing was deployed at Shakargarh sector. Lieutenant Colonel Kurram Kamal, Major Izhar Ahmed Bajwa, Captain Tanveer, Captain Nadeem Haider and Captain Kamil Hameed remained with the wing. The wing was to act as the second line of defence looking after the rear and against the enemy para troopers. From the past experience of 1948, 1965

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298 *Operation Enduring Freedom* <<http://www.wikipedia.org/>> (accessed 3-16 September 2012)

299 *Shuja Nawaz Crossed Swords Pakistan Army Its Army and the Wars within* (Oxford, Karachi, 2008) p- 549.

and 1971 Wars it seems to be much more militarily beneficial if the Tochi Scouts are employed in the hilly and mountainous terrain rather than in plain areas.

#### Operation Blue Lagoon-January/February 2002

In the aftermath of the 9/11 the stance of Pakistan was to seal the Durand Line to stop the infiltration of the Taliban into own territory something which had never been done in the past . One major reason of such an inability of previous regimes was not the lack of resources but the social and cultural values of the North Waziristan and also of other agencies which pose the main hindrance. The tribes were all treated as independent and sovereign states. Wazir inhabit the area on both sides of Durand Line with seasonal migration as part of their life style for instance the Gurbuz Wazir do come down from Khost towards the MiranShah in winter. The other lesson which had been passed down from the history since 1849 is the militancy of the Wazir tribes, they have shown the tenacity of fighting the organised regular army for long period inflicting high rate of casualties on the troops thus it had always been a mixture of politics coupled with the military might that has been the scarlet thread of the area.

There were three main areas which had remained independent in all these years namely the Bangidar area east of the Ghulam Hassan Khan which is roughly thirty miles north east of MiranShah on the Durand Line, second was the area west of Datta Khel and third being the area north west of Datta Khel. The mission given to the Tochi Scouts was to establish the posts on the Durand Line thus sealing the crossing points for the Taliban.<sup>300</sup> The troops earmarked for this operation apart from the integral troops of Tochi Scouts were wing of Shawal Rifles and one company of 25 Frontier Force. This apparently looks an innocuous task but anyone who has read and

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300 *Letter of HQFC Dated 5th January 2002.*

followed the history of the area will recall that similar aims were desired in 1898 when Maizar incident took place near Datta Khel which later resulted in a full-fledged military operation that lasted for well over three years. Operation Blue Lagoon was the code name of the operation meant to seal these border crossing points, this was in fact a three tier operation planned and executed by the Tochi Scouts. For a better understanding of the overall efforts of Pakistan in war against terror it is to be remembered that the efforts had started from October 2001 onwards code name as Operation Al Mizan, in which Tochi Scouts were inducted from July 2005 onwards.

### **Operations of Tochi Scouts**

The operations of Tochi Scouts in connection with the 9/11 started in December 2001 when instructions were received from HQ Frontier Corps to seal the borders. As a first step the main and more frequent entry points at Ghulam Khan were choked by the No.1 Wing, two sub sectors were created, one Ghulam Khan itself under command of Major Nawaz Ul Haq and the other sector Saidgi-Faqiran was under the control of Major Izhar Ahmed Choudhary. Observation posts were established at Tassa and Labejac in this Ghulam Khan sector. Additionally three guns of own field artillery were placed at Dardoni along with one company size reserve force being commanded by Major Munir Khan. Over 13000 Afghans were refused entry into Pakistan after the American had started operation in Afghanistan in this sector alone.

In October 2001 Commandant Tochi Scouts Colonel Wajahat Choudhary presented his appreciation of the situation to the HQ Frontier Corps. Wajahat first identified the main routes emerging from Afghanistan into the agency, he pointed out following, Bangidar

(NNE of MiranShah), Ghulam Khan(North of MiranShah), Naridag (NNW), Saidgi (NW), Zhwazagai (WNW) and Dwa Toi (West of MiranShah). He also highlighted that at present Tochi Scouts are holding areas short of these routes for the reason that all of them are regarded as inaccessible areas for last one hundred years, these areas can act as harbouring places for the infiltrators. Wajahat very rightly read the social values of the valley and appraised the headquarters that there is a very sympathetic feelings prevailing among the people and if and when the local religious leaders declared Jihad against the America then there will be an outburst similar to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. Already donations (Chanda) are being collected for the Taliban either in form of money, weapons or food. Regarding the Taliban, Wajahat collected the intelligence which figured out their strength in the neighbouring Pakiya Province in Afghanistan. It was not much, Khost was almost vacated with only two shops out of ten being opened and carrying out the business, in his estimate there were 400–450 Taliban soldiers in Khost area armed only with small arms with occasional artillery piece and 14.5 mm gun, in Saidgi area he estimated 30-35 Taliban with similar weapons. The major force was in the shape of Qaumi Lashkar which included Maulvi Abdul Khaliq of Matoon Tribe, Abdul Qayyum of Lakhand Tribe, Shahsawar of Tanai Tribe, Abdul Rehman of Zadrani Tribe and Jalal Ud Din Ghundai of Zadram and Khostani Tribe. In Khost the control of the city was in the hand of Taliban police known as Amr Bil Maroof and very strong anti-American feelings persists. Commandant Tochi Scouts very correctly read and highlighted that Taliban are Kandharis and as such are not dependent upon Khost, they want to move back to Kandahar; they have suffered so far very less casualties and are fairly intact and in the case of fall and reduction of Kabul and Kandahar these will spread out and fight a guerrilla warfare in the mountains. On the

issue of refugees the commandant foresaw that since these camps will lack the water and food shortage thus the refugees will spill out to all parts of the agency. Most importantly he pointed out that any prolong war in Afghanistan will turn the feelings of natives into anti Pakistan and government installations and personals will be targeted and attacked. Jalal ud Din Haqqani was appointed as the commander in chief of the southern Afghanistan, he had already left the Tochi Scouts accommodation but his family remained there. This may look strange to the adherents of western way of warfare but this is what Frontier Warfare is all about where families are not targeted to put pressure on the opponent. In over hundred years of frontier warfare in the North Waziristan there is no record of any rape by either the government forces or of the tribes or even among the tribes during conflict. Men have been slaughtered their bodies mutilated but women have been kept out of the conflict, it was only Musa Khan who in 1919 deceived the Tochi Guard at Tut Narai by presenting him and his colleagues as women.

Commandant Tochi Scouts Colonel Wajahat Choudhary stressed that in the first step all inaccessible areas be occupied thus, it was approved.

In connection with events taking place in Afghanistan a company was sent to beef up the security at Dardoni ( near MiranShah) on 21<sup>st</sup> November 2001 simultaneously digging of trenches also started along the Durand Line for protection of own troops. From October onwards the American soldiers approximately 100 in numbers came and stayed at MiranShah, they were housed in the technical school building which incidentally is mere 100 meters away from the house of Siraj Haqqani. Tochi Scouts provided American troops with protection. Havildar Saeed states that these Americans were

provided with Khaki uniform of Frontier Corps and they jointly carried out search operations with Tochi Scouts. Americans were referred as friends in all official correspondences of army and Frontier Corps.

Tochi Scouts routine training went as per planning and additional one week training was imparted conducted by Major Nawaz along with Captains Anwar Saeed, Akbar Alam, Akhtar Azam and Tanveer Husain.

For the sealing of border ahead of Datta Khel initial reconnaissance was carried out in civil clothes by the scouts operating from Datta Khel towards the Durand Line in Madda Khel area. Between 5–10 January 2002 plans were made by the Commandant Tochi Scout Colonel Wajahat Choudhary, he requested for additional two wings of scouts. On 19<sup>th</sup> January aerial reconnaissance of the area was conducted in the Mashaq fixed wing aircraft of 9 Army Aviation Squadron.

No.2 Wing Bangidar 19-22 January 2002.

Bangidar is located fifteen miles north east of MiranShah and five miles east of Ghulam Khan, it is situated on the Durand Line and a major smuggling route originating from Khost in Afghanistan and leading to MirAli, MiranShah and Spinwam. Area is mountainous in nature having an elevation varying from 4500 – 6000 feet, important heights are Labbeji and Ding Sar. There are numerous tracks that originate from Afghanistan and leads into North Waziristan agency. There is no metallic road, the seasonal nullahs are major obstacles for any wheel and track movement; which is possible only on tracks, there are three tracks that originates from MiranShah, Mir Ali and Spinwam and all these join at Bangidar. Gurbuz Wazir is the major

tribe inhabiting the area on both sides of Durand Line. Hassan Khel Wazir a sub tribe of Momit Khel (Uthmanzai Wazir) occupies the area approximately five kilometres south of Bangidar on MirAli & Spinwam approach.

In 1998 an operation was planned but then due to paucity of troops and perceived tribal reaction it was postponed, again in 1999 another operation was planned but abandoned at last moment as political administration feared a law and order situation and seek more time. In the aftermath of 9/11 another operation was planned to kill two birds with a single shot, to curb the smuggling and to stop the infiltration of Al-Qaida.

On 16<sup>th</sup> January 2002 aerial reconnaissance was carried out by the Commandant Tochi Scouts and three other officers in the MFI-17 aircraft of 9 Army Aviation Squadron. On 18<sup>th</sup> January operation plan was formulated and approval of IGFC Major General Taj Ul Haq was taken, on 19<sup>th</sup> January operational orders were given by the Commandant Tochi Scouts. No 2 Wing under the command of Major Nawaz Ul Haq was the commander and he had additional troops in the shape of one company Tochi Scouts, one company of 25 Frontier Force and one field battery of Tochi Scouts in direct support which was deployed at Dardoni. Major Nawaz practically had to conduct the operation with only one company as his entire wing was deployed on posts; he was managing over twenty posts.

Operation commenced at 0700 hours on 20<sup>th</sup> January 2002 with two companies of No.2 Wing moving out from Ghulam Khan towards Bangidar along stony Stana Algad, through the algad with high gorges enroute, a route protection party was deployed in advance. At 0900 hours the troops reached a track nullah junction



and a base camp was established. Wing Commander Major Nawaz himself led one company to capture Ding Sar having an elevation of 5316 feet while Captain Shahid Khurshid led the other company towards an important and dominating knoll having an elevation of 5050 feet.

Major Nawaz after establishing a post of platoon strength at Ding Sar advance forward with two platoons and established posts on adjoining high ground, having one platoon on Khaki Ridge (5150 feet elevation) and second on a mound (elevation 4850 feet) both were in place by mid-day. These three heights mutually supported each other with fire and observation, thus the main track coming from Bangidar was now under observation. On the opposing side the Chalwasti (tribal force) armed with heavy weapons still occupied the track, no exchange of fire took place.

On 21<sup>st</sup> January 2002 a platoon each moved forward towards the Bangidar area and established a foothold, there were few tense moments when Chalwasti initially refused to vacate the positions but on seeing the heavy weapons of the Tochi Scouts moving forward they withdrew. Tochi scouts improved the track and made it trafficable for four wheel drive vehicles. Equipment and stores required to construct the bunkers was also brought forward. Next day (22 January 2002) Pakistani flag was hoisted at Bangidar by the Commandant Tochi Scouts Colonel Wajahat Choudhary.

No.4 Wing-Tochi Pass-19<sup>th</sup> January 6<sup>th</sup> February 2002

An operation was hatched with an aim to stop not only inter-tribal war but also to make use of this opportunity by advancing towards the Durand Line and occupying the Dwa Toi. Sooner or later one of the tribe was bound to seek the help of Tochi Scouts,

it was a game of patience and soon Khaddar Khel asked for Tochi Scouts intervention and help.

## Dwa Toi

Coming back to Datta Khel, it was decided in the first week of January 2002 to make hay while sun is shining; to advance into inaccessible areas. By sunset 19<sup>th</sup> January 2002 the elements were in position at Datta Khel, a tactical headquarters was established, No.4 Wing was the punch it had earlier handed over its own piquets at Thall, Amin, Ahmed Khel, Pawani, Khar Kamar and at Stara Spera to Shawal Rifles to muster own strength for the operation, battery of field artillery and company ex 25 FF was placed at Boya.

First Phase. On 20<sup>th</sup> January in first phase of the operation one company of 4 Wing occupied the Patakheni Sar at 0830 hours under artillery fire cover. The force was divided into two groups, by mid-day 1st Group under Major Mudassar occupied Chappari which is located north of Tochi River having an elevation of 5793 feet, 2<sup>nd</sup> Group under Major Shoukat Mustafa and Captain Saad Zafar headed towards Mama Ziarat and occupied Bajauri, Kotki Ridge and Mama Ziarat by 1930 hours. Mama Ziarat is a beautiful village consisting of hundred houses in Tochi Valley inhabited by Khaddar Khel tribe. There was resistance from Madda Khel but no casualty was suffered by own troops.

Second Phase. It started on very next day (21<sup>st</sup> January), the malaks of Khaddar Khel and elders of Mama Ziarat & Baba Ziarat met the commandant who in turn asked for the details of the mines laid. Artillery was moved to cover the Dwa Toi, Maizar and Timore. Strict orders were given not to fire on the civilian population and permission of commandant was required before firing any artillery

gun. The codes of Frontier Warfare were adhered in which fire is stopped on any person raising the white flag or vacating the firing trenches. Dwa Toi in Pashto means 'place where two rivers meet' it is located near Durand Line surrounded by mountains of Shawal and Afghanistan, water is in abundance, it leads to Lowara Mandi (12 Kilometres), Birmal, Razmak (30 Kilometres) and Gurweikht (13 Kilometres).

22<sup>nd</sup> January 2002. At 0830 the operation started with a platoon strength to occupy the Gharlamai in Madda Khel area, it was successfully accomplished by evening. The going was not smooth as Madda Khel employed rockets and missiles on the advancing Tochi Scouts especially in Mama Ziarat area. Another objective was to occupy the Sherrani Killi area which is again situated in Madda Khel territory, it had hundred houses and it had to be abandoned due to heavy fire from the tribe. Artillery was not employed by the Tochi on the tribe mainly due to presence of civilian population; it was appreciated that any artillery fire if fired can cause substantial damage to the women and children.

23<sup>rd</sup> January 2002. The firing between the warring tribes stopped, Tochi Scouts mainly used the day for consolidation and moving forward the artillery observers. Next day (24<sup>th</sup> January) the elders of Madda Khel also met the commandant and agreed to resolve their differences with the Khaddar Khel through the political agent office rather than resorting to violence. Next two days were hectic as political administration tried to resolve the dispute but to no avail and on 30<sup>th</sup> January the operation against Madda Khel resumed. 4 Wing spearheaded the operation employing its two companies led by the wing commander. Two groups were formed, one headed by the wing commander headed towards the Pate Khine Sar and

other towards the Maizar area but both groups made little headway mainly due to heavy resistance offered by the Girh Madda Khel. Havildar Khan Wazir Khattak needs commendation as he alongwith his pioneer section cleared the mines. Operation was terminated at 1730 hours.

On 31<sup>st</sup> January 2002 the IGFC Major General Taj Ul Haq along with home secretary visited the area, he met the tribal Jirga of Madda Khel and Khaddar Khel, initially the outcome looked promising but later on the talks failed and Tochi Scouts was left with no other option other but to resume the operation which they did on 3<sup>rd</sup> February 2002.

On 3<sup>rd</sup> February 4 Wing resumed the action early in morning, two groups were formed , one under Captain Shahid Khurshid Mohmand moved south of Tochi River and occupied the height in Madda Khel area they included Pate Khine Sar(7321 feet), Niaz Sar(5500 feet) and also occupied area in Madda Khel tribe territory. More important was the advance of the second group under the Wing Commander Major Shoukat Mustafa which successfully occupied the Maizar and Dwa Toi area by the last light. It was an historic moment as these areas had remained outside the writ of the Tochi Scouts and political administration for well over a century. It was nostalgic in nature as almost hundred years ago the same area had successfully resisted the advancement of the North Waziristan Militia. Maizar is located at an elevation of 3500 feet and had over 400 houses with water flowing through the streets.

On 4<sup>th</sup> February Major Shoukat Mustafa carried out the reconnaissance of the area and finally selected the ridge at Grid reference 582463 as permanent location for a platoon size strength

post. On 6<sup>th</sup> February Commandant Tochi Scouts hoisted Pakistan flag in a simple but graceful ceremony at Dwa Toi and with this the Tochi Pass came under the physical control of Tochi Scouts for the first time since the very incursion of the British in the area that dates back to 1895.

Subedar Fazal Orakzai was performing the duties of pay naik then and he narrates *‘there was initially only a platoon strength of Tochi Scouts in Datta Khel and we have never ventured ahead of it, our wing headquarters was at Boya, when the operations started in August 2001 then a tactical headquarters was established at Datta Khel but still the wing commander used to come back at night to Boya, there was no fear of any attack from the locals. Move forward from Datta Khel towards the Maizer and Dwa Toi was carried on foot in a single day, due to winter the day hours were short, one company moved at fast pace and other followed it. It will be wrong to assume that this occupation was entirely due to show of force rather politics played key role. When we reached Dwa Toi it was afternoon and a Jirga was in process, we maintained a distance and waited for the verdict of the Jirga. Some of them were in favour of allowing us to occupy and establish a post near the village and other were opposing it. Finally they reached a consensus in which Tochi Scouts were allowed to occupy the old piquet known as Farangi Post which had only ruins; it was the post which was occupied by the British. In short the elders had allowed us only what was there in the original treaty. The relations with the locals were very cordial, I recall one particular incident when myself and wing commander were coming back from Dwa Toi and at Maizar we were stopped by one man who did not allowed us to proceed further without having meal with him in his house, it was a lavish meal (Fazal is obviously unaware of the fact that in 1898 similar pattern was employed by*

*the Maizar people to lure the British into an ambush). Our Wing Commander Major Shoukat Mustafa was quite adventurous and would try a new route every day, we had no fear and would travel at night from Ghulam Khan to Boya or from Boya to Datta Khel and back. I was performing the duty of pay naik, on 2<sup>nd</sup> of every month we would gather at MiranShah and collect the pay which was then distributed to all the scouts at all posts.'*

In an another recollection of the memory Naib Subedar Sher Alam who was then a havildar in Signals Platoon of Tochi Scouts narrates '*Datta Khel Bazaar area was almost burnt, Khaddar Khel had burnt down a serai of Madda Khel but one mosque of serai was left intact because none could dare to touch it other being a petrol pump which was left intact for the reason that both tribes had invested money in it. There was another mosque in the area which was managed by the Maulana Ameel Khan it was Khaddar Khel's mosque and it had shops in the ground floor. In the initial phase of the operation I was in the detachment of scouts which was led by Major Mudassar Baig a courageous and brave officer alongwith the political agent's assistant, we marched into Madda Khel territory. I was initially sent into Gul Azam Morcha area, when we reached Mama Ziarat we discovered that whole area has been mined by the Khaddar Khel for the reason that they were numerically inferior to their opponents thus to prevent surprise attack they had adopted this tactics. Our Pioneer Platoon Havildar Khan Wazir Khattak breached the mine field with detector, the mines were green in colour and Russian made. We then entered into Sherrani Village where we lost our way, on our way back our civilian driver had a an attack of epilepsy and near Jani Pir graveyard he lost control of the pickup and rammed it into the high ground, we all were saved but driver was unconscious and later we evacuated him, he was sad to see us*

*all alive because he confessed that from his perspective he had killed us all. Anyway we reached Gul Azam area where we were greeted with a burst of 14.5 mm machine gun manned by three men of the tribe, they warned us not to move up or they will fire, they said that they cannot allow us to move forward unless the tribe does not give the permission. We stayed for some time and tried to negotiate but they were adamant on their earlier statement thus we came back to Datta Khel where political administration made some arrangements about which I have no knowledge. Next day we went there again the morchas were vacant yet the arms and ammunition was there, there was a rocket launcher frame also which allowed these men to fire it from a standoff distance. Some of us were left at Gul Azam Post and rest moved forward to Dwa Toi, it was very cold and wind also started blowing and soon snow also started falling, we had no place for cover. Two of our scouts went into the nearby jungle to cut the woods for fire. Night was cold, long, windy and lonely; we hardly slept due to cold, in the morning it was snow all around, we had no water for even abulation, there was no latrines and we had no toilet paper as well. Later we fetched water from a spring almost two kilometres away.<sup>301</sup> Similar was the condition at Dwa Toi where one of the scout had lit fire inside the tent which caught fire, there was ammunition stacked nearby but luckily they survived and also save the ammunition. At Pata Khina Sar which was a Madda Khel morcha there was a 100 mm Russian gun also which the tribe had taken up with the help of ropes.*

No.1 Wing Kazha Valley-12/14 February 2002

Kazha Valley is situated west of MiranShah few kilometres short of Durand Line, initially the plan was to seal the area mainly to curb the smuggling but now with the aftermath of American war

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301 Interview with Naib Subedar Sher Alam Khattak, September 2012 at MiranShah

in Afghanistan it assumed double importance as its sealing would achieve not only to curb the smuggling but also put a check on the movement of Taliban and Al Qaeda elements into Pakistan. No. 1 Wing under the command of Major Shakil was entrusted the task.

Operation started on 12 February 2002, it was a three phase operation. In the first phase artillery was deployed at Dougha Khulla under the command of Captain Ijaz. The post was established on a high mound 300 feet relative to surrounding area on the track Khar Kamar-Lowara Mandi, first phase was over by 0900 hours. Khar Kamar situated few miles west of Boya became the base of operation.

In second phase another post was established at Walgi by 1045 hours in Ismail area along track Khar Kamar–Lowara Mandi, it was also a platoon size post but it was having an elevation of 1300 meters. One of the major advantages of both the posts were in the close proximity of fresh water, in case of Walgi it was only 50 meters away, moreover fresh ration was made available to the troops by the contractor mainly due to close proximity of track.

By 1230 hours the third phase of the operation was achieved by establishing a platoon size post at an elevation of 1600 meters, it was also on the track Khar Kamar–Lowara Mandi , it was named as Shakil Post. It had to rely upon the donkey transport for supply of fresh water. Initially the locals of the area provided the water to the post. By 1530 hours the last phase of the operation which was establishing of post at an elevation of 1800 meters near Lowara Mandi, it was occupied by two platoons, the post dominated the village of Lowara Mandi and also had a visual observation of the Durand Line. One major limitation of the post was the water source



which was three miles away. *'Opening of area along Khar Kamar–Lowara Mandi was an interesting experience, all tribes living along the said axis gave no resistance, officers and troops of Tochi Scouts were warmly received by the tribal chiefs and tribesmen of different tribes in their respective areas with traditional tribal culture, officers were presented with turbans and honoured with lunch and dinner alongwith the troops. A great reception was arranged for the Commandant Tochi Scouts and Political Agent North Waziristan Agency on their visit which took place on 14th February 2002; they were garlanded and presented with turbans amidst aerial firing. By the time these two officials reached Dwa Toi their convoy numbered over hundred vehicles in which over ninety vehicles belonged to locals who had also joined in. Pakistan flag was hoisted by the commandant in a graceful ceremony.'*<sup>302</sup>

#### **Post Operation Deployment. Tochi–Kazha Valley.**

Ahmed Khel Post. Moving westward on the road MiranShah–Dwa Toi, is the very first post located at a height of 3203 feet it is mainly sited for the road protection with section strength. Kisha Post is the next post located four kilometres deep into Kisha Nullah to check the smuggling from Saidgi and Faqiran; section strength commanded by an NCO man it. Musa Khan Piquet located at 4233 feet was again manned by a section strength its primary task was to keep an eye on the Boya Fort itself, another check post was established at Boya Bridge it was again an anti-smuggling post and had the maximum seizures in three sectors with a platoon strength commanded by a JCO. Around Boya a series of posts known as Pawani, 1, 2, & 5 were important anti-smuggling pots, each post had section strength. Boya itself was the wing headquarters; it did not had any boundary wall around it. Ahead of Boya Fort the built

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302 *Digest of Service Tochi Scouts*

up areas of Land Muhammad Khel, Mamit Khel and Degan all Daur towns did not had any post, the last post within the Boya Sector was Khar Kamar Post for the protection of the road having a section strength commanded by an NCO.

Area ahead of Khar Kamar was under the Datta Khel sector there was no other post between Khar Kamar and Datta Khel Fort however within the Fort itself a company strength commanded by a JCO was always ready for any eventuality. Around Datta Khel the important post was the Akhtar Piquet located at 4000 feet with section strength inside, Tut Narai Post had the same height but it was meant for anti-smuggling with platoon strength. All these posts and piquet were already there before the operation and new posts were mainly established in Kazha Valley. The very first post was Gharlamai Post located north of Tochi River at 6167 feet, it was a key post as it had the observation and dominated the entire Kazha Valley a section strength manned it, the post is located on the track which follow the old Spina Khaisora Post of Captain Jotham fame, the track traverse west ward and post is located close to Spin Khak Raghza. Another post Bajauri (5508 feet) was established on a dominating feature north of Tochi River, section strength but commanded by JCO. On the south of Tochi River ahead of Datta Khel the very first post is known as Kotkai Ridge Post (5500 feet) accommodating a section strength commanded by an NCO. In the Khaddar Khel, Khara Wara Post (5500 feet) was established, although strength was less than a section yet commanded by a JCO; adjacent to this post is Pata Khina Sar Post the highest post of Tochi Scouts at 7321 feet, it dominates the entire area up till Datta Khel Bazaar, the post itself is in the Girh Madda Khel and they had their weapon morchas here before Tochi Scouts occupied it, a JCO commands an under strength platoon. The last post of Tochi Scouts was established slightly ahead of Dwa Toi,

one of the most important posts of strategic nature as it controls the tracks leading and coming from Afghanistan, Alwara Mandi, Birmal, Shawal and Gurweikht, platoon strength mans it under command of a JCO.

### Development Plan

Tochi Scouts in a span of one month had brought under control an area of 1500–1800 square kilometres having a population of 50,000–70,000 (entire Madda Khel, Shawal, part of Khaddar Khel and Bangidar). This area was without electricity, postal, health, communication and education facilities. Commandant Tochi Scouts Colonel Wajahat Choudhary in his post operation report highlighted and stressed the importance of having road infrastructure. In his recommendations the priority should be given in constructing Datta Khel–Dwa Toi, Khar Kamar-Alwara Mandi, Ghulam Khan–Bangidar roads and in second phase Khar Kamar-Kotarai, Ismail Khel-Zobgai road should be constructed and in third phase Sherrani-Rashida and Alwara Mandi-Zobgai road should be made. He also highlighted the total absence of medical facilities in the area. Tochi scouts provided the medical facilities to all the inhabitants in the area after establishing the posts, it also established free medical camps in the villages after consultation with the malaks and through local Jirga, naturally the womenfolk never came for the medicine but older generation and young folks were willing to accept the medicines, all in all Tochi Scouts spent and distributed medicines worth Rupees 2, 50,000 in the area. Another sour point which was raised by the locals and noticed by the scouts as well was the low fresh water supply in the area. The water table had gone down in certain areas.

IGFC very wisely sanctioned 15 vacancies for enrolment in Frontier Corps from newly inaccessible areas; educational qualifications were lowered for these aspirants. Case of non-custom paid vehicles was another issue which the commandant recommended should be made legal by registering them.

#### Haider Khel & Bakka Khel-March 2002

In Khajauri there was a land dispute between the Haider Khel and Bakka Khel tribes similar to Dande Plains. On 7<sup>th</sup> March 2002 both tribes resorted to violence and occupied trenches and exchange of fire took place between them. On the request of political agent company strength of Tochi Scouts moved into the area which resulted in the start of peace negotiations. A Jirga was called in but it failed and resultantly on 14<sup>th</sup> March 2002 Tochi Scouts also brought two field artillery pieces as show of force, they engaged the firing trenches of both tribes on 15<sup>th</sup> March without causing any damage to human lives. On 17<sup>th</sup> March 2002 another Uthmanzai Jirga was called which fixed a Tiga of 2,50,000 Rupees on both tribes for violating the earlier peace agreement, both tribes agreed to pay the Tiga and matter was resolved amicably. In another related incident an anti-encroachment operation was conducted by the political agent in MirAli Bazaar in January 2001, two officers, four JCO's and 150 Scouts took part; the task was completed successfully without resorting to violence.<sup>303</sup>

#### Referendum-2002

Tochi Scouts was assigned the task of verification of electoral rolls in March-April 2001 in which five officers, 12 JCO's and 316 Scouts took part; task was to verify the rolls in North Waziristan, FR

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303 *Assistant Political agent MirAli letter No. 28/3/2002 APA/MRL/R.*

Bannu and FR Lakki. It was successfully completed except in Datta Khel area. In April 2002 a presidential referendum was held in the country and again Tochi Scouts was made responsible for the areas mentioned above.

### **Trivial Affairs**

Murder and revenge over the land has been the norm of the valley for last hundred years however for a change, life in the city was disrupted on 17<sup>th</sup> April 2002 when all the shop keepers in the city of MiranShah went on a strike the cause was not the Afghan War rather the installation of electric meters in the city, after two days the electric poles were destroyed by the miscreants, the political agent tried to resolve the issue. The tribes are more than willing to have the electricity in their villages and towns but when it comes to paying of bills they simply ignore it. WAPDA had initiated a nationwide drive to have the electricity being paid for and it was in this regard that the violence took place which with the passage of time became more intense. In MiranShah the electricity is being used for everything for the reason that no natural gas has been provided thus the cooking, heating of houses is all done on electricity. On 15<sup>th</sup> June 2002 the road MiranShah–Bannu was blocked near the Match Factory Chowk MiranShah on the same issue this time it was a protest for the disconnection of their electricity; it was done for non-payment of bills. In another incident on 29<sup>th</sup> July 2002 the tribes of Haider Khel and people of MirAli simply blew the 1100 KV Grid Station at Khajauri, a complete wing of Tochi Scouts along with two artillery guns had to be employed to restore the situation, the main culprit Noor Ullah Hassu Khel who actually fired the rocket remained absconder. In August 2002 shops of Zerrani Tribe were sealed for non-payment of electricity bills, in the same month on

20<sup>th</sup> the shops in MiranShah were sealed for the same reason. The students of Government high school MiranShah also took part in the demonstration when in November 2002 they left their classes and came out in the streets but they remained peaceful. Daurs of Idak as a protest against the load shedding simply threw iron chains on the electric wires thus disrupting the power flow to the MiranShah for a day.

Students also took to the streets in October 2003 when Government College MiranShah students protested by blocking the road highlighting lack of technical teaching staff.

With the passage of time the protests died down and other issues erupted which included the ban on carrying of arms in the city limits of MiranShah, MirAli, Spinwam and Razmak. A Jirga was held on 24<sup>th</sup> September 2003 in which the political agent was able to convince the locals headed by Maulvi Saleem Gul to abide by the rules. Transporters also went on strike in December 2003 to register their disgust against the imposition of Rupees 10 tax on every vehicle by the Bakka Khel in the name of Amman Tax (peace tax).

Apart from the electricity issue the usual incidents of murder on petty issues remain steady. In June 2002 Madda Khel picked up a fight with the Zerrani Tribe, all of a sudden at 2200 hours heavy weapons started firing in which one missile hit the house of Malik Burhan of Biche resultantly he died on the spot. Another member of Zerrani tribe Ghani Rehman also died in firing on 7<sup>th</sup> June. In January 2004 a rocket was fired towards the Datta Khel Fort, on investigation it was revealed that Gul Mahmud had purchased a 107mm rocket launcher and while testing it accidentally fired.

Anti-smuggling duties also took its toll at times the vehicles would not stop or would simply try to fled away by firing in the air or onto the scouts. For instance on 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2003 when the driver of a van when ordered to halt for checking fired at the check post commander at Bargha Khel during which one scout sepoy Hayat Iqbal got injured in retaliatory fire the driver Noor Zaki was killed. A month before gasht commander Subedar Afsar Jan Khattak received a bullet in his chest while trying to halt a convoy of six vehicles apparently on a smuggling run near Babar Post; immediately a force of 166 scouts along with two artillery guns were despatched to the site with Commandant Colonel Aashiq Hussain in the lead reaching the site. Jirga later agreed to hand over the six persons involved in this crime. Colonel Aashiq Hussain like his predecessors was man of action he undertook to increase the cultivable area of Tochi Scouts, upgrade the Tochi Stadium and green belts along the sepoy's living lines; he made the non-commissioned officers also join in the working which they resented and quoted the relevant rules; he abided by the rules and instead made them do drill under the supervision of a JCO during working hours.

### **Operation Boya**

An operation against the hard criminals of MiranShah Sub Division was carried out in April 2003; it was manly in Boya area. One wing of Kurram Militia also took part in this, whereas Major Nawaz Ul Haq of Tochi Scouts led the operation. The reconnaissance of the area was carried out on 2<sup>nd</sup> April and operation itself was launched on 3<sup>rd</sup> April.

There were three main targets, the first one was Rahim (Village Ali Khel) & Tamtilly Hamzoni (Village Ahmed Khel) both were

arched enemies and in the process had committed many murders, both were living close by on the main Boya–Datta Khel main Road. Force used by the Tochi Scouts was overwhelming, five companies along with commando & pioneer platoons assisted by three APC's, Field Battery, mortars and RR's. Operation started at 0600 hours and was completed by 0800 hours, Rahim was able to flee away but his house was demolished and burnt to ground, the other criminal gave himself up along with five other companions.

Arif Khan alias Rappary of Village Lund Muhammad Khel (close to Boya) had carved a name for himself by committing daring robberies, murders and kidnapping. Few days back he killed the son of Subedar Taj Muhammad of Khassadars Force for the reason that his father had arrested his brother. Operation against him started at 1000 hours with the same force which had moved from the previous target to this one. Arif Khan proved to be a coward running away leaving his mother, wife and a kid to face the wrath of the state, his house was also demolished and burnt by 1125 hours.

Kerry Group was another notorious gang, they were in classical sense a family gang with father and sons having trademark of kidnapping and keeping abductees, they kidnapped a three member Polio team; Manzar Khel near Boya was their home base. Operation against them started at 1430 hours by the same force and job was done by 1550 hours, a six house compound was demolished.

These operations were conducted in accordance with political administration's directive. They are a classical examples of how the system works in the agency. The writ of state was established, respect and fear of authority was carved into the very soul of the people if they had any intention of following the same life style.



The planning of operation was meticulous, battle procedures were followed, 150 Khassadars were also part of it, and 100 kilogram of explosives was arranged by the political agent.<sup>304</sup>

### **Not so Trivial Affairs**

Pakistan and America despite sharing the common goals in the period still had differences and the major irritation point for NATO was the Pakistan's stance on the integrity of its border. Pakistan made it very clear from the start that it is very much capable of looking after the border on its side; action speaks louder than the words. The vigilance of the Tochi Scouts in the area of responsibility along the Durand Line even in that period of friendship later proved significant in thwarting the claims of the Afghan government in the readjustment of the Durand Line according to their wishes. There were two types of operations being conducted simultaneously, one within the North Waziristan Agency mainly confined to the MiranShah City and adjoining in which the Deeni Madrasahs were being searched for the Al Qaeda operatives ; in this the political administration, regular army elements and Tochi Scouts took part. These were mainly being conducted on the intelligence tips. The other was the American operations in collaboration with the Northern Alliance troops close to the border. In this the tendency of the Americans was to cross over the border, air violations also took place some of which it seems were not intentional rather the layout of the border itself void of any physical recognisable feature was the main cause. There were no communication arrangements between the Americans and the Tochi Scouts Posts which were all along the 60 kilometres border and it entirely depended upon the judgement of the posts commander to handle the situation as they deemed satisfactorily. The air of good will was there thus on almost all the

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304 *Political Agent North Waziristan Agency letter 677/79/S/153 dated 3<sup>rd</sup> April 2003.*

occasions the issues were resolved amicably. With the passage of time the drills and standing order procedures were modified and drafted by both countries to cater for any eventuality; as a thumb rule the Americans were trusted and treated fairly but the Northern Alliance troops were looked with suspicion.

On 7<sup>th</sup> April 2002 in the evening a civilian Khuban Momit who has been living in Dwa Toi since two generations walked to the Tochi Scouts and narrated over a cup of tea that *‘In the morning at 1100 hours he and his friend Murgahi both cattle owners had gone as usual towards the west with their animals to cut the wood, after half an hour they saw approximately a dozen Farangi soldiers, who made them halted at some distance and using sign language carried out a search of them, there was a Pashtu speaking soldier as well who told them they are looking for the Al-Qaida personals and there is a cash award for any one passing the information, they gave them the edibles also’*.

### **Madrasahs & Ulemas**

Islamia Madrasah is located near Match factory on the eastern fringes of the Tochi Fort. On 20<sup>th</sup> April 2002 the very first raid on a seminary was conducted at 2200 hours on the request of political agent, an under strength company force of Tochi Scouts was employed. Only one person was apprehended later he was declared White which meant that he is clear. This was the beginning as on 22<sup>nd</sup> April at 0730 hours a huge procession of Taliban and Ulemas blocked the road near match factory; they burnt tyres and protested against the raid conducted on the Islamia Madrasah. There were four pick-ups loaded with rocket launchers and grenades. Maulana Zakria announced that American soldiers are deployed in the fort (a

reality) and he also declared Jihad against them and threatened that any American soldier seen would be fired and shoot to kill, however the procession peacefully dispersed at 1315 hours. This was the start of the long story in which the Match Factory became and played a central role as far as the events regarding the MiranShah city are concerned.

From this search operation onwards an unprecedented form of violence started taking birth against the Tochi Scouts, something which for all practical purpose was buried with the burial of Fakir of Ipi. On the night of 23/24 April at 0245 hours Ismail Khel Post was hit with the small arms fire from the northern direction, it lasted for another half an hour. In retaliation a search operation was launched with an under strength wing at Dande on Dar Ul Uloom Haqqani Madrasah, none was arrested or apprehended but few documents were captured which threw feeble light on the coming days; this operation was conducted on the intelligence information of Americans. Month of May was peaceful and life went as usual with scouts enjoying the usual Jaleebis in the city shops and playing volleyball with them. Americans remained at the camp with their officers at times being accommodated in the mess. One house at Toll Khel was also searched with nothing to report about.

On 18<sup>th</sup> May 2002 another search operation was conducted by the Americans with the help of Northern Alliance troops across the border in Tanghrai Killi , they apprehended certain arms and ammunition, the situation took a turn when they tried to enter the Zerai Village where the locals stood up with the arms and this combined forced had to move back. Next day two American Helicopters landed at Tanghrai Killi.

On 1<sup>st</sup> June at 0600 hours a joint raid was conducted with army in which one company of Tochi Scouts also participated; object was Qutab Khel near Chashmai Bridge with an aim to arrest the foreigners and Taliban but again nothing suspected was found and force returned empty hand at 0800 hours. In the city the peace was temporarily broken on the night of 18<sup>th</sup> June 2002 when one rocket was fired from van stand; it landed in general area Toll Khel, another similar incident took place at Boya on 24<sup>th</sup> June when two rockets were fired near Asha Baba Ziarat, two more rockets were also fired on same night at MirAli which landed near Razmak Gate, however these were dud, later defused by Tochi Scouts. Jamal Khan a resident of MiranShah had the reputation of a first class arms dealer his house and godown was searched in a joint operation on 1<sup>st</sup> September 2002 but nothing substantive was found.

By start of November 2002 Americans had erected posts across the border at Zavar Killi and also opposite the Alwara Mandi, it was at Alwara Mandi that the first incident of firing missiles from own side took place when on 23<sup>rd</sup> November 2002 at 2215 hours seven rockets were fired on their location by unknown tribesmen followed by 14.5 mm gunfire, in retaliation the fire also came from their end and four rockets landed near own camp thus a firing duel started which lasted for half an hour in which both sides exchange fire. On the same night one fighter aircraft also flew in the area and fired one rocket. Next day at 1315 hours three American Cobra helicopters violated own airspace by flying two kilometres inside. Another flight of their helicopters dropped ten soldiers near Doctor Najeeb's clinic for search operation and then flew back. On 3<sup>rd</sup> December 2002 two American officers along with ten other ranks paid a visit to the Alwara Mandi Post where Captain Javed Iqbal had a meeting with them, the major issue was the communication. This lack of

communication resulted in having another meeting on 5<sup>th</sup> December because on 4<sup>th</sup> December two rockets were fired at the Pakistani Post but Americans clarified that it was not their deed. On 11<sup>th</sup> December 2002 the Americans closed their camp opposite the Alwara Mandi and same was occupied by the Afghan National Army.

For next six months ( June 2003) the situation remained calm, the activities of the American and Afghan troops remained inside their own border although at times their search operations, landing and flying of jet and helicopters was quite close to the border line but still it was within their own territory. At times one odd mortar shell did fell into own territory as on 31<sup>st</sup> May 2003 at 2140 hours one Afghan shell landed into own territory near Bangidar, again on 3<sup>rd</sup> June 2003 two American helicopters entered into Pakistan territory at 1130 hours near Kunar Sar, on 5<sup>th</sup> June 2003 one Afghan Fighter aircraft violated own air space 800 meters near Alwara Mandi. The one major incident of border violation occurred on 15<sup>th</sup> June 2003 when ten soldiers of Afghan Army were crossing into own area near Bangidar but on pointing out by the Tochi Post they immediately left the area. It was on 1<sup>st</sup> October 2003 when the very first mention of Remotely Pilot Vehicle was made, it was reported that it had hovered near the Ghulam Khan for eighteen minutes.

Thus the year 2003 also ended without any major operation or mishap either by the Tochi Scouts or by the forces across the Durand Line. There was extensive patrolling by the Afghan and American forces all along the Durand Line but all their actions remained within their own territory.

### Wing Rotation

In August 2003 the wings were rotated, a routine procedure in which every wing is circulated to different locations after every

two years. No.1 Wing was moved from MiranShah to Ghulam Khan, No.2 Wing from Ghulam Khan to Khajauri, No.3 Wing from Khajauri to Boya and No.4 Wing from Boya to MiranShah. In this move the ammunition, ration, furniture, regimental property, defence stores, fire fighting equipment, hot and cold water appliances are not taken along rather the incoming wing takes them on charge. Married accommodation of other ranks is however kept for a one year period.

### **Cleansing of North Waziristan Agency.**

North Waziristan from the time of British arrival in 1895 had been a troublesome spot in one way or the other, may it be the insurgency, inter-tribal warfare or simply defiance of government writ NWA has always been setting the pace for other adjacent agencies. Regular actions on the part of political agent employing Tochi Scouts kept a semblance of normalcy and provided environments of carrying out regular rituals of life but agency was never ever under the complete control of government however the situation in Afghanistan being precarious it was now necessary to get rid of all evil doers and to firmly integrate it into mainstream. The operations were randomly conducted and carried out in complete North Waziristan Agency, in the Lower Khaisora the operation against Aarsal Khan was already going on thus similar actions were carried out in Upper Daur and Lower Wazir territories.

### **Boya-Datta Khel.**

There were half a dozen gangs of criminals who had made the life of innocent and peaceful people of MiranShah sub division to carry on daily routine a hard task to accomplish. Rahim Group of Village Ali Khel, Tamtilly Hamzoni Group of Village Ahmed Khel, Arif Khan Alias Rappary Group of Village Land Muhammad Khel

and Kerry Group of Village Manzar Khel were the most notorious. These groups were involved in committing murders on BalaPathar, blocking of roads, robberies, kidnapping and harbouring criminals. The operation against these groups was planned and conducted on 3<sup>rd</sup> April 2003 with a Wing (+) size force. Tamtilly of Ali Khel along with five companions surrendered to the Tochi Scouts whereas other fled away and their houses were completely demolished and set on fire.

MiranShah.

In the aftermath of Karkanwam(2003) and Boya clean-up which certainly had a very good impact on the law and order situation in the Agency, however there was still a dire need of few more clean-up operations against criminal gangs especially in MiranShah city and surrounding areas. The prominent gangs involved in the heinous crimes were headed by Hakim Khan, Hazrat Ali, Muhammad Amin (Chundry Qabila) and Jabbari. A full-fledged operation against these criminal groups was conducted with Wing (+) force successfully on 8<sup>th</sup> April 2003 and as a result 25 criminals out of 60 required by political agent surrendered voluntarily, thirteen houses were razed to ground and nine illegal addas were destroyed,. MiranShah City was declared as a weapon free zone. Not all the criminals were apprehended and two most notorious Hakim Khan and Jabbari remained absconder and later they clashed with Taliban in December 2005 with horrendous effects.

### **Ghulam Killi. Eye ball to Eye ball-April 2003**

Ghulam Khan is the third largest trade route with Afghanistan after Khyber and Chamman, as such it has always been of great importance. There are two major approaches leading from Khost

(Afghanistan) to Pakistan in this area i.e. Saidgi approach and Ghulam Khan approach. During era of Russia occupation of Afghanistan, this area remained hub of Mujahedeen activities and as such a threatened place. After American invasion of Afghanistan it again attained the same position, few minor violations of own air space occurred accompanied by ground violations which were directed towards search of the border villages by allied troops. The matter became alarming and grave when Governor Khost along with Police Commissioner Khost and Corps Commander with an entourage of 35-40 vehicles visited Village Ghulam Khan Killi on 16<sup>th</sup> April 2003 on the invitation of one local Malik Bahadar alias Badru, they held Jirga in which while addressing the locals, Governor of Khost promised to extend facilities like development of the area, establishment of free dispensaries, provision of water supply scheme and establishment of Check Post on Zero Line. As a fall up action US development team also carried survey of the area. All these activities were being monitored by the Tochi Scouts and regularly passed on to the political agent. As a result of these activities, Tochi Scouts were instructed by HQFC to keep a standing patrol in the area to monitor such like violations. On 16<sup>th</sup> April 2003 a US development works team comprising 15-20 foreigners under the protection of over 100 Afghan National Army (ANA) troops again visited Ghulam Killi but were checked by Tochi patrol; response received from them was, that this area belongs to Afghanistan and they have come to plan development works in the area.

Tochi Scouts immediately reported the incident to HQFC and Commandant Colonel Aashiq Hussain hurriedly left for the site to take account of the situation. *‘On my arrival at the site I found that the team had already left 5 minutes earlier but all the surrounding heights including heights No. 1,2,3 and 0 were occupied by ANA*



*troops. As I arrived, we were fired upon from the village side by the locals; replied instantly by Tochi Scouts in a befitting manner. I immediately ordered the available troops (platoon +) to cordon the village and carry out the search. The village was seized without losing any moment and as a result five individuals were arrested and few weapons along with ammunition were recovered. In the meantime, I called the reinforcement from MiranShah and requested Political Agent to come on the site. As soon as both arrived, we were over with the cordon and search operation. Without losing any time, I formed few groups and ordered them to get all heights vacated from ANA troops. We first occupied peak No 4 and 5 i.e. Labbeji dominating other heights and then got other peaks i.e. No.1,2 and 3 vacated from ANA troops adopting leap frog tactics. By about afternoon latest position was that we had occupied heights Nos. 1 to 5 and two check posts on both routes leading to Afghanistan. Whereas ANA troops were in occupation of ridge lines having arrow mark and O point. The latest situation was passed on to HQFC. Flag meeting with US officials was held on 19 April 2003 in the most cordial environments in which they were extremely apologetic and said that we are extremely sorry for the misunderstanding, we recognize this area as Pakistan territory and assure that such like incidents will not happen in future. I also assured full cooperation to them and emphasised for concrete measures to avoid such happening /misunderstanding. Both sides agreed to withdraw troops sitting opposite eye ball to eye ball'.<sup>305</sup>*

#### **First Peace Jirga-February 2004.**

The law and order situation in the North Waziristan Agency remained exemplary when one keeps in mind its volatile history and how Afghan affairs have affected it in the past however the overall

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<sup>305</sup> Post Operation Report Tochi Scouts, May 2003.

situation in the country and in the adjoining South Waziristan Agency was a matter of concern thus on 11<sup>th</sup> February 2004 at 11 hours the political agent very wisely assembled the prominent malaks including Maulana Nek Zaman (Member National Assembly) Senator Matin Shah who agreed that no harbouring of foreign national will be tolerated within the agency and anyone found violating the decision will be fined Rupees one million along with demolition of their houses. The Jirga also agreed to trace the foreign nationals and to surrender them to the political administration. *Malik Madda Lam and Malik Sardar Khan Jan of Macha Tribe, Malik Meetha Khan of Ismail Khel, Malik Ajmal Khan, Malik Hajji Nadir Khan, Malik Maidalay Khan of Khizar Khel and Nazar Khel, Malik Khonia Wali and Malik Ismail Khan of Bashi Khel and Jumbe Khel respectively were also present.*

### **Ides of March-2004**

March 2004 was the start of present day unrest in the North Waziristan Agency which till to date has taken away the lives of 96 Tochi Scouts and 353 have suffered injuries of various categories. In a historic perspective it is very similar to the 12 years' war against the insurgency of Fakir of Ipi, same tactics same area same tribes and similar issues. Fakir of Ipi was also riding the high waves of popularity on the basis of religion and same is the case in present day scenario. In the 1936 British Army initially had taken away the political control of the agency from the political agent and same was the case in 2004 when it was repeated. One glaring difference from the past is the absence of a single authority among the rebels but this was compensated adequately by the Osama Bin Laden who remained an icon for the rebels till his death in 2011 which again is shrouded in mystery as the death of Fakir of Ipi is. In past it was

North Waziristan which was the hub of all the rebellious activities and same is the case now. The very first rocket attack came on 1<sup>st</sup> March 2004 when at 0145 hours two 107 mm rockets were fired, one rocket landed approximately 300 meters west of political agent's nursery the second rocket landed on southern edge of MiranShah nursery. On 2<sup>nd</sup> March at 1145 hours a misfired 107 mm rocket was found near Dardoni Firing Range. The rocket was facing towards the fort. A small piece of paper with wordings Ihsan Ullah, Darwesh, Bismillah and Allah-O- Akbar was also found at the same place.

In 1936 the rebellion started from the lower Daur area and again in March 2004 it initiated from MirAli. On 16<sup>th</sup> March a convoy of 5 Azad Kashmir Regiment came under hostile fire and on 18<sup>th</sup> March three rockets were fired at the FC Battle School at MirAli. Naib Subedar Sher Alam then a havildar instructor at the school recalls *'few days ago an incident had taken place in South Waziristan in which considerable loss was inflicted on the army convoys thus there was a red alert in the school, Captain Agha Javed Akbar Khan from education corps was the duty officer. At midnight we all had a round of the perimeter defence raising the morale of sentry, we came back to the information room , locked it and were walking back to our lines when a loud noise broke the heavenly nocturnal peace, it was a rocket which hit the same very information room where we were sitting few minutes ago, then another rocket landed at the officers mess, Lieutenant Colonel Ghulam Abbas came out of his room and we all were present there assessing the damage when a third rocket came and landed quite close to all of us'*.<sup>306</sup>

### **Deployment of Tochi Scouts-March 2004**

In March 2004 all the four wings were deployed, occupying over 78 posts. In addition, Tochi Scouts was providing security

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<sup>306</sup> Interview with Naib Subedar Sher Alam Khattak, September 2012.

to Friends (US) with a company (+) size force and also providing company size force to Army for Operation-ALMizan. Wings were deployed in following manner. No.1 Wing was the right forward wing in area Ghulam Khan occupying 27 posts maintaining writ of the Government up to border at Saidgi, Tassa Para, Naridag, Ghulam Khan and Bangidar. No.2 Wing was located at MirAli holding the fringes of inaccessible area and dominating the South East of NWA occupying 23 posts. No.3 Wing. the left forward wing deployed on West of the Tochi River up to Dwa Toi, Kazha Valley up to Alwara Mandi with its wing headquarters at Boya occupying 20 posts. No.4 Wing deployed at MiranShah area and Toll Khel occupying eight posts; it was also providing protection to friends (Americans) with a company size force.

### First IED Blast

Subedar Yar Muhammad Afridi of Tochi Scouts Field Battery had to go to MirAli to collect his gun, like all gunners he was in love with his guns and always preferred to bring them back personally; it was seldom that he was separated from them. On 14<sup>th</sup> June 2004 despite other pressing commitments he still managed to convince his superiors that it is important that he should bring the lone gun at MirAli himself. He along with Lance Naik Banaras Khan Orakzai, Lance Naik Shoukat Khan Afridi, Lance Naik Nawaz Ali Bangash, Sepoy Abbas Ali Bangash & Sepoy Taj Rehman Afridi left the main gate of Tochi Scouts at 0900 hours, reached MirAli in an hour. Just short of MirAli near Aslam Piquet the vehicle all of a sudden had a violent shock; it lifted up and hit the ground upside down. This was the first taste of this deadly venomous weapon so easy to build and hide yet having a devastating impact. Yar Muhammad, Taj Rehman and Banaras Khan both embraced shahadat whereas the other sustained injuries.

## **Raising of No.5 Wing**

In March 2004 Frontier Corps decided to raise additional wings resultantly one additional wing was raised in Tochi Scouts, South Waziristan Scouts, Thall Scouts and two additional companies in Mohmand Rifles and Kurram Militia. The overall strength of wings was reduced from 696 all ranks to 667 all ranks. Lieutenant Colonel Zafar Ullah Khan of Sind Regiment was the first commander of No.5 Wing, he raised and assumed command on 5<sup>th</sup> April 2004 and remained in command till 21<sup>st</sup> January 2006. Bhattani Tribe was recruited for the first time in Tochi Scouts when two platoons of said tribe were transferred from Thall Scouts to Tochi Scouts, these two platoons were adjusted in No.5 Wing. The wing had 12 platoons out of which Khattak, Afridi, Bhattani, Mohmand, and Wazir had two platoons each and Turi and Yusafzai had one platoon each. It had nine subedars, 14 naib subedars, 30 havildars, 78 naiks, and 267 sepoy thus it had a strength of 452, it was almost 200 other ranks under strength; which was completed in July 2005. The authorised strength of wings under the FC expansion programme was to have 334 sepoy, 115 naiks, 86 naiks, 47 havildars, 15 naib subedars, 13 subedars, one subedar major and 5 officers with assorted compliment of one religious teacher, nine clerks and 41 non-combatants enrolled. Similarly the strength of a company was reduced to 116 and that of a platoon to 31 and section to eight scouts each, over all the organisation of having four Rifles Company and one Headquarters Company was retained. Within a company the machine gun section was replaced with recoilless rifle section of seven scouts.

No.5 Wing was raised on 1<sup>st</sup> August 2004 at Paro Ali Khel, Tajauri in Frontier Region Lakki Marwat where it was baptised in the hunt of a proclaimed offender by the name of Arsal Khan. The very

first durbar of the wing was held on 30<sup>th</sup> October 2004 in which the wing commander educated the wing about the general awareness of the situation especially about South Waziristan. Lieutenant Colonel Zafar stressed upon the fact that miscreants can deceive own troops by wearing the same uniform. Troops who all were sleeping in open under canvas had no special points but requested that the facility of warm water may please be provided, another point was regarding the barber that he does not have the tools to perform his duty. By July 2005 the Wing moved into its present location at Boya where a master plan was made for the improvement of the fort, Boya did not had an outer wall and it was only in 2011 that the wall was completed. It was manning 12 posts. Scouts were given the freedom of arranging the drama and majlis party. JQ Subedar Muhammad Ur Rehman was praised by the wing commander for his untiring effort in making the life comfortable for the scouts.

From 15<sup>th</sup> August 2004-21<sup>st</sup> April 2005 the wing was in the hunt of Aarsal Khan, the wing had its first casualties when 15 scouts met a road accident but no serious injury took place. After almost nine months of chase the wing came back to MiranShah from where on 5<sup>th</sup> May 2005 it moved to Boya.

With the raising of this new wing the number of platoons in Tochi Scouts were raised to 60, with Khattak having 14, Afridi nine, Bangash and Wazirs having seven each, Orakzai, Yusafzai & Mohmand having five each, Turi four, Bhittani three and Marwat Tribe having one platoon. Out of 78 posts which were being manned by Tochi Scouts there were eight posts which were jointly manned with the army they included Isha, Dardoni, Khar Kamar, Datta Khel, Sarobi Mela, Alwara Mandi and Dwa Toi.

## Arsal Khan ‘Gabbar Singh of Tajaury’

Arsal Khan was a notorious gangster who might have lived the life of his choosing which was mainly kidnapping had he not committed the cardinal sin of kidnapping two girls Fouzia and Sobia daughters of Sharifullah on 12<sup>th</sup> March 2004 while they were going to attend a marriage with their father. Kidnapping of females in the North Waziristan is not regarded as a manly act and that brought the wrath of state against him. Readers might have remembered that almost a decade ago the Nowsher Fort was built in the area of Karkanwam to check the notorious and nefarious acts of anti-society elements and this time again the Tochi Scouts were in hunt for Arsal Khan. His abode was across and over the mountain that stood in front of Nowsher Fort, he belonged to the Shadi Khel clan of Bhittani Tribe. Commandant Tochi Scouts Colonel Aashiq Hussain himself led the expedition along with a wing of Swat Scouts and one company of Khyber Rifles. Village Karkanwam comprising over 200 houses is a notorious area located at the junction of four agencies i.e. FR Bannu on the East, FR Lakki on South East, and South Waziristan Agency on South West and North Waziristan Agency on North West. Due to its geographical layout, it has always been a safe haven for proclaimed offenders who harbour the dacoits, car lifters, kidnappers and other notorious people from down districts. No agency has ever been able to exercise complete control on this area. This operation against Arsal Khan was planned in March 2004 but execution took place on 12<sup>th</sup> April and lasted for well over a year.

Arsal Khan's life is a strange paradox of good and evil, he was the uncrowned king of his area, he had served in Frontier Corps Baluchistan and so did most of his friends and gang members.<sup>307</sup>

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307 *Interview with the Qaum Commander of Bhittani Tribe in Tochi Scouts, 12<sup>th</sup> October 2012.*

Political agents had to pay him for every development in the area for instance he was paid 1.5 Million Rupees for the construction of road from Tajaouri-Gabbar Shadi Khel, he was also paid 1.2 million for the construction of civil dispensary at Gazbaba and another .6 million for the construction of women teachers hostel at Chigalair. His son Wasi Khan was employed at a monthly pay of Rupees 3100/ as chowkidar at the dispensary; but all this changed after the kidnapping of the girls.

After preliminary reconnaissance the operation started at 0530 hours on 9<sup>th</sup> April when Chigalair and Gazbaba villages were surrounded by the scouts, wing of Swat Scouts was employed at Chigalair and Tochi Scouts at Gazbaba. On 12<sup>th</sup> April 2004 the Mandi Khel area was searched, on 13<sup>th</sup> area west of Gazbaba, on 14<sup>th</sup> Mughul Gai in South Waziristan Agency was cordoned, on 16<sup>th</sup> Aram Tala in District Lakki and Serai Gambela were probed, on 17<sup>th</sup> Tajbee Khel, Ali Khel and Ali Khan Khel, on 18<sup>th</sup> Village Rasul Khel and on 19<sup>th</sup> April the break was made with the arrest of Hajji Angoor along with his family (more about him later). On 20<sup>th</sup> April the dead body of Fouzia was unearthed in a grave near Hajji Angoor's house. During this entire search numerous arrests were made but still no clue of Aarsal Khan was found, there were threads which were picked but in the end all led to dead alleys. Aarsal Khan's family including his daughters, wife, son and mother were also arrested on 16<sup>th</sup> April in Jani Khel area. The closet the scouts came to catching him was on 21<sup>st</sup> April when he was sighted running along with his brother Qadir, Sobia and one more abductee but he was able to dodge the Swat Scouts who sighted him. This search and arrests continued till 11<sup>th</sup> May 2004 when last arrest was made in Shadi Khel. A total of 144 persons were arrested and 40 houses were demolished. One



scout (Lance Naik Zahid Javed) of Swat Scouts was killed and three other were wounded in this operation. Two 12.7mm guns, one light machine gun, three sub machine guns, thirteen rockets of RPG-7, 77 bombs of three inch mortar were recovered from Aarsal Khan's arsenal not to mention over five thousand rounds of varying calibres. A total of 329 rounds of artillery were fired in this manhunt with over 260 rounds fired on a single day.

Subedar Sharbat Khattak was then a naik he narrates '*I was part of the commandant's escort then and we carried the reconnaissance, it required almost three hours of hard journey from Nowsher Fort to Chigalair where it was reported that Aarsal Khan is hiding. Major Bajwa, Lieutenant Colonel Zafar Ullah Khan, Major Hanif our military transport officer were also with us, Subedar Yar Muhammad of Tochi Field Battery who later embraced shahadat in a road blast was commanding the guns. We reached the Chigalair by afternoon, it was reported that Aarsal Khan is residing in the government dispensary. The dispensary was empty but when we were about to return we were fired from the nearby houses and from adjoining high grounds, we brought artillery fire and before darkness we retreated to our camp. Next day we went again and arrested few people and then on tips of local we raided few other places like Azad Khel, Ayub Khel, Aram Khel and Paa Khel. On 16th April, we were able to arrest the family of Aarsal Khan including his daughters Chamroza, Eman Bibi and wife Khair Bibi apart from his sons Wasil Khan and Kameshair. I remember that Aarsal Khan's mother was also part of this arrest apart from his two bhabis in which one was old and other relatively young which tried to outrun the scouts but was captured. Aarsal's mother pleaded that this is disgrace to the family's pride on which our answer was that the girls whom Aarsal had abducted also are some body's honour, meanwhile we got the news that one*

*of the girl Fouzia has been killed and her burnt body has been left in open. On 19th April we got hold of Angoor Khan at Tajbi Khel, it was reported that this Angoor Khan is supplying food and water to the Aarsal Khan but Angoor flatly refuted this and took swear on the Holy Koran and also said that if he lies than his Hajj may go waste, on this he was left. Later that night one of the abductee managed to escape from Aarsal Khan and he narrated that they all were kept in a cave, "I saw your feet while you were searching and could hear your words also but Aarsal Khan was pointing a gun to our head and threatened that if any one made any noise he will blast his brains off". This person also confirmed that on same very day Angoor Khan had come and delivered the food. On this we again arrested Angoor Khan, his wife and six years old son, they all were kept in separate rooms, we started interrogation but none of them was willing to open his mouth, thus we played a tactics and threatened the wife that if she wants to see his son and husband alive then she must speak out and also fired a shot in air, the women became hysterical and pleaded that the life of her son be spared and Angoor Khan may be killed, she admitted that Angoor Khan is party to all the crimes of Aarsal Kahn. In another raid we captured two brother' one named Sikander. We used same tactics on them, Sikander was very tough, he was given the beating of his life for the reason that one scout Lance Naik Zahid of Swat Scouts had succumbed to a rifle shot and other Nowsher was taken prisoner along with the weapons by Aarsal Khan, Sikander remained defiant however his younger brother admitted that he has been acting as the driver of the Aarsal Khan and on his tips further arrests were made'.<sup>308</sup>*

Aarsal Khan despite all the efforts of scouts remained fugitive, a combined Jirga of Marwat and Bhattani tribes was assembled on

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308 Interview with Naib Subedar Sharbat Khan Khattak, September 12, 2012.

7<sup>th</sup> May 2004 which imposed a fine of 1.5 Million Rupees on any one found guilty of providing harbour to Aarsal Khan or his friends. One wing of Tochi Scouts, two companies of Kurram Rifles and three guns of Tochi Scouts were left in his hunt, the responsibility was given to the Lakki political administration. Another search and arrest operation against him was launched on 27<sup>th</sup> August 2004 in general area Tarkar Algad but without any result. Time passed by and Aarsali as he was known remained an enigma. In January 2005 another operation was launched to apprehend Salik Khan a friend of Aarsali Khan even he managed to dodge the scouts, in February same year another operation was conducted which although failed to apprehend Aarsali was able to capture his close associate by the name of Qublai Jani Khel. Last operation that was launched was on 22<sup>nd</sup> February 2005 in area Chichandi Khullah but again the same result.

Aarsal Khan finally met his fate in 2010 when he was poisoned by his friend who had invited him on a dinner. The other brother of Sikander was later enrolled in Tochi Scouts and is now a proficient and disciplined driver. Sobia in a dramatic manner escaped from captivity and reached Nowsher Fort in 2005, she was taken back to Bannu in a helicopter to re-join her family.

## 2005

On 2<sup>nd</sup> January 2005 an American predator had crashed inside own territory near Saidgi; almost a reverse of 1987 when Tochi Scouts had to retrieve a crashed F-16 from inside the Afghan territory. The Tochi Scouts under the command of Major Hanif with 106 scouts, one major of ISI, two Friends<sup>309</sup> and one captain along with three soldiers of SSG reached the site and were busy in finding and collecting the wreckage and parts when they came under the fire of long range weapons and mortar shells of Afghan National Army across the border from Mughalgai Camp, opposite to our Girgit Post. Lance Naik Shah Hussain Turi spotted a shining metallic part and he descended down to collect it when he was hit by a bullet, he went down without uttering a word, Lance Naik Aziz ur Rehman Bangash saw him disappearing and he shouted to him but getting no reply he moved forward when he was hit by a bullet in his thigh; he survived however Shah Hussain embraced shahadat. Now own troops also started returning fire and meanwhile they were busy in gathering the debris, job was almost over when Sepoy Noor Shad Khan Afridi was hit by a shell but despite his injuries he remained in position and made sure that his fellow scouts are able to retrieve and accomplish the mission. They were able to retrieve the camera, radio, antenna, power supply, engine parts, wings, one destroyed missile and two timer fuse igniter.

The party arrived back with two injured and one dead to Saidgi Post. Commandant Colonel Bangash was at Peshawar he arrived back in the evening and next day moved to Saidgi with additional company strength. A showdown with Afghans was on hands.

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309 Americans were referred as Friends in all correspondents; the term remained in use before American attack on Salala Post in 2011.

On 3<sup>rd</sup> January the force (Commandant, Wing Commander, Battery Commander, Adjutant, 130 scouts, two field artillery pieces, two three inch mortars) reached the same spot and was fired upon but this time Tochi Scouts were ready and burning with revenge, resultantly own artillery fire was called upon the Afghan Post and similarly a physical attack was also launched on them in which 15 Afghan soldiers were killed and nine others were injured, mortar position was utterly destroyed so was their headquarters. Tochi Scouts fired 100 rounds of field artillery, 30 bombs of three inch Mortar, 80 rounds of 14.5 and 235 rounds of 12.7 mm gun. Afghan National Army replied back with 20 bombs of mortar, four rockets and few bursts of heavy machine gun.

In the aftermath of the operation a flag meeting with Americans was held at Ghulam Khan in which the issue was discussed threadbare. Main cause and point of agreement reached was to improve the communication level among the bilateral. The end result was that whereas the behaviour and conduct of Americans was acceptable the Afghan National Army was treated as *persona non grata*.

### **Dewgar Operation**

On the night of 3/4<sup>th</sup> March an operation was conducted jointly by the Tochi Scouts and Special Service Group (SSG). At that times there were reports, rumours, speculations and apprehension that majority of Taliban are hiding in the close proximity of the Durand Line. The operation was conducted by the SSG and Tochi Scouts was mainly responsible for providing safety for the extrication of the force from target area till MiranShah by deploying piquet and patrolling of the route. Tochi Scouts two companies reached the

target area at 0845 hours. Tochi Scouts also evacuated the injured women and children.

### **MirAli- 26 March 2005**

In the same connotation another search operation was conducted independently by the two companies of the Tochi Scouts at MirAli near Babar Post, the operation went smoothly and half a dozen men were arrested. The things went wrong after the operation when a mob of 2000 mostly students of religious seminaries along with the elders surrounded the force taking up hostile positions, they demanded the release of the suspects with dire consequences in case of non-compliance. It was a volatile situation, powder keg waiting for a flash to explode. Like any mob there was noise, urging of miscreants to open fire and there were some voices which were trying to restore some kind of normalcy. Commandant Tochi Scouts Colonel Bangash very sensibly read the situation and through his reasoning with occasional references to Pashtu proverbs and from Islamic history was able to bring out the force without firing of shot. This is a classic example of Frontier Warfare where force is not the answer to all queries, at times one has to retreat, one has to use his brain and power of logic and natives do understand all this.

### **April 2005**

In April - May 2005 border reconnaissance was carried out and certain gaps were identified which allowed infiltration to the miscreants; it was decided to close these gaps by establishing new posts. In the Ghulam Khan area Zangurai Narai-Shinkai Khullah-Tappi, Bangidar-Ghorostai Algad, Bichi Narai-Tur Khullah Algad and Solak-Kharsin Narai-Nazar Baig Killi were identified and in Boya, Zawan Pul- Gharlamai, Kund Sar-Wazhagai, Lagharkai

Narai-Maidan and Dadum-Zorium-Gharlamai gaps, in the Alwara Mandi sector the gaps were identified between the Border Post No.4 and Lorang and between Astaghai-Alwara Mandi-Dwa Toi areas. As a result new posts were established and area of operations of the wings was redistributed and plan was made to rotate the wings also, joint posts were also established under which 260 FC troops, 240 army troops and 55 Khassadars were deployed on these posts. The major irritant of establishing new posts was in the matter of supplying water to them for which additional resources were required, khassadars had to be recruited. These posts later came to be known as NAS Forts and each fort cost around 17.6 Million Rupees, brick wall of each post cost about extra 3.8 Million Rupees.

A study period was also conducted by the Tochi Scouts with an aim to understand and highlight the security environments of North Waziristan Agency, it was conducted on 14<sup>th</sup> April 2005, Captain Waseem gave the historical perspective of the agency, Major Fawad covered the post 9/11 scenario and existing security environments and Commandant Colonel Bangash had the analysis. The brief summary is that due to the operations in Afghanistan the Talibans shifted, migrated and took refuge in the Waziristan. Army operations in South Waziristan from 2002 onwards have shifted these groups into North Waziristan. Military Operations conducted jointly by army and FC during March 2004 in SWA were initially resisted by the Ahmedzai Tribe but later they along with Mahsud Tribe both came on board. However the aerial strike on 9<sup>th</sup> September during which 60 odd Talibans were killed inside the Mahsud Tribe changed the scenario and turned them against the government. Abdullah Mahsud and Baitullah Mahsud both were leading anti-government stance and had kidnapped three Chinese engineers working on Gomal Zam Dam. Government demanded the handing over of not

only the Chinese but also of both leaders as well which Mahsud Tribe refused. Thus due to intensity of operation there, the miscreants have shifted into NWA especially in MirAli area. Number of Madrassa in NWA are the largest in Pakistan. Idak Madrassa, Maulvi Saleem Gul of Spinwam, Haqqani Madrassa, Dande Madrassa and Degan were highlighted as hot trouble spots.

In the month of April the frequency of sabotage activities increased in the agency but bias was towards IED's. On 14<sup>th</sup> April alone there were two incidents one in MiranShah where an anti-tank mine blasted which took off the hand of a civilian and also at MirAli where an IED was exploded. But it was the beginning as with the passage of time the frequency increased further reaching a peak in June 2005.

#### **21<sup>st</sup> April 2005**

A joint operation was conducted by the Tochi Scouts and SSG at Haider Khel in MirAli. It was suspected that foreign elements are hiding inside compound; Tochi Scouts were employed for outer cordon and for route protection.

#### **Search for Haji Yaqub-2<sup>nd</sup> June 2005 (Khushali Tori Khel)**

Haji Yaqub was an active supporter of miscreants supplying them with arms, ammunition, money and safe places. His zone of operation was in MirAli area. In the last week of May, Tochi Scouts were given the verbal warning of the impending operation. Own intelligence outfit started gathering information, on the 1<sup>st</sup> June an informer gave the news that Haji Yaqub is likely to visit a nearby village on 2<sup>nd</sup> June. On the night of 2<sup>nd</sup> June 2005, six officers along with commandant reached MirAli where at 2300 hours two



companies of Tochi Scouts moved silently out of the fort and by 0130 hours had completed the inner and outer cordon at Khushali Tori Khel Village. Haji Yaqub was believed to be in a mud house compound, which was breached after necessary procedures were adhered which mainly ensures safety and dignity of womenfolk but it also gave Haji ample time to escape through a tunnel. The search which commenced at 0400 hours in the presence of political agent and lady police thus failed to achieve their mission. However nearby compounds and madrassa was also searched but to no avail.

On 4<sup>th</sup> June the ten prominent local representatives led by Maulvi Rukn ud Din met the commandant and assured him of their support, however they also put forward certain demands which included lifting of the army check post on the Spinwam Road or to hand them over to the Scouts, their another complaint was against the intelligence agencies alleging that they are teasing them through telephones asking for reports. On 16<sup>th</sup> June the political agent too had a meeting with the malaks of the agency, they all were the real kingmakers of the agency and included names from almost all Wazir Tribes very few Daur were also present.

On 10<sup>th</sup> June an unfortunate incident happened at No.4 Wing when one of its scouts Lance Naik Tariq Bangash committed suicide by shooting himself. Reasons could not be ascertained.

### **Haqqani Madrassa Search-11<sup>th</sup> June 2005**

On 11<sup>th</sup> June a search and cordon operation was conducted independently by the Tochi Scouts to apprehend the foreign miscreants at the Siraj Haqqani Madrassa at Dande Darpa Khel. The operation was set on move almost a week before, the intelligence agencies were keeping a close watch on the madrassa. On the night

of 10<sup>th</sup> June two companies of Tochi Scouts marched out of Tochi Fort, they secured the road and established an outer cordon. One command post was established at the abandoned Afghan refugee's camp which is almost at the end of runway. The actual madrassa which in fact had three distinct compounds one known as Haqqani compound, other as Madrassa and third the mosque are situated on the western side across the road from the runway. There are clump of trees which shields these compounds and one has to walk a kilometre on dirt track to reach them. An algalad passes through them separating the Haqqani compound from other two, moreover this compound is situated at a higher ground. Another cordon was established encompassing all the three structures. Political administration, khassadars and intelligence representatives were also present during the search. Nothing objectionable was found. Another operation at the same very place was launched and conducted in September 2005.<sup>310</sup>

### **Diffusing a Bomb-14<sup>th</sup> June 2005**

Miscreants planted a bomb close to Alwara Mandi with an aim to cause havoc on the military convoys, it was placed on the katcha side of the road, but it was unearthed by the Tochi Scouts who were given tip by the local source, Tochi then had the road blocked on both ends and their Pioneer platoon disabled it.

### **First heliborne operation in NWA**

On 2<sup>nd</sup> July 2005 the first heliborne operation was conducted in the NWA, more than eight helicopters took part in the operation during which 120 SSG troops were heli landed at Macha Madda Khel area. However only two persons were arrested both Wazirs, not much of weapons were found, only one RPG-7, six 82mm mortar bombs, 13 grenades and certain minor items as well.

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310 Tochi Scouts Intelligence Record of same date.

## July-2005

5<sup>th</sup> July has historical and political importance in the history of Pakistan but in the context of on-going war this date is important because on this date Tochi Scouts formally came under army as part of 7 Infantry Division. The division was initially placed at Peshawar but with the operations in South Waziristan the law and order situation also started deteriorating in the NWA. Major General Akram Sahi was the GOC, now Tochi Scouts was formally part of Operation Al Mizan. One key factor for this was the marked increase in incidents of terror in the valley, in April there were only three such incidents, in May it increased to five and in June there were ten such incidents. Tochi Scouts had the task of sealing the Pakistan–Afghanistan Border in conjunction with the army, to conduct search & cordon operations. Provide safe passages to army convoys on road operating days within its area of operations and finally to provide security to MiranShah Garrison in coordination with army. The area of operations of Tochi Scouts included Astagahi Narai to Bangidar. Datta Khel Wing was responsible from Astagahi to Mazarme, Boya Wing from Mazarme to Solak (point 5889) Ghulam Khan Wing from Dewgar to Hassan Khel, Khajauri Wing from Thal Piquet to Tapakai and MiranShah Wing for protection of MiranShah. Additional resources in the form of two wings one each from Swat and other from Thall were placed under command along with one medium battery; thus Tochi Scouts had almost two infantry brigades strength.

Back in 1936 when the insurgency started in the Waziristan after the Islam Bibi affair at that time Tochi Scouts was also put under the operational control of army, the political control of the agency was also handed over to the army; similar actions were taken at this time

also. Frontier Corps and army have two distinct military cultures and both have seldom worked together for long duration. Majority of the scouts present less the officers had very little knowledge about the way army works and same was the case among the army jawans. One of the scouts narrated that in initial days he was uncomfortable with the presence of army. One key reason was the lack of communication between the two. Scouts invariably speak Pashtu which very few in army ranks and even less in officer cadre understand. A scout irrespective of his rank always shake hands with the visitors irrespective of his rank, would offer him tea and since he is not that proficient in Urdu thus his vocabulary is very informal in addressing the seniors; in army it is other way around where it is the prerogative of the senior to offer his hand for handshake. In army all company commanders are invariably officers preferably a field officer but in Tochi Scouts or for that matter in FC the companies are commanded by JCOs; which is a very powerful and authoritative rank. The concept of Qaum was another enigma for the army; scouts despite having tables still tend to eat together and on floor covered with mat, in army they eat on tables. Scouts were wearing kameez shalwar of khaki colour with brown chappals where as in army the kameez shalwar is basically an off parade dress, in scout's code of manners the officers are allowed to visit mess in the kameez shalwar with chappals but in army the same very dress code can land an officer in trouble. In FC there is more initiative, less staff work for the reasons that the authorisation of officers is less. Tochi Scouts had the strength of an infantry brigade commanded by a colonel with two more officers as his staff, a wing had more or less strength as in an infantry battalion, but whereas both the wing and battalion are commanded by lieutenant colonels (mostly majors in Tochi Scouts), the similarities finished here, a battalion commander has no less than fourteen officers on his strength where as a wing was lucky to have one more officer.

Scouts life pattern is also different from army; his sense of motivation and pride is centrally revolving around the pride of his Qaum more than his sense of unity with wing where as in army the battalion is the pride. Scout is very demanding and vocal in terms of his right of ration and leave, he expects everyone else to be as dedicated to his charter of duty as he is thus he fails to understand that a ration can get late. Statistically a Scout is more religious oriented than an army jawan, although in Tochi Scouts there were 234 scouts who were unable to read Holy Koran yet a scout seldom misses a prayer. A Scout seldom urinates while standing but in army it is a common affair. Professionally in the contest of Frontier Warfare a scout is more professional, his body muscles are more tuned to mountain marches, climbs, descends and use of ground than an army jawan. An army jawan have the edge in technology; he had a broader outlook, more educated and above all better equipment. Tochi Scouts had fired more artillery shells in operations than majority of artillery units of Pakistan, it seems odd but remember that in capturing Arsala Khan it fired 260 rounds in a single day, artillery units on the other hand had fired only on artillery ranges since 1971 leaving apart Siachen & Kargil. In FC the scouts were more in harmony carrying their weapons loaded with ammunition than the army. It is no secret that in army the guards at quarter guards were always armed with sticks or carrying rifles with ammunition lying with the guard commanders, it was not the case in FC. Religiously FC or more precisely the Tochi Scouts had more liberal, tolerant and broad outlook; for instance in no army cantonment one finds an Imambargah but every FC Corps has one. FC troops requires careful handling, dealing and attention they are sensitive to any adverse remarks, at times are unable to understand common jokes and above all hate any racial comments. There are no pictures of female actresses in the FC canteen, a common feature

in most of the army canteens, there are no cinemas in FC, in army every station has one and in FC one seldom finds a woman walking without at least a hijab, something which by itself is rare in army cantonments. FC troops seldom talk about females and absolutely detest anyone inquiring about their family members; unless he has developed a confidence in his superior. A FC jawan takes Niswar, army jawans prefer cigarettes. Their fables, proverbs, heroes, folk lore, songs, dances all differ from each other.

In Tochi Scouts or for that matter in FC the officers are from army, on a deputation to the civil, they serve in scouts for two years and seldom have any officer served twice in command structures in FC. These officers are from various arms and services of army. Other ranks on the other hand spent 15-23 years in Tochi Scouts or in the Tochi Valley thus they are familiar with every village, killi, alga and khar. They know the culture, riwaj and traditions of each tribe and village. In army majority of officers (from armoured or infantry) spent all their military lives with one regiment, he is commissioned in it, serves in it and commands it. An army unit seldom interacts with civilians thus to them there is no such thing as riwaj. In army, ration is provided by the army units, in FC it is supplied by civilian contractor or in simple words it is purchased. Scouts commandants have more financial powers than their counterpart in army. Scouts have less of medical, pension, rehabilitation, welfare, leave, secondment, courses as compared to the army. One positive aspect of all this is that a scout is more conversant with his task, area and duty because he spends more time in corps than an army jawan. In FC giving away the cash prizes on anything and everything is norm of life, in army it is the medals which matters. In brief, Frontier Scouts way of warfare is medieval in cultural aspect; army on the other hand represents modern times.

Yet it is the sense of nationalism which binds army & Frontier Corps together, it is the religious bindings which surpasses all these odds.

Army last had a tour of duty in North Waziristan way back in 1947, over passage of time it has become more technological in outlook which was correct keeping in view the likely future war on Eastern Front however as the time passed it became obvious that the technology has little to offer to offset any limitation in deviations from the basics of Frontier Warfare.

### **Tochi Scouts Deployment**

The beginning of this marriage was not on a good omen, the first issue was the command articulation at the posts jointly manned by the Tochi Scouts and army units. The other was more important as to what kind of posture should be adopted, one option was to have forward posture by holding the choking points and establishing the writ of government but it had the demerits of over stretching the troops with insecure line of communication, political clearance was mandatory for this posture, it also had the inherent flaw of delayed reaction of reserves and above all required additional construction work. The other option was to occupy the most important choking points. It is easy to analyse an event when it has passed but requires lot of consideration in opting any option at that given time. Both options had its merits and demerits and in the end it was decided to have a forward posture.

By the end of July 2005 there were 33 forward posts along the Durand Line in which an infantry brigade was deployed along with the Tochi Scouts, bias was towards the Tochi Pass with infantry battalion headquarters at Dabar Miami, Lakka Narai and one in Ghulam Khan Sector at Naridag.

The troubled spots were identified at MirAli bazar, Bichi, Karkanwam, Idak, Naurak, Hadi Villa, Haqqani Madrassa, Degan, Datta Khel, Dwa Toi and Alwara Mandi. SSG had already carried out operations at Dande Obey, Kajum and at Alwara Mandi and more significantly at Manna on 13<sup>th</sup> March 2005. In the threat assessment protection of MiranShah Garrison was given the highest priority with special attention to MirAli. It was also highlighted that army convoys are vulnerable to hostile action specially while passing through bottle necks of MirAli bazar, Boya and Dande. Road Bannu – MiranShah if blocked will paralyse the military organisation in terms of logistics and similar dilemma will be faced in case the road leading to Ghulam Khan or Datta Khel is blocked. In the absence of any railway network the logistic situation had undergone very little change since the start of 1936 insurgency. The most important point highlighted was *‘lack of coordination and sharing of information between SSG, army and Frontier Corps may entail disastrous results while operating together.’*<sup>311</sup>

Tochi Scouts was manning the border in three sectors, Alwara/ Datta Khel constituted as one sub sector in which Mangaseen (Subedar Rafiq), Saratoi (Subedar Gul Rehman), Gharlamai (Subedar Afsar Jan), Akhtar Piquet, Datta Khel ( Captain Javed), Tutnarai ( Naib Subedar Hussain), Ismail Khel (Naib Subedar Gul Nawaz), Baramand ( Captain Amir), Gharlamai (Subedar Iftikhar), Ganderi (Subedar Awal Band), Kisha (Subedar Gul Zar) were the posts. These posts had varying strength of manning, for instance Saratoi was being manned by a platoon, Tut Narai by two sections and Datta Khel was the company headquarters. A platoon level post had 30 scouts, with two LMGs, one MG, one 12.7, two 60mm Mortar and two RPG-7 as the main weapons apart from personal weapons. One Night Vision

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311 GOC Brief 7 Division, 24 April 2005.



Goggles, one Global Positioning System and one solar charging panel was the equipment. Section level posts had only one LMG and MG. Communication system comprised of VHF set or Motorola at section level, Kenwood at platoon level and company headquarters had the HF, VHF and Motorola. Artillery was placed at Baramand where 21 Field Artillery also had its gunners.

In Boya sub sector the posts were at Ahmed Khel (Havildar Naveed) Pawani-I (Havildar Qadir) Pawani-V (Havildar Sarfraz) Pawani-III (Havildar Yahya) Musa Khan (Havildar Hamid) Boya Bridge Check Post (Subedar Nadar Shah) Khar Kamar (Naib Subedar Munawar). All these posts were manned by a minimum of two sections, where JCO's were the commanders those were platoon level manning.

At Ghulam Khan sub sector, Faqiran (Naib Subedar Mian Gul), Dewgar (Subedar Noor Hassan), Sassa (Naik Chinar Gul), Dande (Naik Jehanzeb), Saidgi (Naib Subedar Sher Nawaz), Girgit (Naik Khan Tarin), Zafar (Naik Wajid), Hassan (Naik Abdul Qias), Naridag (Subedar Faujoon), Wacha-II (Havildar Ghulam Murtaza), Dardoni-III (Havildar Saleem), Dardoni-II (Havildar Yaqoob), Ping Sar (Naik Zaib Ullah), Charkhai Nullah ( Naib Subedar Bakhmal Khan), Ghulam Khan Killi Check Post (Subedar Ghaffar), where as at check post (Subedar Gul Khannan), Bangidar (Subedar Rait Khan) and at Hassan Khel a two section post was commanded by Havildar Lal Khan. Bangidar had a 14.5 mm Gun also apart from three LMGs, two Two Inch Mortars and one RPG-7.

At MiranShah sub sector the posts were at Tol Khel-I & II both under command of Naib Subedar Iqbal, No.7 Piquet by Naib Subedar Alizeb, Butt Marka by Naik Rahim, Kalanjar-I & II by Naib Subedar

Kinan, Amin Piquet by Naib Subedar Awal Faqir, Isha Check Post by Naib Subedar Shafi and Tapakai by Naib Subedar Javed. It is apparent that this sector was given the high priority as no less than seven JCO's were commanding the nine posts. The strength of the posts was under a platoon at all posts less Tol Khel-I, Butt Marka had only one section so was Amin Piquet. In Khajauri sub sector the majority of posts were permanent in nature like Thal Piquet which is a permanent piquet of Tochi Scouts a section manned it under Naik Jalil, Thal Check Post by Subedar Zulfikar, Gosh Piquet by Havildar Gul Amir, Kamar Piquet another permanent piquet was commanded by Havildar Rasool, Idak Fort under Naib Subedar Ahmed Ali, ChinaRob by Havildar Zarmat, Khajauri by Subedar Noor Bat, Nowsher Fort under Naib Subedar Usman, Bichi by Naib Subedar Zewar, Jallar by Naib Subedar Sher Nawaz, Machi Khel under Havildar Saif, Butt Marka (Naik Hazrat), Zara Mela (Havildar Nasir) Sarapal Mela (Naib Subedar Siraj) Shinpon under Naib Subedar Amir Ullah. The other important posts in this sub sector included New Palaseen, Old Palaseen, Hadi, Wazirabad, Mashal, Pump Group, Khazana and Sultan.

In a briefing and conference to joint team of HQFC & Army it was suggested that certain adjustments and improvements should be made, mostly it concerned with having a command post with the post like Faqiran, Naridag, Hassan Khel, Ganderi, Ghurlamai, Baramand. New post were also recommended which included having a joint post at Wacha Bibi along with field artillery, it was also proposed to have a joint gasht of the MiranShah Bazar, a mobile joint check post at Tochi River Bridge and posts at Zara Mela and Bichi. Few post like Babar, Old and New Palaseen, Mashal, Wazirabad, ButtMarka, Pump and Khazana in Khajauri sub sector were recommended to be lifted.

**14<sup>th</sup> July 2005**

Americans carried out an operation against the Taliban in Lataka Narai on the night of 14/15<sup>th</sup> July in which 24 Taliban were killed; this incident triggered a chain of events because all of these dead bodies were later buried inside Pakistan territory. It coincided with the very first address of GOC 7 Division to Uthmanzai Jirga in which he gave 24 hours ultimatum to hand over the miscreants, somehow the other the timings of Jirga and American attack coincided with each other. The back ground of the attack was that Taliban were coming back into the Pakistan territory after carrying an attack inside the Afghanistan when the light of one of the pickup was turned on and resultantly the missile killed all the 23 sitting inside, the lone body of a Sudanese was found a mile earlier.<sup>312</sup> Details of the dead Taliban is as under three belonged to the MirAli and out of them two were Wazir (Bora Khel) two belonged to MiranShah one of them was a Tori Khel Wazir, six were residents of Razmak all were Tori Khel, four belonged to Datta Khel.

On 15<sup>th</sup> July Tochi Scouts and army carried out the operation to locate the dead bodies. The area under concern is a track junction close to the Durand Line, on its west is Admi Kot, in north Sakhali, on north east is Char Khel and on east Gharlamai. One dead body of an African was located at the track junction of Sherannum-Almanza and 23 other dead bodies were found almost a mile west of it at Zalga Narai, also a track junction. Corps Commander 11 Corps had an aerial view of the area on 19<sup>th</sup> July.

Another operation was conducted jointly by the army and Tochi Scouts on the night of 14/15 July in Alwara Mandi in which few persons were apprehended; later in August most of them were released by the army.

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<sup>312</sup> Tochi Scouts intelligence Report dated 16<sup>th</sup> July 2005.

On the night of 19/20 July HQ 7 Division which was at MirAli came under attack, similarly on 22<sup>nd</sup> July an IED was exploded on an army convoy near Chashmai Bridge in which five army jawans were injured.

### **Clean Sweep-16/17 July 2005**

MiranShah city had certain principles of its own, for instance no brothel house is allowed to operate in the city and secondly no bank is looted. On 12<sup>th</sup> July Muslim Commercial Bank was robbed and in the process five innocent persons were killed and two were injured, accused was recognised as a foreigner. Thus a clean-up operation became necessary.

Starting from the night of 16/17<sup>th</sup> July and commencing on the evening of 20<sup>th</sup> July three connected operations were carried out with multiple aims; show of strength, clear the area of unlicensed weapons and to apprehend any foreign miscreants. All three operations were conducted in the surroundings of MiranShah Fort.

The First one was put into action at the first light in the MiranShah Village (Datta Khel Village). Tochi Scouts laid the inner cordon whereas army had the outer cordon at Narai Kot in Bora Khel territory. Nothing much was achieved but sixteen persons were arrested apart from nine light machine guns & one rocket launcher. Unnecessary resistance and the ensuing fire opened by the army resulted in the death of eighteen foreigners out of which five were women, four boys and six minor girls who also died in the action. Two injured foreign women were taken in the helicopter to Bannu for medical treatment. One army jawan Nadeem of 19 FF also died in the action.

A second operation was carried out on 18<sup>th</sup> July in Qutab Khel area of MiranShah, Qutab Khel is located 4 kilometres south east of the city in a fertile flat land across the algaad. Army had established eight outer cordon posts. Eight houses were searched; this time resentment was shown by the people which were mainly directed towards the presence of army troops during the search.

The last operation was carried out on 19/20 July in the Ghundai Killi area which is almost ten miles east of city, it is very close to Tappi Village where a disastrous search and cordon operation of similar pattern had resulted in the beheading of Captain Russell in 1941. Pattern of cordon remained the same with army at the outer cordon establishing eight posts, however this time lady searchers were also taken along and elders of village were also incorporated in the operation; similar resentment was shown by the people and situation tend to get out of control as more than 1000 people gathered in protest of searching of their homes, political administration and Tochi Scouts were able to diffuse it and mutual respect was restored. The main house to be searched was the house of Sultan Khan who had a compound comprising of six more houses. Elders of the village who helped in the search included Malik Rab Nawaz the councillor of the area, Maulvi Sadiq Ullah Khan, Muhammad Tahir Khan and Malak Niaz.

The operation at Qutab Khel resulted in the holding of a Jirga at MiranShah attended by over 450 persons headed by the Maulana Abdul Rehman and attended by the Maulana Abdul Rehman (MNA) and Nek Zaman (Senator) the demands were simple that either take us into confidence before the operation or search or we will not cooperate with the army, tribal traditions should be respected and dignity of womenfolk should be observed and furthermore no

American should be allowed to be part of any search operations. In the end they showed their confidence on the Pakistan Army also. On 28<sup>th</sup> July Tochi Scouts conducted a snap operation at Ansar Killi to apprehend the robbers of the bank, Akbar Gul was taken along for the reason that his brother allegedly had a part in the robbery.

On 22<sup>nd</sup> July an IED was exploded near Chashmai Bridge (near Sarbandkai) resultantly four soldiers of 19 FF were injured. On the same day two gatherings were addressed by the religious leaders in which the same points were raised as in the MiranShah Jirga.

### **MiranShah under Attack**

On the night of 23/24<sup>th</sup> July at 0200 hours five rockets were fired from the eastern direction, one hit the front door of Tochi Scouts canteen contractor Namos Dar Khattak, another hit the quarter of Naib Subedar Sher Zaman Khattak, another hit the Tochi School gate and rest two landed at the far end of the runway. Two more rockets came on next night also.

Khajauri was also hit with three missiles on the night of 26<sup>th</sup> July, one landed 800 yards away and other two landed near the mess. Thal piquet also received one missile on the same night without any effects.

### **Abu Shoaib Madrassa 28<sup>th</sup> July**

MiranShah City had over 17 madrassas which all were under surveillance of intelligence agencies, a small madrasa on the western outskirts of the city caught the attention of the law enforcing agency, Abu Shoaib Madrassa is located on the MiranShah–Ghulam Khan road a kilometre ahead of the end of runway, it is almost on the

opposite side of Haqqani Madrassa. Commandant Tochi Scouts was the commander along with SOTF elements, Tochi Scouts also provided the quick reaction force with army carrying out the duties of outer cordon. Inner cordon troops captured one foreigner who fired back but he was killed in the shootout, another one was forced to surrender. Ammunition in reasonable quantity was also confiscated.

### **Wings Rotation**

On 20<sup>th</sup> April 2005 the proposed rotation of the wings was approved under which No.1 Wing had to move to Khajauri from Ghulam Khan, No.2 Wing from Khajauri to Datta Khel, No.3 Wing from Datta Khel to MiranShah where the No.4 Wing had to move to Ghulam Khan and No.5 Wing to Boya from Tajauri. All the moves were completed by August 2005.

### **Tribal Feud Tanai & Bahadur Khel Tribes**

Tanai is an Afghan Tribe and Bahadur Khel a Pakistani (Wazir) Tribe occupying land and area between the Admi Kot and Dewgar (West North West) of MiranShah in Spin Kanarai area. Both had a dispute over land in which Tanai claimed space almost 800 meters inside own territory and since June 2005 they both were engaged in firing on each other. In ordinary times it might have gone unnoticed but under the prevalent situation their exchange of fire had all the ingredient of causing a war between Pakistan & Afghanistan as both countries were taking this tribal duel as firing and intimidation by state organs. In August alone both these tribes exchanged fire almost daily with a break on 14<sup>th</sup> August only. On 26<sup>th</sup> August Tanai fired 80 rounds of 14.5 mm gun and on 29<sup>th</sup> August they fired two rounds of rocket as well, another tribe Ali Khonis also joined on 30<sup>th</sup> August. On an average both tribes were busy ten to twelve hours daily. The

disputed territory was wide spread, Tanais were able to establish bunkers at areas like Lataka Narai, Dadam, Taghakai, Mangaseen and Mazarme. Tochi Scouts were the first one to highlight the issue at all levels, it was raised at the tri-party conference held at Ghulam Khan and also at 2005 in Afghanistan; the issue was later resolved with Tanai forced to stay on the west of Durand Line.

### **Corps Commander's Jirga**

On 2<sup>nd</sup> August 2005 Corps Commander 11 Corps Lieutenant General Safdar addressed a well-attended Jirga of local malaks. Commander was able to infuse the confidence into the hearts of the natives and also established a bridge of trust. However on 4<sup>th</sup> August an IED was exploded by the miscreants on a convoy of 166 Medium Regiment and 34 FF near Ghalzai Village resultantly five soldiers embraced shahadat and two were injured. The intelligence sources had confirmed reports that certain Afghan tribesmen who were shuttling in between the MiranShah and the Afghanistan were responsible for these atrocities.

### **14<sup>th</sup> August 2005**

A grand, dignified, morale boosting, trust building ceremony was held at the Tochi Stadium attended by the Corps Commander Lieutenant General Safdar Hussain and General Officer Commanding 7 Division Major General Akram Sahi, apart from the Political Agent and the Commandant Tochi Scouts. Later an exhibition football match was played between the MiranShah City and Tochi Scouts which ended in a draw. A tea break was arranged for the visitors and guests by the Scouts.



## **Barber Masood**

Sepoy Barber Masood was a jolly person who had the habit of always narrating a joke while performing his job, an excellent Champai master. He was at Datta Khel and out of sheer comrade ship volunteered to help his comrades in collecting mud from outside the fort for plastering inside. He unfortunately came under a mud slide and died on the spot. He is certainly missed.

## **Haqqani Searched Again 11<sup>th</sup> September 2005**

Haqqani Madrasa remained a thorn in the eyes of law enforcing agencies, majority of the people who were apprehended had the links with this madrassa, thus again on the night of 11/12<sup>th</sup> September 2005 another raid was conducted on this seminary. There were reports that three close aides of Haqqani are present inside including Abdullah Mahsud. Two battalions of army and two companies of Tochi Scouts were hurriedly launched into the search and cordon operation, secrecy and quick reaction was the key to the success thus planning was kept secret. The plan envisaged Tochi Scouts to put into force an inner cordon, army at outer cordon and finally the SSG, political administration and lady searchers to carry out the search. The Haqqani seemed to have nine lives of a cat because he was not present and neither were his three close aides who were reported about. The operation went as per usual but in one compound the inmates refused to come out citing the purdah, it took almost an hour of negotiations which were mainly conducted by the commandant for the reason that he was the only one among the senior officers to know Pashtu and as such could communicate with these people, he was able to convince them to let the lady searchers have a search. Although the wanted men were not found, but as a consolation large cache of arms were recovered and confiscated this included

equipment required for making IED's as well. Thirteen persons were also arrested. Another search operation was conducted in the area by the Tochi Scouts and army on 14<sup>th</sup> as well but nothing worth mentioning was gained.

The key to the search of all the operations and madrassas was the intelligence but as is obvious from the history that it is never fool proof. The time between the first gathering of intelligence and time spent in planning and subsequent move generally is enough for these wanted men to disappear into the wilderness. Fakir of Ipi was never traceable for eleven years despite the best effort of British and Afghan government, Aarsal Khan was never traced too.

An interesting event took place on 14<sup>th</sup> September when school children pointed out an anti-personal mine placed near Afzal Petrol Pump, one of the boy had while kicking the ground in a youthful manner saw the mine, they reported to the Khassadars who in turn informed Tochi Scouts; pioneer section later diffused it.

### **Khatti Killi Operation 29<sup>th</sup> September-2<sup>nd</sup> OCTOBER, 2005**

This was the biggest operation till to date in North Waziristan Agency for the reason that for the first time Army Aviation Cobra attack helicopters and air force was also employed, although their employment was not part of original planning. It was conceived as a minor operation in line with the other operations conducted so far but in the context of the insurgency it attained an importance much more than what it merited. A series of attacks started in August 2005 on the army and FC Posts starting from night 29/30<sup>th</sup> July when three rockets were fired at MiranShah Fort from behind the Kalanjar Top, one of the rockets landed at the Signals Lines but there was no damage. There was a gap of almost a fortnight before the next attack

came on the night of 19/20<sup>th</sup> August when again three rockets were fired at the Fort, on 4<sup>th</sup> September, four rockets were fired at the Fort they were RPG-7s and till the night of 22/23 September there were attacks on each night the numbers of rocket fired never exceeded beyond five at one time.

Maulvi Sadiq Noor is a young man of mid-thirties (37 years old) who was living and is still residing in a small village by the name of Khatti Killi (also known as Khare Killi in the native and is marked on the map as Khare Killi) which is located almost 15 miles west of MiranShah on the southern bank of Tochi River in Upper Daur Valley. Sadiq Noor was a confirmed abettor of foreign miscreants; he was collecting funds for them, providing them with training and recuperation facilities. He was fond of riding horses, his guide and steno. was a student of his own madrassa by the name of Faqir Muhammad, Sadiq had a double pick up as well which had the registration number of 976<sup>313</sup>. On 16th September 2005 officer commanding military intelligence met director general military intelligence at Peshawar at 1100 hours and go ahead of the operation was given after pondering over the intelligence reports. In the initial briefing it was decided to have Commandant Tochi Scouts as the force commander, with outer cordon being under the command of 33 FF who would also be responsible for the quick reaction force and blocking positions, one major of Tochi Scouts will be responsible for the inner cordon. The indication of target was the responsibility of the officer commanding military intelligence.

Tochi Scouts had five integral wings, additional FC force attached was in the form of one wing from Swat Scouts, one wing from Thall Scouts, one special operations group company and one

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313 Tochi Scouts own intelligence report dated 12<sup>th</sup> August 2005. ( Tochi Scouts had established an integral intelligence set up from 2003 onwards)

armoured troop. In terms of artillery apart from own integral field battery one medium battery of Thall Scouts was also placed under command. Out of this artillery firepower, four medium guns were deployed at MiranShah, three field guns were at Wacha Bibi and two were at Baramand. There were 52 posts for the MiranShah Garrison only out of which 26 were for the Fort security and 16 posts were on the outer cordon and 10 posts were in the inner cordon, all in all 104 scouts were deployed for the fort security. From the attached wings 258 scouts of Thall Scouts and 289 scouts of Swat Scouts were deployed for road protection duties. Thus two companies which were managed from various posts and piquet were earmarked for any impending operations.<sup>314</sup>

There are two routes leading to the village, one along the main MiranShah-Boya-Datta Khel Road; in this case from Boya Bridge one has to back track almost five miles to reach the village walking along Muhammad Alam Kot, Bastigra Narai and reaching Khatti Killi which is situated in a re-entrant on a higher ground on the banks of Khaizai Algad. House of Sadiq Noor is located further ahead almost a kilometre passing through Dillipuri Village Other route leads from MiranShah- Isha- Thal Piquet and then follow the road leading to the Boya along the southern bank of Tochi River coming across Khozai & Panekzai Villages before encountering Sadiq Noor's compound. Task was simple; to apprehend Sadiq Noor either from his madrassa or from his residence and simultaneously search & demolish the madrasa, arrest or kill the miscreants and if possible to gather intelligence related documents. Intelligence reports confirmed that the compound is not defended by more than fifteen miscreants.

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314 Briefing by Commandant Tochi Scouts to GOC 7 Infantry Division on 21<sup>st</sup> September 2005 at MiranShah.

Two companies of 27 FF, one platoon ex 4 Commando Battalion of SSG and one company of Tochi Scouts were earmarked for the operations, 30 Khassadars and two lady searchers were also part of this force, assistant political agent and muharrar were also integrated. Two Cobra helicopters and two cargo helicopters were also available on call.

Operation was envisaged in four phases, in the first phase the move from MiranShah and debussing at Boya Bridge moving towards the Khatti Killi from west, in second phase establishment of cordon and blocking positions, this was to be performed by the 27 FF. In Phase Three the political process was to be initiated with the help of political administration. Search was part of Phase Four and disengagement and move back were the last part of the operation. It was perceived that by the end of the evening it will be over. Operation was envisaged at the first light; thus move started at the midnight.

Brigade Commander Brigadier Ghayur was on leave, he rushed back. The standard battle procedures were not strictly adhered as the operation was too obvious; in fact from the onset of operation in the NWA they were seldom adhered in spirit. The very warning which was given by the Tochi Scouts in the April briefing highlighting the lack of communication to be a catalyst was about to turn true.

### Conduct of Operations

27 FF was inducted at the last moment, the new commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Tahir Wafai had taken over the command hours before the operation and as such had no reconnaissance of the area, his second in command had gone on leave and the officer had never been in the area before. Tochi Scouts one company was

led by the Commandant Colonel Bangash, they initially moved on transport from MiranShah and disembarked at Boya Bridge where the other company joined in on foot from Boya.

Troops debussed short of Boya. At 0350 hours on 29<sup>th</sup> September the Taliban opened fire on the troops who were marching towards the Khatti Killi. The main force on the other hand was moving forward with FF Company leading followed by Tochi Scouts with SSG in the rear. As they moved forward in hours of darkness they came under fire from adjoining hills on the right side of direction of move, they had few NVGs' also and fire was exchange; three soldiers of FF and one Tochi Scout Ghani Rehman Khattak were injured and when they were being evacuated in the vehicle of SSG the vehicle itself was ambushed injuring two SSG soldiers. On this the medical officer of Tochi Scouts Captain Saeed move forward and evacuated all the casualties, eye witness accounts highlight the devotion and courage of Captain Saeed who was challenged in the dark by the miscreants but he replied that I would have treated you equally with same care had you been also injured, so let me go. FF now started returning the fire and under this fire the Tochi and SSG move forward and started occupying the positions but surprise on which this operation hinged was now lost. Artillery fire was called in depth, but the whole night was spent on ground without any clear identification of enemy who was also wearing the regular army uniform. Furthermore the announcements were being made in the village mosques urging people to take up arms and tribesmen started pouring in from the adjoining villages taking up positions on the dominating heights south of target area.

## 117 Brigade

By morning it became obvious that the troops have been encircled and outnumbered at Khatti Killi, thus 117 Brigade was inducted in the operation, its one unit 19 FF was at Datta Khel and other 23 AK was located at MiranShah along with remaining 4 Commando Battalion.

At 1040 hours the very first sortie of Cobras came in and attacked the miscreants, By 1350 hours the brigade tactical headquarters and 23 AK were heli-lifted to Boya from where they marched westwards, brigade establishing the tactical headquarters at Pawani (3988 feet) and 23 AK attempting to establish a link up with the company of 27 FF. 4 Commando Battalion's company was also heli-dropped at a height of 3644 feet, it was accomplished by 1420 hours, however due to the miscreants accurate fire the intended drop zone was compromised, another company of 33 FF was dropped on the east of the village Khatti Killi. Helicopters flying through Berai Sar and Panekzai, this company was in position from 1500 hours onwards, four helicopters flying in two sorties accomplished the drop. Two companies of 19 FF also reached the area by 1600 hours. Thus an outer cordon was established.

33 FF Company Commander Major Muhammad Khan assessed the situation and decided to occupy the ridge lines where miscreants were already in position, he advanced along with his group and then communication was lost till 1845 hours.<sup>315</sup> On resumption of communication it was learnt that he is encircled and as such artillery fire was called in. Meanwhile another company of Tochi Scouts was moved from MiranShah towards the Khatti Killi adopting the southern route for link up with the 33 FF. Tochi Company arrived in

315 117 Brigade Headquarters Post Operation Report, 12 October 2005.

the area in hours of darkness and tried to establish the contact, but to no avail. On the western side of the target 23 AK was able to secure the Pawani Ridge before the arrival of two companies of 19 FF that were heli-lifted from Datta Khel to Boya. By the end of first day 29<sup>th</sup> September there were ten soldiers missing and there was no contact with them, it was only in the next morning at 0900 hours that three dead bodies including that of company commander was found in a nullah, all in all three died, three were wounded and four other went missing in this link up east of target area.

### 30<sup>th</sup> September

The main effort and aim was to secure the heights around the target area where miscreants were hiding and carrying out fire on the troops below, another aim was to link with the company of 33 FF and Tochi Scouts on the east of target. Early in the morning three PAF's A-5 aircraft flew over the target area for fifteen minutes (0745-0800 hours) along with the Cobra Helicopters. Use of PAF was more psychological than having any effect on the operation in terms of physical damage, the speed of the aircraft is quite high and target area was clustered with own and miscreants thus it was difficult for any pilot to identify own troops. In the pre Independence era the British used the air force quite frequently for the reason that helicopters were not invented then, but now with the Cobras on inventory the use of aircraft had no useful effects.

23 AK and 4 Commando started moving eastward from the night positions amidst fire from the miscreants, they were able to clear the first ridge known as Wat Khawara (2666 feet) and later Ware Pal, both actually formed ravines and algal, it was done by noon. Simultaneously the two spurs between Spelmazai Algal



and Prambagal Algad were also secured, Sepoy Hassan Jan of 4 Commando was shot first in the leg by the miscreants and as he bent down he received another fatal shot. Two Companies of 19 FF which were at Boya started moving forward and rest of the battalion was heli lifted from Datta Khel to MiranShah. Brigade tactical headquarters also moved forward eastward thus having a better observation of the events taking place below. Meanwhile at 1600 hours the company of 19 FF which had earlier been heli-lifted to MiranShah was now dropped near the company of 33 FF which had lost its company commander. Tochi Scouts suffered three casualties when miscreants' fire caused injuries they included Lance Naik Lal Muhit Khattak, Haroon Khan Bangash and Qaiser Abbas Bangash, Tochi was trying to link up with the western force and simultaneously they were trying to locate the Talibans on the ridges. Lal Muhit was hit in the chest by a bullet as he was busy in ascertaining the positions of Talibans, Haroon and Qaiser were hit simultaneously by a sniper, both were buddies.

Sarkho Ridge (2967 feet) was important in the context of the operation and as such it was secured by 1600 hours by 19 FF (less two companies) along with SSG.

1<sup>st</sup> October 2005

The area around the target was not utterly secured, there was sporadic fire coming down from the ridges and link up between the western and eastern forces was not completed yet, and with this aim the day started. PAF was called in for show of force and their A-5 aircraft flew low over the target area for 55 minutes (0735-0830). When the actual movement of troops started taking place the Cobra helicopters were in direct support along with artillery fire. 27 FF

& 19 FF regiments (each less two companies) and Company Tochi Scouts manoeuvred and secured the Sarkho Top and Spurs south of Dillipuri Village. Tochi Scouts led the force, the objectives were attained by 1225 hours.

On the other side at eastern end a search of the area was conducted by the company of 19 FF along with 33 FF & Tochi Scouts, later Bera Sar was secured at 1500 hours and link up with the 27 FF was achieved. The circle around the target was now completed and now the actual task of searching the madrassa and the compound had to be undertaken. On the third day the locals came out and pleaded for a cease fire which was agreed and search of Maulvi Sadiq Noor's house was carried out and operation culminated successfully. The search started at 1525 hours and within an hour it was completed 'few items including a small quantity of rounds of different calibres were recovered'.

2<sup>nd</sup> October 2005

At 1100 hours the Engineers demolition squad was heli lifted from the MiranShah and they carried out the demolition of the Sadiq Noor's house at 1540 hours. The force after the demolition of the house started extricating and reached back to MiranShah at 1915 hours under the cover of Cobra Helicopters.

Artillery fired 185 rounds of medium calibre in this operation against nine targets employing six observers. Fire support was provided by the batteries of 65 Medium, 86 Field, Tochi Field and Thall Scouts. Reportedly over 50 Talibans were killed in this operation and scores were injured including Sadiq Noor who unfortunately was able to escape through. The own casualties were four shaheeds (two from 33 FF, one from 44 Signals, One from 4

Commando) thirteen were injured( three each from 27 FF, Tochi Scouts & SSG, two each from 33 FF & 86 Field) there were three missing in action two from 33 FF and one from 86 Field.

### Eye Witness Accounts

Brigadier Tahir Wafai is presently commanding an infantry brigade at MirAli, he was leading 27 FF, he recalls <sup>316</sup> *'it was a dark night and I was leading the battalion, ahead of me were two Tochi Scouts, I had my battalion commander group with me, track was uneven, we had reached almost halfway, at 0215 hours all of a sudden fire came down on us from all direction, we immediately took positions and started returning the fire. Few of my troops while taking cover had fallen into the trench which was almost six feet deep, after some time I ascertained the command and control. In darkness nothing much could be done, my major worry was about the situation that is likely to unfold with first ray of dawn. Miscreants were occupying the mountain on the right of my battalion, on the left River Tochi, we were squeezed in a tight belt of uneven ground. I whispered to my adjutant that I am going to shout orders, do not take any actions on it. I started abusing Taliban and shouted to my troops to take the mountain from the rear and do not leave any one alive, I will slaughter all these bastard Taliban myself. My ruse worked and fire stopped coming on us. But then dawn also came upon horizon. Later in the day we got the attack helicopters for our support but they were rather high and not much of use initially; later I gave one of the pilot my piece of mind and it worked. My first soldier got wounded in the first hours after dawn. Later we climbed up the ridge on our right and kept it under own control till the termination of operation. we started creeping forward, trying to reach the heights, in which we were successful by the end of first day'*.

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316 Interview with Brigadier Wafai at MiranShah, 4th October 2012.

Naib Subedar Sharbat Khattak was then a havildar, he narrates *'We had a briefing about the mission which was to carry out a search and cordon of Khatti Killi, we reached Boya in our own transport and from there we started marching, ahead of us was the army, we were second and behind us was the SSG, at some time one of the civilian flashed a torch and inquired about us, I told him to switch off the torch, we move forward and all of a sudden fire came on us, we all hit the ground and started returning the fire. Enemy fire was not intense rather sporadic in nature , in the same very position we spent the night. Fajr Prayers call was given by the Khatti Killi mosque, followed by an announcement that army has come into the village and as such Jihad is now compulsory. In the morning the jets came but they were high and did not dive due to narrow valley. Cobras also came and they were a great morale booster, I came to know that Brigadier Ghayur has also arrived. We also came to know that one major has been slaughtered along with another jawan and that one jawan has been left alive for the reason that he is a Pathan. Taliban had made deep trenches in the peaks and in the mountains like rat holes, from where they were firing, one SSG soldier was killed and evacuated by his own platoon mate later told me that it was almost impossible to identify the Taliban for the reasons that they were also wearing the army uniform. These Taliban used to hide inside their mouse holes on hearing the helicopter noise. On the third morning it was announced that the peace committee is coming with a white flag and as such no fire should be opened on them, they later went into the house of Maulvi Sadiq Noor also. We were provided food from Boya and helicopters also dropped a little food but we sustained it. We had reached the house of Maulvi Sadiq Noor by the third evening and ourselves and SSG conducted the search, it was a pucca house, Sadiq Noor himself was not present, later we spent the night in the adjoining mountains. On the fourth morning at noon a*

*Malak Kalu<sup>317</sup> came and guided us through the eastern track through the Shina Khawara Pass, it is a narrow defile which was under the control of Talibans, it is green area with orchards, after crossing it we embussed and reached MiranShah.'*

Havildar Farman Bangash is presently performing the duties of commandant's escort, he was also part of Tochi Scouts which took part in the Khatti Killi operation, he recalls 'We were ready by evening for move to Khatti Killi and for reasons known better to superior officers we moved around mid-night and reached Boya Bridge, from where we started moving close to first light, we were stopped enroute by a civilian who inquired about our mission and commandant had a discussion with them and we move forward. Khatti Killi Village is situated between two ridges, there were guards on both the edges, one of them fired a rocket on us and they had also made bunkers there. One SSG soldier was injured who was evacuated by our doctor Captain Saeed, while he was taking him and others back towards Boya, he was fired upon near Raghazai and few men probably Talibans stopped him and he told them that he is a doctor and as such it is his duty to care for people and he would have done the same for them also, he was allowed to proceed. I saw four Taliban being hit with Cobra fire, one hit the ground and other came to rescue him and were also hit'.

Brigadier Sardar Sajjad was a lieutenant colonel during the operation and in command of the 9 Army Aviation Squadron, he narrates that 'on 1st October 2005, I had brought the Corps Commander Lieutenant General Safdar to the MiranShah, we had landed at the brigade tactical headquarters at around 0830 hours, from where we flew to the MiranShah, corps commander attended a meeting, while I was at the helipad I received a message regarding

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317 Malak Kalu was later assassinated by Taliban.

*the evacuation of a casualty from the Khatti Killi. As I was warming up the Lama, the corps commander also arrived, I explained to him the situation. Cheerfully he waited at the helipad and I flew to the Khatti Killi. After landing there I saw a body of troops who had plastered dry lips and wrinkled faces, they were waving their empty water bottles. I gave them all the water I had, placed the injured soldier in the helicopter and promised them that I am coming back with water. I gave call to Air Traffic Controller at MiranShah to get hold of all the water bottles and water coolers, hats off to the Tochi Scouts that as I landed they were ready with water which I immediately took back to the Khatti Killi, I made another trip before I ran out of fuel’.*

Naib Subedar Riaz Wazir is presently serving in No.5 Wing at Boya, he also took part in the operation and regarding the water issue his observation is quite interesting that ‘*we all ran out of water, the villagers majority of whom had left on the very first day of operation... we stopped firing while women and children were leaving the village, later when the water shortage started occurring then villagers gave us the water, but they were reluctant to give water to army jawans’.*

Captain Doctor Saeed Akhtar Khattak was commissioned in 2003 and reported to Tochi Scouts as Regimental Medical Officer (RMO) on 23<sup>rd</sup> September 2004, he was posted as RMO of No.5 Wing at Boya on 26<sup>th</sup> July 2005. His conduct during the operation was applauded by all, he upheld the values of medical profession and Army Medical Corps. Risking his life beyond the call of duty, he after God Almighty saved the lives of five soldiers. His name was mentioned in despatches.<sup>318</sup>

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318 *Tochi Scouts Letter No.5313/7/A 9<sup>th</sup> October 2005.*

## Lessons Learnt<sup>319</sup>

The battle procedures were not followed thus the individual scout was not aware of the aim and mission. The scouts performed their tasks valiantly; three scouts were injured also in this engagement. The battle started in the hours of darkness in which the individual thus becomes the key to success, it is different from conventional warfare where the whole platoon or section are deployed in totality, here the command and control of tactical leaders was impaired by the nocturnal vision, firing, layout of ground and stretching of platoon. Water carried by to the regular army was too less and it caused another logistic irritant.

On 3<sup>rd</sup> October 2005 a debriefing was conducted by the Tochi Scouts in which the GOC 7 Division was also present along with other participants. Tochi Scouts commandant highlighted that Scouts were responsible for the inner cordon and army for the outer cordon. Army had placed seven outer cordon posts apart from establishing the two blocking positions. Colonel Bangash highlighted the weaknesses and short falls which included underestimation of the target which he attributed to the lack of intelligence and this was later supported by the 117 Brigade post operation report also. Colonel Bangash admitted that initially less force was employed and there was lack of coordination & communication among the ground forces and Cobras, absence of political work was another shortfall he mentioned and in the end he highlighted insufficient administrative support and insecure main supply route. Learning from this experience he recommended that in future operations should be conducted during hours of day light, use of over whelming force, intelligence gathering, placing of piquet on the route and sufficient

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319 *Post Operation Report 117 Brigade, 5<sup>th</sup> October 2005. Also see 7 Division War Diary (Both have Restricted Access)*

administrative support. 7 Infantry Division shared the same view but added that the troops lacked the requisite kind of the missiles to bust the bunkers; they recommended the inclusion and induction of SPG-9. It is irony that Tochi Scouts had the Milan Missiles but they were never used.

Operation was a success as almost all the aims were achieved; only missing link was the capture of the Sadiq Noor. Casualties were also less only three fatal out of an infantry brigade plus (thirteen infantry companies) and three artillery units. However there were seventeen persons from army and scouts who were abducted and they were later released in pockets. In the end this operation highlighted the power of commander's personality in the outcome of the engagement. Commander 117 Brigade Brigadier Ghayur was able to infuse it among the troops; the presence of commander on ground raised the morale and changed the course of conflict.

### **Operation Datta Khel 1-3 October 2005**

Operation at Khatti Killi had a chain reaction across the NWA; the most affected areas were the Datta Khel and MiranShah. On the night of the operation 29<sup>th</sup> September no less than nine rockets were fired at the MiranShah Fort, two at Jallar Post at MirAli and on 30<sup>th</sup> September the road blocks were established by the miscreants at MirAli, Degan, Qutab Khel and Khar Kamar (all Daur territories). MiranShah again came under attack on the next night and so were Idak and MirAli where eight rockets were fired upon which later resulted in the shahadat of two NCOs and other five were injured at STA including Lance Naik Zain Ullah Wazir.

A simultaneous operation was envisaged at Datta Khel where Ajab Khan, Pashakai and Mushtaq Khan's houses were to be



searched and they all were to be apprehended; preferably alive. They were all notorious arms smugglers although they were not rated in the same breath as Sadiq Noor was in terms of giving safe heavens to the miscreants but they were suspected of having soft corner for them. One company of Tochi Scouts, two companies of 5 AK Regiment and available artillery were the force available and task to carry out this operation. Anyone having read the history of the area would have cast doubts about the success of such venture with the composition of force for this operation.

There had been rows of incident in Datta Khel where on regular basis army and locals had narrow and minor clashes, for instance in one incident on 13<sup>th</sup> September 2005 a vehicle of 5 NLI was stopped at Dwa Toi resultantly firing was exchanged in Maizer Village. On 17<sup>th</sup> in another incident No.3 Wing and 5 NLI troops signalled a car to stop but it did not complied with instructions and fire was open on it. On 21<sup>st</sup> September 2005 a Jirga was held at MiranShah in which malaks of Madda Khel and political agent attended, the end result was a deadlock. On the next day another search operation was conducted by the army in Datta Khel. The elders and malaks pointed out that where as they are ready to cooperate but lady searchers must be there for search of the houses. The problem was that no lady searchers were available at the tehsil or village level and had to be transported from MiranShah. On 28<sup>th</sup> Another Jirga was held at Datta Khel Bazar in which Commanding Officers of 19 FF, 5 NLI and Wing Commander Major Tariq of Tochi Scouts participated, later searches of the 16 shops was carried out, it lasted for an hour without finding anything objectionable.

Compounds of all three were situated on the southern bank of the track leading from Datta Khel Post towards Idar Khel, almost a

mile to the south of Chashmai, on the numerous fringes of Wucha Shaga Algad. Ajab Khan's compound comes first, then a kilometre on the west comes Pashakai's compound and finally the Mushtaq Khan's compound is the last one a further mile away, but it is almost inside the Dande Killi and north of the track, east of Idar Khel. The first compound was to be searched on 1<sup>st</sup> October and other two were on 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2005. In the initial planning all three were to be done simultaneously but later realising the gravity of situation and with the moving of force towards the Khatti Killi the plan was made flexible.

The best part of the operation was that it did not had to meet the same resistance as experienced at Khatti Killi, but nothing significance was gained from the searches. It was the diplomatic power of Tochi Scouts which paved the way for the searches. It must be remembered that only few years ago Tochi Scouts were able to gain foothold in the area. Tochi Scouts had to establish the inner cordons and army was given the responsibility of putting the outer cordons.

In the debrief the points almost were the same as in the Khatti Killi, lack of intelligence and update information about the target, insufficient troops, communication problem and above all the lack of co-ordination with aviation, Aviation earlier raised points about the insecure heli landing sites.

This operation later resulted in the physical attack on Zara Mela Post in which six miscreants were killed and other five were injured. Another attack was launched against the Datta Khel when on the night of 5/6<sup>th</sup> October three rockets were fired, in retaliation own troop's fire killed three civilians and one was injured. Next night

Isha Post came under attack but it was repulsed and on the morning of 9<sup>th</sup> October an IED was exploded on MiranShah-Boya road in which one army jawan embraced shahadat. NLI Camp came under attack on 6<sup>th</sup>October too, 12 Sind Regiment was attacked near Ghulam Khan, all these check posts were jointly manned by the Tochi Scouts along with army. Tochi Scouts expended 220 rounds of G-3 at Ghulam Khan and 390 rounds at Datta Khel.

### **Zara Mela**

On 2/3 October 2005, miscreants attack Zara Mela Check Post at 0215 hours in strength, there were at about 60 odd miscreants. The post not only absorb the attack but also retaliated in fury, reportedly six miscreants were killed and one dead body was found in the morning. Havildar Inayat Khan Orakzai was the post commander, an inspiring commander; he not only held his own nerves but inspired others as well. Sepoy Zia Ur Rehman Orakzai was the sentry who first detected the movement in the darkness, he very correctly alerted all and fired the opening round. Sepoy Usman Khan Afridi played a key role in the defence of the post. He was manning the signals equipment. The batteries of the set became weak. Usman very intelligently conserved them by operating the set in an economical manner. A stage came when the set was almost dying, Usman switched off the set, opening again after pause of few minutes to get the instructions from the Wing Headquarters and also to pass back required data. In the end miscreants were forced to leave the area with their weapons left behind which included few magazines of SMG, odd round of RPG-7, one intercommunication set and three grenades. This does not look much but notion of victory was achieved by the Tochi Scouts.

Names of Naiks Muhammad Khan Khattak, Haroon Rashid Afridi, Lance Naik Khaista Khan Orakzai, Sepoys Amanullah Orakzai, Aminullah Khattak, Sabir Ullah Wazir and Abdul Waheed Wazir were mentioned in despatches for the valiant defence of the post<sup>320</sup>.

### **Isha Check Post**

Tochi Scouts had the duty of checking all the vehicles at Isha Check Post. There have been certain observations regarding this checking of vehicles as it caused inconvenience to the civilians but following instance highlight how important this checking was and still is. It was 0900 hours on the morning of 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2005, the Bannu bound flying coach from MiranShah was stopped at Isha. Lance Naik Abbass Gul Khattak climb up to have a look at the passengers, he suspected two among the fourteen passengers sitting and ordered them to get down. Both initially hesitated but then made moves as if getting down. The moment they reached the door of the flying coach they took out pistols and fired on Abbass, who was lucky to survive the hits. In next moment he turned around and grab one of the assailant, dragging him down.

Two more miscreants in meanwhile opened fire on the scouts present on ground through the open windows of the van. Naib Subedar Saleem Yusafzai retaliated and fired on the tyres of the van. Sepoy Mohabat Ali Bangash ran forward and took position in front of the running van forcing the driver to halt. Two miscreants jumped out and started running towards the vegetated area but were shot down by the accurate fire of Naik Rajb Ali Turi and Lance Naik Lal Ibrahim Orakzai, two other were arrested. Four grenades, two SMG, two automatic pistols and eight magazines were confiscated from the miscreants.

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320 *Tochi Scouts Letter 5313/7/A/20 dated 6<sup>th</sup> October 2005.*

## **Chashmai Bridge 10<sup>th</sup> October-2005**

10<sup>th</sup> October was Monday and No.4 Wing's vehicle was going towards Isha when it reached the outskirts of the city and was about to climb onto the bridge a loud bang was heard and the vehicle toppled, an IED had been exploded at the home edge of the bridge, the other two vehicles following it, immediately halted and scouts took position. A motorcycle with two riders tried to sped away but one received fatal shots and other survived and captured, later given medical treatment as well. Five scouts of Tochi were seriously injured included Naik Bakhri Zaman Yusafzai, Lance Naik Kabir Hussain Orakzai, Sepoys Shahid Hussain Yusafzai, Khial Hussain Turi & Siraj Ul Islam Afridi; all of them later recovered with passage of time and were back on the front. The confiscated motorcycle was handed over to the next of kin on 22<sup>nd</sup> October.

Throughout the month of October the law enforcing agencies were under attack but these attacks were not of organised nature rather odd rocket fired at the posts, IED blast, or simply firing on the moving vehicles. Reply from the army and Scouts was spirited. On 14<sup>th</sup> October another scout of Tochi Naik Basir Khan Wazir was hit when a rocket landed at Khajauri at 2330 hours, a burst of fire followed from the western side (college side) which was returned by the Tochi. A day earlier at 1330 hours three missiles were fired upon the MirAli camp without causing any damage. Kunar Sar Post a joint post manned by Tochi & 13<sup>th</sup> Punjab Regiment also came under attack on 13<sup>th</sup> October at 1020 hours in which one soldier of 13<sup>th</sup> Punjab Havildar Muhammad Aziz embraced shahadat. On 17<sup>th</sup> October Tochi Scouts disarmed four bombs of 82 mm Mortar which were remote controlled and packed in a crate, these were handed over to 206 Survey Group. The Pioneer Sections of Tochi

Scouts again carried out a commendable action when a shopping bag which had the explosives was placed near Honeymoon Hotel on MirAli-Bannu Road and was identified by the Thall Scouts on road protection duty, the pioneers had to rush from the MiranShah to carry out the task.

On the morning of 31<sup>st</sup> October, working on an intelligence tip Tochi Scouts not only found but also disarmed four hand grenades and two anti-tank mines at 1410 hours before handing them over to the division. Amidst all this an unfortunate incident took place at Kalanjar II Post where at 2300 hours Sepoy Irshad Ahmed Afridi fired eight rounds on his superior Havildar Ashraf Bangash, out of which four shots hit him on the feet, the firer was overpowered by the other scouts on the post, later Chigha platoon had to be despatched from MiranShah to bring back the culprit and the injured.

### **Eid Ul Fitr**

Eid was celebrated on 5<sup>th</sup> November 2005 with usual prayers and routine. The malaks of the city came to greet the commandant from 0920-1300 hours, later IGFC Major General Tariq came to greet the troops from Peshawar and met them. On Eid usually the commandant visit as many posts as possible with Eid gifts and sweets, but it was not possible on this Eid.

On 12<sup>th</sup> December 2005, Colonel Yousaf Iqbal took over the command of Tochi Scouts.

### **Gangs Banged- MiranShah**

North Waziristan Agency had always been a breeding place for gangsters and despite regular operations by the different law

enforcing agencies they have been able to flourish in their trade, the last gang warfare in the agency took place in December 2005. Jabari and Hakim Khan about whom last was mentioned in 2004, they had managed to escape the arrests then but in December were caught between the devil and the sea. Both these gangs had a notorious history and rivalry that dates back to almost three decades during which they had committed all kind of crimes. In October 2004 Tochi Scouts carried out an operation against both these gangs, majority of their houses were demolished on 9<sup>th</sup> October 2004, and positions around their compounds were occupied by the Tochi Scouts in December 2004 , two scouts Sepoy Asif Bangash and Sepoy Abdullah Marwat had received fatal injuries during that operation. Jabari had surrendered unconditionally on 15<sup>th</sup> December and Hakim Khan on 16<sup>th</sup> December 2004, both were placed inside the Tochi Scouts quarter guard and later shifted to the Dera Ismail Khan Jail, in their absence gangs were led by Sher Ali and Jahangir Khan respectively.

The last act of this gang warfare was played in December 2005, which by itself shows the situation prevailing in the agency. The trouble started when in end November 2005 Hakim Khan's gang forcibly took the money from the public transport near Boya, the passengers mostly women were related to Maulana Sadiq Noor. The Talibans threatened the groups but to no avail, on 6<sup>th</sup> December 2005 the gang again stopped five vehicles carrying goods for 'Bhatta', the goods belonged to Sadiq Noor. Taliban resisted on which Sher Ali who himself was leading this act opened fire on them and killed five Taliban on the spot, in the return he also received a fatal bullet which ended his life too; this duel lasted for half an hour.

By 1650 hours Taliban concentrated and surrounded the houses of Sher Ali and Hakim Khan and fired the first of the rocket on them

at 1705 hours, within half an hour both houses were demolished, heavy weapons including rockets & missiles were used. These Taliban were not satisfied with this and they hunted the group members of the gangs and by the end of the night had killed 11 members of Hakim Khan Group alone. Next day after the Fajr prayers the Taliban continued with their manhunt and killed further seven members of the group. The houses and property of these members were also burnt, demolished and destroyed but womenfolk were not harmed. The dead bodies were displayed in open hanging from the electric polls and trees in Dande Darpa Khel. In next move these Taliban cordoned the house of Mir Kalam Khan and inflicted the same fate on him too. The gangsters in retaliation fired three rockets on MiranShah Fort at 1215 hours without causing any damage. It must be noted that both these gangs had bitter feelings towards the Tochi Scouts on the basis of Dande Land issue which they claimed belongs to them and in the past used to send the threats to the scouts.

Another interesting and strange phenomenon that took place was the announcement by the Taliban from the mosques that anyone who will cause any damage or harm to the Tochi Scouts or the army will meet the same fate.<sup>321</sup>

On 8<sup>th</sup> December the hunt for the gangsters was resumed by the Taliban and by the end of the day a total of twenty gang members were killed and their bodies displayed on road MiranShah–Datta Khel. Taliban handed over five dead bodies to Darpa Khel tribe for burial, thirteen to political agent for burial and two they kept hanging on the road. Political Agent had a meeting with the GOC 7 Division on the issue. Company of Tochi Scouts was kept alert for any eventuality. On 9<sup>th</sup> December the gangs were completely eliminated, a Jirga was convened by the political agent and things started returning to normalcy.

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321 Commandant Tochi Scouts briefing to IGFC on 12 December 2005.



It is a sad commentary on the overall act because with this action the Taliban established them as an alternate organ, a state within the state, they achieved within a span of three days something which all the elements of the state were denying them. It seriously altered the very mind set of a common person. The same very group who almost two months back had inflicted casualties on the military at Khatti Killi was now in action and they were not taken to the task by the military, it was a golden opportunity to crush them.

The positive aspect was the good will by the Taliban towards the law enforcing agencies; they created an impact among all that the fight is not between these rather with those who are not part of the agency. It needs clarification, because there were different groups of Taliban working, living, operating in the agency and as such there was no single person controlling all these, thus from the state point of view it was important to have as many friends as possible among them. After all these were Muslims, Pakistanis and as such no deep enmity existed, however the very people responsible for attacks on the military, for killing and kidnapping of troops, for attacks on posts and convoys had to be brought to the justice and this is where the path of state and Taliban separates.

### Army Aviation

In both operations (Khatti Killi & Datta Khel) the lack of coordination with Army Aviation was highlighted. Both should have been Army Aviation operations; ideally suited for a heliborne insertion. Comments of Tochi Scouts, 117 Brigade and 7 Infantry Division all highlights the lack of communication among the ground and helicopters. The division highlighted that the SSG Company was dropped before the drop zone and 33 FF Company ahead of the

drop zone. This was the first major operation of Army Aviation in NWA involving ground troops<sup>322</sup> and it played a decisive part in both the attack and logistics part of it. There were and still are certain fundamental misconceptions about Army Aviation employment in the operations. Army Aviation from 2001 onwards underwent drastic changes in which new helicopters were inducted as part of efforts against the terror, special operation task force (SOTF) was raised in which aviators and SSG operated together; yet aviation did not have integral fighting troops. All the troops in aviation are on extra regimental employment from artillery and as such are not employed in operations. The need was and still is to have integral fighting troops as part of aviation squadron, which can be inserted into the battlefield as in Khati Killi, who are capable of holding, advancing and fighting at their own. The insertion of troops from infantry, FC or from SSG who have very little experience of the helicopters is not a good omen. This was the primary cause of the delayed response from heli- inserted troops and in case of 33 FF it proved fatal. Cobra pilots at no stage were inducted in the planning phase and neither any of the cargo or utility pilot was taken into confidence. 33 FF Company had never been inside any of the helicopters lest to talk about the practice of jumping or orientation of ground. In case of Datta Khel Operation had the troops been part of aviation squadron then the issue of landing sites would have never arisen and moreover all three compounds would have been searched in a single day rather simultaneously.

Aviation squadrons are of multiple kinds, attack squadrons which are equipped only with Cobras, utility or cargo have Mi-17, Puma or Bell 412 Helicopters. These squadrons are part of aviation bases. Within a corps an aviation squadron has one odd Lama Helicopter

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322 History of Pakistan Army Aviation, p - 369

and dozen fixed wing single engine MFI-17 aircraft. These pilots less the corps squadron never directly came under the command channel of field formation and as such the issue of communication remained a sore point. Moreover during operations the variety of helicopters (Cobra/Mi-17/ Puma) were all from different squadrons and had the inherent technical limitations of endurance, radius, firepower and above all ego.

### **In Taliban's captivity**

Many scouts were kidnapped by the Talibans while they were coming back from leave to their posts, these scouts were part of Tochi Scouts and also from Swat and Thall Scouts which were under command Tochi Scouts. The normal procedure was that these scouts used to travel by public transport running from almost all parts of NWA to Bannu onwards to Peshawar. Few were kidnapped during operations (Khatti Killi), their accounts of captivity shed light on the Taliban culture and the prevailing environments in the agency. Nursing Sepoy Samiullah Mohmand of Tochi Scouts had proceeded on leave from Mangaseen Post he was coming back when between Degan-Khar Kamar the public transport he was travelling in was stopped and from among the passengers he was off loaded by the Taliban, these Taliban at the same very time and spot also got Havildar Gul Muhammad of Swat Scouts who was proceeding on leave along with six other scouts. All these scouts were blind folded and taken into another car and driven to another place' *we were driven for about two hours on a dirt track, then we were forced to march for some time and pushed into a room where our blinds were removed, it was a deserted mosque with mountains all around. They asked us whether we belong to militia or army, they assured us that they will set us free after couple of days, there were eight sentries*

*posted on us, we slept on mats, they would allow us to go a little bit away to attend call of nature. Food was good and seem to be home cooked but it was meagre. Whole day we were confined to the one room, our hands were bounded* <sup>323</sup> Recalls Havildar Gull, Samiullah has similar memories. Sepoy Lazmat Khan of Mahsud Scouts was abducted along with two other scouts of same corps while going back to Razmak near Qutab Khel. They were also blindfolded and taken away in a double cabin transport. *'We had no idea about the massive earthquake which had hit the country but one of the Taliban sentry had a newspaper and told us about it, we were warned not to run or we will be shot, they were not rough neither we were tortured, they asked us about our job and inquired whether we belong to army or militia. On hearing that we belong to militia, they said that had we been part of army then they would have done something different to us, these Taliban were against the Punjabis. Food for us was brought on a car, all these Taliban always covered their faces, they used to call each other as Emir or Hafiz, and they were carrying rocket launchers as well. They used to recite that we should be grateful that we are part of militia and not army. We all used to pray regularly and together, they did not took our personal belongings and returned them to us when they dropped us in the same manner in which we were abducted'* narrates Lazmat Khan. Sepoy Israr of 5 Wing Tochi Scouts was also abducted on 29<sup>th</sup> September 2005 near Degan and had the same narration *'when these Taliban dropped us near Tablighi Markaz MiranShah, they all embraced us before departing'*.

The routine during Ramadan during captivity was not much different from earlier days but proper sehri and iftar was arranged, including chicken and Pepsi. All the kidnapped scouts were released by mid October 2005.

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323 Tochi Scouts Intelligence Record, 2005

## **2006**

The year started with the operation in the Saidgai area, aim was to search the three compounds belonging to Hafiz Noor Muhammad, Dareem Khan and Shammati. In an related event a large gathering(300/350) at Naurak was addressed by Maulana Sadiq Noor in which Sadiq stressed that Hafiz Gul Bahadur is the commander-in-chief of all the Taliban forces and no action should be taken without his consultation, the actions across the borders will be continued, the strict vigilance against the drugs, immorality, theft, dacoits and lawlessness in the agency will remained enforce, last but not the least was the decision that all sacrificial hides in the agency should be collected and deposited in Bait ul Maal. Another gathering was held at Idak where similar announcements were made, it was also highlighted that from now there will be one person in each village who will keep an eye on the people who are working or reporting to the military. Coming back to the Saidgai, the operation was conducted independently by the Tochi Scouts and is a classic example of how these kind of operations should be carried out.

Saidgai is situated at an elevation of 4235 feet having a population of 5000-7000 scattered in mud houses. Area is surrounded by dominating heights all around, Faqiran, Dande, Dewgar and Saidgai are the important villages in this complex, Saidgai Wazir are the dominating clan. On 4<sup>th</sup> January 2006 Tochi Scouts received the orders from the 7 Division for a search operation to be carried out by last light 7<sup>th</sup> January; initial intelligence highlighted the presence of foreigners in the area. This was the first operation under the new commandant Colonel Yusuf Iqbal and he made sure that all the

battle procedures are followed. He had a wing strength force with a company of 177 Brigade as reserve, the helicopters were on call, and one medium artillery battery of Thall Scouts was in direct support.

Operation envisaged a simultaneous cordon of the surrounding area and then search of the houses with the help of lady searchers and political administration including the Khassadars.

### Conduct of Operation

Commandant along with Lieutenant Colonel Bilal Asghar the No.1 Wing Commander, Captains Waseem, Afzal and Wajid moved to the Saidgai Check Post for a detailed reconnaissance and formulated the plan. It was decided to have two blocking positions one on the north west and other on the south east of the target area; they also decided to occupy the surrounding heights. On the same day one company under the command of Captain Waseem moved from MiranShah and concentrated at Saidgai.

### Establishing Cordon

Dardoni II was the rendezvous (RV) for all the forces, Wing Commander Lieutenant Colonel Bilal moved with his company from Ghulam Khan and reached there at 0500 hours on 5<sup>th</sup> January minutes later Captain Wajid also arrived from MiranShah with his company followed by the Commandant. On getting the signal Captain Waseem along with his troops moved stealthily from Saidgai and before anyone could notice he had established the road block on the northwest of the target area, simultaneously he moved a platoon towards the southeast of the intended target, he established his company headquarters on the northern edge of the compounds, all his troops were in place by 0715 hours.

Occupation of southern side of the target area was the responsibility of the Captain Wajid, who also moved out from Dardoni II with his company on motors and debussed at Dardoni III, from where he lead his troops , he established a road block, thus cutting off the target area completely. He was in position by 0730 hours.

Lieutenant Colonel Bilal had a company with him, which he led to the northern and north eastern ridges around the target area. Here the fog of war started when he was challenged by the tribesmen who were already on the ridges, Bilal very wisely avoided the confrontation and readjusted his positions.

Lieutenant Colonel Bilal along with the Assistant Political Officer Iqbal Khattak in the company of khassadars and two lady searchers now embarked on the most difficult part of the operation to convince the elders of the villages to allow the search of the compounds, they finally managed to get through the arguments and searched started at 0945, it was over by 1145 hours. Nothing was found.

At 1245 hours the signal from the division was received to fall back, one vehicle was stopped at the road blocks and three persons were apprehended but they were later released. The complete force arrived back at MiranShah at 1320 hours.

## Conclusion

Nothing was found but more importantly no loss of human lives took place, force was not encircled neither ambushed which has been a pattern of Frontier Warfare. This operation highlights the intricacies of the tribal life pattern and the way of dealing them.

You cannot enter a house without permission, no male can search the ladies portion of a house, it requires lady searchers, when all this is followed in letter and spirit then surprise is lost. The houses of natives are not ordinary in pattern or construction, they are compounds, the tunnels are dug for escape routes, thus it is possible for any miscreant or wanted person to make good of escape. The other option is to just storm a house which army initially adopted in early days of the operations with far reaching consequences. Thus a search and cordon operation in the agency under the prevailing circumstances was a no win situation.

### Hassu Khel

On the night of 6/7 January 2006, Tochi Scouts had the worst of everything, it suffered catastrophic casualties, its reputation was marred and for the first time since 1971 it had to face so many casualties in a single day in a single attack. The war was now on its door step. Tochi Scouts had taken parts in the actions as part of Operation Al Mizan, yet the mind set was still reeling in the state where it was felt that nothing serious will happen but this attack brought a stark reality to everyone that this is not just army's operation it is every one's war and it has to be won.

The tribes in the area around MirAli includes Daur, Haider Khel, Mausaki, Hassu Khel, Hurmaz, Zerraki, Khaddi, Tori Khel and Maddi Khel. Major villages are Mausaki & Hurmaz Killi in South West, Ipi on South East, these are situated in close proximity of MirAli whereas Hassu Khel, Natasi and Khushali all in the south are almost 6-10 Kilometres away. Hassu Khel is on the northern bank of Tochi River where as Natasi is on southern bank and Khushali is again on the southern bank but slightly away.



## **Natasi Check Post**

Warning orders for establishment of a post on the Tochi River came on 31<sup>st</sup> August 2005. Resultantly Natasi Check Post was established on 2<sup>nd</sup> September 2005 on the orders of 7 Division, its primary aim was to keep an eye on the movement across the river. Initial strength was 25 scouts. There was already a khassadar post at Natasi almost 850 meters south of Tochi River thus it was merely reinforced. Establishment of a post in North Waziristan Agency is not like establishing a post on Mall Road of Peshawar or Lahore; rather it involves a political process, it is always assessed in a historical perspective and in the end no post can be established without the consent of a jirga. From 1900 onwards this system has been challenged time and again by the army with serious consequences and this time again it was no exception. Natasi Post was surrounded by the locals who demanded its removal as it violates their Riway. Jirga of Hassu Khel presented an application to the assistant political agent urging and requesting the removal of Scouts from the Natasi post. Tochi Scouts and political administration had a difficult time in making the division understand the consequences; they partially succeeded and Tochi Scouts were taken away from the Natasi Post from 25<sup>th</sup> October 2005. The No.2 Wing of Tochi Scouts was placed under command sub sector MirAli of Army from 8<sup>th</sup> October 2005 onwards.

## **Hassu Khel Check Post**

Most delicate part in Frontier Warfare is the issue of face saving & ego, whenever these two abstract values override historical evidence then disaster is almost knocking on door. It was decided to have the post in the same area but instead of having it on southern end as part of khassadar post, a new post was established on 25<sup>th</sup>

December 2005 on the northern bank of Tochi River to be known as Hassu Khel Check Post. Tochi Scouts rightly demanded defence stores from the division but it was left to the political administration to do so; which they did but it was forcibly taken away by the locals on 29<sup>th</sup> December 2005.

The post was established under canvas on 31<sup>st</sup> December 2005 with 35 scouts. One officer, two JCOs and 32 scouts (one havildar, one naik, 10 lance naiks, 15 soldiers and five NCEs). This post had the first warning of impending attack when on 3<sup>rd</sup> January 2006 at 2330 hours miscreants fired two rockets coupled with small arms fire, the scouts on duty responded back and attack was repulsed. After an hour the post was again attacked with similar results. Post had no bunkers at that time it was living under the tents.

Post had established a barrier on the main road just adjacent to the bridge, it had four main machine gun mud bunkers. Two bunkers were at a distance of 500 meters away from the bridge on the northern direction (towards MirAli) two were on the bridge itself (one was on the road and other at the base of bridge), mortars were placed in the centre. The bias of post was towards the south east, all living and ammunition tents were pitched on the eastern side adjacent to the bridge relatively at a lower height. Lone armoured personnel carrier was also parked here. It had six machine guns with 18500 rounds, one RPG-7 with 17 rockets, two mortars with 48 bombs and 36 hand grenades apart from APC as major weapons. Post had the built up area on its west (Hassu Khel Village) on the east village of Mullagon with Tochi River flowing on the south, the road MirAli-Jallar bisects it in centre. There were open patches of field between the post and built up areas.

**6/7 January 2006**

On the night of 6/7 January 2006 at 0115 hours suspicious movement was spotted by the machine gun bunker sentry from the northwest direction (Hassu Khel), simultaneously miscreants moved in from the northeast (Mullagon). Both sentries fired warning shots, on hearing the shots the whole complex got into stand-to position (battle ready). This position lasted for half an hour. It should be kept in mind that these two bunkers were almost five hundred meters away from the living bunkers and there was no communication with them.

There was suspense at the post, all were awake and occupied their battle positions, firing cautiously on any movement. Half an hour later the command echelon decided that there is no imminent threat thus apart from the regular sentries all other went back into their tents.

Ten minutes later another burst of fire awoke all and they rushed outside, occupied their battle positions. Heavy fire was coming from north and south of post with small arms being fired from other two directions. Post also replied with full firepower, this lasted for almost ten minutes and then again silence. Artillery fire was called by the post through the No.2 Wing at 0132 hours and within twenty minutes communication was lost with the post. Artillery responded blindly at 0215 hours but by that time it was all over. Captain Yahya, Subedar Zewar Khattak & Naib Subedar Sahib Wazir kept the morale of post high by moving from one position to the other, encouraging under commands, firing at the suspected positions.

Captain Yahya Mohmand of 58 Medium Air Defence Regiment was the post commander, he was an attached officer. Subedar Zewar

Khattak and Naib Subedar Sahib Rehman Wazir were both seasoned scouts; they decided to have a patrolling of the area to ascertain the facts and above all to raise the morale of the post, thus apart from these three, Lance Naiks Tahir Iqbal Khattak & Mukhtar Ullah Orakzai, Sepoys Mukhtar Ali Turi, Khurshid Iqbal Khattak and Mehboob Ur Rehman Khattak formed a fighting patrol. They moved in an anti-clockwise direction, almost between the outer living tent and the machine gun bunker they came across miscreants who in dark shouted and warned them to surrender. Captain Yahya moved forward with an aim to engage the miscreant in conversation and replied in negative to their earlier offer; he was shot dead receiving a full burst of machine gun. On watching this the patrol also not only refused to surrender but rather attack the miscreants who were hiding in darkness. Fighting Patrol charged but they all embraced shahadat.

Sepoy Mehboob Ur Rehman Khattak was the first one to go down when a rocket hit him in the head, *‘Sepoy Mehboob Ur Rehman Khattak, took position in the bunker and retaliated with MG1A3. Due to the heavy fire sprayed by the machine gun of Number 202693 Sepoy Mehboob Ur Rehman Khattak, the miscreants dared not to take a step forward. Seeing the valour and exemplary marksmanship of the individual, frustrated miscreants fired RPG-7 rounds on the bunker. When his bunker collapsed, this brave and gallant son of Frontier Corps kept fighting from the damaged bunker till he was shot with burst of bullets and embraced Shahadat’.*<sup>324</sup>

Sepoy Khurshid Iqbal was hit with a machine gun burst, Lance Naik Mukhtar Hussain Turi and his name sake Mukhtar Orakzai both died fighting with miscreants. *‘Sepoy Mukhtar Ali Turi, was on duty in his bunker. He effectively engaged the miscreants with his*

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<sup>324</sup> Citation by Tochi Scouts. 15 January 2006.

*light machine gun by bringing accurate fire and kept the miscreants away from the post. During fighting one of the miscreants engaged his bunker with RPG-7, due to which Number 203688 Sep Mukhtar Ali Turi, got badly injured but he kept on firing on the miscreants and kept them away. Due to heavy blood loss he embraced Shahadat'.<sup>325</sup>*

Subedar Zewar Wazir was a brave man, miscreants shouted to him offering him the amnesty; he replied back with an abuse followed by a burst of his machine gun, he was the last man to die. Sepoy Razif Afridi and Sepoy Sabir Ullah Wazir both managed to escape from this inferno.

Miscreants who reportedly numbered over 300 were able to take away three sub machine guns, 15 Rifles G-3, five MG1A3, one RPG-7, two 60mm Mortars and 48 grenades apart from sizeable quantity of ammunition which included 6000 rounds of G-3, 1450 rounds of SMG, 1200 rounds of LMG, 17 rockets of RPG-7 and 54 bombs of 60mm Mortar. Not only this they also made good of the ration at the post taking away 84 kilograms of dry milk, two kilogram of tea, 70 Kilograms of sugar and four tins of ghee. The sole armoured personnel carrier was also burnt.

After the incident the strength at the post was increased to 140, out of which 82 were from army and 58 from Tochi Scouts (No.2 Wing) commanded by a captain. It had six LMG's, one 14.5 mm gun, two RPG-7 and two 60mm Mortars apart from night vision devices.

#### Eye Witness account

Sepoy Razif Afridi is from Tirah (Khyber Agency) he joined Tochi Scouts in 2003, had six months training at MirAli before he was employed on operational duties. He recalls that in 2003-2004

<sup>325</sup> *Ibid.*

there was freedom of going to the MiranShah City and none knew anything called Taliban in the city. Remembering that eventful day, he narrates *'I was in the No.2 Wing at MirAli, on that day 6<sup>th</sup> January 2006, I was told to proceed to the Hassu Khel Check Post which was a mile away from the MirAli Bazaar. It was pay day in a sense that vehicle taking the pay of post was proceeding. I was informed by the acting wing commander Captain Qayyum that I will be helping in the construction of the post and as such I do not require to carry my weapon with me. I thus arrived at the post with a heavy hammer.*

*The post was in the shape of three or four tents and few bivouacs, it was on a lower ground, the road passing next to it is on a higher level, the tent complex was on the northern side (towards the MirAli), there were two check points on the road, one was hundred meters away from the bridge other next to the bridge, I had to help in the construction of two rooms for the sentries on the road check points. Subedar Zewar briefed me and assured that I will not be performing any other duty on the post except construction of the rooms. I soon changed into my civvies and worked till evening, two other persons of Tochi Scouts also worked with me Mistri Juma Khan and Sepoy Rasheed, and they both have been working there for last one week.*

*There was no security on the post, locals were coming and going, stopping and chatting, inquiring about the aim of construction of post and in the end giving advice to vacate the area. The whole tent complex was in an open field with only one reinstaring wall on the southern side separates it from the Tochi River. We all had our food in the open, the cook cooked food and chapattis on a big 'tawa' since it was cold thus it was heartening to sit around the fire. I soon left and went into my tent where apart from me there were another dozen of scouts, I slept on the floor with quilt wrapped around me.*

*Around midnight there was a general alarm and stand-to was observed. I just stood outside my tent wearing the shoes under my shalwar kameez with a chaddar wrapped around me. I had no duty; I just stood there idle watching the proceedings. The sentry had observed some movement coming from the southern side towards the camp, he was wearing night vision device. He had alerted the camp, subedar and Captain Yahya stood with him when a short burst of fire was made by the Taliban, in return post fire back with all weapons for fifteen minutes before the subedar intervened and highlighted the ammunition state, post stopped firing. I went back to my tent and soon others also followed. We were still standing outside the tent when all of a sudden a man from outside the post shouted that you all have been surrounded by over 1000 mujahedeen thus you should surrender. Captain Yahya was not fluent in Pashtu language thus Subedar replied back that we do not want any trouble and in the morning the post will be removed therefore you all should go back. The man replied that you should come forward for negotiations and on this the Captain Yahya and Subedar moved forward and then all of sudden we all were hit with rockets and machine gun fire. I at once hit the ground and crawl to my tent; I could see the other tent on fire. After some time I crawl back to the open and saw Taliban standing with his face wrapped holding a gun, there was chaos on the post with men running around, shells bursting, and tents on fire. I crawled away from the scene and jumped over the wall without giving any thought to what is on the other side, I landed on stones. I just remained idle and move few feet deep into a dug hole. The Taliban were carrying out the loot, talking at times in Arabic at times in Pashtu; they were wearing our helmets too.*

*Now own artillery shells started landing in nearby vicinity, I crawled under the bridge to keep myself safe from the splinters.*

*I could see the Taliban walking on the bridge at times flashing their torches. I remained in this state for another two hours. I then crawled a mile and then almost ran towards the Khajauri which was almost three miles away. I reached at Khajauri at Fajr time, other scouts from the post have been pouring in all night thus sentry knew that I am also one of them. Later a court of inquiry was held, all of us were given punishments, sepoys were given 28 days rigorous imprisonment, and all others were demoted. I took the plea that I was never given the rifle in the first instance, but to no avail'.<sup>326</sup>*

Razif might have forgotten certain facts or the events but by and large this is what happened at Hassu Khel, where deviations from standard operating procedures (SOP), taking the whole episode and events lightly and above all delayed reaction from the army and No.2 Wing resulted in this catastrophe.

Never again since Hassu Khel has Tochi Scouts ever been taken by surprise, lesson was learnt through the hard way but it has been learnt. It is paramount to know the culture and back ground of the area, always be prepared for any eventuality and above all never to establish any post in haste.

#### *US Raid on Saidgai-6/7 January 2006*

On the same very night when Hassu Khel Post was under attack, another attack was underway at Saidgai where American gunship helicopters entered Pakistan territory at 0300 hours and fired the missiles at 0305 hours in the same area where Tochi Scouts had carried out search operations on 5<sup>th</sup> January. Americans landed the helicopters near the compounds of Salala Mir & Noor Muhammad,

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Interview with Sepoy Razif, 30th September 2012. Also see post operation report.



conducted a search at 0340 hours and flew back at 0435 hours, leaving behind six dead and six wounded natives and taking away two wanted persons; Gul Badshah and Rehmat Shah.

The events of the first week of the year in the agency set the temperature very high on military and political front. The two incidents of Hassu Khel and American raid on Saidgai were not inter linked but now they were constructed as one by the locals. Pakistan Army helicopters conducted search operations on the day of Hassu Khel attack (7<sup>th</sup> January) and resultantly one car was hit, eight men of Village Idar Khel were arrested and put into jail.

### *Jirga Tochi Mess*

On 7<sup>th</sup> January amidst all this a jirga was called and held at Tochi Mess between 1230-1345 hours which was addressed by the GOC 7 Division Major General Akram Sahi and attended by Commandant Tochi Scouts, Political Agent and Uthmanzai Wazir apart from notable Ulemas, overall over 100 were present. Atmosphere was gloomy, charged and volatile, GOC demanded arrest and handing over of the persons responsible for the attacks on Hassu Khel Post, Uthmanzai regretted the incident, assured of their innocence, agreed to Barampta by handing over eight persons from their tribe till the time actual culprits are not arrested, meanwhile they asked for the reason of attack on the Saidgai. Major General Akram Sahi regretted the attack, in the end funeral prayers were offered for all the deceased including the one who died at Saidgai, it was led by Maulana Muhammad Alam.

Another jirga was held on 8<sup>th</sup> January at Tochi Mess from 1400-1525 hours attended by Senator Mateen Shah, Maulana Noor

Muhammad, Malak Daud Khan, Malak Kalu Khan, Malak Toti Gul, Malak Gul Akbar and many others. Malak Gulabat Khan spoke on behalf of others and stated that they have gone to the Hassu Khel area and they have agreed to hand over ten persons as guarantee , but let me state that we all demand the removal of check post from there and also the return of army. Malak Khan Marjan spoke for the people who were killed in the American raid at Saidgai, Senator Mateen Shah asked for extension of time limit in finding the culprits, initially (Major General Akram Sahi had given 24 hours but now they were demanding it to be extended to five days). By and large jirga was able to outsmart the military as they committed nothing and put conditions for their cooperation which were not acceptable to the army; the leading one was the removal of Hassu Khel Check Post and release of persons captured by the army.

*Amin Post under Attack-9<sup>th</sup> January 2006*

On one hand the jirga was in action and sincere efforts for maintaining peace were underway, on the other hand army and Tochi Scouts were looking for an opportunity to wrest the notion of victory away from the miscreants. A jirga was held in the political agent's office (political agent was on Hajj leave thus assistant political agent was performing his duties as well). HQ 7 Division gave a list which included 22 men from Hassu Khel; six men from Khushali Tori Khel, 26 men of Daur. It must be mentioned that jirga handed over ten persons which they had promised in the yesterday's jirga.

Amidst all this another attack on the Tochi Scouts took place on the night of 9<sup>th</sup>/ 10<sup>th</sup> January when at 0245 hours the initial contact was made with the raiding miscreants. Amin Post was manned by platoon strength with Subedar Suleiman Sher Afridi in command;

it was mix strength with scouts from Thall Scouts also performing the duty. Post was attacked initially through light and small arms fire followed by three inch mortar attack which commenced at 0255 hours with physical raid coming at 0256 hours. Artillery fire was called by the subedar at 0315 hours and raid ended at 0345 hours.

The general pattern of such raids was that the miscreants would bring accurate small arms fire from multiple directions, rapidly changing their positions and locations and then all of a sudden they would rush towards the post hurling grenades and shouting slogans to demoralise the troops. It was mainly a test of nerves of the defenders, Clausewitz had stated that defence is stronger than attack, it is true but then it requires strong leadership which was available at Amin Post. Four scouts of Thall Scouts suffered injuries, Naik Farooq was hit with a bullet in his feet, while Nasrullah and Noor Sultan were hit with splinters in their eyes and Sepoy Taj Muhammad was hit with a bullet in his backbone.

#### *Sarbandkai Post 9/10<sup>th</sup> January 2006*

Another deadly attack was launched by the miscreants on the Sarbandkai Post on the night of 9/10 January 2006. Sarbandkai Post is on the south eastern edge of the MiranShah garrison, almost six miles away from the garrison on a high ground. The post was manned jointly by the Tochi Scouts and army. The bulk of scouts were from Khyber Rifles (No.1 Wing) and 23 Azad Kashmir Regiment. There were 25 soldiers of army and 17 from Frontier Corps. The attack as usual was launched by the miscreants at night taking cover of darkness. The one reason of this was the better field craft of the miscreants, thus they tend to neutralise the advantage of military firepower by attacking during nocturnal hours.

Fire started pouring on the post at 0035 hours, the reaction of the post was to open up the firepower on fixed line, artillery was also called in which primarily is not much of use in such close range, artillery lacked the illumination shells which are most useful when the attacker is in close range of post. Simultaneously MiranShah Garrison itself came under attack when two rockets were fired one after the other at 0045 hours. The physical attack on the Sarbandkai itself was launched from the southern direction taking full advantage of the broken ground. The disadvantage on being a higher ground is that once the attacker crosses the field of fire or the killing zone then the fire power of fixed line weapons becomes ineffective due to the low angle or the dead arc it creates due to its height. Post despite all this held its nerves and repulsed the attack. Five scouts of Khyber Rifles embraced shahadat along with two army soldiers and two were injured one each from army and FC.

*Amin Post Attacked Again-10/11 January 2006.*

On this night two posts were attacked simultaneously by the miscreants, Isha Post came under attack at 0230 hours in which one scout of Mohmand Rifles was injured due to splinter hitting his feet. Amin Post was also attacked but Subedar Suleiman Afridi (Thall Scouts) and Naib Subedar Awal Faqir Orakzai (Tochi Scouts) stood tall and became a beacon of strength for the scouts on the post. There were thirty scouts from Tochi & Thall Scouts on the Amin Post at that time manning four LMG's and 27 were having rifles G-3. It was attacked at 2340 hours; Suleiman immediately called the artillery, also another post Banda which is on the east of Amin responded with fire. Naik Malik Shah Afridi of No.4 Wing Tochi Scouts was injured and so was Sepoy Niazmeen Shah Khattak of Thall Scouts. Sepoy Hameed Akbar Khattak, Havildar Ghulam

Nasir Afridi, Havildar Abdul Hameed Khattak of Tochi Scouts were mentioned in despatches for their valour and extra ordinary courage under attack on Amin Post.

#### *Amin-Sarbandkai-Posts under attack-13/14 January 2006*

These two posts bore the brunt of miscreant's indiscriminate fire which included light and heavy machine guns, rockets and grenades. Sarbandkai was tested on 13<sup>th</sup> January at midnight, it retaliated by calling the field artillery fire, four of these shells landed in the village, resultantly one Muhammad Khan died when one shell landed on his house.

Amin and Isha Posts were attacked on 14<sup>th</sup> January. Amin Post received the first round of miscreants at 2100 hours and without wasting any time it responded with artillery fire. Later it was reported that in the Darpa Khel Village the people tried to catch the miscreants but they fled away.

Tochi Scouts own intelligence sources later revealed while the attack was undergoing on Amin, a group of 10-15 miscreants came out from Darpa Khel Village and reinforced the attackers. These terrorist according to the source belongs to the Abdul Khaliq and Ahmed Jan Group. The madrasah at Darpa Khel known as Khalifa Madrasah is the hub of such groups.

#### *Scouts Training Academy (STA) under attack*

STA at MirAli was the subject of miscreants attack , it was attacked on 18<sup>th</sup> January when at 2350 hours three missiles were fired which landed inside its compound, in retaliation over 60 rounds of

artillery were fired back. On the east of STA resides Zikr Khel Wazir and on the north lives Haider Khel Daur. On 20<sup>th</sup> January again STA was targeted at 1430 hours, this time the number of missiles were increased to five, however all five turned out to be blind which were later diffused by the Tochi Scouts.

#### *Boya-16/17 January 2006*

Boya Bridge was hit with a rocket on the night of 16/17 January. It was reported by the intelligence sources of Tochi Scouts that Ibrahim who is brother of Jalal Ud Din Haqqani, recently released from the American prison and his nephew Ishaq are the master minds of the attack. A car was hijacked for this purpose, driven by Habib and Mahmud both Wazir. These two after firing the missile sped away to Degan.

Thus January 2006 became a turning point in the ongoing efforts by the state to curb the militancy in the agency. Hardly a day passed by when one of the posts was not subject to the fire attack, sometime it would last for minutes at other for hours. None of the army or scout could move freely. The Road Operating Days were in force from October 2005, now everyone had to travel in the military convoys. Extra man power was employed for this purpose; almost 4000 soldiers were employed on a single day.

#### *Improvised Explosive Device (IED) 30<sup>th</sup> January 2006*

The resistance against the Russian invasion in Afghanistan is always synonym with the Stinger anti-aircraft missile, the present insurgency in the Pakistan and in NWA have IEDs apart from suicide bombers as trademark. A simple and easy to make, construct, place

and explode yet with deadly results. An IED requires an electronic detonator, a detonation wave carrier, it uses radio frequency, TNT Powder or slabs. The power unit can be purchased locally which is commercial battery. Varieties of explosives were employed by the miscreants which included anti-tank mines, mortar bombs and anti-personnel mines. Tochi Scouts after coming under the operational control of army had the primary responsibility of ensuring the safe passage of convoys thus it included detection and removal of IED's. Between 7<sup>th</sup> June 2005 – 30<sup>th</sup> December 2005, Tochi Scouts detected 12 IED's at places like Alwara Mandi, Machi Khel, Ghulam Khan, Tarnol Piquet, British Cemetery, Chashmai Bridge, Idak Fort, Saidgi Fort, Darga Mandi and Khawaja Jan Chowk.

IED detection is not easy; they are light and can be hidden or placed anywhere. At British Cemetery it was dug in the ground close to the road, At Chashmai Bridge it was hidden in the rocks on the turn, at other time inside a tree and then on another day in a drain passing close to the road. Tochi Scouts diffused 14 such devices and 11 other were exploded by the miscreants. Which resulted in 9 Shaheeds and 56 injured, four military vehicles were partially damage including two of FC and three were completely destroyed. On 30<sup>th</sup> January 2006 at 1040 hours a convoy of Swat and Kurram Militia who were under command Tochi Scouts had an IED blast near Isha Post resultantly 13 scouts were injured. On the same day another IED was exploded at Khajauri without causing any damage. IED's thus compelled the army drivers to drive fast which resulted in many accidents most notable being on 2<sup>nd</sup> February 2007 when a vehicle of 12 Sind overturned resulting in serious injuries to 17 soldiers including one officer.

IED's thus imposed restriction on the military movement, Road Operating Days were introduced, and use of jammers was

another step taken to counter these. In a briefing to the IGFC the Commandant Tochi Scouts on 11<sup>th</sup> January recommended that cash prizes for informers, pioneer platoon and bomb disposal squad be introduced.

MiranShah City had few craftsmen who were master in making these IED's and were in great demand they were mainly Uzbek, most notorious was the Immad Uzbek another was Khabrooz, the last one had his workshop at MirAli. He was charging approximately .3 Million Rupees for making one IED.

### *Ides of March 2006*

MiranShah remained the key to the success of military operation in North Waziristan Agency; Fort was and is a symbol of the state's authority. Any intrusion into it would have caused an irreparable damage to the dignity and morale of the Tochi Scouts and army.

On 9<sup>th</sup> February 2006 a single rocket attacked was launched in which the rocket landed at the northern edge of the runway at 2220 hours without causing any damage, in retaliation six rounds of artillery were fired. On next night another rocket was launched against the fort, this time eight rounds of artillery were fired back. On 13<sup>th</sup> February Cobra attack helicopters were employed, they fired four rockets on the suspected place from where the rockets were being launched on to the fort and garrison.

The month of March started with an operation by the SSG (Operation Noor Payo) at Saidgai on 1<sup>st</sup> March, it resulted in one fatal casualty and seventeen other soldiers wounded (army). Noor Payo himself was not captured but his two daughters along with 25



foreigners were reportedly killed, his two sons (Marjan & Syed Ali were wounded, captured and later treated at Tochi Scouts hospital). This resulted in all-out attack on the MiranShah Garrison. Maulvi Abdul Khaliq was the main instigator. Within an hour (1215–1320 hours) 17 rockets were fired on the Garrison another five were fired at 2140 hours.

On 2<sup>nd</sup> March the Pakistan Telephone Corporation Limited (PTCL) exchange on the eastern edge of Garrison was taken over by the miscreants. Political administration had to talk with the Maulvi Abdul Khaliq to get the exchange cleared, he agreed but as a bargain the Tochi Scouts post in the city Khawarza Chowk had to be vacated. Operation to clear the PTCL building was carried out by the Tochi Scouts, Captain Altaf Hussain who had joined the Tochi Scouts as a Ghazi Officer in August 2005 was in charge of the Chigha Platoon which carried out the operation on 6<sup>th</sup> March 2006. At 0515 hours on 6<sup>th</sup> March the Chigha Platoon entered the PTCL building, telephonic link was restored at by 0900 hours. It was this display of force which compelled the miscreants to vacate the building.

4<sup>th</sup> March was a normal day, nothing unusual took place till evening but at 1645 hours, three missiles were fired from the city side which landed inside the fort, killing one and injuring four soldiers of Tochi Scouts. Faqir Taj Mohmand embraced shahadat while Ijtahad Ali Turi, Ikram Ali Turi, Ghaffar Ali Orakzai and Idrees Khattak were injured. In retaliation miscreants positions were hit hard with artillery. Subedar Amir Nawab Khattak, Havildar Khalid Iqbal Khattak, Lance Naik Nateef Ur Rehman Khattak & Naik Manzoor Afridi of Thall Medium Battery fired 19 rounds in first ten minutes, all in all they fired 63 rounds of medium artillery.

It was not just a case of firing missiles rather the miscreants had gathered around the western edge of garrison but stiff and accurate fire by Sargardan Post spoiled their efforts. Havildar Mobeen Afridi, Havildar Misl Khan Khattak (later embraced shahadat due to missile attack in 2007) Naik Ismat Gul Khattak all led by Naib Subedar Syed Arif Hussain Turi were mentioned in despatches for their boldness and courage.

On the same day at almost same time (1645 hours) another attack was planned and executed by the miscreants on the north-eastern wall there by attacking the political agent's colony; aim was to establish a foothold in the garrison. This attack was thwarted by the timely action, co-ordination, determination and better firing standards of Tochi Scouts. Sepoy Sajid Hussain Turi, Lance Naik Dilbar Hussain Turi, Lance Naik Akhtar Ali Bangash, Havildar Rehman Ullah Mohmand, Sepoy Liaqat Hussain Turi he was having a mere year service in Tochi Scouts were mentioned in despatches for their valour. The attack which was launched at 1645 hours initially did not had much of strength but with every passing moment the miscreants were growing in numbers. In this background the action of Tochi Scouts needs to be studied. This section held the attackers at bay for an hour before further reinforcement could join in defending the garrison. Naib Subedar Ali Zeb Bangash was also commended for his leadership qualities. Co-ordination of own fire was a tantamount task, there were recoilless rifles, artillery, heavy machine gun and mortars available for a befitting reply. Major Syed Kamran Hashmi as intelligence officer of Tochi Scouts was equal to the task. No.5 Wing was responsible for the inner perimeter defence, its wing commander Lieutenant Colonel Zafar Ullah Khan was also mention in despatches for his inspirational leadership under the tiring circumstance.

On 17<sup>th</sup> March another rocket attack was launched on the fort when two missiles landed near stadium without causing any injury.

As a punitive measure and to curb any further attacks on the fort the dominating points and buildings in the city which included the water reservoir a 150 feet high tower was hit, artillery shells also targeted another high rise building where as the Cobra strafed the water reservoirs on different houses which were acting as sniper and observation posts for the miscreants. Above all Madrasah Gulshan Ul Uloom was demolished, Fazal-e-Ghani Hospital Complex also met the same fate, a number of houses facing the eastern wall of the fort were all demolished.

### **Gosh Post & Thall Piquet**

On 21 March at 0340 hours both the post and piquet came under attack, miscreants fixed the Thall Piquet with mortar fire and physically attacked the Gosh. At Gosh 20 scouts of Mohmand Rifles and 14 Tochi Scouts were deployed. Miscreants launched multidirectional attack on both the posts. Gosh had a microwave communication tower as well, the post fought valiantly and blunted the attack. Later artillery fire was brought upon the miscreants.

The night passed peacefully, a disaster was averted and miscreants were taught the lesson that they cannot over run a post any more, however the lessons drawn were also pertinent, which included provision of night vision devices, defence stores and provision of high frequency communication sets.

### *Tut Narai Post-24<sup>th</sup> March 2006*

By the end of March 2006 Tochi Scouts was manning 80 posts and seven check posts out of which 42 posts were jointly manned

by the army and Tochi Scouts and four check posts were also jointly manned. No.3 Wing at Datta Khel was manning 16 posts out of which only one post was independent rest all were jointly manned. Tut Narai was one such jointly manned post where army had 15 soldiers and Tochi Scouts had 40 scouts.

Tut Narai made headlines in 1919 when Musa Khan was able to pull a fast one on the North Waziristan Militia, on the night of 26/27<sup>th</sup> March 2006 this post again came under attack. Major Sajjad Munir Yusafzai was the post commander since 6<sup>th</sup> March; he was serving in No.3 Wing Tochi Scouts.

Tut Narai is a complex of three positions, the main position situated close to a dry nullah and main track which leads from Datta Khel to the Gardei and Razmak passes like a curving snake thus separating the North-western post from the other two posts. Main Post had three rooms two were occupied by the Khassadars and the Tochi Scouts and the third room by the 5<sup>th</sup> Northern Light Infantry (NLI); it also had a lawn and a mosque. Apart from this main position the post had two more protection posts, 500 yards away on the Northwest which is 250 meters higher than the main post and was manned by the Tochi Scouts, the other protection post located 150 yards towards the Southwest and 50 meters higher than the main post was manned by the 5 NLI. In terms of tribes Manzar Khel occupied the northern and southern edges of the post whereas Khaddar Khel inhabited the western edge. The post is covered by high ground all around; the lone heli pad is across the track from the post gate.

The Tochi Scouts protection post was located next to the track junction from where apart from the main track a branch track leads

towards a civilian house across the nullah. The size of hillock on which the protection post was sited had length of 125 yards and width of 30 yards. This post had barbed wire all around; post itself is in elongated shape having two machine gun bunkers on each end with a living room in the mid, latrines on its east and kitchen on the south west. There were eight trenches which starting from Northwest were numbered as 1-8. Trench No.2 and No.5 were the machine gun trenches and No.3 was a RPG-7 trench. The housing (living, latrine, kitchen) in the middle thus divides the whole post into two parts, limiting observation and fire among the various trenches on both sides. Post had a wall about four feet high and thirty yards away from the protection post itself, it was in a depression, ahead of wall barbed wire was placed for protection. A black rock on the south-eastern edge restricted the observation and fire.

On the night of 23/24<sup>th</sup> all the three complexes were simultaneously put under fire initially and later physical assault was carried out on the Tochi Scouts post. Naib Subedar Shafi Ur Rehman Wazir was the post commander at the Tochi Post (Northern) with fourteen other scouts. At 0235 hours while he was walking in between the trenches as per his routine to see how the things are he heard the first burst of fire, he jumped into the nearest trench and opened up the fire, soon the fire started coming from all the three direction (Northern, North-eastern & South-eastern). After emptying his two magazines he calmed his nerves and started observing for the miscreants' direction of fire, it was dark night and amidst this solitude the shattering noise of fire, rocket grenades and machine gun rounds hitting the lone bunker and then ricocheting all around was nerve wrecking. Shafi had been in Tochi Scouts since 1987, he calmed his nerves and crawled to another trench to raise the morale of his scouts, at the next trench which was a RPG-7 trench with Sepoy Gulzar and Naik

Munir Hussain manning it; he fired a round himself towards a flash, his hand got burnt, Naik Munir was hesitant to fire citing a blockage in the launcher as the reason on which Shafi had to demonstrate. The miscreants pushed forward and reached the eastern edge of the post. Sepoy Arshad Khan died on the spot in his trench with his hand still on the machine gun trigger.

As the miscreants reached inside the post compound the Naik Munir, Sepoys Saifullah, Adil Rehman, Muhammad Iqbal, Lehaz Muhammad and Rozi Khan moved into the alternate position which made the whole matter complex. Thus with the abandoning of trench No.1,4 and 5 the miscreants were able to crawl to the trench No. 1 and the machine gun trench taking away in the end one LMG, one RPG-7, one Rifle G-3 . However the other trenches kept their wits about and were able to keep the miscreants at bay otherwise they would have over run the whole complex.

Naik Shakoor Jan Wazir was the duty NCO at the time of firing, the procedure at vogue on the posts was to have a guard of two sepoy with one NCO as guard commander, it at night gives ample time of rest to everyone. This is the advantage which attacker enjoys over the defender as he has the freedom of action. Defender on the other hand cannot remain vigilant all the time, it may takes weeks or even months before a post is attacked thus a routine is adopted where everyone on the post is at various level of readiness. The two sentries on two hour watch thus are the first one to react, other takes minutes to wake up, put on the shoes and then rush to their respective trenches. Shakoor narrates that the first volley of fire was from the eastern edge and sentry fired back and then came the fire from the front and from the left, it was intense. I fired 173 rounds of machine gun before it was double feed, Sepoy Arshad Khan was

with me and then he had gone to the trench No 8 where he embraced shahadat. The machine gun post was slightly higher than the rest of other trenches and as such was the main target of miscreants fire, the distance between the southern and northern walls to the trenches was about 30 yards (after the incident this was reduced).

Sepoy Majid Ullah Mohmand was the sentry in the trench No.6 which was on the South-western irection when all this started, *'I had three magazines of ammunition Rifle G-3 filled which I fired, and it took me almost twenty minutes to do so then I shouted to Sepoy Muntazim to bring more magazines to me, the miscreants were shouting that "Ismail has died (he was probably one of the attacker)"*.

In the end the miscreants were able to get away from the post with one LMG, one RPG-7, one Motorola and few magazines of the ammunition, later in the morning the RPG-7 was found abandoned in the nullah.

Miscreants might have done more damage but due to the timely intervention of the Cobra Attack helicopter at 0410 hours, which created more of deterrent than actual damage. The reason being that there was no difference among the attacker and defender, Cobra had the night vision devices but firing of machine gun with precision was not possible thus few rockets which they fired landed away from the post. Artillery fire was also brought but it had no impact rather calling any fire upon own troops is demoralising. Tut Narai Post fired 1720 rounds of G-3, 180 rounds of SMG, 2050 rounds of LMG, three rockets and also threw 19 high explosives grenades onto the miscreants. There was no separate bunker for ammunition rather it was placed in the living bunker.

Tut Narai Post action on that night is an example of human conduct and behaviour under stress and fear. On that night there were fifteen scouts representing seven different tribes yet the behaviour of all varied; even among themselves. Naib Subedar Shafi Ur Rehman Wazir stood the test and inspired every one under his command with bravery and exemplary courage. However he failed to inspire few odd individuals(four in number) who could not take the stress of the attack and abandoned the post the topmost was the Rozi Khan who fled and took refuge in a nullah four hundred meters away and came back to the post at 0700 hours.

A thorough court of inquiry was conducted which recommended that the army and scouts posts be amalgamated and no independent post of scouts should be maintained within a complex of posts, it also recommended that Tut Narai post itself should be abandoned.<sup>327</sup> In the end it was confirmed that post had been able to kill six miscreants and injured nine others. GOC 7 Division visited the post and lauded the action of Tochi Scouts and gave cash prize of Rupees seven thousand.<sup>328</sup>

British Cemetery Last Guard-23<sup>rd</sup> April 2006.

British Cemetery inside the city on its South-eastern edge is more of a Tochi Scouts Cemetery, as it was being maintained by the scouts. The majority of graves inside are of those British officers who died here with their boots on. It is worth mentioning that Tochi has been maintaining and is still looking after the graves of Afghan Mujahedeen, this graveyard is in front of the Northern gate. Tochi Scouts is a cultural icon of the valley and try to preserve all the cultural and military heritage of the valley irrespective of which side

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327 Recommendations of the court, dated 28<sup>th</sup> April 2006, court was headed by Major Saleem Qadir with Captain Saqib and Subedar Habib Jan Afridi as members.

328 Tochi Scouts letter No. 5305/7 of 28<sup>th</sup> August 2006.



of coin they belong. The library, Masjid e Muhajeeren and museum apart from the Yadgaar are few of the examples. The guard in the British Cemetery is one of the oldest in Tochi Scouts; the guard is not primarily for the cemetery alone but is known as such, the other old guard is Serai guard.

On 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2006 at 1045 hours Sepoy Qayyum Shah Mohmand was standing on guard at the cemetery when a car passing by opened fire hitting him on the chest, he died on spot but his two other comrades were alert and they without wasting any time returned the fire, this duel lasted for twelve minutes at the end two miscreants namely Asad and Wali were killed and other two namely Liaqat Ali and Sharifullah were arrested. As a precaution the Cemetery Guard was discontinued, later all graves were defaced by the Taliban. Qayyum was born on 11<sup>th</sup> August 1984 in a small village by the name of Dhund in District Charsadda, he joined Tochi Scouts after passing his matriculation examination on 21<sup>st</sup> November 2004, and he was posted in No.5 Wing at Boya.

### **Veterans Requests**

In April 2006, Honorary Captain In charge Pensioners Jafar Khan wrote a letter to IGFC Major General Alam Khattak, this petition had signatures of over ten subedar majors. The crux of the petition was to highlight the difference in rules, regulations and customs of service mainly in relation to the shaheeds of army and Frontier Corps. *‘we should like to compare FC and army as two sons of a father, if a father gives more attention to his one son and ignore the other what will be the feelings of the ignored son, if both are equally obedient to his father, same is the case of Frontier Corps and the army personnel, we are the ignored son.’*<sup>329</sup>

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329 Tochi Scouts Archives.

The points highlighted by the pensioners were genuine and accepted by the IGFC. Issues seems minor but keeping in view the culture and very nature of the scouts they were pertinent, for instance the lack of any condolence letter on death in operations, absence of shaheeds pictures in the FC magazine as compared to the Army Magazine Hilal. They highlighted that the wards of army is given the free medical treatment in military hospitals but no such arrangements have been made for FC. Above all the discrimination in pay and allowances of army and scouts while performing the same job.

This letter was timely, it had its impact and there was a genuine effort to address the grievances. The fact that army and FC while performing same duty should have differential & preferential rules is certainly beyond comprehension.

Similar issues were raised earlier also in which the same attitude towards FC troops while performing the duty with Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA) was also highlighted, for instance scouts were not authorised free air warrants, which an army soldier was enjoying.

In September 2012, Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani hosted a dinner for war veterans, attended by FC troops also. Almost all points raised in the original letter have been addressed by then less the treatment of scouts after retirement.

### *Suicide Attacks, May-June 2006*

Miscreants changed their tactics and along with attacking the post physically or with rockets they now resorted to the suicidal

attacks on the check posts, the aim was to force the militia and army to remove these check posts thus giving them free hand to travel at any time of day.

Hurmaz School MirAli Check Post was the first to be hit with suicide attack when on 20<sup>th</sup> May 2006 at 1015 hours Sepoy Muhammad Laiq Afridi and Sepoy Waheed Rehman Khattak both from No.2 Wing were performing the duty of checking every vehicle. Laiq was looking at the rear compartment of a Land Cruiser when Waheed noticed a bearded man walking briskly towards them, the man put hands in his pocket and threw two hand grenades on these scouts. Laiq died instantly, Waheed stood there when he was hit with a burst of SMG from the southern side and he also had his last breath there. Sepoy Ghazi ur Rehman Orakzai the third sentry took the position and fired at the direction of incoming fire, he moved towards his fallen scouts, in the process he also received a bullet on his thigh.

Very next day Datta Khel Check Post was made target when on 28<sup>th</sup> May 2006 another bearded suicide bomber in mid-thirties blew himself at the check post resulting in the death of Lance Naik Muhammad Ashraf Mohmand and injuring Subedar Shams Ul Haq Wazir, Naik Zulfiqar Alam Khattak and Sepoy Mir Hassan Jan Turi. One khassadar also embraced shahadat. The check post was made of mud bricks and on the track leading towards the Tut Narai, it was in a clump of trees, there were two other protection posts almost fifty yards behind and the main post was hundred meters away and same distance high on a crow flight but on ground a track leads to it in a winding pattern. The layout was as per the teaching but it was good for a physical attack and not for the suicidal attack. Suicide bomber had used a white station car; the power of blast threw the parts of

the car to the other two posts as well. The post itself was subject to physical attack when on 4<sup>th</sup> June 2006 indiscriminate fire was opened on it. The ensuing fire fight which started after the attack later caused serious injuries to Sepoy Kamal Shah Bhittani. The attack had started at 0145 hours while Kamal was on duty, he fired back and as per teaching he moved to change his firing position, he was hit with a bullet on his left foot during the manoeuvre.

In June, Isha Post came under suicide attack on 26<sup>th</sup> June 2006; routine checking was in progress, Sepoy Abid Ullah was having a thorough inspection of a Hiace, when he noticed a white Suzuki car moving from MiranShah towards MirAli accelerating pass the already parked vehicle. Subedar Siraj Gul also noticed this and he almost came in front of the white Suzuki, Abid also rushed behind the car. The vehicle at that instant blew up.

It killed Subedar Siraj Gul Khattak instantly and injured Sepoy Abid Ullah Wazir. Isha Check Post crossing point then was narrow and had the posts on both sides of the road. The northern post was higher and much bigger in size but the one used for the checking of the vehicles and persons was a makeshift and almost at the road level. The blast waves not only destroyed the small post on the road but also played havoc with the bigger post ripping its roof and walls. Attack took place at 1730 hours and luckily majority of the sepoys had taken their food earlier on that day otherwise the figure of casualties would have been much higher. Isha was a post manned jointly by the Tochi, Thall and Swat Scouts troops, there were 23 scouts injured apart from three khassadars. Sepoy Abid Ullah took his last breath at Bannu CMH, apart from two shaheeds of Tochi Scouts four other scouts and one khassadar also embraced shahadat. Havildar Saif Ur Rehman Wazir, Sepoys Ijaz Ahmed Afridi, Rehmat

Ullah Afridi and Asif Raza Khattak of Tochi Scouts were among the injured.

### *Survivors*

Very few people have survived a helicopter crash, Sepoy Muntazim Shah Mohmand and Sepoy Waseem Abbas Bangash are among those lucky who can narrate this to their next generation. On 21<sup>st</sup> June both were detailed with an Army Aviation Bell 412 Helicopter flying from Bannu to MiranShah for convoy protection. Both Tochi Scouts were signallers, the helicopter crashed overhead Baran Dam near Bannu, both pilots died. Waseem Abbas felt out of the helicopter at the time of impact and sustained injuries whereas Muntazim remained inside. Muntazim had followed the direction and instructions to fasten his seat belt. Both survived but Waseem sustained injuries and remained admitted in hospital for a much longer duration whereas Muntazim was back on duty after few days.

### *Banda Post-June 2006*

Banda Post was established on 26<sup>th</sup> July 2005 at a distance of six kilometres south east of MiranShah, it is almost 500 feet higher on a ridge surrounded by villages of Banda and Anghar, a track passes below almost 750 yards away which leads across a road then to a spring amidst woods onwards to the Tochi River, usually a platoon manned it. Creating a post is not difficult in terms of manpower the problem is of sustaining it with fresh water for drinking and provision of fresh rations. The dry rations can be stored for months like flour, sugar, tea, rice, pulses but that cannot sustain the troops, they require fresh items like vegetables. Fresh meat is again not

much of an issue as meat on hoof can be provided to the posts. Fresh water is even a bigger issue, the area generally is void of water and these posts are at higher ground thus the fresh water for drinking is a major logistic night mare. At many posts the water is stored for week but then it has its own drawbacks it is always preferred to maintain a fresh supply of ration and water. Thus donkeys and mules are of paramount importance in the sustenance of any post. In army the supply corps is responsible for the logistic provisions but in Frontier Corps the same is done through private contractors or by giving money to the troops to buy it themselves; it works but it proved fatal at Banda Post.

The fresh contractor was threatened by the Taliban to stop the supply to the posts and he complied, Banda Post scouts thus resorted with buying the fresh items from the nearby village through the children. Mali (gardener) Damsaz of Tochi Scouts is a resident of MiranShah Village, he is an old man in his mid-sixties, speak very little Urdu and serving in Tochi Scouts since 1985; he was given the responsibility of this and he fulfilled this task admirably. He at times even took the ammunition and other equipment from the fort in the hired car and dropped them at the base of the post from where the scouts would collect it.

In June 2006 Naib Subedar Rahim Zaman Bangash was commanding it, he arrived on the post on 8<sup>th</sup> June and till 22<sup>nd</sup> June the post was fired upon no less than 14 times by the miscreants.

On 23<sup>rd</sup> June the post ran out of even dry ration which included dry milk, moreover the firewood and sandbags were in perilous quantity thus Rahim sent signal for these and next day these items were received through a civil tractor. Post was able to take them up but still a considerable quantity of firewood was left in open.

On 25<sup>th</sup> June Rahim went down along with Lance Naik Hafeezullah and Sepoy Sajid Iqbal with an aim to bring the firewood up, to buy the fresh ration and above all to freshen up in the nearby spring. So confident he was or so casual they all were that none was carrying any weapon. For fresh ration he just waved to a passing by car but it sped away, disgusted with the behaviour of the driver, Rahim now reached the spring which had thick growth on both sides and few deserted huts, as he reached near the spring the first shot hit Hafeezullah on the right side of the face he just felt back with the power of the shot. Sepoy Sajid Iqbal who was few steps back simply turned around and ran for the post while Rahim and Hafeez took cover, in the next second a shot first pierced through the body of running Sajid and other shots hit Rahim. Naik Rytan Ali was the senior at the post and he already had his apprehension about the new post commander who had gone down without even informing him to cover him, he made a mental note to talk about this when he arrives back.

Sepoy Yar Muhammad Bangash had a service of nine years and was the sentry at the post when Sajid was hit, as a sentry he had been watching them going down the track, waving to the car and then he just looked at the other end to make sure that nothing untoward happens during his tenure of duty. He again gazed at the party going towards the spring which was 200 yards away and the very thought of fresh water created ripples in his own body it had been almost nine days that he had not taken any bath for the reason that there was no water on the post for such luxury. *‘I observed that they had suddenly sat down on the ground, then started running in different direction and again falling on the ground, I immediately realised that something has gone wrong, Naik Rytan Ali the next senior also came and immediately started firing in the woods, the complete post was*

*now stand to and firing on to the woods, after fifteen minutes, Rytan and I decided to go down because all three of our comrades were lying unconscious, Sepoy Mateen also volunteered to come with us, rest of the post provided us fire cover, when we reached at the fallen comrades I saw that all of them have been hit with bullets, blood was oozing profusely from various parts, I saw a car passing by and waved it, it stopped but driver was not willing to take these wounded back to MiranShah for the fear of Taliban, meanwhile I saw Mali Damsaz who normally comes with our fresh ration, he ran towards us and it was he who convinced the driver to take these wounded , he accepted the loss if any that will occur to the car and then sat with the wounded bodies and took them to the MiranShah.*<sup>330</sup>

Sepoy Sajid Iqbal recalls those moments when he was hit with bullets ‘ *I first saw Hafeez being hit because I heard the noise of bullet, as an instinct I ran back towards the post while I still heard Naib Subedar Rahim shouting me to hit the ground but before I could comply with, I felt a shock wave passing through my left shoulder and micro seconds later I felt the same sensations in my left leg, due to shock I hit the ground and it was then I realised that I have been hit with bullets, the pain was not much more like needles pricking but mind suffered the most, I could feel blood drenching out of my body, the last thoughts that came to my mind were that of my mother.*’<sup>331</sup>

Hafeezullah Wazir who received the first bullet had similar feelings of being hit, ‘ *I was hit in the leg first and when due to recoil I bent I received another stinging blow in my face, I did not realised at that moment that I have been hit with a bullet, but when the noise followed the shock pain then I came to know that I am hit, I don’t*

330 Court of Inquiry, July 2006. Tochi Scouts Archives

331 Interview with Sepoy Sajid on 21st August 2012 at MiranShah



*remember anything from that point onwards, all I recall is that I am in a car and then varying faces and voices started coming into my mind, I had recollections of my parents, family and then another cloud.'*

This is a classic tale of bravery amidst violation of standing orders procedures(SOP's), the troops especially the platoon commanders were still living in an aura and era of friendly environments and had to pay dearly for such hallucinations.

In an another related incident which took place at Ismail Khel Post, three scouts two from Tochi and one from Swat Scouts performing the duty at Ismail Khel Post had similar experience on 7<sup>th</sup> April 2006 when all three had gone down from the post along with two donkeys to fetch fresh water for the post, only two were armed both from Tochi Scouts (Naik Amanullah Wazir with SMG & Sepoy Shad Ali Khan Wazir with Rifle G-3). As the party reached the spring, four miscreants who were hiding behind the rocks and had been observing the routine of the post for well over a month suddenly jumped on these scouts, without giving them any reaction time to even straighten their rifles, they put their shining daggers on to their throats and gave the warning, 'one word and you will be slaughtered like a lamb'. They then tied their hands and stuffed their mouths and walked away with two rifles and donkeys. Later these were released from their bondage by another party who also searched for the missing weapons and surprisingly found G-3 almost 200 yards away but there was no trace of the SMG.

It is in circumstances like this that the name of Havildar Karrar Shah Afridi comes into mind, who during 1942 Datta Khel attack had made sure that his recruit retrieve his weapon but also his turban.

## Peace Talks

The efforts for peace had been going on since mid-January 2006 after the two deadly attacks one on Hassu Khel and other on Sarbandkai. In the jirga held on 26<sup>th</sup> January 2006 presided by the Political Agent and attended by Malak Ghulabat Khan, Maulana Dindar, Maulana Nek Zaman, Maulana Muhammad Alam, Malak Shireen Akbar, Malak Afzal, Malak Shahzad and Malak Tooti Gul( it is no surprise that the numbers of religious persons now challenges the traditional malaks). It was a volatile jirga which was hijacked by the religious leaders, Maulana Nek Zaman was a member of national assembly whereas Maulana Dindar is the same person who attacked the Boya Fort in 1965.

Political agent initially tried to be on offensive asking them to hand over the wanted persons who are involved in attacks on the military posts, the jirga demanded that the state should take action against the Americans for violating their dignity and why the military has failed to protect them. Political Agent countered them by stating that there are spies among you who have given the information to the Americans in greed of dollars and above all why you people are giving refugee to the wanted persons, when army and militia carries out raid then you fire back. In the end none could agree with each other and it dispersed.

A day earlier on 24<sup>th</sup> January 2006 a delegation of religious persons led by Maulana Abdur Rehman had gone to Dera Ismail Khan to meet the leader of opposition Maulana Fazal Ur Rehman (all religious parties in NWA are affiliated with the Fazal Ur Rehman's party). Maulana Fazal spoke in nationalist manner and it was agreed that no one will give the protection to foreigners and

all religious seminaries will get themselves registered. All mosques and madrasahs did not agreed with these instructions. On 6<sup>th</sup> January 2006 in another jirga held at Darpa Khel among the Uthmanzai and Taliban, they demanded that the freedom of crossing the border be given to Taliban, all check post on main roads be removed, the very people with whom we are residing should not be put under pressure and above all, all our arrested Taliban should be released.

Baitullah Mahsud and Abdullah Mahsud two wanted rebel commanders also addressed a Friday sermon on 20<sup>th</sup> January at Spelga and openly called the people to carry out jihad against the state, a day earlier on 18<sup>th</sup> January they had meeting at Degan where the locals had requested them to stop the fighting in NWA.<sup>332</sup>

The people of the agency were divided in two factions, majority in favour of the military and state and other wanted militancy. Mostly the religious seminaries (not all) but unregistered were in favour of second option for instance AlMarkaz Ul Uloom at Alwara Mandi an unregistered madrasah headed by Maulana Fatah Ullah having a strength of 60/65 students with 20 odd Afghani students as well, another madrasah at Maizar under Maulana Shakeel was again unregistered with 80 odd students all under 12 years of age. In the same period a Danish newspaper published blasphemous cartoons which further added fuel to the already volatile situation. NWA was and still is very sensitive to any world event that creates even an iota of insult regarding the Islam.

After the Noor Payo raid the situation became tense. On 22<sup>nd</sup> April 206 IGFC addressed a jirga at MiranShah which was attended by the PA, commandant and other notables. For the continuity sake

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332 Intelligence report of Tochi Scouts dated 1<sup>st</sup> February 2006; source of the report was in attendance at both places.

it is highlighted that on 5<sup>th</sup> April another major engagement took place between the military and miscreants in which three soldiers of NLI embraced shahadat. IGFC stated that only 2% of population in the agency has made the majority hostage. The malaks in return asked for safe passages to move across the border and suggesting that military should give them passwords for this purpose.

Another Grand Jirga was held on 13<sup>th</sup> August 2006 in which the Taliban Shura committee asked for the release of all the prisoners before any further progress be made. One of the key issue was the presence of Arab fighters notably Abu Kash and Abu Nasr Groups, they had engaged into marriages with locals, Abu Nasr was married in MirAli area with a Daur family and his sister was also married into locals. Abu Kash had erected the check posts of his own group as well; this put him at odds with Maulana Sadiq Noor Group. They had almost drawn the weapons on each other on 12<sup>th</sup> August 2006 at Hurmaz Daur area.

The Jirga on 23<sup>th</sup> August again failed to reach a consensus, all these moves were initiated by the PA who assured the jirga that the answers to their queries will be given on 24<sup>th</sup> August after meeting of Governor NWFP with the President of Pakistan and till that time the cease fire will remain in force. On the same night or next day these Taliban leaders including Hafiz Gul Bahadur Madda Khel Wazir who led the other members reached Bannu where they met Maulana Fazal Ur Rehman.<sup>333</sup>

On 25<sup>th</sup> August 2006 at Khatti Killi the Taliban or their jirga extended the cease fire for another fifteen days, on the same day at another jirga held at Idak Maulana Dindar Hassu Khel Daur was elected as the president of Jamaiat Ulema Islam (Fazal Rehman

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333 Tochi Scouts Intelligence Report .

Group). Finally the very demand of Taliban was accepted when on 26<sup>th</sup> August 2006 the PA released ten prisoners demanded by the Jirga. The rest of the prisoners numbering thirteen went on a hunger strike from 30<sup>th</sup> August onwards; they finally ended their hunger strike after assurance from PA on 31<sup>st</sup> August that they all will be released next day. On the same day (31<sup>st</sup> August) another grand jirga was held at MiranShah presided by PA Doctor Fakhr Alam who agreed to the release of all prisoners on 1<sup>st</sup> September and also to return all confiscated material, above all the state will pay the damages incurred to the local and in return all looted weapons from the military will be handed back.

Friday 1<sup>st</sup> September 2006 was a hectic day with multiple meetings taking place at various places and hideouts, end result was that a ten members committee will be formed to look after the peace and the pact in the agency. On 2<sup>nd</sup> September at 1130 hours the draft copy of the pact was scrutinised by the Taliban Shura and Grand Jirga at Madrasah Ashrafia at MiranShah and finally they all agreed on the draft copy, Taliban were led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur, at 1700 hours they all signed at the Circuit House (Taliban Commanders did not signed) thus grand jirga was able to bring peace in the agency after a lapse of nine months, Taliban Commanders agreed to sign on 5<sup>th</sup> September.

#### *5<sup>th</sup> September 2006, Pact Signed.*

On 5<sup>th</sup> September 2006 at 1130 hours a grand jirga was held at MiranShah in which peace pact was signed, GOC 7 Division, Acting Commandant Tochi Scouts Lieutenant Colonel Bilal, Political Agent North Waziristan Agency, Taliban commanders and over 350 local malaks and ulemas attended it, Political Agent signed it on behalf

of the state and on behalf of Taliban it was signed by the seven Maulana, Holy Koran was made as witness.

Army returned three double cabins, one single cabin, one land cruiser, 22 Kalashnikovs, one .303 Rifle, two .30 pistols and one movie camera. In return Taliban handed back four Rifle G-3 along with 237 rounds, one beret, four uniform belts and one bandolier. It is obvious that this all was customary and cosmetic in nature but more important than this was the peace in the agency.

On very next day as a sign of good will Taliban arrested one suspicious man and handed it over to the 7 Division. Tochi Scouts were once again allowed to visit the MiranShah Bazaar and travel in private transport; it seem as if the good old times are returning.

As a sign of goodwill a friendly volleyball match was played between the Tochi Scouts and civilians on 20<sup>th</sup> September, few army players were also accommodated in the scouts' team. A free mobile medical camp was also established on 17<sup>th</sup> October 2006 by 117 Brigade, over 433 patients were treated including 206 females and 123 children.

Army (19 FF & 23 AK) as part of the pact closed down certain posts including Boya and Machis (only Tochi Scouts were agreed to remain there), Tochi closed down PTCL, Colony, from Kalanjar I the 19FF pulled back its troops thus only Tochi was left there, army also recalled troops from Thall Piquet, Tut Narai Post (mines were also removed), Dardon II and Sarbandkai Posts.

### *6<sup>th</sup> September Defence Day Celebration.*

The traditional Defence of Pakistan Day was celebrated with religious zeal, military vigour and tradition. The signing of the

peace pact brought back the traditional fervour, pomp and glory to this function. Tochi Scouts celebrated it in the Martyrs Monument Park. Lieutenant Colonel Bilal who was performing the duty of commandant, all officers, junior commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers attended it. Colourful buntings were placed. Scouts of Thall and Swat were also presented. Flower wreaths were placed at the monument and special prayers were held for all martyrs who had laid their lives in the recent unrest in the agency.

By end November 2006 Tochi Scouts had conducted 25 operations as part of Operation AlMizan, with 31 injured and 21 Scouts embracing shahadat, it had killed 61 miscreants, apprehended 31 and injured another 10.

### Media in Agency

On 8<sup>th</sup> September 2006 a media team comprising of CNN came on a helicopter had a brief stay at MiranShah and then flew to Razmak and back to Islamabad. Nothing has damaged more to the cause of military in the agency then these media channels who have either a very brief stay here or never visited it yet they every evening similar to Story Teller Bazaar; passes judgements on what should be done here and what is being done is wrong; it is still going on.

Assistant Political Officer North Waziristan Agency Mr Iqbal Khattak needs commendation for his utmost dedication and professional competence, his name was recommended by the Commandant Tochi Scouts Colonel Yousaf Iqbal for ‘Order of Shujaat’ in November 2006.

## **Eid Ul Fitr 2006**

Eid was celebrated with religious fervour, main prayer congregation was organised at Tochi Scouts Stadium at 0830 hours on 25<sup>th</sup> October 2006, a second prayer congregation was held at 1000 hours. The reason for having two congregations of prayers was to facilitate the troops on guard duties. From now onwards it became a standard pattern to have two congregations.



## **2007 a Bloody Year**

Year started with Eid Ul Azha prayers at Tochi Stadium at 0835 hours and at 1000 hours Headquarters Logistics 7 Division arranged a tea break for all officers and JCO's of MiranShah Camp; logistics have been very helpful to the Tochi Scouts. The hopes of a lasting peace in the agency had their last breath in 2007 when a wave of IED's, suicidal attacks, ambush, raids, fire and physical attacks rocked the agency. Statistically only 67 such attacks had taken place till September 2006, out of which 24 such incidents occurred in July alone. Therefore in the two years period since army took control only 91 attacks occurred but then from here till February 2008 it touched an all-time high of 426 such incidents. Similarly the casualties which were only 86 shaheeds till September 2006, but in the next eleven months there were 215 shaheeds and 480 wounded. The peace pact which was signed on 6<sup>th</sup> September did not last long and another peace agreement was reached between the government and miscreants on 17<sup>th</sup> February 2008 which then remained in vogue for a much longer duration and even today the agency is working around the Scarlet Thread of February Pact 2008.

From 2008 onwards the focus of insurgency shifted to the other agencies in which two wings of Tochi Scouts took part and till to date one is still deployed outside the NWA. Tochi Scouts did not took part in any major or minor operations as part of Operation AlMizan within the agency in 2007, 2008, 2009, and only one minor operation was conducted in 2010 and then another in 2011. On the other hand it had to face almost 330 fire raids, IED's and physical attacks in between January 2007-February 2008.

Pakistan itself underwent a drastic change when military regime of President General Musharraf had to hand over the power to newly elected democratic representatives in 2008; within NWFP the religious political parties were defeated in the 2008 general elections. On international front Republican Party of George Bush which had initiated the war against terror in 2001 was ousted from power and Democrats walked into White House, in United Kingdom the Conservatives were replaced by the Labour Party, all these had their impact on the situation in NWA but the one event that affected most was the Lal Masjid incident at Islamabad in July 2007 which in reality sent the shock waves in the agency and all events and incidents are related to it.

In 2007 alone Tochi Scouts despite not being part of any operation still suffered 12 shaheeds and 38 wounded, 10 of the scouts were wounded in a single incident at Saidgai. The major cause of all the casualties were the suicidal attacks, ambushes, IED's and fire raids. Water collection by the posts (Banda/ Ismail Khel) was targeted by the miscreants. Old names like Boya, MiranShah, Amin, Ismail Khel and Banda remained in limelight as confirmed hotspots. New names like Machis came into forefront from July 2007 and even today is the source of irritation and all blood spilling along with Amin Piquet. In 2007 there were five suicide attacks, 22 IED attacks, three ambushes and 299 fire raids which were faced by the Tochi Scouts. Between July-2<sup>nd</sup> October 2007 alone there were 137 fire raids, two ambushes, two raids and 10 IED's attacks. Nine scouts embraced shahadat and 30 other were injured. The year 2007 had started with a suicide attack on a convoy carrying army on 22<sup>nd</sup> January near MirAli, Frontier Corps and Tochi Scouts soldiers. Four soldiers lost their lives in this.

Naik Saadat Hussain Bangash embraced shahadat on 30<sup>th</sup> March 2007 in South Waziristan Agency, he was part of Tochi Scouts but had joined Special Operations Group of Frontier Corps. An excellent football player, he was born in Hangu (Village Ibrahim Zai) on 5<sup>th</sup> March 1976 and joined Tochi Scouts on 1<sup>st</sup> January 1994, he was decorated with Tamgha-e- Basalat (posthumous).

In July 2007 alone there 26 fire raids and rocket attacks, in August they rose to 58, in September to 53, in October they decreased down to 37 and finally petered out in November 2007 when only seven such attacks and raids were carried out, again in December they increased to 15 and in January 2008 only one such incident occurred, still five more were carried out against Tochi Scouts in February 2008.

### **Raising of No.6 Wing**

In July 2007 a new wing No.6 Wing was raised as part of Tochi Scouts, its most drastic feature was its extraordinary strength; it is supposed to have 913 Scouts. The outline organisation remains the same with four rifle companies each having 155 scouts with three platoons having 36 scouts and each platoon having three sections of ten scouts each. Company headquarters have three sections one each for Recoilless Rifles, Heavy Machine Gun and Mortar. Additional and distinctive aspect is the Combat Company having strength of 196 in which mortar, signals, mechanical transport, animal transport, pioneer and administrative aspects are covered. Last but not the least are 42 water carriers. It initially had only 489 all ranks strength in which only 311 were scouts. In terms of fire power it is authorised with 36 LMGs, eight MGs & mortars (60mm), 12 rocket launchers and six three inch mortars.

Tochi Scouts had additional weapons which included ten 12.7 mm guns, seven 14.5 mm guns, six 75 mm RR, four 107mm Rocket

Launchers, 82mm Mortars and two 73mm Rocket Launchers. It also had three tanks T-55 under its command at Bannu.

Deficiency of officers even in such critical periods was alarming, Tochi Scouts was authorised 63 officers but only 22 were held on strength, but the positive aspect was that now all the wings were under command of lieutenant colonels, 16 majors were authorised but only six were present. State of mechanical transport was excellent with 127 vehicles held as against an authorisation of 113 and remarkably 125 vehicles were on road. Signals equipment still suffered from serious deficiency in high frequency sets where only 70 such sets were held as against an authorisation of 170.

### *Articulation of Command*

Service structure of all ranks less commissioned officers was changed, now the JCO had an upper service limit of 24 years as compared to 21 years previously in vogue, similar NCOs had 21 years as compared to 18 years and sepoy's service was increased to 18 from 15 years. Tribe composition also changed, Tochi Scouts by August 2008 had 72 platoons, new tribe inducted was Swati which had two platoons, Bhattani were increased to seven from four, and Marwat from two to three, Yusafzai and Bangash also got one additional platoon increasing their strength from five to six. Overall strength of Tochi Scouts thus reached an all-time high of 4638 all ranks. No.6, No.1 & No.4 Wings were at MiranShah. No.1 Wing had moved from Boya in April 2007 where as No.4 Wing was at MiranShah since August 2003, No.3 Wing at Ghulam Khan (under command to 22 Brigade) had also moved there in April 2007 and No.5 Wing at Boya. No.2 Wing remained on march, initially it was at Khajauri then moved to Gharlamai in 2006 to be under command 27 Brigade.

No.1 Wing responsible for the inner perimeter security of MiranShah was manning 14 posts out of which only one post (Sarbandkai) was jointly manned. No.4 Wing was sharing the responsibility of MiranShah security too but on keeping the main supply routes safe and open. It was manning nine posts including Banda and Machis. No. 6 Wing was also responsible for the MiranShah, outer perimeter manning 11 posts. No.5 Wing manned six post including Dwa Toi, Khar Kamar and Boya Bridge Check Post. All in all Tochi Scouts was manning 56 posts including three jointly manned with army. The number of posts in 2006 had been 95 (including five manned by Thall Scouts) out of these. 35 were border posts and 60 were rear posts. 38 of these posts and 18 check posts were jointly manned.

7 Infantry Division had five brigades, 27 Brigade at Gharlamai, 117 and 52 Brigades at MiranShah, 6 Brigade at Manna and 77 Brigade at MirAli( in May 2012 a sixth brigade was also added for a brief period).

The deployment of wings had the problem of articulation of command, thus No.1 Wing at Datta Khel by virtue of its own area of responsibility(613 Square Kilometres) was placed under command two different infantry brigades (No.6 Brigade at Manna & No.27 Brigade at Gharlamai) who had different areas of responsibility. Similarly No.3 Wing at Ghulam Khan (241 Square Kilometres) was under command 117 Brigade and 52 Brigade (both brigades located at MiranShah), No.5 Wing at Boya (306 Square Kilometres) was also under command No.27 and 52 Brigades. In case of No.4 Wing (128 Square Kilometres)the situation was tricky because while the wing itself was in 77 Brigade (brigade headquarters at MirAli) area of responsibility but it's one post Banda Post was in the area of 52

Brigade. Only No.2 Wing (184 Square Kilometres) at Gharlamai escaped this articulation of command.

Thus brigades allocation of area of responsibility divided the entity of the wings. The Tochi Scouts wings were deployed on geographical boundaries of tehsils whereas brigades frontages were on different aspects. The issue may look ordinary but when the tribal composition is taken into account then the nature of the problem becomes serious.

### **Naridag, Tanghrai Sector**

Despite the articulation of command irritant, the output of scouts and soldiers were not affected, Naridag is a classic example of such comradeship. Naik Munir Hussain Turi was performing the duties along with 3 Punjab Regiment in Tanghrai sub sector (Ghulam Khan). On the night of 2/3 April 2007 at 0230 hours a gang of miscreants attacked the post from three directions, first engaging the post with rockets followed by small arms fire. Turi was the old hand at the post and well conversant with miscreants way of attack. He guided the post commander on the fire discipline, kept the morale of the post high with his selfless devotion interspersed with occasional bits of humour.

### **Political Agent's Office**

Political Agent's office which is next to Officers Mess Tochi Scouts came under attack on 12<sup>th</sup> July 2007 when at 1555 hours a person disguised in a khassadar uniform entered the premises and fired two rounds of pistol in air seconds later he blew himself up. Mr Faridullah (runner to political agent), Mr Sadiq Amin (telephone operator) died on the spot whereas Mr Manzoor (steno to political

agent), Sher Zameen & Maulvi Gul Ramzan a local visiting the offices were seriously injured.<sup>334</sup>

### **20<sup>th</sup> July 2007 Boya.**

In July 2007 eight additional check posts were established and incidentally all eight were targeted by the miscreants, the year 2007 revolves around these Check Posts.

Boya Bridge Check Post was established on 7<sup>th</sup> July 2007; it was established once before in 2002 also for anti-smuggling purposes but it was burnt within a week by the natives who resented having any check on their movement. An average of 300 vehicles passed through it every day commuting between Boya and MiranShah.<sup>335</sup> Boya have a special place in the history of Tochi Scouts; the Commandant Major Fitz Maurice was shot in the knee in 1940, Tochi Scouts was decorated with two Sitara-e-Jurat at Boya in 1957 & 1965. In July 2006 an average of 400 vehicles passed through it and all were checked.<sup>336</sup>

20<sup>th</sup> July 2007 was Friday and troops a mixture of Tochi Scouts and 5 NLI had offered their prayers and took their lunch early at the makeshift mess at the bridge. The check post at the bridge was established on the northern bank of Tochi River; it also facilitates the Musa Khan Post and Gharlamai because track to them passes through it. On Road Operating Days it used to be crowded as convoys going and coming from Boya, Datta Khel and Gharlamai would halt momentarily to pick or drop letter or parcel from any soldier on post.

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334 Tochi Scouts letter No. 5354/54/G, dated 12 July 2006.

335 Situation Report No.478/2006 Dated 29 August 2006. Tochi Scouts archives.

336 Tochi Scouts letter No.5354/54/G of 19<sup>th</sup> July 2006.

Subedar Major Gul Nawaz Bhattani who retired in October 2012 after completion of 23 years of service was a subedar then and standing at the post chatting with Lance Naik Abdus Salam Khattak and Sepoy Lal Baz who were on duty. There were 20 soldiers of NLI and equal number of Tochi Scouts present on the post. Gul Nawaz turned towards the mess which was located at a stone throw on the western edge slightly higher than the road, while he was climbing up he noticed a black Surf (Toyota) coming from Degan and an ambulance coming from MiranShah direction, he shrugged of his shoulders and shouted to a scout who was walking without a helmet. Moments later an earth shattering noise ripped the otherwise calm peace of the area, there was a debris and smoke in the air. Gul Nawaz felt the tremors of the shock and hit the ground, regaining his conscious moments later and then realising that an attack has taken place rushed towards the road; it was not a physical attack rather a suicide attack.

Lance Naik Abdus Salam saw the Surf approaching from the southern bank at a high speed and he waved from his protective bunker made of sand bags to stop but the driver instead of stopping, sped and hit the protective embankment and with it he blew himself, taking the life of Abdus Salam in the process, Naik Sajjad lost his hearing due to the shockwaves. The opposing ambulance had just reached the check post at that precise moment, it stopped for routine checking when the opposing Prado approached and the driver of Prado had no option but to blow himself up. The driver of the ambulance died on the spot, the patients inside the ambulance an old man, an old woman, his daughter and their two grown up children all had serious burns and were later evacuated to MiranShah for medical treatment.<sup>337</sup>

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337 Tochi Scouts letter No. 5354/54/G of 20 July 2007. AlMizan situation Report No.404/2007.



## **Fire Raids & Rocket Attacks-2007**

The year 2007 from July onwards witnessed an unprecedented volume of fire raids and rocket attacks but they did not cause as much damage as the volume of attacks suggested. One key factor was better preparation of the military, posts were better equipped with weapons, ammunition and protective walls. The soldiers and scouts now were mentally in a state of mind where the danger was appreciated and precautionary steps taken in advance.

MiranShah Garrison bore the brunt of such attacks; almost all attacks were conducted in the dark hours. On 17/18<sup>th</sup> July 2007, Political Agent's Colony and Headquarters & Division along with the Tochi Fort were made the target. These attacks started from 30<sup>th</sup> June, and lasted till 1<sup>st</sup> August. PTCL and British Cemetery were also hit on 30/31<sup>st</sup> July, on the same night Banda Post, Wacha Bibi, Ganderi and Amin as usual received the indiscriminate fire and stray rockets.

## **IED**

One of the most effective weapon in the hand of miscreants after the suicide bombing was and still is the improvised explosive devices which are difficult to detect but are lethal in nature. The usual pattern adopted by mid-2007 was to physical carry out an inspection of the road and route for these IEDs before the passage of convoys. On 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2007, No.2 Wing deployed at Gharlamai was performing this task on Khar Kamar–Baramand route for safe and secure passage of 56 Baluch regiment convoy when at 1555 hours one of the IED exploded. Lance Naik Muhammad Khan Afridi, Lance Naik Adam Khan Orakzai and Sepoys Aman Ullah Turi and Faiz Ullah Afridi were injured. Faiz got both his wrists fractured, Aman was hit in the

face, and Adam also got fracture in his right leg whereas Muhammad Khan had a blunt trauma in right eye. Miscreants normally covered these IEDs with small arms fire and this is what happened here also, as soon as it exploded there was indiscriminate fire and then silence. Field Battery of Tochi Scouts fired seven rounds of artillery shells. Evacuation of casualties is an important task and it is a tribute to all that no casualty has ever been left or delayed at the post by military. Army aviators also needs commendation that irrespective of the risks involved they were always there for evacuation, all the injured scouts were getting the medical treatment at MiranShah by the end of the day.

The same pattern lasted in August and September as well with MiranShah Garrison being hit on nine nights in the month of August and eight times in September and if one includes the outer and inner perimeter post then there was hardly any night in which there was no fire duel. On 3<sup>rd</sup> August 2007 Kalanjar I & II, Amin I & Amin II all were attacked and in return 86 rounds of 12.7 mm gun, 226 rounds of LMG. 74 rounds of SMG and 713 rounds of G-3 apart from lone RPG-7 were fired by these posts.<sup>338</sup> Datta Khel received eight rockets between 0315-0400 hours on 4<sup>th</sup> August without causing any damage but it disrupts the working pattern of the scouts, leaving very little time to unwind.

Another day to remember is the 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2007 when intelligence reports indicated attack on MiranShah Fort & Garrison; it was received through intercept at 0055 hours because for all practical purpose the intelligence outfits were confined within the boundary walls of garrison. At 0105 hours (ten minutes after intercept) the attack was launched on the fort with heavy intense fire coming from MiranShah Bazaar direction on Stadium Check

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338 7 Division Situation Report Dated 30<sup>th</sup> August 2007, No.500/42/Situation/GS/ (ops)

post, WAPDA Piquet, College Piquet, PTCL Building, Amin Piquet, Amin-II Check Post and British Cemetery Check Post. Own troops responded with artillery , mortars and small arms fire, intense fire continued for 45 minutes then reducing to sporadic for thirty minutes. Miscreants fired 15 rockets in this period. Same night Mangaseen Check Post was also attacked. Cobras despite being serviceable were not employed. MiranShah faced another such onslaught on 5<sup>th</sup> October when another fifteen rockets were fired within a time span of half an hour, they all landed within a radius of 300 meters, and three soldiers of army were wounded.

Army Aviation assets at MiranShah reached an all-time high with eight Cobras, two Bell 412, two MI-17 and one Jet Ranger. Two Cobras remained grounded for over a week. Special Operation Task Force (SOTF) was also located at MiranShah apart from Headquarters 7 Division, two infantry brigades and divisional artillery.

Army and Tochi Scouts adopted a simple but effective countermeasure; to retaliate with full fire power. This tendency was cut short and on 5<sup>th</sup> July 2007 instructions were passed to all the wings not to open fire without recognising the target or unless target is within range.

On 12<sup>th</sup> October 2007 when MiranShah Fort and Garrison was put under fire attack then 841 rounds of LMG and 115 rounds of 12.7 mm gun were fired as comparison only 149 rounds of Rifle G-3 were expended which indicates the over reliance on machine gun fire rather than rifle fire. Military could have finished off these miscreants nuisance within days but it was the care for collateral damage which binds the hands of military fire power. Every shell

was fired with lot of calculation and after repeatedly cross checking the damage assessment. Small arms were different ball and game. Sentries at night are alert for extensive hours and it takes heavy toll on reflexes, any lapse on their part can endanger the safety of complete post.

These fire raids were erratic but even then they stalled aviation efforts when on 17<sup>th</sup> October 2007 two rocket splinters hit Bell 412 and MI-17 resulting in a hole of three inch each. It was in 2012 that aviation erected a soft fabric hangar which is meant for maintenance and not for protection. The early protection that was made possible for the helicopters after this incident was in having a mud wall around parking bay, this is economical, time saving and good enough for protection from splinters. The need to have a concrete pen is still being felt. It must be kept in mind that PAF lost one of its F-16 before they erected a wall around their bases similarly Army Aviation has also suffered operational setbacks through splinters yet there is no concrete pens for helicopters. It was at end October that PAF started giving serious thoughts of using the MiranShah strip for C-130 aircraft.

#### **Ismail Khel Post 26<sup>th</sup> August 2007**

On 26<sup>th</sup> August 2007 between 0140–0230 hours the post was physically attacked from multiple direction, it was a joint post in 27 Brigade area being manned by Tochi Scouts and 7 NLI troops. Subedar Zulfiqar Ali Turi of Tochi Scouts was the post commander and credit goes to him for keeping the miscreants at bay, inflicting casualties on them. One of the factor which has emerged out of the analysis of attacks on the posts by the miscreants is that whenever post commander reacted by changing his positions within the post

the attack has been repulsed; Zulfiqar did that on this occasion. Naik Amir Afzal of Tochi Scouts embraced shahadat whereas Sepoy Aziz Bhattani both from No.2 Wing received a critical head injury he later died at Combined Military Hospital Peshawar on 7<sup>th</sup> September 2007. Two soldiers of 7 NLI were also injured.

Major Akram the wing commander along with Captain Jahangir of the brigade reached at the post with a QRF at 0330 hours. They searched the area and found the dead body of a miscreant, own injured and dead body were first evacuated to Gharlamai Fort from where one Mi-17 with another attack helicopter as protection flew them to Bannu at 0545 hours. Other posts in the area including Baramand and Gharlamai were replenished with helicopters as road movement was restricted.

The dead body of miscreant was identified as Taj Ali Mahsud, it was announced from the Tochi Mosque to hand over the dead body to any one as a Sadqa of own Shaheed, finally Hakeem Maulana Said Marjan of Kani Rogha Manzar Khel came forward to accept the dead body.

It is a pattern of the area that whenever any miscreant is killed in any encounter than next night attacks are launched on various post. This time Amin Piquet and Amin II received the attacks when both were simultaneously put under fire raid from 0050 hours till 0145 hours. Attackers were later identified from Sadiq Noor Group. Amin Piquet received six bombs of mortars and 14 rockets followed by small arms fire. Amin II received 34 rockets and small arms fire from bazaar direction without causing any loss. Next day a gasht was carried out in the area with 50 scouts. The one major aspect was that no attack helicopters were employed at the time of attack. There

has been very few occasions (Tut Narai is one) when the attack helicopters were use during the actual fire raid or physical assault, which in any case always lasted more than an hour, time sufficient enough for Cobra to reach the spot but still seldom employed.

Even on the day following the attack no flying was carried out by the attack helicopters, there were four Cobras available at MiranShah out of which two were grounded. Artillery was thus utilised which fired 25 rounds of medium artillery on an under construction madrasah near Kalanjar II.

With the onset of winter the focus of miscreants was solely the capitulation of MiranShah Garrison and its perimeter posts, Amin, Sargardan, Banda, Cemetery, Stadium, PTCL, Machis all were troubled by the irregular pattern of fire. There was no warning about these. Day would start with the sound of machine gun burst and it will continue all day with low intensity but as soon as the sun set the fire would rattle the night. At times sky would be lit with vary light flares, the humming noise of Kalashnikov, the artillery shells and guns would rattle the wooden and mud barracks of the Fort. The major danger was from the rockets fired by the miscreants, since they all were fire and forgets thus there was no safety. Tochi Scouts as a precaution dug holes in the ground where at alarm they would seek protection.

On 13<sup>th</sup> September 2007 WAPDA Piquet, British Cemetery Check Post, PTCL Building Post and Amin- II all came under fire attack.

### **September 2007**

September 2007 was another tough month with serious setbacks for military, the Pash Ziarat operation suffered casualties when

the 14 FF and SSG troops were cordoned by miscreants, 16 SSG soldiers were killed but sadly 18 more were missing. The staff work in this operation needs analytical dissection because all the four attack helicopters available at MiranShah were grounded for last three days and remained so for another three days. Aviation fuel was too less, so less that one MI-17 and one Bell 412 despite being serviceable did not had fuel. Later aviation fuel for attack helicopters was transported by helicopters from Bannu and all flying missions were performed from Bannu. The troops were deinducted, replenished, evacuated and supplied by the MI-17 helicopters for at least another seven days. On 29<sup>th</sup> September 11.6 tons of logistics were heli-transported to Razmak and surrounding posts by MI-17 helicopters.

Mangaseen Post found itself encircled at 0120 hours on 29<sup>th</sup> September 2007 by the miscreants, almost all posts are defendable provided training is converted into practical ability. Even one scout's actions can alter the odds, this is what took place at the post. Sepoy Daulat Khan Afridi displayed exemplary act of bravery and responded with effective fire on the advancing miscreants. Afridi did not panic rather he took his time in hitting the miscreants, he was dead accurate. It was his solo, prompt action which compelled the miscreants to flee.

## **Red October**

There are days which needs to be remembered purely for the lessons they give, one learns from own mistakes. 6<sup>th</sup> October 2007 was one such day when an Frontier Corps convoy while coming back to MirAli from Jallar was ambushed, ' it disengaged from the situation by retaliating immediately and reached MirAli camp safely leaving behind a damaged vehicle.'<sup>339</sup>

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<sup>339</sup> 7 Division War Diary, p – 20. Also see 7 Division Situation Report dated 7<sup>th</sup> October 2007.

77 Brigade planned an immediate operation to retrieve the vehicle and in doing so also decided to punish the village suspected of such act. Two companies each from 11 Baloch & 15 Sind Regiments, one company of 59 Baloch Regiment and a task force comprising of 67 all ranks of Frontier Corps including Tochi Scouts along with requisite engineers party for demolishing , medical and signals were made ready, all in all 682 all ranks were put together.

11 Baluch with FC was made responsible for securing the route to the Tochi River by having picquets including one at Tochi River. 15 Sind and 59 Baluch Regiments to recover the vehicle and after doing so demolish the houses and then everyone to fall back. It was expected that by the end of day it will be over, but it did not happened like that.

Bridge on River Tochi was secured and when the remaining force move forward it soon realised that it has been encircled. Thus half the force was on the northern side of the bridge and other half on the southern side. The rear guard action of southern force became uncontrolled melee. Their attempts and efforts to reach the bridge was foiled by the miscreants, in a panic they left the road and started travelling cross country in order to cross the Tochi River. PAF was called in for support.

The same very Hassu Khel Village again became notorious, the same place where a year and half ago a post was ransacked by the miscreants again became a battle field. Air Force was called upon which was wastage of efforts because there is nothing an aircraft can do in such close quarter battle which an attack helicopter cannot perform. Three Cobras and two Bell 412 helicopters, one combat flight was employed. Own troops at the bridge also disengaged at



1545 hours thus leaving the remaining force at their own, miscreants also effectively checked any reinforcement coming from MirAli to the site. The entire force was able to reach back MirAli in pockets with last one arriving at 0700 hours 8<sup>th</sup> October and last one being extricated at midnight 8/9<sup>th</sup> October 2007. 61 troops lost their lives and another 45 were injured. 7 Division later analysed the operation in which it reached the conclusion *‘not withstanding the bravery of soldiers, there were incidents of non-adherence to minor tactics, especially to basic drills of rear guard action, taking up of hasty defence and use of ground...weak command and control especially at section and platoon level...withdrawal was completely disorganised which resulted into chaos and more casualties...pulse of locals could have been ascertained by intelligence agencies but this valuable input was lacking... cost benefit analysis was ignored before launching the operation instead an over reactive approach was adopted leading to hasty planning for retrieval of a damage vehicle.*<sup>340</sup>

Four Kinetic strikes by Predator at 2153, 2217 and 0207 hours restored the notion of victory. On 8<sup>th</sup> October dead bodies of 45 soldiers were handed over by the locals and another 17 were handed over on 9<sup>th</sup> October. Same night three Kinetic strikes were conducted, two at Mausaki and one at Arkh Ghundai.

This operation brings back the memories and lessons of the Waziristan Campaign of 1922 and 1936. In both campaigns it was highlighted that regiments coming from the plains (Punjab) are ill-trained for Frontier Warfare, an acclimatisation period should be imposed upon them , separate training institutions and centres be established and above all the role of air is paramount. In 2007 despite having the superiority in air there seems to be shyness at

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<sup>340</sup> 7 Division War Diary, page – 24.

staff level to incorporate the attack helicopters. The hard fact is that aviation assets never really came under the divisional control even for once. Aviation should have been able to extricate the whole force, no reinforcement was inducted in the area through helicopters, sadly Mi-17 helicopters were not even employed for any of the role.

### **Saidgai Ambush 12 November 2007**

Wacha II Post was under the responsibility of No.3 Wing at Ghulam Khan and on 12<sup>th</sup> November it was planned to vacate it as part of overall scheme of readjusting the posts, Girgit II was vacated on 11<sup>th</sup> November. The convoy while coming back was ambushed resultantly one Havildar Siraj ud Din Khattak embraced shahadat and other ten scouts were seriously injured. One of the key factors that surfaced after the incident was the violation of standing order procedures which resulted in such high number of casualties and more so it broke the momentum of operations of the law enforcing agencies. On 11<sup>th</sup> November Girgit II was vacated and it was done late but nothing unpleasant took place, same pattern was adopted on 12<sup>th</sup> when Wacha II was again vacated late and this time the convoy had to pay the price for this. Convoy had only one wireless set and no internal communication was available. Convoy was ambushed in the dusk light as its leading vehicle entered into a causeway near Saidgai Village. There was a quick reaction force also protecting the convoy and it retaliated forcibly. Soon darkness engulfed the whole spectrum, communication was lost with the headquarters, the officer commanding the convoy Captain Nisar Ul Haq (he reported at Tochi Scouts on 30<sup>th</sup> September 2007, his parent unit was Army Supply Corps) lost all command & control. He himself later reached the Dardoni III Post with the help of GPS. In his absence Naib Subedar Sami Ullah Marwat took control, he along with a small band of

scouts which included Naik Muhammad Mashal Khattak and Naik Munir Hussain Turi were able to restore command and control, they affectively responded and ensured that the convoy should not suffer further mishap. Ten scouts were injured in the fight back. All vehicles and men including the dead body were safely extricated. Sepoy Sardar Hussain Turi, vehicle mechanic played an important role in the evacuation of casualties, his name was mentioned in despatches.

The conduct of Captain Nisar became debatable with varying versions but he was given benefit of doubt by commandant.

### **Water Ambush**

Water was responsible for maximum casualties of Tochi Scouts in the year. Tochi Scouts had a total of 12 fatalities in the year, Naik Syed Sadat Hussain Bangash embraced shahadat(30<sup>th</sup> March 2007) at Wana , he was part of Special Operations Group (SOG) which is a Frontier Corps Special Operations Task Force. One fatality occurred due to suicide attack at Boya, another took place at Saidgai due to ambush, one more occurred at Bakka Khel when Lance Naik Abdul Sattar Marwat who was driving the vehicle hit an IED on 12<sup>th</sup> November while he was moving with a convoy towards Bannu. Three died due to attacks on posts. Lance Naik Yousaf Khan Bangash at Gharlamai was attacked on 29<sup>th</sup> September 2007, he had gone to the village to purchase some items and while coming back to the post was ambushed, he was hit with three bullets which he did not survived. Cook Sepoy Zarmat Khan Khattak and Sepoy Dildar Khan Orakzai were also with him and were wounded in this incident both had splinter injuries.

At Ismail Khel Post before it was attacked two fatalities took place due to water. On 24<sup>th</sup> July 2007 at 1755 hours Sepoy Nawaz

Khattak and Sepoy (Animal Transport) Muhammad Hayat both embraced shahadat when their 'water party' after fulfilling the mission was proceeding back to the post and had an encounter with the miscreants who also suffered equal number of casualties.

At Machis Post on 30<sup>th</sup> July 2007 three scouts were killed when an IED was placed after careful reconnaissance by the miscreants for the water seeking party of Tochi Scouts. It was almost replica of what had happened at Banda almost a year ago. The strength of the party at both posts was also identical, one junior commissioned officer and two other ranks, both parties had gone not merely to collect the water but to take shower in the spring also. Naib Subedar Amir Akbar Yusafzai, Sepoy Hayat Khattak and Sepoy Nawaz Khattak lost their lives when an IED was exploded when all three of them were close to it.

On 29<sup>th</sup> August 2007 an IED blasted near water source(27 Brigade area) onto a joint army and Tochi Scouts patrol that had moved from Maltika Sar Post to fetch water, three were injured including two from Tochi Scouts (Havildar Wahid Gul Afridi and Sepoy Rafiq Bhittani).

The increasing number of water ambushes forced the military to replenish the post with QRF protecting water bowzers under attack helicopters cover.<sup>341</sup> On the last day of the month two water seeking parties one from army and other from Tochi Scouts were ambushed near the water source. Tochi Scouts were fired upon near Banda whereas army party was hit near Danai Post. Miscreants fired only solitary shots but in response over 14 rounds of artillery, 100 rounds of LMG, 82 rounds of G-3, four bombs of 60mm were expended by the military. Purely in terms of economics the cost of ammunition

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341 7 Division Situation Report Dated 29<sup>th</sup> August 2007.

alone would have been sufficient to cater for any water requirement of these two posts for well over a year. Again at Machis on 15<sup>th</sup> November one soldier of 27 Sind Regiment was shot dead seven others were injured when they were busy in collecting water.

Datta Khel Post suffered one injury when on 3<sup>rd</sup> October 2007 a patrol moved from Akhtar-I Piquet to Datta Khel piquet to fetch water, they were engaged by miscreants in the Bazaar area, fire started and few shops in the bazaar caught fire, it stopped at 1355 hours with ten casualties of miscreants and own Havildar Noor Ullah Afridi getting one bullet on right leg, he was evacuated to MiranShah hospital by helicopter. Situation became tense as miscreants vowed to take revenge, the hard reality is that not all inhabitants of the area are miscreants but incidents like this only help in increasing the number of miscreant's sympathisers. The helicopter which came to evacuate Noor had to fire 400 rounds of LMG before it could pick him up. A jirga was called to diffuse the tension, announcements were made from mosques for peace and calm and compensation was made to the locals.<sup>342</sup> But no lesson was learnt and again Akhtar Piquet (Datta Khel) No.1 Wing water party was fired upon on 19<sup>th</sup> October 2007, no loss took place this time but in retaliation 106mm RR and RPG-7 rockets were freely fired by the military.

Another water related attack took place on 5<sup>th</sup> October 2007 when the very bowzer carrying water for Tochi Scouts Posts at Machis, Pahari-II, & I while returning at 1305 hours had an IED blast, it destroyed the bowzer and both driver Lance Naik Fazal Amin Afridi and Sepoy Zar Manan Afridi received minor injuries. As punitive measures the nearby compound was demolished employing 128 soldiers. Next day as expected Machis Post received fire raid from 2220 hours till 2230 hours. Amin-II Post came under fire next day

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342 7 Division Situation report dated 4<sup>th</sup> October 2007.

in which Sepoy Rehmat Khan received bullet injury on left shoulder and had to be evacuated to Bannu on a Bell 412. On 9<sup>th</sup> October this water fetching took two more army lives and eight other were injured when in 27 Brigade areas an army party was hit with IED. It is worth mentioning that Sepoy Faizullah Khattak who was driving the QRF vehicle had detected one IED while proceeding towards the Machis. Moral of the episode is that alertness pays.

Similar incidence of locating IED took place on 25<sup>th</sup> October 2007 when Sepoy Naseem Khattak being part of QRF, moving from MiranShah towards Bannu spotted a black shalwar hanging from a tree four Kilometres ahead of Isha Post. Naseem was intelligent enough to understand that this is unusual and on his persistence the convoy stopped, area was searched and an IED located and diffused. Subedar Ismail Marwat was the QRF commander and he was the one who listened and agreed with Naseem's logic. A shell of 155 mm artillery was being utilised as the IED.

Sepoy Qadeer Jan Mohmand also detected one IED on 28<sup>th</sup> July 2007, he was performing the duty as light machine gunner in the leading vehicle. They were proceeding towards the Hussain Post carrying ration & water. Qadeer spotted one battery amidst the bushes; it was an anti-tank mine converted into an IED by the miscreants.

Sepoy Falak Niaz Mohmand on 2<sup>nd</sup> November 2007 destroyed one IED with a single shot of sniper rifle near Chashmai Bridge, he spotted it and in next moment blasted it. Same day in same convoy there was report of another IED planted on the route. Naik Rehan Turi was the one who spotted it being planted and covered amidst tree branches.

At Banda another water ambush took place on 30<sup>th</sup> November 2007 when No.4 Wing Tochi Scouts were ambushed by miscreants resultantly Lance Naik Suleiman Afridi sustained injuries, in retaliation one miscreant was shot dead and four other were captured, the miscreants took the dead body away at night. It was not a successful ambush as Tochi Scouts were able to retaliate and inflict casualties upon the miscreants. The positive aspect of water collection was in the activity it generated among the posts. Water is life line and had to be obtained, thus water collection became an art of warfare. Miscreants were looking for an opportunity so were the Tochi Scouts to retaliate. The method adopted was to have a protection party of three Scouts and one soldier clearing the area and water collection party comprising of almost seven scouts then fulfilling the requirement.

Thus a series of fire raids was initiated against Banda Post during which on 1<sup>st</sup> December 2007 a night raid was carried out but it was repulsed. One drawback of such raids was the collateral damage that invariably took place due to artillery shells landing in the nearby villages. Army was no exception in such matters, on 7<sup>th</sup> August 2007 Lance Naik Dilbaz Khan of 11 Baloch died when an IED exploded while he was busy collecting water at Banda Post. On the same day Amin & Kalanjar-I water parties of Tochi Scouts were attacked and attack helicopters had to be employed for their safety.

By 2008 procedure remained the same but now water collection was carried out under the protection of QRFs.<sup>343</sup> These quick reaction forces would carry the water and ration to all surrounding post including Pahari-I & II, it would take two hours to perform this task.

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343 HQ Tochi Scouts Situation Report 23/2008 dated 12<sup>th</sup> January 2008.

In 2009 there was another incident which seems to be a carbon copy of earlier accidents. On 10<sup>th</sup> August 2009 Havildar Rashid Ali Bangash and Sepoy Niaz Orakzai both embraced shahadat at Banda Post while they were preparing to take a dip in the cold water of the spring after filling their water containers, an IED exploded, and both had their last breath near the spring. But before this incident a warning was given when on 25<sup>th</sup> June 2009 at 0730 hours two shots were fired on the water carrying party. The party had gone down to the base to fetch the water through generator, in retaliation 11 rounds were fired by own troops on the individual who was able to make good his escape. Same event took place on 27<sup>th</sup> June when again the party was fired upon by a moving vehicle. Again on 26<sup>th</sup> June an individual fired a single round on the water party but in retaliation over 30 rounds of 14.5mm gun were expended. It became almost a plaything for the locals to fire one odd round and then run away but scouts had to follow a drill to retaliate which was costly.

By the summer of 2009 the situation improved slightly despite best efforts of all, still nine posts were dependent upon spring water and four on animal transport. Banda Post was lucky as it survived a narrow miss, on 15<sup>th</sup> July 2009 its water fetching body comprising of 15 scouts under the supervision of Captain Waqas the post commander detected an IED near the spring, they fired rounds on it to blast it and were successful, only Captain Waqas received minor splinters on head. Two days earlier Isha Post had similar episode and were able to detect and blast the IED. On 26<sup>th</sup> August 2009 another IED was detected, despite firing 45 rounds of LMG and 37 rounds of G-3 they could not explode it.

In 2011 two casualties were related to water, Lance Naik Inam Khan Yusafzai was drowned in the river at Dir on 10<sup>th</sup> July, it was a



hot day and he had gone to the river to wash his clothes. No.2 Wing had recently arrived at the area. Inam decided to have a swim and was swept away forever. One casualty took place in order to make the life of others safe, Naib Subedar Zahir Shah Marwat was the post commander at Thall on Tochi, he was keen to have a water source for the piquet and in the process he embraced shahadat when the dug well equipment hit him(7<sup>th</sup> May 2011).

Water Carrier Akbar Khan Wazir needs to be remembered because he was the first casualty related to water. He was abducted while he was performing the duty of water carrier at Bichi Post of No.2 Wing at Khajauri, his dead body was found later near Thall on Tochi.

### **Political Front**

The political activities that underwent in the agency is interesting from historical perspective, in times when political agent was all powerful then he was responsible for all decisions and usually took the advice from the governor but now the chain of command became lengthy. Political Agent had to ask the GOC 7 Division who in turn would be relying upon the corps commander.

The opening move was made by the locals in August 2007 when an IED exploded on a 44 vehicle military convoy near Salai Village. Next day the mashrans and malaks communicated to the PA that they understand that this IED has been exploded by miscreants to implicate Bora Khel and Daurs tribes. Next day Maulana Dindar also condemned this IED, this was the starting point. Daurs felt that the Wazirs area is creating problems for them and as such a rift was created among them.

Army and political agent had a single point agenda that miscreants should announce unilateral & unconditional cease fire whereas the miscreants demanded withdrawal of army from the posts or stop its movement within the agency.

A number of jirga took place from October 2007 onwards. The Daur and Wazir rift became obvious with Daur alleging the Wazirs that sabotage activities are only taking place in Daur areas especially in lower Daur area. The main Daur so called Taliban leader was and still is Maulana Sadiq Noor of Khatti Killi whereas the Wazir Taliban was and still is led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur with Haqqani sandwich in between.

Political Agent NWA Mr Aurangzeb played a key role in mustering the lashkar of Daurs and encouraging them to forcibly evict the foreigners from the area he paid Rs half a million in one instalment for such lashkar in December 2007. On 17<sup>th</sup> December 2007 Gul Bahadur unilaterally announced a cease fire for the coming back of hajjis and from this point onwards the opportunity was exploited by Major General Ghulam Dastgir GOC 7 Division.

Taliban demands were centred on removal of army and certain Tochi Scouts check post with Banda Post topping the list, they also demanded release of all prisoners and compensation of losses, army demanded return of its stolen armoury and captured soldiers apart from banishing of foreigners. The ceasefire which was initially to expire on 8<sup>th</sup> January thus lingered on till 21<sup>st</sup> January 2008. Jirga returned two stolen RR's and army in return returned one double cabin pick up and four prisoners. Major General Ghulam Dastgir also gave 34 points demands.

On 21<sup>st</sup> January 2008 the final rounds of talks were held in which the Jirga finally gave a deadline for acceptance of all of the Taliban

demands. It was led by Malak Qadir Khan, Malak Liaqat Ali Khan, Malak Inayat Khan and Maulvi Khan Daraz. As a compromise army agreed to allow the malaks to visit the posts and readjust them, the posts under considerations were Boya, Dwa Toi, Michi Fort, Wacha Bibi, Damdil, Dosalli. Razmak, Spinwam and Shewa. Corps Commander Lieutenant General Masood Aslam came on a visit next day and had a brief on the area. One is not certain of the outcome of all the talks but from now onwards the focus of fighting shifted to Razmak area which received almost 35 rockets on a single day (25<sup>th</sup> January 2008).

Later on 26<sup>th</sup> January 2008 eight prisoners were released with a gift of one thousand rupees, one Holy Koran and one tasbeeh (rosary); resultantly Taliban extended the ceasefire till 8<sup>th</sup> February 2008. It was a great political move as the operation in Razmak was still going on.

The pattern of discussion was that initially the PA or army intelligence would approach the groups who were having soft corner for the government, thus jirga was formed and this jirga would then negotiate with the Hafiz Gul Bahadur the Taliban leader who in turn would refer the demands to his own small group of jirga and a constant flow of agreements and disagreements would continue. Taliban Shura was different from the jirga, Commandant Tochi Scouts Colonel Tariq Mahmud was part of all the process. Jirga was accepted as the mediator by the Taliban Shura but with condition that its decision should be based on riwaj but the state's draw back was that it could not accept the unilateral decision of the jirga, it insisted on further negotiations for which Taliban were not ready, this is the issue in nutshell. On 17<sup>th</sup> February 2008 the peace pact was finally signed rather agreed in a grand jirga in which

over 200 members including Malak Qadir Khan Wazir, Khan Draz Wazir, Malak Shahzada Wazir, Ajmal Khan Wazir took part, from state Commandant Tochi Scouts, GOC 7 Division, PA NWA and few others attended and gave consent.

This peace pact is relic of one fact that peace in North Waziristan Agency cannot be maintained or attained without active involvement of Wazirs and political administration. With the peace agreement the administration of the agency was practically taken over by the Taliban. On 21<sup>st</sup> February 2008 these Taliban formulated the policy under which transportation of flour to Afghanistan was banned, all compact discs shops were closed and above all any one kidnapping or threatening the army or Frontier Corps along with any official will be taken to the task. These announcements were made through pamphlets and loudspeakers on behalf of Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Sadiq Noor.

On 18th March 2008 another jirga was held at 1230 hours in which all the leading malaks and officials attended less GOC 7 Division who later met the jirga at 1415 hours and congratulated them and the entire nation on the safe passage of one month of peace agreement. He lauded the efforts of jirga for curbing smuggling in the agency; he agreed that no army or Frontier Corps units will check any vehicle at any check post unless there is a dire requirement. The conduct of jirga has changed in over the years, initially it was either called by the political agent on a schedule or in emergency or when a high official was visiting the agency but seldom a jirga had to wait for hours for any person who is present in MiranShah. The malaks as noted by a political agent in 1920 are highly sensitive about protocol.

In South Waziristan Agency the peace process started on 14<sup>th</sup> May 2008 when army and Taliban released each other's prisoners, army released 37 Taliban and in lieu got its 12 members including one captain; six more soldiers were released on 15<sup>th</sup> May.

The last day of year 2007 passed away peacefully.

### *Redeployment Army & Tochi Scouts*

In November 2007 redeployment of army was considered which also had its outcome on Tochi Scouts. The rationale of army redeployment was logical as they came to the conclusion that there is no danger from across the border, not all tribes like and appreciate them being among themselves.<sup>344</sup> As long as American, NATO, ANA operations are undergoing in Afghanistan there remains a need to seal and monitored the Durand Line. 'Afghan Wars are not like wars in Europe the trouble only became serious when the war was over'.<sup>345</sup> The appreciation was not much different from the Waziristan Force had in 1922 and in 1937 and again in 1939. Keep the army units at bay within the fortified cantonments; always available at short time for any reinforcement in the area. In NWA it means occupying MiranShah, Mir Ali, and Razmak. British had also adopted the same policy of keeping the Frontier Corps or more precisely Tochi Scouts as the front line with army always on call. One deviation from the past was the lack of air cover in the Tochi Valley; whereas British kept a No.3 Wing of RAF as part of the Waziristan Command. They had over 29000 combatants with equal number of non-combatants deployed in Waziristan in 1920. In terms of military organisation they had six infantry brigades, thus air support remained the weak link. Army Aviation's helicopters

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344 Headquarters 7 Division Letter No.600/4/GS/ 29<sup>th</sup> November 2007.

345 *Mizh a Monograph*, Evelyn Howell, p-41.

remained the only air power, army aviation was maintained at the MiranShah, tradition of pilots remaining aloof were rekindled; they were really not under any body's command. Another debatable point in the rationale for keeping the army within the agency was the apprehension that Tochi Scouts itself along with Shawal Rifles and Thall Scouts are not capable of maintaining peace in the agency; partially true but the track record of Tochi Scouts in opening of the inaccessible areas including Dwa Toi, Kazha and Bangidar do defy this logic.

The most delicate and dangerous part of the redeployment was that certain posts had to be abandoned in totality, the experience of Operation Curzon of 1947 is a stark reality when troops were attacked while going back. This time it did not happen for which the staff officers and commanders deserve appreciation. All defence stores were completely removed, remaining structures were razed to ground by using explosives, posts were booby trapped with information given to locals and as a reward to the loyal natives the posts in the rear were left intact. A contingency plan for new posts was made in the light of Vice Chief of Army Staff General Ahsan Salim Hayat's directive which included water availability and storage. The best part was that now a company had to guard only three posts each with a platoon strength on every post, another feature was the concept of grouping the posts into a fortress each providing cover to the other. They all had to be on nodal points with potent reserves. From Tochi Scouts point of interest the articulation of command was restored there by dedicated sections will be held by either army or Tochi Scouts depending upon the severity and sensitivity of the area.

Five battalions were to be deployed on border with Tochi Scouts No.2 Wing relieving one battalion (7 NLI) at Baramand Sector

(Gharlamai) in March 2008. 27 Brigade's task were to be performed by this wing.

Only one more wing of Tochi was to be deployed at Ghulam Khan, rest all were to be used for MiranShah Garrison security (two wings) and other two for security of main supply route. Datta Khel thus came under Shawal Rifles; a nostalgic loss because Tochi Scouts had some of the most glorious chapters of its history written here. Dwa Toi which was won with so much of efforts and guile was also taken away, history of Tochi Scouts is never complete without this valley which includes places Sherrani, Maizar, Gurweikht to name few.

Tochi Scouts under the redeployment were given Thal, Isha, Sarbandkai and Gosh Posts, they were made responsible for the defence of MiranShah Garrison. Their mandate included defence and security from including Dewgar to Manda Narai included. Protection of route thus now extended from Khar Kamar to Thall/Isha Post in the rear. One company of No.3 Wing was placed under command Task Force MirAli. Field Battery of Tochi Scouts was also placed under command of divisional artillery

On army side 117 Brigade was deinducted, 327 Brigade remained at MirAli, 52 Brigade at MiranShah (later relieved by 102 Brigade in March 2008), 27 Brigade at Gharlamai and 6 Brigade at Datta Khel, over all one brigade was thus spared from NWA. One wing of Thall Scouts was also de-inducted from MiranShah, it was of great help and Tochi scouts appreciates their efforts. There were 13 Frontier Corps wings deployed in the agency.

## No.2 Wing

No.2 Wing was deployed at Gharlamai from where at end December 2007 it moved to Thall on Tochi, after two days it was ordered to move to Darra Adam Khel Kohat for the protection of the Kohat Tunnel. Subedar Aurangzeb of mechanical transport branch was then naib subedar and Lieutenant Colonel Nasser Janjua was commanding the wing. Aurangzeb narrates *‘we initially stayed a night at Bannu and next day moved to Kohat where we camped near the tunnel. Wing commander and I drove around to select places for the establishing of posts, we stayed there for a week but nothing significant took place and one evening we received orders to proceed to Razmak, we reached Bannu by 0300 hours, we had a 16 vehicles convoy. Early morning we left for Razmak where the situation was quite precarious, with missiles attack being launched every day. Majority of the attacks were carried out in day time. It was very cold but we had snow line equipment. One company was given the area of responsibility of Ali Jandola and other company was deployed at Nawaz Kot.’*

Part of wing was deployed at Razmak.<sup>346</sup> On 26<sup>th</sup> January 2008 no less than twenty scouts of No.2 Wing deserted which included the wing tailor master also, out of these twenty only four belonged to No.6 Wing. They included six Khattak, six Bhattani, three Afridi, four Marwat, two from Orakzai tribe and one Wazir. Another two scouts deserted on 27<sup>th</sup> January 2008.

Subedar Aurangzeb admitted that one of the deserters was from his platoon who had gone down to the company headquarters by stating that he needs a shower and then disappeared.

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346 HQ Tochi Scouts Situation Report No.16/2008 dated 8<sup>th</sup> January 2008.



## 2008 - Life after the Peace Agreement

The life in agency after the peace agreement became peaceful with matters other than the military taking precedence. Tochi Scouts did not had any casualty in the year within the agency. There were two scouts who embraced shahadat, Havildar Salim Khan Orakzai who was kidnapped by the miscreants on 22<sup>nd</sup> December 2008 near Kohat while he was coming back from leave, his dead body was later handed over to the political administration by the miscreants and he was buried with the Scouts dignity and rites. Sepoy Gultan Khan Afridi was unlucky as he was hit with own aircraft stray bullet at Khyber Agency on the last day of the year 2008. It was only in mid June 2009 that next fatality took place in the agency. Luckily there were only six injuries to the scouts in the year 2008 out of which only two occurred in the NWA, two at Hangu and rest in Bara and Dara.

Taliban now took the control of the area, every day someone was caught in smuggling or firing or theft. Men suspicious of working for India were handed over to the army. They on 8<sup>th</sup> March 2008 warned the officials of Radio MiranShah to close down as in their view it was working on foreign agenda and threatening the values of the locals. They [host] talk to our women when we are not at home was the logic against FM radio.

The smuggling or movement of flour and other edibles to Afghanistan had been a sensitive issue for over a century. One point is that free trade corridor be given as in Europe and other favours strict control of such items. In NWA the issue becomes even more delicate as tribes are living on both side of the border. Daurs generally favours strict movement control and Wazir are in favour

of free access. On 17<sup>th</sup> April 2008 Hafiz Gul Bahadur addressed a gathering of Taliban commanders at Idak and warned that any one stopping the flour movement will be dealt with; his face will be blackened and given a tour of the area on a donkey. Flour price at MiranShah was Rupees 1700 for a bag of 100 kilograms.

The crimes in the agency continued as before there were murders, kidnapping, looting firing and theft but now with Khassadars and Taliban; they were being chased. On 19<sup>th</sup> April 2008 three men were shot publicly on charges of adultery and murder. Agency in over a century never really had any sex crimes, there are unconfirmed reports of a brothel in MiranShah in early part of decade. Kidnapping for ransom is the favoured crime. There were splinter groups working in the agency, there were old enmities like the one between Tabiwal Wazir and MiranShah Daur, they both again clash on 24<sup>th</sup> February 2008. Abdul Khaliq and Jabbari groups also try to create a mischief by planting dummy explosives at Dardon Check Post which destroyed the water tank. National Bank at MirAli was opened on the assurance of local Taliban taking the surety. There was no set day for the move of military convoy but one of the conditions of the Taliban was that army should fix one particular day for road movement as it causes inconvenience to the public. On 31<sup>st</sup> March 2008 political administration started working again in Razmak, the issue of Razmak Cadet College was still under consideration as the college was moved from here at end 2007. Now the tribes were requesting for its reopening but government wanted a written assurance from them for the safety which was not coming forward. On 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2008 it was announced that college will be reopened, resultantly 61 Punjab Regiment which was occupying the premises started shifting to the Razmak Camp. College was finally opened on 24<sup>th</sup> August 2008 but it was again closed after a short period.

There was a monthly meeting between the officials and the jirga held at the circuit house MiranShah. Issues were minor but nevertheless raised, that is one disadvantage of having too many jirga because something has to be communicated; if nothing else then complaints. In the April meeting the point raised by the army was that the sale of compact discs banned by the Taliban is not part of the peace agreement, another point was about one vehicle carrying cement which was stopped by the Taliban for four hours. The drawback of these minor points was that the jirga now had to communicate all these to the Taliban Shura and then come back to the army circles thus the air of mistrust started creeping up. From the Taliban Shura the points conveyed were regarding the issue of Khassadars pay and the distribution of flour bags. With the passage of times the air became cordial among the negotiators and atmosphere also friendly.

It was the Khassadars pay which ultimately set the course of collision among the various stake holders of the agency. At end April 2008 Khassadars went on strike jirga reminded the political agent that that it was part of the peace pact to pay the Khassadars pending pay. The issue looks minor with Khassadars demanding seven months of pay and PA willing to pay only four months as balance was beyond his financial ceilings. Regarding CD's shops they were demolished by Talibans in MiranShah on 3/4<sup>th</sup> June 2008, a total of 12 shops were destroyed. Shaving of beard was banned and any barber caught doing so punished; same was the case for drug sellers and consumers.

### **Protection Walls-2008**

Protection wall on MiranShah strip started on 2<sup>nd</sup> January 2008 and by 12<sup>th</sup> January 168 feet of wall was completed having a height

of two feet. 15 more feet were added to the wall length within next three days and by 24<sup>th</sup> January the overall length increased to 224 Feet but height was reduced to one and half feet. Other posts including Faqiran Killi, Dewgar, Sassa, Girgit, Saidgi, Naridag, Danai and Tanghrai also started erecting mud walls around them, each having wall height of four feet, length differed from post to post. By 9<sup>th</sup> March 2008 half of these protective walls were completed, Danai-I was the first post to complete it.

### **Vehicle Checking**

Another task performed daily was the checking of vehicles moving between Pakistan & Afghanistan. The check posts at Ghulam Khan, Charkhi Nullah and Alwara-II were the border check posts while Dardoni-II and Boya Bridge were the rear check posts. In winter on an average 35 heavy and 60 light vehicles moved daily between these two countries.

### **Agency Headquarters Operation-22 January 2008.**

With the onset of operation in the South Waziristan Agency the miscreants who were hit now looked upon Agency Headquarters MiranShah for medical treatment. At 2245 hours on 2245 hours Major Moazzam Cheema the intelligence officer of Tochi Scouts was busy in the mess library when his informer came and whispered some news. Tochi Scouts intelligence network were able to achieve a breakthrough, the all important information about the arrival of miscreants from Ladha. Cheema immediately walked towards the commandant's house and informed him about this and also gave the outline plan. There is no time to get in touch with army, any delay or involvement of staff work will hamper the success of the mission, informer is reliable and Cheema himself volunteered to carry on and

lead the mission. Commandant Tochi Scouts Colonel Tariq Mahmud was looking for such opportunity, the hospital is within a stone throw from the stadium check post, he was reluctant in carrying out this operation all by himself, in case it fires back then he will be taken to the task but in the end he gave go ahead and also got ready to monitor it from his office. Colonel Tariq did inform the army and convinced them of its success, one Quick Reaction Force of 1<sup>st</sup> FF was made available at MiranShah main gate for any emergency.

At 0145 hours the Chigha Party of Tochi Scouts comprising of 36 scouts, four JCO's left the Fort on foot, Mr Amanullah the Tehsildar of MiranShah was also taken on board. Chigha Party had a plan, the lone miscreant sentry at the main gate had to be disposed off quietly before he alerts anyone else in the neighbourhood and above all the whole mission have to be completed before the arrival of any reinforcement for the miscreants which was bound to come.

Deception was adopted, with Havildar Ijaz Yusafzai pretending to be a patient and suddenly overpowering the miscreant guard who was armed with his SMG and three loaded magazines.

At 0150 hours the Chigha Party entered the hospital from the southern gate, divided itself into groups, one group of scouts led by Naib Subedar Sharbat Khan Khattak rushed to the Surgical Ward but there was no patient, other group under Subedar Nadir Shah Bhattani had gone to the Emergency Ward but there was nothing there too. Major Cheema now started having second thoughts about the reliability of his informers, he intelligently checked the private patients register and there the names of ten patients were registered an hour ago.

The layout of hospital is colonial in style with separate wards spread over the area, high trees, and shrubs blocking the observation,

half broken pavements linking the various wards. They managed to locate the private ward and ten miscreants were arrested without firing any round.

### **Election Day-18<sup>th</sup> February 2008**

Tochi Scouts had been ensuring free and fair elections in the agency whenever they are held, on this day flag march was conducted by the Tochi scouts, all troops earmarked for polling duties reached their location by 0700 hours and were back by 1300 hours, no untoward incident took place. Out of twenty candidates contesting the election on National Assembly seat No.40 (tribal area No.5) only five were Wazir and rest all were Daur. On 30<sup>th</sup> December 2007 a pamphlet was distributed in the area in which democracy was lamented and people were threatened not to visit polling stations. On 18<sup>th</sup> February 2008 polling was held peacefully, out of a total 35214 registered voters only 43% casted their votes; Kamran Khan Madda Khel Wazir bagged 5883 votes while Engineer Abdul Qayyum got 5441 votes.

### **24<sup>th</sup> February 2008/Attack on Stadium Check Post**

On 18<sup>th</sup> February MiranShah was again subject to missile attacks, five missiles (probably 107 mm) were fired from the WNW of Tablighi Markaz, slight damage to one of the barrack was the only effect they achieved.

Gul Badshah age fifteen was the younger brother of a Taliban commander Eid Niaz who took an active part in the attack on the Hassu Khel Post in 2006, he died there due to bullet wounds. At 1615 hours on 24<sup>th</sup> February Gul Badshah walked towards the stadium at the edge of the Fort where a post of Tochi Scouts was established, he

put his hands in the jacket and took out a hand grenade. Havildar Lal Zeb Khattak and Sepoy Sial Badshah Afridi were on duty, in fact Lal Zeb had just came to help Sial in checking of the people who were returning back to the colony after a day's work in the city. Lance Naik Hikmat Afridi was also present at the site, while other two were busy in talking he was immersed in scanning the people who were moving around on the road, it was he who first detected Gul Badshah's abnormal behaviour, as he approached the check post, he raised his rifle and it took micro seconds in which Gul put his hands in the jacket and took out the grenade and at that precise moment Hikmat's bullet ripped through his body; the grenade blew and its splinters hit Lal Zeb and Sial but both survived.<sup>347</sup> One good sentry who is alert can stave off a disaster.

### **Amin II Post Closed**

There were many posts which were closed down with the onset of winter starting from November 2007. Dadum, LatkaNarai, Kharsin, Shinkai, Girgit, Sherranum, Red Hut, MantakaiSar, Ismail Khel, KundSar, Mammon Panga, Tanghrai, Dardon III, Saidgi, Faqiran, Dande, Girgit No.2 all were closed down by end 2007, few of them were handed over to army as well. On 15<sup>th</sup> April 2008 Acting Commandant Tochi Scouts Lieutenant Colonel Imran had a jirga with the Darpa Khel, Datta Khel Bora Khel Wazir and announced the closing down of Amin Post No.2 with a hope that now the locals will protect their own areas, on 16<sup>th</sup> April 2008 at 1600 hours it was closed down. Another nostalgic post which was closed down was the British Cemetery Post which had last sentry duty from No.1 Wing Tochi Scouts on 17<sup>th</sup> January 2008.

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347 HQ Tochi Scouts Situation Report 110/2008, Dated 24<sup>th</sup> February 2008.

## **No.2 Wing, Darra-Hangu-Buner-Bajaur**

No.2 Wing remained on march, initially it was at Khajauri then moved to Gharlamai in 2006 to be under command 27 Brigade, in 2008 it moved to Razmak, marched in June 2008 to Darra Adam Khel and from there in August it moved to Hangu, from there in April 2009 it moved to Buner in Swat, then to Bajaur Agency in September 2009 and in October 2010 to Gomal Zam Dam area in South Waziristan Agency, finally in November 2012 it moved to Boya. Much of the history of Tochi Scouts from 2008 onwards centred on No.1 & No.2 Wing. No.2 Wing moved from Thall on Kurram to Darra Adam Khel on 9<sup>th</sup> January 2008. More about these two wings later.

In early June a field firing was conducted at Nowshehra for the Frontier Corps in which Tochi Scouts also participated, aim was to train the scouts in modern art of war. At the end of the training in which troops from various wings of Tochi Scouts were amalgamated under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Nasser Janjua, it was decided to employ No.2 Wing for Bara Operation in Khyber Agency thus remaining soldiers of the wing also moved to Nowshehra to join the wing.

## **Tochi Scouts Deployment-March 2008**

On 20<sup>th</sup> March 2008 Tochi Scouts having an authorised strength of 4638 all ranks was holding 3725 all ranks, out of which 418 were on courses, 284 were attached with centre, 44 were in hospital, 31 were absent without official leave, 130 were over staying leave, 333 were on leave, 175 were employed on various administrative duties at Bannu, MiranShah and Peshawar, 69 were in transit. That left 2242 scouts who were participating in Operation Al Mizan and out of this 287 were non-combatants.



Field Battery was deployed at MiranShah, Baramand and Wacha Bibi, each position holding over 200 rounds of shells with Baramand having the maximum; 389 rounds.

### **C-130 Hercules**

The efforts to land the transport aircraft C-130 of PAF were given the serious thoughts after the October 2007 experience when the posts had to be replenished through the helicopter sorties. The bad part was that there was no aviation fuel available at MiranShah because of miscreant's threat of hitting the fuel convoys and also due to poor planning on part of staff officers. Helicopters (Mi-17) thus operated from Bannu. Aim was to have C-130 sorties in such times and thus allowing helicopters to operate from MiranShah. On 24<sup>th</sup> April 2008, No.3 Wing carried out the funnel clearance for the inaugural sortie. Inaugural Y-12 flight of army aviation took place on 2<sup>nd</sup> May 2008.

## **2009**

Year started on a positive note, there was no shell or round fired by any of the Tochi Scouts posts since 13<sup>th</sup> November 2008 and neither were they fired upon. As a sign of increasing confidence, a different kind of operation Al Muhafiz was conducted on 2<sup>nd</sup> January 2009 when three officers including the regimental medical officer, 9 junior commissioned officers and 99 other ranks move towards Banda, Sarbandkai and Panekzai Village from 0805 -1520 hours. Aim or mission was not to search or cordon any specific house or area rather to interact with local population, distribute free books, gifts, sports items and to establish free medical camp. The force also supplied fresh water to the villages with the help of water bowzer, 132 patients were given free treatment. This was the first such activity in the area since the start of operations and it speaks itself about the environments. Another similar operation was carried out in the area of Ahmed Khel-Boya & Khar Kamar. Five officers including Commandant Colonel Tariq Mahmud, 3 JCOs and 52 scouts took part in it; there were three woman health visitors also part of contingent. Local meetings with Jirga, elders, and mashrans were held, sweets and gifts were distributed and free medical camp was established in which 79 male, 28 females and 86 children were treated and given free medicines. Machis and surrounding area was visited on 23<sup>rd</sup> January but no free medical camp was established. Another sign of peace was the high number of scouts who were given leave, in early part of year there were only 344 on leave and by mid-February, they were 441.

In January 2009 not a single round was fired even in speculation, however practice firing was conducted twice a week, it took the life of Sepoy Zahir Afridi while cleaning his weapon at Butt Marka on 27<sup>th</sup> January. Another incident of similar pattern occurred on 2<sup>nd</sup> December 2011 when Lance Naik Syed Ijaz Hussain Turi died due to accidental fire.

From January 2009, onwards the pattern of submitting daily situation report to the No.7 Division was modified it became more comprehensive and detailed in nature; it now included daily deployment of troops and the number of them present in the area of operations.

Tochi Scouts in 2009 was deployed with No.1 Wing at Ghulam Khan having posts at PingSar, Y-Post, Charki Nullah, Saidgi. Bangidar, Butt Marka and Dardoni etc., it was manning ten posts with 244 all ranks deployed on them; army strength numbering 17 soldiers was also with it on three posts (Dardoni-II, Y-Group, Bangidar-I). No.2 Wing at Bajaur (it was responsible for Alwara-Wacha Bibi) No.3 Wing protecting inner perimeter with 16 posts with 240 all ranks deployed on them, in addition 26 army soldiers were also deployed with them at only three posts with maximum 24 at Amin. No.4 Wing protecting outer perimeter of MiranShah Garrison with ten posts with 257 all ranks manning them, additional four army soldiers were also with them at two posts namely Banda & Kalanjar-II. No.5 Wing at Boya for the protection of main supply route from Ahmed Khel-Khar Kamar, it was having eight posts with 209 scouts and additional 7 army soldiers. No.6 Wing at Isha, it had its headquarters at MiranShah Fort and it was looking after seven posts with 229 scouts having twenty additional army soldiers. Field battery was distributed into two troops each having three guns; one

was deployed at Wacha Bibi and other at Baramand. Army soldiers were mainly artillery observers and only in case of Amin they were there as a reinforcement.

## **7 Infantry Division**

Army deployment did not unfold exactly as per the planning with brigades and regiments interchanging and altering the initial deployment. Two western forward brigades were No.27 Brigade and No.6 Brigade. No.6 Brigade was looking after the Shawal Valley, it had its headquarters at Datta Khel, 55 Baluch Regiment was also having its headquarters at Datta Khel and another regiment 2 Sind Regiment was deployed at Dwa Toi. No.27 Brigade was having its headquarters at Gharlamai with 41 Baluch Regiment at Baramand & 48 FF at Wacha Bibi. In the original concept, only No.2 Wing Tochi Scouts was supposed to be at Baramand. However on 17<sup>th</sup> January 2009, No.2 Wing moved to Hangu with strength of 411 Scouts (368 integral troops and balance from other wings). No.22 Brigade was at MiranShah with 15 NLI & 34 AK Regiments, Tochi Scouts No.3 Wing at Ghulam Khan was under command to this brigade, originally 102 Brigade was supposed to be inducted but it remained at Peshawar having units deployed at Shabqadar and Jamrud. No.327 Brigade was the Divisional Reserves No.1 at Mir Ali. In nutshell, army retained the original plan of keeping only five infantry brigades in NWA.

This altering of deployment was affected with the events on the tribal boundaries of North & South Waziristan Agencies where army conducted successful operation Rahe-e-Najaat in October-December 2009. Army Aviation took out the attack helicopters from North Waziristan and MiranShah only had two helicopters one Bell

412 and other Mi-17. Regular flights of Y-12 were in progress. 9 Army Aviation squadron with its fixed wing Mashaq aircraft became more active in the area.

One important feature was the fencing of Durand Line, almost 14 Kilometres of boundary was fenced from Alwara-Red Hut. This resulted in inconvenience for the locals who still crossed over the fence to fetch wood. Hotline communication was also established between the Pakistan Army and American Post across the border.

Tochi Scouts area of responsibility for all practical purpose was within the area of operations of No.22 Brigade. Eastern limits started from Kamar, which is five miles west of MirAli, northern limits remained unchanged with Bangidar as the extreme north-eastern post; on southern edge, it runs almost parallel with Tochi River with few miles south of Thall as the limit, on western side Khar Kamar was the limit. Never in its history had Tochi Scouts been confined in so small area. Tochi Scouts had traditionally from 1895 onwards been guardian of Tochi, Shawal, Kaitu Rivers & Valleys. One reason was the identified trouble spots in the Tochi Valley; they all were in the Tochi Scouts area of responsibility. From west, Degan, Boya, Khatti Killi, MiranShah; in the north were Dande Darpa Khel, Tol Khel and in east Machis. In south of MiranShah places like Naghar Killi, Qutab Khel and Spelga.

On 25<sup>th</sup> March 2009 the swap over of No.1 (MiranShah) and No.3 Wing (Ghulam Khan) started. In 2011 No.1 Wing moved out to take part in operation in the Buner and later in Kurram Agency. This swap over was completed by 27<sup>th</sup> March 2010. Changeover of wings is a regular feature in Tochi Scouts; it is different from regular army unit's move. Wings only take their private property along, thus it is quick and timely in nature.

### **April 4th 2009. Stadium Check Post**

The peace in the agency, which came into existence since September 2008, finally broke down in March 2009. On 30<sup>th</sup> March a convoy of 15 NLI was hit by a suicide bomber between Bannu & MirAli, resultantly five soldiers embraced shahadat and seven more were injured.

In this background the mental alertness of everyone is aroused to the maximum. On 4<sup>th</sup> April another convoy led by the QRF of 9 Baluch Regiment entered MiranShah at 1325 hours, its two lead vehicles entered the garrison through the stadium gate. The civilian traffic was already stopped almost three hundred meters away. All of a sudden one suicide bomber in Red Toyota Surf sped from the direction of MiranShah Bus Stand, which is not more than two hundred yards away from the check post. He had synchronised his movement with the convoy entering the garrison from Bannu. Being a curfew day his best chances were in hitting it when it is vulnerable; entering the garrison when vehicles are bound to slow down. Guard commander Naik Syed Muhammad Turi at the post observed it coming; another sentry at the stadium wall had already warned him about this vehicle leaving the bus stand. Thus in this two hundred yards of stretched straight road the Surf had to be stopped otherwise the casualties would have been colossal. Bursts of light machine guns hit the tyres of the vehicles, it turtle over and blew itself almost hundred yards in front of the post. The Tochi Scouts at the post who were engaging the vehicle by firing in open received the splinters from the flying debris of the vehicle. Five of them received injuries but unfortunately a flying object hit one of the army soldiers and he embraced shahadat.

On the same day, ten foreign fighting elements were eliminated in a Predator strike. On 18<sup>th</sup> a peace committee meeting was held at the divisional headquarters which was attended by the political agent also. Local were warned and reminded of their obligation. The peace committee was task to locate the culprits and to talk with the Taliban Shura for maintaining peace in the agency.

Weather also played havoc with all in the agency. In February heavy snow fall closed down many of the routes, it was followed by a series of lightening and then heavy rain fall in April. At the close of month Sargardan Post came under attack in which one Scout Sepoy Zanoood Afridi was injured. Post sustained four rockets that were fired in short duration from the vocational centre. It started at 0125 hours on 24<sup>th</sup> April and lasted for quarter an hour.

## **June 2009**

From February 2008 until June 2009, nothing extraordinary took place, which is an attribute to the Tochi Scouts high level of vigilance and alertness. In April, there was one fire raid at Sargardan Post, in May the intensity increased but only Sargardan Post was targeted which endured six night attacks in May.

The first instance of resuscitating violence occurred on 8<sup>th</sup> June when two RPG-7 bombs were fired at Machis. Tochi Scouts had its No.1 Wing at Ghulam Khan, No.2 Wing at Hangu, No.3, No.4 and No.6 Wings at MiranShah, while No.5 Wing at Boya. Field battery had seven guns instead of six, thus the seventh gun was placed at MiranShah it had a sight problem, three at Baramand and three at Wacha Bibi. By June the contingent at Hangu (No.2 Wing) had moved into Buner area.

Sargardan Post was hit with small arms and lone rocket on 16<sup>th</sup> June. Water related incidents also started appearing; it was on 17<sup>th</sup> June that Isha Post water carrier party was hit with a timed missile but luckily, the missile was blind. Captain Hammad the post commander took out another patrol to diffuse the missile. Same post was hit again with a missile next day; it exploded but caused no damage.

On night 19/20 June 2009 at 0320 hours two persons in kameez shalwar, shouted in Pashtu ‘we are friends please do not shoot, please do not shoot’ Sepoy Anar Khan Afridi was on duty , he is a sensible person and he was perplexed as what to do, he fired two rounds of G-3 in air which made the advancing persons halt at the spot, Anar called his superior and lady luck was favouring these two civilians, they identified themselves as Tahir Ud Din son of Rozi Khan an Afghan, other called himself as David Rohde an American citizen. They claimed themselves to be prisoners of Taliban for last eight months and only hours ago they managed to escape. It created a ripple, division was informed and then under a QRF they were brought to the Tochi Scouts office area at 0345 hours. It was revealed that Rohde is a journalist for New York Times. They had their breakfast at 0630 hours, made calls to their families and had a good sleep in the Officers Mess Tochi Scouts.

Probably in relation to this escape or for other reason, Banda was hit with seven missiles on 22<sup>nd</sup> June. Tochi scouts fired 55 rounds of 14.5mm gun, 85 rounds of LMG, 148 rounds of G-3 and 16 bombs of three-inch mortar. The first sign of coming inferno was felt on 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2009 when at about 1242 hours a joint Army-Tochi Scouts convoy was hit near Khar Kamar, convoy was moving from MiranShah to Baramand. Prompt response of Tochi Scouts at Khar



Kamar saved the day, they fired seven rounds of 3-inch mortars and only two army soldiers were injured.

The miscreants employed a new tactics when on 22<sup>nd</sup> June they at two different places stopped the canteen contractor's vehicles carrying ration, fresh and miscellaneous items and walk away with the goods and money. Canteen contractor of No.5 Wing was looted near Ali Khel Village at 0800 hours. Miscreants snatched away 37 kilograms of onion, 74 kilograms of potatoes, 130 kilograms of vegetables, 149 kilograms of fruit & meat. In the second incident that took place on the same day. The canteen contractor carrying fresh for the outer perimeter posts around MiranShah was robbed of similar values; only he was carrying fruit in more quantity. Third incident occurred at 1242 hours when an army convoy was hit near Khar Kamar, Tochi Scouts fired back from the post with mortars, one army pick up was destroyed. This convoy was violating the procedures by moving on a non-ROD.

*26<sup>th</sup> June 2009*

On 26<sup>th</sup> June, the luck was not as favourable. A joint convoy was moving towards Bannu, it left the main gate at 0710 hours. Moving out of a convoy is an event in the otherwise stale life of MiranShah garrison, the joy of going on leave is overpowering and everyone looks forward to the point where he can start using his mobile telephone to hear the voice of loved ones. There are demands and request which had to be met, some official more of private nature. After an hour, it had reached the Chashmai Bridge and leading vehicle an Isuzu mini truck made a smooth turn and driver accelerated the vehicle when all of a sudden, a loud blast in front shattered the windscreen, credit goes to the driver for

keeping his nerves, he immediately put on brakes but it was too late. The splinters from the blast hit the persons sitting in the open rear. Superintendent Clerk Ghulam Hussain Bangash, Canteen Contractor Asif Raza Khattak and Sepoy Fayez Khan Bangash all embraced shahadat on the spot while other nineteen Tochi scouts travelling in the same vehicle were injured, one scout from Shawal Rifles was also injured. JCO Said Ullah Marwat of Tochi scouts was among the wounded he did not survive his wounds and took his last breath soon after his evacuation to Bannu.

As per the instructions of the division and from experience, the convoy moved on but it was ill fated as another IED blast occurred near Kamar Piquet at 1208 hours in which Lance Naik Jehanzeb Khan Afridi was seriously injured and four army jawans also sustained injuries.

### **Khar Kamar**

Khar Kamar incident on 29<sup>th</sup> June 2009 is thought provoking as at 0415 hours a vehicle coming from Datta Khel direction was warned by a sentry to stop. The sentry does not stand at the road neither there are any barriers, thus the sentry who stands at higher ground fires a round which he did but vehicle did not halted therefore 82 rounds of LMG, four illuminating shells of three inch mortar, six rounds of 12.7mm gun, 160 rounds of G-3 and 36 rounds of SMG were fired by the post. Vehicle stopped almost five hundred meters ahead and passengers inside escaped. Next day at 1030 hours, 27 scouts move forward and brought back the vehicle to the post. It had only one bullet mark at the windscreen and few spots of blood inside. Post had one RPG-7 but did not had any night vision devices. The moral of the incident is that vehicles do not explode with firepower as generally perceived.

As a result of this incident the post was uplifted, an additional platoon of army was inserted, thus the total strength which was already 74 all ranks crossed over hundred; water state still remained the same neither any additional toilets were made.

The worst was yet to come, 28<sup>th</sup> June 2009 was Sunday, a road operating day marred by an ambush in Madda Khel area between Gharlamai-Wacha Bibi on a military convoy. 32 Soldiers embraced shahadat, 37 were injured including one Tochi Scout. It was the most devastating ambush which army encountered in North Waziristan Agency, a similar ambush which took eighteen army lives in 2007 was also laid in Madda Khel territory.

### *July & August 2009*

Summer time has been a rough time for the military deployed in NWM. In 2009 also the MiranShah Garrison and other posts were subject to indiscriminate firing, timed missiles and rocket attacks. On 6<sup>th</sup> July, army aviators had a narrow escape when a rocket landed 10 meters away from their living quarters; another rocket landed 50 meters northeast of quarter guard. This attack took place at 1640 hours. Isha Post survived an IED attack on 9<sup>th</sup> July when it was detected in time, next day as a frustration miscreants fired two RPG-7 on it. Banda the hot spot received thirty rounds of sniper on 13<sup>th</sup> July when troops were preparing their lunch; instant heavy response from them ensured a peaceful and enjoyable lunch without any further disturbance. Next night miscreants fired upon them at 2145 hours, they planted an IED which post was able to detect on 14<sup>th</sup> July, on 15<sup>th</sup> July, they fired small arms on it.

17<sup>th</sup> July was Friday, MiranShah was back on the hit list when on a warm morning and just as the officers and troops were leaving,

their living for office two rockets hit the garrison, one landed into the family quarters and other a bit away. Khar Kamar was engaged on 18<sup>th</sup> July, while troops were preparing for Maghreb Prayers. Same night seven missiles hit MiranShah Garrison.

These attacks had no precision guidance system thus it was a matter of luck as where they will land. Subedar Missal Khan Khattak set an example, his troops were deployed at the western wall of MiranShah Fort, he was heading towards the recruits area when he decided to pay them a visit to raise their morale, At 1210 hours Machis Post reported that two missiles have been fired by the miscreants, one of them landed near Subedar Missal Khan, he embraced shahadat on the spot, he was hit with a missile close to the post which is now named after him. Soldier Clerk Mohib Ali Yusafzai, Sepoy Najeeb Ullah Wazir, Abbas Khan Marwat, Latif Ullah Khattak and Sabz Ali Khattak all received injuries.

An incident similar to the Khar Kamar (29<sup>th</sup> June 2009) took place at Banda on 23<sup>rd</sup> July. Sarbandkai Post at 2217 hours informed Banda on wireless that a suspected vehicle is moving towards your direction; meanwhile Sarbandkai fired no less than 2 rounds of RPG-7 and 57 rounds of G-3 apart from lone round of mortar to illuminate the area. Later at 2235 hours, it reported of hearing an explosion from the same direction. Division intercepted communication, which indicated that there is one injured person sitting inside the vehicle and miscreants will try to retrieve it at night. Banda Post until morning fired 220 rounds of 14.5mm gun at intervals and 15 rounds of LMG; in the morning, there was no sign of any vehicle. Attack helicopters also engaged the village on 27<sup>th</sup> July with fourteen rockets and substantive bursts of 20mm, northeast of post. Target was a house and a flourmill (same flourmill and house were suspected of Chashmai Bridge IED on 26<sup>th</sup> June 2009).

**28<sup>th</sup> July 2009**

Two actions by sentries need elaboration, on 28<sup>th</sup> July, at 1540 hours when the sun is in west of MiranShah, Lance Naik Gul Shad Yusafzai while standing in his post at Dardoni-II observed a red colour double cabin vehicle coming from MiranShah. Sentry has very little time to reflect on his actions, if he thinks too much or for too long then the consequences may have drastic results, if he thinks too less even then he can have regrets. It is a split decision, a vehicle is bound to slow down near a check post, halts and after a sentry has made visual inspection, it is allowed to proceed. Instructions in Pashtu are written on boards displayed on both sides of road, there are speed breakers and obstacles placed and erected. This vehicle did not slowed down, Sepoys Nadeem Yusafzai, Badshah Bhattani, Muhammad Ali Afridi all opened fire on the incoming vehicle. Noor Jamal of Levies reminded of early days of North Waziristan Levies when he almost came in the mid of road to have correct aim. Bullets hit the vehicle, burst the tyres, vehicle turned over and driver blew himself up. All Tochi scouts sentries were injured but Noor Jamal died because of the direct hit of a splinter.

Synchronised with this suicide attack was another vehicle borne attack team, which veered towards the Stadium Post at 1630 hours, this time colour of car was white. Driver also sped towards the post. Sentry warned him by firing aerial shot but in reply he was fired upon which narrowly missed him. Next instant post opened the fire using machine guns and hit the driver and his occupants. Car swerved and hit the island, it started blowing up, first a small explosion and then a big one. There were three attackers inside who all died. Aim and method of miscreants who all were Uzbeks was to simply fire upon the sentries with a burst of Kalashnikov and then sped home. Mental alertness of the post saved the day.

Miscreants were playing psychological game also; there were rumours that miscreants had planted 200 IEDs on Khar Kamar-Datta Khel road and adjoining tracks. Another rumour was that daily an IED is planted near Boya Bridge, which is taken away at evening.

MiranShah received another torrent of missiles on 30<sup>th</sup> July when at 1115 hours no less than five missiles, out of which one landed inside the fort and four landed near the helipad. At the same moment Amin Post was also attacked with missiles, one such missile hit a newly under construction command post where Havildar Rabna Wali Khattak was working, he died at Amin Post, his dead body was brought back same night to MiranShah. Amin was engaged again by the miscreants same night with heavy weapons and missiles from 0218 hours until 0400 hours.

### *14<sup>th</sup> August 2009*

14<sup>th</sup> August have an emotional, spiritual and religious inspiration for all Pakistanis and Muslims. On this day in 1947 the very first ideological nation in a millennium purely for Muslims took birth. Muslims in India paid a heavy price in terms of financial and emotional loss for the new nation. The biggest exodus in history took place, millions were forced to leave their birth places, thousands lost their lives, honour and pride for the glory of Pakistan.

Miscreants adopted a negative attitude towards the Independence Day which from 1948 has always been celebrated with pomp, glory and in festive atmosphere at Tochi Scouts. Fort was always decorated with colourful buntings, lights, the day traditionally starts with prayers, then a military march past on the tunes of Tochi Scouts band. Civilians were always invited and served with traditional

Tochi Scouts hospitality, friendly match between the Scouts and civilians used to take place, prizes distributed and every one having a festive day.

In August 2009 a rain of rocket attacks hit MiranShah and surrounding posts, ten such attacks were launched in the first two weeks. On the night of 3/4<sup>th</sup> August, a freak missile hit the Army Aviation flying crew sleeping at the air traffic control tower, resultantly two havildars and two naiks embraced shahadat and seven other soldiers were injured including five aviation flight crew, one from NLI and one Sepoy Rafi Ullah Bhattani of Tochi Scouts. This freak attack put all the flying aircraft on a non-flying status because there was no crew left to fly (pilots were not injured but all flight engineers and maintenance crew was either killed or injured).

On the morning of 14<sup>th</sup> August at 1030 hours seven more rockets were fired upon the MiranShah, three landed inside the fort, one landed near the Imam Bargah. 13 Tochi Scouts received splinter injuries. Another attack came at 1140 hours when Banda received small arms and rockets. Three more rockets were fired upon MiranShah but they all landed outside the fort area. Gosh Piquet also came under attack, from 1950 -2020 hours small arms fire was launched on it from east. All these attacks were retaliated with fury by the Tochi Scouts employing all available weapons.

In 2011, recruits were getting ready for the Independence Day Parade, it was 0715 hours when a rocket landed outside the Recruit Mess, followed by another. Irfan Ullah, Saeed Ur Rehman and Haidullah all recruits of less than nineteen years of age, all Wazir, embraced shahadat. Twenty six other recruits including one tailor received minor injuries.

Independence Day ceremony is still conducted and as a sign of morale the Defence Day of Pakistan is also celebrated with commandant laying wreath at the Tochi Memorial outside the Fort.

### **Isha-18<sup>th</sup> August 2009**

The constant battle between the suicide bombers and Tochi Scouts ensued into August 2009 as well, this time Isha Check Post was the target. Posts established on the road were a necessity, they physically check the passengers sitting inside the vehicles both public and private. They were handicapped due to absence of any lady searchers among them thus they were unable to ascertain who is sitting behind a veil. Isha Check Post is an old and key post it is a junction from where the road leads towards the Razmak or Mahsud territory. Post was manned jointly by the army and No.6 Wing of Tochi Scouts. On Tuesday 18<sup>th</sup> August 2009 at 1940 hours an unusual time for any vehicle to be on road due to curfew; one white colour Toyota Hiace, the most common model of public transport was spotted coming from Mir Ali.

Posts do not react blindly for the concern of collateral damage, rather they fire warning shots in air forcing the vehicles to halt and then the driver or the passenger to step out, walk and at a safe distance stand and explain his reason of being out. Sometimes there are delivery cases at other dead bodies being taken back to the native places for burial from hospitals. Scouts can either left them at their own or simply wireless the situation back to their headquarters for further instructions.

Same procedure was followed but the Hiace instead of slowing down further increased its speed, there were obstacles erected on both sides of the post for this very purpose to force a vehicle to slow



down. Driver of Hiace after crossing the first obstacle was unable to keep a control over the vehicle thus he rammed into the embankment and blew himself up. The vehicle was full of explosives and despite blowing up at a distance from the post yet its splinters hit the post , three Scouts(Naik Syed Rehman Mohmand, Lance Naik Asal Mir Bhattani & Sepoy Saeed Ur Rehman Marwat) and one army soldier embraced shahadat , eight Scouts and one army soldier were injured.

### **Amin Piquet-21<sup>st</sup> August 2009**

Amin Piquet came under attack on the night of 21<sup>st</sup> August 2009, miscreants were in for a surprise because 21 Horse's tanks were in position. Yet by 0410 hours the miscreants were able to sneak past the outer defences and reached within 50 meters of main post. Lance Dafadar Nizam despite being hit with a bullet on back and feet still managed to occupy his position and hit back.

Subedar Naib Hussain Turi of No.3 Wing had joined Tochi Scouts in 1986, it was his last year in service and what a way to end such a glorious service. He stood tall at the post, moving fearlessly, adjusting positions, raising morale, helping injured. Turi effectively checked the attack with his well-coordinated moves.

Another name to mention is that of Sepoy Nouroze Ali Turi, he was the sentry on the post and first one to fire. He lived up to the reputation of Tochi Scouts being trigger happy but it was his initiative which in reality saved the post from being taken by utter surprise.

### ***Operation Rah-e-Najaat-24<sup>th</sup> October 2009***

Tochi Scouts did not took part in Operation Rahe-e-Najaat yet in the overall context of North Waziristan Agency this operation is

of vital importance. It was conducted by 326 Brigade which was inducted in the NWA (7 Division) in May 2009. Tanks were used at an altitude of 6500-8000 feet. No go areas around Razmak were cleared and most important notion of victory was taken back from the miscreants and their myth of invincibility was shattered. Operation aimed at Makin, which is hub among Razmak-Ladha- Sararogha. All these names and places carry bitter memories for army and Frontier Corps (Tochi Scouts being no exception). The operation itself had started in the first week of October when 22 sorties of PAF were utilised on 6<sup>th</sup> October in Nawaz Kot, Kundi Sar & Karam.

### **Tochi Scouts-2009**

There were 19 fatal casualties in the year and 74 injuries. Summer period June-August remained the period in which highest number of incidents and fatalities occurred. Last casualty of 2009 took place in November. Tochi scouts were manning 43 posts almost half of what it was looking after in 2005 (89 posts). One reason for this decrease in number of posts was the fact that No.2 Wing was operating outside the North Waziristan Agency, other reason was the overall change in the strategy of military which had reached a hypothesis that it is not possible to physically seal the Durand Line without having electronic surveillance devices thus Scarlet Thread of holding every nodal point was discarded. Another factor seems to be the lack of manpower in holding the posts.

Majority of the injuries were of minor nature with over 75% injured disposed with two weeks sick leave. 60 % of injuries took place in the agency with overwhelming number being hit inside the MiranShah Fort, followed by IED blasts and suicide attacks. Fatalities took place at Buner-Maula Syed where nine brave, daring

and proud Tochi Scouts embraced shahadat, Sepoy Sami Ullah Marwat had his leg amputated due to Buner operations. Sepoy Zahir Shah Afridi had to pay a heavy price for his casualness when on 27<sup>th</sup> January 2009 he while cleaning his rifle at the firing ranges simply overlook the first principle of treating every weapon as loaded till one has not physically checked it himself, he got an accidental bullet ripping through his chin and he embraced shahadat few hours later. Lance Naik Ghayoor Hussain Turi and Sepoy Izzat Ali Turi both distant relatives were happy to get a ride in the Mi-17 helicopter flying back to Peshawar from Parachinar on 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2009. Both were on leave , had never been inside the helicopter before and as such were excited to have this ride, both did not realised till the last seconds that helicopter is crashing , therefore both died peacefully; instantly when helicopter hit the ground.

There were two casualties in relation to water procurement, which have been narrated before. By mid-2009, the gravity of the situation was fully dawned on the chain of command that getting water is the most dangerous act but this was at times over looked by the scouts at the posts and at others it was simply unavoidable.

There were only six 500- Gallons water tanks authorised in the table of authorisation which translates into one water tank for each wing with no catering for the companies or platoons or for that matter for the posts which were 56. Certain steps were undertaken at the commandant level which included installation of electric motors and keeping in view the erratic power supply the diesel generators were also procured, water pipes were laid from source until post. Corps procured dosen 400-gallon water tanks from its own sources. These measures were implemented at Banda, Sarbandkai, Amin and Khar Kamar Posts. All inner cordon posts had the integral

tubewell water supply which included PTCL, Agency Accounts Office (AAO) Colony Gate, Mortar Group, WAPDA I & II, Grid-I, Sargardan, College Wall and Group, However even among the inner posts Datta Khel-II, and Stadium Post were dependent upon water bowzer and Sarbandkai which is on the outer cordon was also not fully independent in this aspect till mid-2009. Bangidar series of posts Bangidar, II & I were all dependent upon the spring, which is flowing almost nine hundred meters down winding and narrow track. It was the case with Y-Group, Ghulam Khan Killi Check Post and Ping Sar employing animal transport (Donkey), for the water transportation; so were Isha, Gosh and Banda. Bowser was maintaining Machis, Pahari I&II, Khar Warsak, Hussain and Thal Piquet. At some posts, the local civilians were hired to fetch the water and it worked, Kalanjar I & II were dependent upon a civilian to operate the electric motor installed at the source. Boya sector was wholly dependent upon the spring water only the headquarters had the tube well.

The Chaugal universal made of canvas is an excellent reservoir of water but out of 2319 authorised items, only 1657 were held. Post life is a complete life where ten, twenty, thirty or even more grown up men live with an aim to survive and to perform the duty assigned to the best of their ability. They have to either kill or be killed in the process. Posts are small for the reason that nodal points are neither plateaus nor meadows but rocky, barren, dry and broken pieces of uneven area. Majority of the posts after July 2005 were established in haste with more consideration on the tactical aspect. Later logistics became the major reason of casualties in which water and issues related to it were paramount. Tochi Scouts posts built in the past had limited physical and ecological expansion, Musa Khan Post built in 1919 never had a built in water reservoir or source. Not

every post had latrines, in the absence of running water the sanitation becomes fundamental issue when seen with the cultural issues and taboos. There were only three tent latrines screens present in Tochi Scouts against an authorisation of 78, which ensured a latrine screen for every post. Thus, scouts and troops had to attend the call of nature in open. Scouts comes from conservative back ground where even farting is taken as extreme social taboo. In these circumstances the mental stress is too much especially in summer thus maximum occurrence in hot months of July & August.

Leave thus remains a cardinal method to ensure a high state of morale. In 2007, 2008 and also in 2009 over 1800 scouts availed privilege leave with another 113 enjoying three months leave. Tochi Scouts from their inception have been sensitive about their leave and delay in this regard is not seen in a positive manner; quite right to some extent. A scout on post or in a wing is delayed for leave only on one pretext that manpower is not sufficient now. It is not that individual scout's fault if additional manpower has been attached with higher headquarters, which in turn restricts his right to have few days of relaxation with his family.

Figures generally do not tell lies and are easy to interpret. There were only two drill instructors in the Tochi Scouts and both sepoy (hundred years ago they had thirty two), only one non-commissioned officer trained from an army institution in the art of defusing an IED, again only one NCO trained from SSG Cherat in anti-terrorist training, four scouts were trained in bomb disposal art, (one JCO & three NCOs), however there were five JCO's who were qualified in the intelligence gathering techniques from School of Military Intelligence (SMI). Only two scouts were available who were trained as snipers despite being in operations for almost five

years (from School of Infantry & Tactics). This had its effect on the training being imparted to the recruits in the corps. 11<sup>th</sup> Batch of recruits having 337 men who were accepted for induction in the Tochi Scouts, were trained between 14<sup>th</sup> April-20 September 2008, they further had to undergo six weeks of training as young soldiers before they could be employed as real scouts for guards and duties, raids or ambushes. Between January 2007-January 2009 over 1200 scouts were put through four training cycles of six-eight weeks each. The problem with war and other related insurgencies is that they demand full attention and maximum man power but on the other hand, the bureaucratic channel of military promotion criteria imposes a difficult choice on the individual and his commanders. If a scout fails to pass the promotion cadre from sepoy- lance naik then his career dooms resulting in financial and social impacts, on the other hand he has to be spared for preparation and examination; a difficult choice. In 2007, maximum failure (eleven) happened among sepoys in the promotion cadres between the months of March – July 2007 when the highest number of attacks took place. The day operation at Pash Ziarat was undergoing, maximum scouts appeared in the promotion cadre numbering 103. Naik to havildar cadre is very important for a scout, in two years 2007-2009 no less than 190 naiks attended the cadre with only four failing.

7 Division in a year also arranged cadres, out of five cadres conducted, four were related to artillery in which 18 scouts appeared and passed, one cadre was organised for IED in these two years in which four scouts passed. There was no cadre from infantry on post defence, laying or defusing mines. Tochi Scouts received Harris communication sets but only two scouts were qualified. It should not be forgotten that from Khatti Killi onwards (September 2005) the communication with helicopters have always been highlighted as a

sour point which can affect the outcome of a conflict but despite this reality not a single cadre, course or even demonstration or exercise was either conducted by the Tochi Scouts or by the division in which troops were imparted any education regarding helicopters, how to embark or disembark. It looks very simple and wastage of time but there are incidents in which even a field officer in Siachen had got his fingers chopped off when he raised his hand to wave good bye, in another incident a loose stick had grounded a helicopter because it had hit its rotors, there are many other instances when a mission had to be aborted due to soldiers rushing towards the helicopter from the rear without even realising that there is a rear rotor running also.

Night Vision Goggles are a battle winning facility and by start of 2009 they were available at almost every post, Khar Warsak had one, Banda had three, Ping Sar also had one of these, in total 41 Night Vision Binoculars (NVB) and 29 Night Vision Goggles were held with Tochi Scouts; all on loan. They enhanced the defensibility of the posts. However, Sophie sight, which is the most advance in this field were only three with the entire corps and one out them was unserviceable. Bulletproof jackets were in critical shortage with only 696 available and that too on loan, only 125 shell proof jackets and 700 ballistic helmets. These modern gadgets are lifesaving and as such in great demand. Limited numbers thus preludes them having with every scout, it was not even sufficient to make all posts react in a proactive manner. No post had ACT set to communicate with the helicopters in case if they want these to provide fire support.

Two battle inoculations were held and attended by Tochi Scouts, in May 2007, 105 all ranks attended it at Darra Parachinar and 157 attended at Nowshehra in June 2008. Without being cynical, there was no place or time better than what actually was happening at

MiranShah for battle inoculation. It would have been an ideal for the recruits basic and continuation training also.

One very useful training was the raising of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) standards, one four week cadre was run by the corps itself at MiranShah (25<sup>th</sup> January-25 February 2008) in which Commando Battalion instructors imparted training. Every wing was maintaining its own independent QRF, at MiranShah there were six such QRF's having strength of 42 Scouts in six light vehicles. These 42 scouts were commanded by a JCO, mainly due to shortage of officers and never for once, they let down the name of Tochi Scouts. They included one bomb disposal sepoy, one nursing and one artillery observer, one signaller, one vehicle mechanic, one intelligence havildar and six drivers, they had four light machine guns, two RPG-7, one 60mm Mortar and personal weapons, two jammers, one mine detector, two binoculars, one Global Positioning System (GPS), two compasses and two maps. For communication, they had four short-range sets known as I-Com. Two PRC-77 VHF sets, one PK-786 HF set, one Thuraya and one ACT Set for communication with aircraft. Six vehicles with fixed LMG mountings were made ready. Their task include cordoning an area, to respond to miscreant's activity, to assist a convoy which has been ambushed, to reinforce another QRF, routine relief and replenishment of posts and above all to assist and react in case of an IED attack or a suicidal attack.

Another commendable act was the purchase of four 12.7mm Guns from the open market at a price of Rupees 85000 a piece and one sniper rifle was purchased for Rupees 65000. These shortfalls and deficiencies when seen in the background of the American military aid programme are pinching to say the least. The American media and world media have been taking a snipe at Pakistan for not doing



enough; it was never made public that the military is suffering from these shortfalls. The issue of NVG reminds of the time when Tochi Scouts and South Waziristan Scouts both procured the hand held walkie-talkie sets from a London amateur shop in 1930 to augment their communication system against the Fakir of Ipi. The best option was to simply halt the operations and tell the world that till the time equipment is not provided the sanctity of Durand Line cannot be assured in totality. After almost four years of intense operations the medical facilities at MiranShah remained below par, patients had to be evacuated to Bannu at the minimum for almost every injury related to war. Tochi Scouts at their own improved the standard of medical facilities by incorporating dental section.

In the wing commanders conference held on 25<sup>th</sup>-26<sup>th</sup> February the points raised were interesting and gives an insight into the mind-set of the command structure. It was highlighted that the powers of Qaum Commanders should be reduced, it went a step further by advocating that the entire system of Qaum should be done away; no substitute was given. This Qaum system is there for last one hundred years and so far, nothing drastic has been observed. In terms of desertion, the average remains almost at par with standard army units. Purely in terms of operational analysis, there is hardly anything, which distinguished any one organisation from the other. Both had bad days and both displayed extraordinary courage as well. Army had its red day at Hassu Khel in October 2007 and Tochi had it there in January 2006. Army did not conduct any operations in North Waziristan Agency, searching madrasah or houses cannot be termed as operations, there were no pitch battles in NWA, almost all actions were reactions of miscreants actions. Thus to even have a doubt about the validity of the Qaum system without highlighting its drawbacks is not comprehended. Most valid observation was

regarding the attachments of scouts with Headquarters Frontier Corps on long duration there were 73 scouts attached with HQFC, 42 with Scout Training Academy at MirAli, 15 were out with UN mission and 15 were part of SOG, a total of 228 scouts were thus out. The case of Lieutenant Colonel Khalid Khan Jadoon needs attention as he was posted as a wing commander but then sent abroad with UN on special police duty, same holds true for Captain Doctor Javed Ali. These secondments abroad are a morale boosting factor and there should be more of it; however army cannot provide relief for such postings as they have taken place under Ministry of Interior. Medical Branch suffered the most during these peak operations as apart from one doctor five other nursing staff were attached with the other headquarters. Statistically throughout the year of 2009 the number of patients in hospital remained between 40-45 daily.

### **Non Combatants Enrolled (NCsE)**

There were 184 non-combatants enrolled at the beginning of Operation Al-Mizan in Tochi Scouts who were taking part in the combat; by 2010, their strength rose to 223. Under the Geneva Convention, a non-combatant has certain rights but in a non-conventional war, they have nothing. They do not put on uniform, they are civilians in true sense but they are needed at posts, a post simply cannot work without them. In the back ground of water casualties the importance of water carriers is obvious, there were 38 such persons in the Tochi Scouts, with each wing having about 4-9 of them which is far too short keeping in view the number of posts. Only one misalchi in the entire corps, four Tindal's and four veterinary compounder were totally insufficient when the importance of animal transport is seen in the light of water crisis, only two ferriers in the entire corps but most importantly only

80 khakroobs, No.5 Wing had only 12 of them against a bayonet strength of 506 scouts, manning seven posts. Related to this was the attachment of eight khakroobs away from Tochi scouts. It must be remembered that in the initial days of North Waziristan Militia's raising this point was hotly contested because it was hampered into the minds of finance department that for the safety of the posts it is vital that every post should have a khakroob, thus their attachment away has an effects on the operations, it may not be that serious in the plains of Punjab for a unit to detach them but here in NWA they are important. On top of everything, four vehicle mechanic sepoy's were attached out without any authority.

### **Administration Staff**

Separate from the NCsE are the Administration Staff, who perform similar duties but are trained as soldiers wearing uniform. They include cooks(163), hajams(29), dhobi(25), misalchi(7), mess waiters(6), tailor(3) and clerks(38) a total of 312 scouts. The idea behind was to have every scout counts as a bayonet strength irrespective of his trade. This is a wrong fallacy, these administrative scouts seldom possess the correct mind-set of a general duty scout and they very rarely perform night sentry duties. The advantage on the other hand in having a barber trained in basic scout drills is overwhelming, they still can fire a weapon.

It must have been noticed that soldiers are not trained as khakroobs, water carriers and other trades. The issue is social and cultural, it further leads to the composition at posts where the accommodation is limited, how to integrate the NCsE with the bayonet strength and even among the bayonet strength where to draw the line between the administrative staff and general duty soldiers. A soldier will not

share his living bunker with a non-combatant; neither will he share his food utensils with him. All khakroobs are non-Muslims, mostly from Punjab; there is a ban in the enrolling of Muslims as wet sweepers. In the layout of posts the locations of animals has seldom been highlighted or catered from the inception, even the latest posts/ forts like Gharlamai and Bangidar have no provision for the animal area, no separate living bunker for khakroobs and above all no septic tanks for disposal of human body waste.

Disposal of human body waste at post away from water and on high nodal points with minefields, barbed wire, obstacles all around, having only one entry and exit point is thought provoking. Normally the cook house is established in the mid towards a leeward side to allow the use water to flow down and that also makes the only logical place for human waste disposal also but it has to be done at a distance to keep the stench away, which in case of North Waziristan is difficult. This was one of the key factor that so high number of events, incidents, casualties occurs close to water sources.

There were some attachments, which were productive in long run like the attachment with Independent Armoured Cavalry Squadron (IACS), 33 scouts were attached with it mostly as tank crew. In terms of discipline 12 scouts including six sepoy and six recruits were dismissed from the service in 2008 with another 38 awarded rigorous imprisonment in own quarter guard, another 17 reprimanded and five were warned to improve their discipline.

There were 93 families living at MiranShah and another 13 at Boya. By mid-July 2009 there were 270 on leave, 90 on courses, 41 in hospital, 39 over stayed the leave and only eight were absent without official leave. Thus, on a given day, only 1591 scouts were

available, who were actual bayonet strength, out of which 1241 were deployed on posts and 350 were kept as reserves.

Figures at times are misleading, take College Group Post as a case study, College group had one JCO and six soldiers on the post in July 2009, but out of these six soldiers one was batman to the JCO leaving five as fighting strength. Similar figure about posts having large strength are at times misleading too. Sarbandkai Post had 2 JCOs and 33 Soldiers, but without having a clear picture about their trades it will remain an enigma, because even khakroob is not mentioned among the strength. The Contingency Plan format issued by division and Tochi Scouts also failed to cater for the disposal of human waste. Regarding the strength of khakroobs and cook sepoys on each post, there is not a single correspondence between the division and under command units or between the Headquarters Tochi Scouts and wings on this subject. No equipment have ever been received in any of the military aid since the inception of Pakistan from abroad, which has shown any improvement in this field. Thunder Boxes remained in use until mid-nineties and eastern commode has replaced them now.

## **End of Decade**

2010 marked the end of the first decade of new millennium, not much of difference from the preceding decade of 1900-1910. It also signalled the five years marker of joint operations with 7 Infantry Division. Hundred years ago the tempo of violence was picked in the second decade which also witnessed the First Great War and Third Afghan War, in retrospect Tochi Scouts are fighting the Fifth Afghan War now. Fundamentals of Afghan Wars have retained their basic ingredients which circles around excellent marksmanship, high standard of physical fitness, use of ground, deception, treachery and above all ruthless treatment of enemy.

There was no letting down of the guard on behalf of military, every day there was some incident at some part of the NWA. Bannu Serai was fortunate to survive an attempted suicide attack on 23<sup>rd</sup> December 2009. It was again the sentry on the spot which saved the day and prevented an apocalypse. One Toyota Surf laden with explosives attempted to hit the Bannu Serai of Tochi Scouts, sentry on duty challenged the vehicle and fired initially in the air then hit the tyres. Vehicle overturned but miscreants were able to escape. Serai is a traditional Persian name for a resting place, English language does not have any proper word to convey the spirit of a Serai. It is not a transit camp, neither motel nor a guest house. Scouts going or coming from leave towards MiranShah invariably have to spend a night or two here. This Serai was hit again in 2011 and this time miscreants were able to full fill their evil designs. On 24<sup>th</sup> December 2011 a suicide vehicle was the cause of four scouts embracing shahadat, namely Lance Naik Alamgir Khan Khattak, Sepoy Ghafoor

Ali Orakzai, Sher Madullah Wazir and Taj Muhammad Mohmand. Tochi Serai was shifted from its old place to a new place inside the cantonment. Old Serai was established in mid-eighties after a lot of paper work the land was purchased but it was not safe under the present circumstances.

### **2010-Machis Village**

Machis is a small village on the east of MiranShah the original name is after the Match Factory which was established in early seventies, like most of the names it has also been given the local colour thus match factory area became Machis. For unknown reasons it has become a hub of foreign fighting elements living in North Waziristan Agency. One cannot say with authenticity that all foreigners are terrorists or miscreants but as a thumb rule they all are classified as such. The conduct of the foreigners over a period of time has become unbecoming, they support people who are involved in anti-state activities by giving them harbour, shelter and physical support.

Own intelligence agencies and political administration have strong reasons to believe that no permanent peace in the city can be attained or maintained as long as these foreign fighting elements are present. On 22 January 2010 a search operation was conducted in the village with the help of political administration, 22 Brigade, SSG and Tochi Scouts. Aim was to flush out the foreign terrorists, establish the writ of government and to give strong message to the locals. 15 miscreants were killed and another 70 were arrested.

January of 2010 started with a promise of peace but these hopes were short lived as on 23<sup>rd</sup> January 2010 at 0300 hours four rockets of RPG-7 landed inside or near the fort without causing any damage;

it was more or less a reaction of Machis Village search operation. Next day same pattern was repeated with five rockets landing inside the fort, one rocket landed near the school, one near the grid station, one landed inside the political agent's colony. Two more such attacks were launched on 30<sup>th</sup> & 31<sup>st</sup> January with same results; no damage was caused. It was in mid-February that 7 Division passed the instructions to all under command highlighting that level of violence has increased in last one week there by urging all levels to remain cognizant of effete environment. In 2009 alone 54 people were killed by the Taliban in the NWA on the charges of spying.<sup>348</sup>

## **February 2010**

MiranShah Garrison was hit again with missiles on 19/20 February 2010 at 0150 hours. Next morning the civilians informed Pahari-I Post about few more missiles lying close by. A fighting patrol under Lieutenant Colonel Khalid Wing Commander No.6 Wing along with bomb disposal party of 8 Engineers Battalion and representatives of 83 Ordnance Battalion searched the area (Village Gul Rauf in Tol Khel) and found four missiles inside a mosque, they all were blasted outside the mosque and villagers warned.

## **Enigma-March 2010.**

No exact information is available as to what exactly took place on the first day of March 2010. After consuming lunch Naib Subedar Syed Badshah Khattak the post commander at PTCL decided to have a look inside the adjoining building of works department. He took along Lance Naik Gul Dyaz Khattak and Lance Naik Lal Rehman Orakzai with him, since the post is within the inner perimeter thus he carried only one sub machine gun. After quarter of an hour his

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<sup>348</sup> Political Agent North Waziristan Agency, letter No. Intelligence/NWA/2 dated 4 March 2010.



colleagues at PTCL heard a burst of machine gun and they rushed towards the post; fully armed. What they witnessed inside is a mystery even today, on the floor were the dead bodies of the Syed Badshah and Dyaz Khattak lying in a pool of blood, Rehman was missing. Sub machine gun was lying next to the dead bodies and it was revealed after wards that no fire was shot from it. One theory is that when this party entered inside the compound there were already miscreants inside who ambushed them, killed the two scouts and made the third a hostage; but then why did they left the weapon?. Lal Rehman later surfaced at his hometown but he never reported back to the Tochi Scouts for duty.

Next two months were regular in a sense that routine attacks on the post continued. On 6<sup>th</sup> April WAPDA Post was hit at 2340 hours with rockets. On 19<sup>th</sup> April three rockets landed inside the fort, one exploded at the football ground, other near the college and third at the circuit house.

#### **No.1 Wing Tochi Scouts Reconnaissance.**

On 1<sup>st</sup> April 2010 Lieutenant Colonel Hasnain Ahmed No.1 Wing Commander Tochi Scouts carried out a reconnaissance of the border area to ascertain the inter unit gaps and probable miscreants cross movement routes in Ghulam Khan Sector. His analysis were that due to rugged mountain terrain with dry nullahs along the border facilitates cross border movement, these nullahs at places are not under direct observation of own or Afghan posts. These miscreants do not follow any set pattern, they operate in small groups. Locals are helping them especially the Khaliwal and Gulak Khel. According to locals the miscreants at times just cross the border carry out sabotage activity and then simply vanish. No vehicular

movement is possible towards Afghanistan except Ghulam Khan-Khost and Ghulam Khan-Shameet Mandai. However a track exists from Nawab Mandai to Shameet Mandai in front of Y-Post.

### **April Ambush**

Ambush has remained the most potent form of attack by the guerrillas all over the world against the conventional armies. In Waziristan it was perfected by the tribes against the British to a level where as a military historian one tends to appreciate the clockwork precision and devastating results it achieved. Similar tactics were employed by the Mujahedeen against the Russians. Pakistan Army suffered from the ambushes laid by the Mukti Bahni during 1971 insurgency in former East Pakistan. During Operation Al-Mizan not much changed as far as the skills of adversaries were concerned in laying and avoiding the ambushes.

22<sup>nd</sup> April 2010 was Thursday, a road operating day. Two QRFs one from army and other from Tochi as per routine performed their task by clearing the road till Khar Kamar. While they were coming back, as they reached Chitoon Village where a sharp bend exists and road is narrow. Tochi Scouts vehicle was hit first with the burst. Driver had no space to turn back thus he pushed the accelerator but another burst of fire came and he halted his vehicle on one side, meanwhile scouts jumped out took positions and returned the fire. Lance Naik Azam Khattak of Tochi Scouts was among the QRF; he joined the commando platoon of Tochi Scouts in 1996, received training from 3 Commando Battalion instructors in 2004, he recalls. *'In 2010 the procedure in vogue was that there were 60 Tochi Scouts who were trained and detailed on QRF duties. Twenty five scouts from each wing (No.3 & No.4 Wings) remaining ten scouts were comprised of*

*a nursing staff, signaller, a vehicle mechanic, an officer, two JCO's and one battalion havildar major. We also had bomb disposal party of army attached with us, one signaller from army also formed part of us. There were 15 scouts in the QRF who were trained by the army commandos in this art. We had six dedicated vehicles as part of QRF, our equipment would always been placed in them and we all would always carry our personal weapons with us. The training imparted by the army was of 12 weeks duration in which the basic drills were taught, first aid was also practiced. Our dress was khaki kameez shalwar, the procedure at that time had an overnight stay for the convoys moving either from Datta Khel direction towards MiranShah onwards to Bannu or vice versa. Our responsibility was to provide cover and protection to the convoys, on that day 22 April 2010, we had to move towards the west with the convoy till Khar Kamar and then drive back.*

*QRF was an elite composition; they were spared from any working, rather our time was spent in training, one time some of us were detailed on working by the subedar major and Colonel Ashraf saw us, he immediately called the subedar major and made him pay for our tea break on that day. Captain Saleem was our commander with another Ghazi officer attached with us. We were all a very close knit team, I knew the men by heart, and we shared jokes, laughter and even personal issues among us. Before start of any day, we would try to recite as much Koran as possible.*

*On that particular day, we had 15 NLI Battalion's QRF also with us, in reality they were not QRF rather they were responsible for piqueting of the road from Amin till Khar Kamar. In the morning the bomb disposal parties of the army moved out first and they gave all correct report on which the convoy moved out. There was no*

*particular position for the QRFs, three of our vehicles moved in front and other three at rear with convoy and 15 NLI in between. While going out, when my vehicle reached Ahmed Khel I saw a large gathering of people in the mid of road, on inquiry it was revealed that something had taken place on which people were agitated. The leading vehicles earlier were not allowed to proceed but when they threatened to use force then the women came out of their homes and made a human shield. In the end I was handed a boy Kamran age 15 as a hostage who was alleged to have either fired on the convoy or thrown a stone. We reached Khar Kamar without any incident and on our way back reached Boya Bridge. I had tied the hands of Kamran with ropes, I myself was standing behind the mounted machine gun in the single cabin vehicle. At Boya Bridge we received instructions from MiranShah not to move ahead because people enroute are agitated, we were to move only when the helicopters are in air, after some time I saw the helicopters in air but they were flying towards the Alwara.*

*After crossing the bridge the road takes a right turn and after another Kilometre the Chitoon Village starts. It was evening when I first heard the unmistakable sound of a rocket being fired and hitting the embankment followed by bursts of Kalashnikovs. As per teaching the vehicles sped forward to get out of the ambush site as soon as possible. The NLI soldiers who were descending down from the higher vantage points after performing the piquet duties were already on the road with many more coming behind thus convoy had to stop to pick them up. This delay divided the convoys with many vehicles able to drive ahead and equal numbers stuck at the spot. The attack came from the River side, it was April, there was plenty of plantation and as we move forward the intensity of fire increased. I remained at this point for well over half an hour as there were few*

*vehicles also coming behind. I had few long bursts of machine gun fired in the general direction of incoming fire. We move forward, and cross the road bend and reach a point from where a side road leads towards the Khatti Killi village direction. We all were pinned here, we took our positions and fired back. My prisoner Kamran was now tied with me, I made him fill the belts of machine gun promising him that I will set him free once we reach MiranShah. His life was in real danger as NLI soldiers wanted to kill him in retaliation of what they were suffering but I had given my words to him thus it was becoming difficult for me to keep my honour. Captain Saleem came to my rescue and told the NLI to keep their hands off the boy.*

*It was here that maximum casualties were suffered, we were in two minds either to reach the safety of Ahmed Khel Post or to make a dash for the MiranShah. It was getting dark and all soldiers were spread out. We had earlier been asked by the aviation to pass on the grid reference, we told them that we are close to the algad. Pawani I our post had earlier been providing us the fire cover through 12.7 mm gun and it was morale raising to know that there are scouts who can see us. Now with darkness it was difficult for them to fire accurately. As we all were lying, firing and making small movement forward, I noticed one of the scouts sitting in the vehicle, I shouted at him and even abuse him to come out and fire. I finally saw that he is unconscious, I ran to the vehicle along with Lieutenant Khalid of 32 Supply & Transport Battalion who was a ghazi officer. The injured scout in the vehicle was none other than the Sepoy Akhtar, he had received a bullet in his lower abdomen. I picked him up and we brought him next to the embankment. To stop his bleeding I had to torn my own kameez and made a bandage. There were two other scouts also wounded but not seriously. The message from the MiranShah was to move forward so helicopters can pick us up. One*

*of our vehicle had received bullets on the tyres. In this darkness we made a disciplined retreat, on our way forward I had the Akhtar with me and two other scouts Lance Naik Inayat and Sepoy Nemada. Our driver Sepoy Ismail drove at breakneck speed keeping direction and control only with the braking lights of forward vehicles. I remember that Sepoy Akhtar requested me to delete all songs from his personal mobile.<sup>349</sup>*

In the broader picture a reinforcement was sent from MiranShah at 1700 hours but it was also ambushed near Shina Khowara at 1748 hours. From the original force, 33 arrived back at MiranShah and 21 managed to reach Ahmed Khel.

Sepoy Akhtar took his last breath at MiranShah, there were thirteen other scouts who were injured. Sepoy Turan Gul was injured but his comrades highlights his motivation and acts of courage, he remained cheerful and despite being injured refused to vacate the area; he was taken up to Ahmed Khel in an unconscious state. Lance Naik Hazrat Bilal was another scout to display similar characteristics so was Lance Naik Ayub. Havildar Nasir Zeb adopted fire and move tactics which is the correct procedure, he managed to reach back to MiranShah along with his men. Naib Subedar Shahid was at the tail of the QRF and as such had to overcome a much higher risk factor, his vehicle was riddled with bullets, he marched, manoeuvred and passed through the first ambush site. He had almost gone past the second ambush as well but he went back to ensure that no scout is left behind. He was the last one to enter the MiranShah Fort that night. Captain Saleem was the QRF commander and he displayed a sound head by not getting involved in any pitch battle especially when the initiative was with the miscreants. At Ahmed Khel Post Nursing Sepoy Kamal Ud Din turned out to be an angel in militia

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349 Interview with Naik Azam Khattak on 11th October 2012 at MiranShah.

dress, for two days he looked after injured Sepoy Turan Gul almost without blinking.

NLI suffered six fatal casualties and 20 others were injured. One QRF was also lost. It was not a good omen to have such kind of ambush so close to the MiranShah; however the convoy must be given credit for extricating itself when compared to other earlier experiences of ambush. Analytically army aviation helicopters were not utilised, the old points which were highlighted in Khatti Killi operation of 2005 ‘army aviation and ground troops need better communication skills’ were again highlighted. One paramount reason for this repeated weakling was the fact that army aviators were having short tour of duty. Had a full-fledged squadron been deployed, under command to the field formation then the question of asking for grid reference of ambush site would have never been raised. Attack helicopters before being committed requires permission from the corps headquarters which certainly consumes time. Another facet that surface is the dual chain of command, NLI was not as well conversant with the area as Tochi Scouts but by virtue of rank seniority advice of Tochi Scouts was over ruled. There is no second question about the miscreant behind this incident, he was none other than the Maulvi Sadiq Noor, and it was his area.

### **Tochi Scouts (April-July 2010)**

Isha Check Post after the suicide attack of 2009 was again made functional and it proved its importance when in the last week of April 2010, it not only apprehended ten suspects on 25<sup>th</sup> April but also eliminated another four on 28<sup>th</sup> April. First incident took place at 1815 hours when around a dozen miscreants on motor cycle, vehicle and double cabin tried to pass through the check post; very

intelligently the Tochi Scouts on duty cordoned the car in a manner that all six inside the vehicle had no option but to give up. The two miscreants on motor cycle and four other in another vehicle started firing.

Isha Post was now fully alive and alert, scouts took the positions and did not allowed the already captured miscreants to escape. Their accurate fire compelled the remaining miscreants to escape towards the open area. Gosh Post was also providing fire support and observing the unfolding of the events, they sent a ten member scout party to block the escape route of the miscreants; after brief fire exchange all miscreants were arrested less two who managed to escape.

Seventy two hours later a similar incident again took place at Isha, on 28<sup>th</sup> April the scout sentry at check post waved an incoming white Hiace and a Binjo car, there were no passengers inside the Hiace only a driver where as in the car there were four passengers. As the sentry was having a look inside the Hiace the occupants of the car came out and opened fire. It was promptly returned back by the other scouts on duty. The four miscreants ran in multiple direction. Isha Post fired mortars and heavy automatic fire, all four miscreants had disappeared but scouts went in their search, another brief firing encounter took place. One mortar bomb exploded prematurely at the post which hit Sepoy Wisal Gul but professional approach of Nursing Lance Naik Muzzafar Gul was paramount in saving his life, he inserted a chest tube. Miscreants were encircled and cautiously scouts approached and after an hour of fighting found that all four miscreants were dead. The dead bodies of miscreants lead to the conclusion that probably they were injured and killed themselves up by blowing up a hand grenade.



Two scouts were injured but not due to miscreants firing rather due to premature exploding of a 60 mm mortar at the post.

Eric Breninger 22 years of age a convicted German terrorist was among the dead bodies. He was member of Islamic Jihad group based at MirAli maintaining close association with Hafiz Gul Bahadur. Eric had embraced Islam; his video was posted on You Tube in 2008. Another German killed in this encounter was Ahmed M. alias Salaheddin, a Germany born Turk who was expelled from Germany almost ten years ago.

Isha Post again excelled in checking when on 8<sup>th</sup> May 2010 it apprehended two more miscreants along with 100 rockets of ammunition.

### **Rule of Engagements**

In May 2010 Pakistan Army modified its rule of engagements on the Western borders. There already existed a General Staff Publication on the subject but it was not comprehensive to deal with the volatile situation. The best part of these rules of engagements are that it lays great emphasis on avoiding collateral damage, observance of local customs, traditions, Riwaj and tribal culture. It admits that distinguishing a miscreant from a civilian is a herculean task.

### **4<sup>th</sup> July 2010**

Just a day short of fifth year of being part of 7 Division in war against terror, Tochi Scouts Sargardan Post killed a top ranking Taliban commander Mazloom Yar. It was a road operating day and there were intelligence reports and communication intercepts which indicated presence of a high level miscreant commander in the area.

At 0915 hours the piquet party at Sargardan Post observed a bearded middle age man walking, the man pretended to be a lunatic. Subedar Shafi Bhittani took no chance and fired a shot in the air, the lunatic man immediately changed his stance and took out a sub machine gun from under his clothes and opened fire on the scouts and try to flee the spot. His shots hit Sepoy Shadi Khan Marwat but scouts fire almost mow him down before he was able to cross the road. Later during search it was confirmed that he is Mazloom Yar belonging to Bait Ullah Mahsud group having a head money.

### **August 2010**

By August 2010, Tochi Scouts was manning 50 Posts in the North Waziristan Agency. No.2 Wing was deployed outside the agency since June 2008. No.1 Wing was at Ghulam Khan since March 2009, No.3 Wing at MiranShah since March 2009, and No.4 Wing also at MiranShah from March 2003 along with No.6 Wing which since its raising was in MiranShah from July 2007 onwards. On 28<sup>th</sup> August at 2230 hours Afghan National Army fired three mortar bombs which hit the Y-Post of No.1 Wing. It should not be taken as an attack by them but ANA never showed any restrain or any kind of professionalism in handling fire, they are nothing more than a brigand band wearing uniform. This bombing injured Naib Subedar Mashk Alam Khattak, Sepoy Lachi Khan Afridi and Sepoy Intikhab Alam Khattak.

### **Winter of 2010**

Two incidents took place in winter of 2010, firing was carried on the piquet party at MiranShah Bazaar on a ROD, in another incident an IED was exploded on a military convoy near Boya. This IED was in fact identified by the Musa Khan Piquet. The Tochi Scouts at the

piquet as per the procedures kept all the tracks under observation especially a day prior to the movement of convoy. They observed a white vehicle passing, halting as if changing tyre and then moved on. This happened on the track passing close to the Musa Khan. Tochi Scouts informed the bomb disposal party about it. Next day they searched the area and found that a fresh ground has been dig. IED was detected and disarmed; as the convoy moved on towards Gharlamai.

On this track another IED exploded a kilometre away. Miscreants introduced another dimension by carrying out balloon borne IED, on 16<sup>th</sup> November one IED was blasted by No.3 Wing Tochi Scouts at 0040 hours overhead PTCL Post.

### *January 2011*

From 2011 onwards two wings of Tochi Scouts remained deployed outside North Waziristan Agency. No. 1 Wing is still deployed in Kurram Agency under command 73 Brigade where as No.2 Wing join back its paternal valley in November 2012 after almost three and half years of deployment outside its perimeters. Presently No.6 Wing is at Ghulam Khan, No.4 & No.3 Wings at MiranShah, No.5 Wing is in the process of moving to MirAli and No.2 Wing is also in the process of establishing itself at Boya. Isha Sub sector posts which were previously under command of No.6 Wing are being handed over to No.5 Wing.

January 2011 started with a fire raid on Sargardan Post, no damage was incurred rather it acted as catalyst to improve the defence of posts further. Protection wall was raised, a bunker was constructed for 106 mm Recoilless Rifle, construction of a protection bund started

between Sargardan and Butt Marka along the MiranShah-Ghulam Khan Road. These steps proved valuable as another attack on the same post was launched by miscreants on 17<sup>th</sup> June 2011. Attack started with one RPG-7 rocket hitting the post simultaneously small arms fire poured in from four different locations all across the road. Sargardan Post in 2012 alone sustained eleven fire raids.

IEDs remained a potent weapon in the hands of miscreants. Naik Zulfiqar Ali Bangash after enjoying leave in his hometown Hangu was coming back towards Kohat when he embraced shahadat near Kohat due to an IED on 17<sup>th</sup> January 2011, it was planted in a Hiace Coach near Village Jawazara.

### **5<sup>th</sup> July 2011**

Miscreants used an IED on an army convoy on 5<sup>th</sup> July 2011, the sixth anniversary of Tochi Scouts coming under army operational control. One soldier embraced shahadat and two soldiers were initially injured, three more sustained injuries in the fire fight with the miscreants that ensued after the explosion. On the same day Signaler Lance Naik Akhtar Ali Bhittani also embraced shahadat due to an IED blast near Amin Piquet.

Military for long has been restraining itself from excessive use of force but with this pattern it was appreciated that unless stern action is not taken immediately the miscreants will keep the notion of victory with them. On 6<sup>th</sup> July 2011 a joint operation involving army and Tochi Scouts was undertaken in which the known locations of miscreants close to own posts were targeted heavily with artillery. Zakeem Hospital located on the south western edge of MiranShah close to Sargardan was demolished, their locations inside the MiranShah Bazaar were hit with attack helicopters.

Colonel Amir Akbar Khan Commandant Tochi Scouts personally led, supervised and co-ordinate the demolishing phase of Zakeem Hospital. Sargardan Post which is the closet to the hospital came under intense miscreants fire. Commandant realizing the gravity of situation move to the post and stayed with the scouts, this raised their morale. Commandant ordered the APC to move towards the Sargardan chowk, it did but was hit with a RPG-7 causing partial damage. Sepoy Muhammad Ashraf Khattak protected it valiantly against the advancing miscreants, he was manning the LMG 'miscreants were trying their utmost to reach Sargardan Chowk but he did not allow any one of them to move even an inch ahead... he sustained injuries also' remarked his superiors. Ashraf remained with the APC for an hour before he was evacuated but he had done his job. Lieutenant Colonel Kamran Ashraf was the local wing commander responsible for the protection of inner cordon. Kamran's presence was another source of inspiration for the scouts because he despite the deadly sniper fire of miscreants which they were carrying out from the safety of the surrounding high building moved freely between his posts. Kamran was the one who asked for tanks to come forward and then directed their fire.

Isha Post as usual remained in forefront, it came under attack on 8<sup>th</sup> July 2011 when during routine checking of vehicles one motor cycle with two riders tried to bypass it by firing at the Scouts. Retaliatory fire killed one miscreant whereas other managed to flee from the scene.

In August 2011 MiranShah Fort was hit with rockets which took the lives of three scouts and injured another twenty odd recruits. Still the Independence Day ceremonies were celebrated with vigour and zeal. Shaheeds were all Wazir recruits including Irfan Ullah,

Saeed Ur Rehman and Haidullah. They were all getting ready for the parade when the missile landed outside Recruit Mess.

MiranShah Garrison was another important target for the miscreants. On two occasions in November 2011 they physically attacked the fort but both times were repulsed with heavy fire. On 7<sup>th</sup> November 2011 the first attack came followed by another on 14<sup>th</sup>. Miscreants were making use of Shawal Medical Complex and Shaheen Hotel. 7 Division employed all fire power including tanks, attack helicopters, artillery and automatic weapons to engrave the fire power superiority of the military on miscreants. Five anti-state elements were killed, Shaheen Hotel and Shawal Medical Complex were hit hard.

#### *No.1 Wing Tochi Scouts.*

No.1 Wing in June 2011 was ordered to move to Dir, where it was placed under command Dir Scouts, the aim was to beef up the internal security of the area and to curb the infiltration of the Taliban and Afghan insurgents into own area. It was 14<sup>th</sup> June 2011 when one half of the wing's strength was moved to Timergarh, they left MiranShah at 1000 hours and there was no curfew in the city. Naib Subedar Sher Alam wanted to see off his friend Naib Subedar Muslim Khan Wazir at the colony gate but when he reached there the convoy had already left. Commandant Colonel Amir Akbar was present at the spot to have a last word with his scouts.

Dir have a history of insurgency, in the meanwhile the successful operation Sher Dil had almost culminated in the adjoining Swat State thus it was vital that no resurgence should be allowed to take place. Lieutenant Colonel Qaiser of 52 Cavalry took over the command of

the wing on the eve of move. The Wing reported at Dir Scouts after a successful road move of almost 500 miles. The very first incident took place on 4<sup>th</sup> July 2011 when a Scout Niazat while taking bath in the Panjkora River was drowned to death, he was rather playing in the water when a wave took him astride and instantly his head was smashed into a boulder and he vanished, his dead body was found after a lapse of three days; not a very good omen for the start of the command and operation.

## **Dir**

Dir have an average elevation of 2000-3700 meters, the major tribes are Gujjar, Wardak, Swati, Roghani, Katani, Mashmani and Shinwari. The major Talib leader was Latif alias Yasir of Village Chiragh Ali. Mutabbar Khan was another chieftain having a lashkar of over 1000 under his control.

Wing was initially placed under command Dir Scouts and it was only in September that it came under command 105 Brigade as part of 19 Division.

On 30<sup>th</sup> July and 1<sup>st</sup> August 2011 the Wing carried out two search and cordon operations in the area, in the first operation 45 scouts of No 1 Wing in collaboration with 33 Baluch Regiment conducted the operation in Village Loi Kandao between 1000-1500 hours in which not much was confiscated, major weapons that were seized included two heavy machine guns and two small machine guns. In the second operation the booty was much bigger, it was conducted in the Village Ayagai Gharbi between 1630-2310 hours, 30 scouts of No 1 Wing along with 33 Baluch Regiment and local police including female personals carried out this task. The general pattern was that scouts cordoned off the area at a distance of 300 meters and regular

army at 200 meters there by allowing local police and political administration to individually search each house. Five SMGs, one HMG and one Recoilless Rifle along with Thuraya communication set were confiscated.

From August onwards the deployment of the wing was spread, the headquarters were established at Chauktian having a strength of 145 Scouts, 14 scouts at Tariq Observation Post, 31 scouts at Siar Amin Post and another 110 scouts at Nawa Killi pass base and at Zakhana Killi and finally 137 scouts were placed at Shingara, Attan and Shahi. 16 Azad Kashmir Regiment was also incorporated into the operations and few posts were jointly managed and rest were responsibility of either scouts or the regular army. The scouts were not at the top rather they were at the bases of passes checking the influx of people. No.1 Wing from August onwards came under command of 105 Brigade which was part of 19 Infantry Division commanded by Major General Ramday, in an interview General Ramday highlighted his plans which revolved around closing the passes and not allowing the miscreants inside the valley either to escape or to get reinforcement from Afghanistan thus control of passes was vital. Later the General received a bullet in his thigh while carrying out aerial reconnaissance in the area. Chauktian the base is ahead of Timergarh where the headquarters of Dir Scouts is placed, a road leads towards the Chauktian and from there various tracks leads to passes which starting from north are Dobando Dara where an independent post of No.1 Wing was established, on the left of this pass is Anwaar Darra then further left is Shingar, then Bin Darra and Nusrat Darra.

Not much of activity was faced by the wing, administratively the supply of water was abundance. Sepoy Aiyan have a service



of three years and according to him ‘*The life was not as difficult as it was in Datta Khel, the area is beautiful and overall it was easy to keep an eye on the passes. Our duty was to check the people and to defend ourselves in case of an attack by the Taliban, no such attack came however a detachment of 16 Azad Kashmir came under fire rather it was ambushed in which own scouts later played key role in evacuation of the casualties and warning others of impending danger. Naik Bismillah spotted the miscreants firing upon the soldiers of 16 Azad Kashmir Regiment and he opened up with his 12.7mm gun, Lance Naik Falak Taj a signaller of the wing promptly informed the regimental headquarters about the ongoing ambush. Both were later praised by the battalion commander of the ambushed platoon.*’<sup>350</sup>

### Kurram Agency

In the first week of October 2011 the Wing received orders to move to Kurram Agency for an impending operation, subsequently the advance party reached Thall on 15<sup>th</sup> October and main body after two days of refurbishment and coordination at Bala Hisar also arrived at Thall on 16<sup>th</sup> and later moved to Sadda on 17<sup>th</sup> October 2011. Wing Commander Lieutenant Colonel Qaiser carried out all the necessary coordination with HQFC at Peshawar and he acknowledges their support.

The operation was planned in Central Kurram Valley. Intended area of operation does not have any physical boundary with Afghanistan rather it is bounded on the south by Kurram (Parachinar) in the north by the Tirah or Khyber Agency in the east by the Upper Kurram and in the west by the lower Kurram (Arawali-Thall) area. The major tribe within the valley are Masuzai and Mamuzai both

<sup>350</sup> Interview with Sepoy Aiyan, 29th October 2012.

are sub tribes of Orakzai thus the valley or the operation are known as 'Mamuzai Operation'. There is a metallic road which leads to Parachinar from Kohat, there used to be a narrow gauge railway track which was serviceable during the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. This track terminates at Thall Fort but with the passage of years it became unserviceable and now only few remaining portions of the railways are visible. Thall Fort which stands out on a high ground is one of the most impressive fort in the area it was constructed in 1932 along with Razmak. It guards the lower Kurram Valley, all along the Kurram river flows with the road and provides a refreshing scenery, valley is wide and fertile. Thall is now the headquarters of Thall Scouts which were raised in 1948 and also housed one infantry brigade apart from the Combined Military Hospital. From Thall after a distance of ten miles comes the Arawali Fort another major and impressive fort being under the use of Kurram Militia and after few small towns comes the Sadda which is a tehsil, it is at this point that a road leads towards the east into the Mamuzai Valley.

### *Mamuzai Valley*

Mamuzai Valley is wide and fertile, initially after a small blocking it opens up and follows the Khamuzai Nullah for another twenty miles when a junction is reached (Dwa Toi) here another algal join in and as such divides the valley into halves, a bridge known as Sultani Bridge allows the vehicular movement to drift on the western side of the nullah. A stony track with constant climb and narrow turns passes along the villages and terminates at Tabbi Khili where a post of Kurram Militia was located, ahead is the village of Daggar which before the operation was a flourishing arms market and ahead of the Daggar after a kilometre is the Dappa Pass which allows the foot and jeep movement into the Khyber or Tirah Valley

onwards into Afghanistan. On the other side of the valley from Sultani Bridge onwards on the eastern bank the track is shingle and it leads to the villages of Jogi and Dabgrai both were strongholds of Taliban before the operations. From July 2011 onwards the whole Mamuzai Valley became almost inaccessible for own troops and Taliban started strengthening their positions. They ideologically influenced the people, threatened them, took away the money and almost made the locals hostage to their whims. Another aspect of this incursion was the increased sectarian tension in the complete Kurram Valley. Lower Kurram is Sunni by faith with pockets of Shia faith. The people of Mamuzai Valley are Sunni by faith peaceful in nature, with the advent of Taliban the sectarian differences were given added colour. The Orakzai Tribe especially in Mamuzai Valley are not militant in nature, education level is rather high as compared to Tochi Valley. In the morning, valley especially the Tabbi Killi is full of children chattering or repeating their lessons intermingled with occasional burst of laughter. At noon the track is full of these boys coming from government run school wearing black militia kameez shalwar and black peak cap with a red badge, these students normally travels three or four miles one way to school. The girls also attend school, the overall outlook of the valley is modern and progressive. The women observes purdah but yet they work in fields. Construction of the houses is also different from Tochi Valley, here the houses are longitudinal in nature, with roofs almost joining each other and they are compact in nature, made of stones and wood. Quite a number of male in the valley are working abroad thus signs of prosperity are visible in the form of their houses having iron gates adorned with paint. Weather is moderate, it is warm in summer and in winter the temperature drops below zero with bouts of snow fall in the first week of January or end of it which covers the complete valley making any vehicular traffic almost non-existent. The valley

is not entirely flat rather it has low level mounds on which the villages are made, the surface is rough and stony but in the fields astride the Nullah the area is flat and fertile and gives an almost picturesque view. The valley can be at best compares with the Gilgit and Skardu area with Tabbi Killi almost resembling Shigar Valley.

## Preparation

No.1 Wing's advance party moved to Thall on Kurram on 22<sup>nd</sup> October. Lieutenant Qaiser now had one more commissioned officer Captain Asad, in Dir he was all alone but junior commissioned officers of Tochi Scouts are highly competent.

On 25<sup>th</sup> October at Sadda the very first operational briefing was carried out. IGFC Major General Nadir Zeb personally came and had a talk with officers apart from holding a Durbar. Corps Commander 11Corps Lieutenant General Asif Yasin also came to raise the morale of the troops. No.1 Wing was put under command 73 Brigade along with 42 Punjab and 16 Frontier Force Regiments. Light Commando Battalions is a new concept introduced in army under which every corps is allotted one such battalion, in this operation Northern Light Infantry Commando Battalion was also taking part. Objective given to No.1 Wing Tochi Scouts was to clear the Cheelosar Feature. 14<sup>th</sup> November 2011 was the D-Day.

Thus these twenty odd days were well utilised by Lieutenant Colonel Qaiser for the training of his wing for the impending operation. Extensive firing and field craft were practiced, small sections and units were formed as mountainous terrain restricts use of classical taught organisation. Lieutenant Islam was another officer who was posted to the wing.

### *Cheelosar Feature*

At the end of Mamuzai Valley is Cheelosar feature, an imposing mountain of 8000 feet which acts like a patriarch of the valley. It dominates not only this vale but also Tirah (Maidan) and Orakzai Agency. There is one prominent pass known as Dappa Pass which allows foot movement from Kurram Valley to Tirah Valley onwards to Afghanistan. The track which starts from Sadda and terminates at Daggar Village is the base of Cheelosar Feature; in fact the feature is mile ahead of village across the small river.

No.1 Wing from first week of November 2011 started preparing administratively for the incoming operation. Kurram Militia had one post at the Daggar Village; rather short of it known as Three Pimples. No.1 Wing was handed over this post to establish its headquarters, few more house from the locals were taken over on rent, signal headquarters were established and importantly all ten mules were transported from Sadda to Three Pimples.

Natives were helpful and no incidence of IED or ambush took place during this phase of operation. On 14<sup>th</sup> November as per plan 16 FF cleared the area but Cheelosar Feature remained under miscreants control. On the evening of 15<sup>th</sup> November, Lieutenant Colonel Qaiser had the biggest test of his military career to capture the feature. Qaiser's plan was simple, he assigned the task to A Company, divided them into two groups, one group to move at last light, trek through the mountainous terrain in darkness, cross the small river and establish a base of fire and gives signal for success. Basing upon this signal next group to move forward and joins the first group. Later both groups to climb to the top leaving only mortars at the base. Plan looks simple but the hard part was that there was

no authentic intelligence information about the actual strength of miscreants at the top.

First group under Naib Subedar Wahid Mir with one platoon marched off at last light and when the signal of their safe arrival at the base was received that was the time when Qaiser had his first sigh of relief. He was controlling the operation from the command post which he had established at a vantage point on the three pimples, he could observe the scouts through night vision devices.

Lieutenant Islam led the second group which set off at 2230 hours and joined the first group at 0030 hours. Now the real and hard part of the operation commences. Qaiser had ensured that every scout is well armed, each was carrying four spare magazines, meal ready to eat (MRE) it was a novelty for the scouts, dry fruit and traditional Gur & Channa.; ample water in water bottles. There was nothing new in all this equipment, same was carried in traditional gasht also but drastic changes in uniform & web equipment had made all this a complex affair.

At 0100 hours A Company started climbing, a track leads to the top but tactically it was not viable to follow it due to fear of mines and miscreants fire. Mountain had very little to help, rugged stones, bushes, slippery ground, night, fear of unknown all combined together makes any climb dangerous. Keeping direction was the biggest challenge and everything depended upon it. There have been instances in military history where a force had been circling around and around all night. The leading scouts had the task to act as markers, there was no question of having any kind of light neither any sound was permissible thus whispers and sound training was the key to successfully reach the top.

Few slipped and were helped by other scouts, two had severe ankle sprains. Company was not going up in a straight line rather every scout was making his own way up forward. Move was tactical in nature with one platoon moving up and then covering the climb of second and then third platoon moving; a scene similar to Iblanke ridge.

When the first scout reached the left shoulder of the Cheelosar, he scanned the area in darkness, there was no sign of any fire, within minutes the whole platoon was at the shoulder and then they just rush forward and got themselves deployed almost hundred feet ahead. Second and third platoons followed and success signal was given; it was premature.

With first light they came under sporadic but accurate sniper fire from the high ground. Top was not flat rather it had plenty of cover in the form of thick trees and broken ground. No.2 Platoon move forward from the right and No.1 Platoon from the left with the No.3 Platoon providing fire base. They creep forward and then just charge on the suspected miscreant firing bay. They found half cooked food and some utensils apart from cartridges of fired rounds.

By mid-morning it was clear to Qaiser that he has achieved a half victory, as long as he does not clear physically the complete Cheelosar Feature his troops will remain in perpetual fear of a sniper. Already one scout was wounded from the enemy fire, Sepoy Naseeb Wazir was hit with a bullet in his right thigh.

By evening, Qaiser started pounding the right shoulder of the feature with artillery, firing 29 rounds and another 31 rounds on the top of the feature, he now ordered his scouts to capture the top and then move towards the right. Meantime the first mule train carrying

ration and more importantly ammunition including 12.7mm gun had set off from the command headquarters. It dumped the goods at the base camp which was further secured with another platoon which also carried these items to the top, line of communication was now secured.

By mid night 17<sup>th</sup> November 2011 top of Cheelosar feature was with the wing and next day in a systematic manner they descended down towards the right shoulder and whole of Cheelosar Feature was cleared and posts established.

Lieutenant Islam Shahzad led by personal example, he stayed over two months at the crest and through his energetic, hardy and cheerful personality created a sense of security among his under command. Islam came directly from Pakistan Military Academy, he is from the first batch of cadets who have been given short commission from the branch. This concept is the brain child of Chief of Army Staff General Kayani and Lieutenant Islam through his deeds and acts have validated his Chief's idea.

25<sup>th</sup> November 2011

On this day the wing came under heavy attack by the miscreants. Wing had a strength of 359 scouts who were deployed, strength of companies varied depending upon the location. A Company had eighty, B Company had sixty three, C Company had only forty four and D Company had 128 scouts with another 44 being part of the command post. A rear headquarter was maintained at Sadda in a government college. On Cheelosar alone there were eight posts namely Dappa Top, Flag Group, Islam Mir Top, Afraz Top and Asad Post, last one acted as company command post as well. On the left of Cheelosar Feature, river separated it from other features,



the adjoining feature known as Takht Sar was under control of C Company which had four posts, it now dominated the Daggar Bazaar; at the base of Takht Sar two nullahs joins in and forms the river. On the right of Cheelosar Feature a track and open fields created a gap in which Tari, Barmela villages are at the near end and Dargai and Samo Killi villages are at the far end. This track acts as an intercompany boundary also. On the southern edge of this track which is in fact the right of Cheelosar feature another high ground known as Ghakhai Feature was occupied by the B Company with four posts. D Company lies further east of this feature with another riverine creating a gap. Fire base of the wing was established in this company.

In plain areas this might have created no major issue but in a mountainous terrain with hostile local population the maintenance of these wide spread company locations is a logistic night mare. First major issue was the establishing of communication network among all the posts, second to logistically keep them updated. Lieutenant Colonel Qaiser initially established a central cook house from where fresh food was daily provided to all the posts. It had its merits and demerits. On the lighter side the very scouts assigned to this task would have the pick of meat enroute thus independent cook houses were established. Initially the major and most important aspect of the whole command echelon was this task; and they rose to the occasion. Every scout available performed this duty of ferrying fresh and dry ration to the posts. All posts were linked with communication network enabling deployed scouts to have occasional talk with his family. Leave was another issue, wing had been deployed for long and leave was restricted for last almost six months. *I initially started sending men in small groups, without informing the posts regarding my intention, once the men reported*

*at the headquarters they were given leave pass and transported away to the Sadda, but not for long this secret was kept from the others. Soon an influx of applications and petitions started flowing, they were right in their own perspective but somehow I managed it;'* recalls the wing commander.

Army units after clearing the area move ahead and maintenance of peace and mopping up was entrusted to the No.1 Wing Tochi Scouts. One village remained a thorn in the overall success of the operation it was Sammo Killi. On 25<sup>th</sup> November 2011, wing performed another task, recovery of a toppled tank, it had gone down the track while moving forward. Qaiser himself from cavalry supervised this recovery operation, tank got toppled at 1630 hours, soon it was darkness but wing successfully retrieved the tank.

### **Sammo Killi**

From 27<sup>th</sup> November 2011 area domination started towards Sammo Killi, Qaiser himself took out the QRF and established a new post short of village on the track Daggar-Sammo Killi. It was this post which later came under heavy miscreants attack, wing retaliated with 2298 rounds of G-3, 300 rounds of SMG, 2128 rounds of light machine gun and 111 rounds of 12.7 mm gun. Importance of post can be visualised from its ammunition expenditure on 29<sup>th</sup> November when over 1300 rounds of G-3 were fired in protection along with 1255 rounds of LMG.

Post itself is located on the left side of the broken hilly track while moving towards the Sammo Killi. To reach Sammo Killi wing has to cross a seasonal nullah which starts climbing after crossing, then passes through three likely ambush sites, the width of the track is hardly good enough for a single vehicle, one has to use low gears

all the way up. Post itself is at the hump, thus it provides excellent observation and firing position. Miscreants also knew the importance of this post, as long as it stays intact their movement was restricted and curbed thus they were adamant to eradicate it by raid or ambush. Area is green with trees providing cover to infiltrators, long logistic trail was another Achilles Heel. Like other posts it is mud made with thick vegetation on one side. Initially post was provided fresh food daily but then the vehicles were ambushed therefore independent cook house was established. On 30<sup>th</sup> November one tank was also placed at the post. This tank certainly shifted the balance of power in the arena, miscreants knew that as long as this piece of iron is standing next to post their chances of gaining any respite diminishes with the hour thus post came under more stern fire raid. Sepoy Banat Khan Afridi was shot in the arm while giving sentry duty on 4<sup>th</sup> December 2011 but he kept his vigil till the time loss of blood made him unconscious. In another tank related accident Lance Naik Syed Ejaz Hussain Turi had embraced shahadat two days earlier (2<sup>nd</sup> December 2011) at Ghiljo, Ejaz was attached with Orakzai Scouts, he was part of Independent Scouts Cavalry Squadron; it was an accident fire, Ejaz could have saved his life but call of duty for him was more important than saving his life.

Aim of the post was mainly to check the main supply route of miscreants leading towards Nikka Ziarat and Saman Bazaar through Dargai.

On 2<sup>nd</sup> December 2011 three fire raids were carried out by the miscreants on the post, first one took place at 0950 followed by another at 1330 and last one at 1700 hours. Cover was ample thus miscreants would fire few rounds create a sense of insecurity and when scouts were confident that attack has been beaten back then

another raid would take place. This is one major disadvantage of being fortified. Sammo Killi Post sustained 22 attacks from the miscreants. Captain Asad Kamal was the post commander and he through his leadership and bravery kept the morale of the post high. Two leading miscreants were killed in these encounters namely Ibrahim and Muslim. Asad finally decided to come out and raid the miscreants, twice he conducted successful minor operations to regain the notion of victory. Lance Naik Arif Yusafzai was another stalwart scout, he was brave and daring in nature. During one of the miscreants attack on the post Arif stealthily moved out and stalked them, his sudden and unexpected arrival on the scene behind the miscreants created a ripple scenario which led to chaos among the rebels. Lance Naik Arif was part of initial assault group which took the Cheelosar feature, was part of mortar group which had stayed at the base and later went up. On 4<sup>th</sup> December 2011, Arif was again part of a raiding party which had gone out from Sammo Killi to dominate the area, he was again carrying the mortar. While coming back the party came under attack, it was dusk and scouts were retreating in an orderly manner by fire and move. Arif had fired six mortar bombs on the suspected miscreants positions; mortar firing is bit technical in nature, one can fire blindly also but to hit the miscreants one has to observe the fall of round and adjust accurately being a perfectionist Arif always preferred the second mode. It was during this observation that he was initially hit with a stray bullet on his right arm yet this brave son of soil again rose to have an observation which was pertinent for the safety of his comrade; he had a mortal blow and embraced shahadat few hours later.

Subedar Major Muhammad Ullah Mohmand also needs special mention. Role of Subedar Major is very important because in our culture he acts as a bridge between the scouts and the command

echelon, passing the pulse both way. Muhammad Ullah was a source of strength for the wing and wing commander; in such circumstances when operational requirements are multi fold and there is little time for peace or solace the mental harmony of wing commander and wing subedar major is a force multiplier. SM as he is commonly known gives time tested advices and tips to the wing commander, he knows by virtue of his long service more about individual behaviour than the officer; in most of the cases. Muhammad Ullah was it seems never got tired, all the time running around to make sure his scouts are well fed and logistically strong.

He rose to the occasion by ensuring that all scouts are getting warm food, managing their leave, relief and rotation on posts ‘ *Subedar Major Muhammad Ullah worked with complete dedication, selflessness and positivity which not only helped the troops to fight fully fed and equipped but also acted as a morale booster during entire conduct of Operation Mamuzai*’.<sup>351</sup>

Role of junior commissioned officers is very important in Tochi Scouts because shortage of commissioned officers put extra responsibility on them. Naib Subedar Sher Azam Wazir was the administration officer of the wing, his systematic administrative arrangements which only he can explain; worked much better than what is taught in books. Posts were separated by rather long distances through circuitous routes on feeble tracks. Food, water, ammunition had to be supplied to these posts irrespective of weather. Wazir made an excellent use of animal transport, mules and donkeys also need rest and recuperation, they are equally affected by the weather and good food also acts a catalyst to them; Wing purchased special ration for the animal transporters. Subedar Noor Salim Yusafzai’s act in evacuating an injured scout Sepoy Momin Khan Bangash

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351 Citation excerpt, Tochi Scouts archive.

highlights this. Momin was hit in the head by a sniper bullet while he was performing the sentry duty, he had just raised his head to have a better observation when the bullet slipped through his helmet and stuck in his head. It was a dark night, post on a high ground with nearest track almost two miles away from where a vehicle can rescue Momin to safety. Noor Salim along with four other scouts carried their wounded comrade through darkness and intermittent fire, they walked through the stony and slippery terrain, sweating and panting they finally managed to reach the QRF which had also arrived on getting the signal of Momin's injury. Momin is still alive but he has not recovered fully. Naib Subedar Rehmat Ullah Bhittani is another example of junior commissioned officer's importance and their role. He remained at Sammo Killi Post for well over twelve weeks at a stretch, a source of strength for his post commander Captain Asad and later Lieutenant Islam ; Rehmat was always a volunteer for any raid or for that matter any work which involves attacking the miscreants. He hates paper work.

Naik Asghar Hussain Bangash signal operator No.1 Wing recalls, he was part of the leading company A Company on the night of 15<sup>th</sup> November 2011. He was part of Lieutenant Islam's group.

*We started our march at 2100 hours from three pimples, Taliban were sitting at Daggar bazaar, we climbed up the Dappa Top, then descended down to Tarri Village, cross the water channel and reach the other group at the base. We had 2500 rounds of LMG, jackets were heavy, three RPG-7s along with 12 rounds per launcher, two grenades per scout. 60mm mortar was with us. We had ten LMGs. Climb was difficult, we had manageable moon light. At Fajr we were at top, we offered prayers, I was carrying solar panel and at top I placed it there for charging, which prove handy next night.*

*There was a house at the top where there were few men moving around. They fired on us which hit Naseeb Wazir... cold was another factor, we had no warm bedding. Some of us had sleeping bags, rest would just close up, one of my friend Lance Naik Gul Makhan had one chaddar. At evening we were fired upon heavily, we took cover behind stones that is why artillery fire was called upon. We then climb towards the Cheelosar Top through fire and move, we again reach at the top by Fajr, offered our prayers.*

*Sepoy Altaf Yusafzai was hit on second day when we were advancing towards the right shoulder. He was evacuated. We spend two nights at the top and then advanced towards the Flag Group... Sepoy Afzal Afridi picked one grenade which was time fused, he threw it and it blasted away. I remained at the top for another four months, there was no water. Food was provided through mules, each scout was provided four chapattis, there was no arrangements for cooking food but after one month the earlier house which was now abandoned was utilised for cooking. Weather was the main issue, sleeping bags were provided after three days on mules, ten on one day and ten more on second day.<sup>352</sup>*

Captain Asad was with B Company. Ghakhai was occupied on 17<sup>th</sup> November.

## *No.2 Wing Tochi Scouts. 2009-2012*

No.2 Wing Tochi Scouts marched out of Tochi Valley in 2008 to confront the miscreants in Swat, from there after successful operation it was moved to Bajaur Agency in 2009 and finally it was given a respite for a year and half at Gomal Zam Dam, it has

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352 Interview with Naik Asghar Bangash, 17th October 2012.

arrived back to its home base in December 2012. Three different officers commanded it in this epic era. Lieutenant Colonel Naseer Janjua took it to Buner , Lieutenant Colonel Asim Baig took over from Janjua and major operations in Bajaur were fought under him , however role of Major Azhar Sahi needs to be highlighted as for a fortnight he performed the duty of acting wing commander with zeal and dash. Presently the wing is being commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Arshad Hussain.

June 2008 was the start of journey, initially the wing moved to Mangal Bagh at Bara to apprehend Mangal Bagh a miscreant leader, he was heading the Lashkar-e-Islam. His home was destroyed but he himself managed to escape. One scout was injured in this operation.

#### *Hangu. August-April 2009*

On 23<sup>rd</sup> August 2008 Wing moved to Hangu, where it was deployed at Doabba/Zargari area near Orakzai Agency. Reason for such sudden move from Barra area was the increase Taliban activities in the area. On 22<sup>nd</sup> August 2008 at 1400 hours eight policemen were killed in an ambush at Naryab, a small town close to Tirah Valley on the main line of communication from Hangu. Initial mission was to establish the writ of government in the area, however with passage of time it took another shape; to curb the sectarian terrorism in the area.

Wing under command Lieutenant Colonel Janjua reached Hangu within a day of receiving orders. This is another characteristic of Scout Wings that they by virtue of their light equipment and flexible organisation are able to move much more quickly than any other military organisation.



Hangu Bazaar is the hub of communication, two parallel roads leads out in a westerly direction, north-westerly track after a twenty odd miles of loop joins in with the main metallic road which links Hangu with Thall onwards to Parachinar. This north-westerly track was the main source of irritation for the government, it was slowly going under Taliban control. Important villages or choke points on this track are Darband, ahead of Darband a track leads to famous Lockhart/Samana Post into Orakzai Agency onwards towards Tirah. Billyamin, Banda Tangi, Shinwari, Nariab (site of policemen's killing). The other road from Hangu moves in a westerly direction linking it with Thall onwards to Parachinar. On this road Doabba is an important small town, it also forms a communication hub with tracks leading towards the Orakzai Agency. Doabba lies in upper Miranzai whereas almost in the midpoint (Hangu-Doabba) is Lower Miranzai; both are Bangash.

Wing had to establish posts and ensure peace in the area from Hangu-Doabba on East-West axis and towards north, Samana was the limit.

On 25<sup>th</sup> August, Wing started its operation clearing the main road and establishing posts on it, company headquarters was established at Doabba. On 26<sup>th</sup> August area was cleared from Hangu- Darband- Billyamin and another company established its command echelons at Billyamin. Two more check posts were established till Samana and further posts were established between Samana and Doabba which included Gulistan Fort, Shinawari, Sarmlo Kando, Zargari, Kahi and Doabba itself. Among these Sarmalo Kando was hit hard by the Taliban for the reason that their free movement towards Nariab was restricted. Army action (38 Frontier Force) had already cleared the area and now it was left to the No.2 Wing to consolidate

the gains. There were fire raids on the posts but nothing to match the severity of Tochi Valley.<sup>353</sup>

In winter of 2008 another dimension was added to the situation, sectarian friction which already exists in the area but remains within limits. With the ongoing operation against Taliban the situation started deteriorating. Taliban especially Baitullah Mahsud had visited the Hangu and there were plans to eliminate the Muslims practicing the Shia covenants. This is why this whole war against Taliban is important to win because these people have no tolerance for anyone else apart from those who adhere to their school of thought as far as religion is concerned.

Muharram's new moon sighting affected the wing deployment, already scouts were deployed on posts but now all these posts were reduced in strength and wing concentrated itself at Hangu. Orakzai and Bangash lives in Hangu and both have adherents of both Shia /Sunni faith. Main threat was from Tirah Valley which is overwhelming Sunni in nature. Shermast Pir is a dominating feature which allows trans agency movement between Hangu-Tirah. On one side are Sunni and on other resides Shia. There is a Ziarat at the top. Wing Headquarters was established at Shermast Pir. Feature itself is like any typical mountain high ground, not very difficult to climb, have sufficient spaces at interval for establishing posts. Naib Subedar Aurangzeb Khattak was the post commander at one such post (Ziarat Post), he recalls.<sup>354</sup>

*'First eight days of Muharram passed away peacefully, but the major test was on the coming three days because as per tradition the Shias take out Tazia and a huge number of people follows it, it is*

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353 Interview with Subedar Hidayat Afridi ( October – November 2012)

354 Interview with Subedar Aurangzeb (October-November 2012)

*at this stage that maximum chances of sabotage activities are more likely to occur. Brigade had requested the Shias not to take out this Tazia, another factor was that Shia from Kohat were also bringing out a procession towards the Hangu. In the end Taliban ambushed both of these processions near Flour Mill. ' Much has been written about ambushes, how deadly they are to tackle even for well trained military regiments and here a civilian procession was now under attack. Free use of light machine guns, small arms fire, RPG-7 were made. There was a chaos and panic, with shrieks of people filling in between the firing, blood of own brothers freely flowing on the road, sky filled with dust and smoke, it was nothing but a civil war.*

*'At my post on one side at the foot hill was a Shia Village and on tenth Muharram a sizeable strength of Taliban advanced from Tirah direction. Firing of rockets and mortars was going in the air regarding which none could do anything as it was being fired from the hideouts. My duty or the purpose of my post was to protect this Shia Village, at mid day this Taliban lashkar started advancing, our post was the hurdle and as such I saw them climbing upwards. A showdown was on hand in which nothing else but bloodshed was imminent. All our posts occupied the battle stations, there were three posts which were inter supporting each other but still had blind spots in between'.*

Subedar Aurangzeb on that day diffused a highly tense situation by walking straight towards the miscreants and telling them without mincing any words that it is his duty to protect the village and his whole platoon is willing to sacrifice their lives to honour their commitment, it will be much better if you just leave this area otherwise I will slaughter you all here. Taliban did not left the area immediately but they also did not violated the sanctity of village,

after half an hour they just retreated. Subedar Aurangzeb was given the IGFC Commendation Card for his deeds apart from cash prize.

Wing on 24<sup>th</sup> April 2009 was ordered to move towards the Buner in Swat to deal with Taliban.

*Buner: April-August 2009*

North of Mardan lies the Malakand Agency, Swat river separates it from Swat State, on the North-west of Mardan is Buner District, a metallic road leads to it passing through Rustam with Ambella the first major town and then comes Daggar.

Wing moved from Hangu to Peshawar and from there it moved to Mardan and reached Rustam in two days. From Rustam the move was precarious and all eventualities were catered for. Two army regiments were also part of this clearing force namely 30 Punjab and 3 Sind Regiment, one Special Operations Group of Frontier Corps, No.2 Wing of Khyber Rifles were also part of this force. Subedar Aurangzeb Khattak was also part of it and we follow his account.

*'We cleared the road on foot, scouts were marching in front, establishing piquet and army followed us, area is green, fertile and pleasant. Population not very hostile, at that time majority of them had left the area towards safe places. ROD was led by Naib Subedar Ismail. We had our first parhau (halt) at Sairbeen, a small tourist spot where a hotel was still functioning. Weather was hot however abundance of fresh water in the form of natural springs made it very comfortable. Curfew was imposed in the area thus not much of vehicular traffic. I recall that Naib Subedar Ismail had a bath in one of the spring as well. After a halt the ROD party again moved forward to clear the road ahead, Ismail went ahead with one major*

*of Mahsud Scouts attached with us. Special Services Group (SSG) of army was also part of our force but they were heliborne and not marching on ground with us.*

*We had our first casualty ahead of Sairbeen. On 30<sup>th</sup> April 2009 Naib Subedar Ismail Marwat was leading the ROD party, they had reached a petrol pump, where one vehicle was parked and Ismail informed the rear headquarters on wireless about it. Disregarding the instructions, Ismail went ahead along with Sepoy AttaUllah Marwat to physically ensure that the vehicle is safe. One native boy was present at the petrol pump, he lured the party towards the pump by stating that he knows where the weapons of miscreants are hidden. Few moments later the same native boy blew himself up. Both Ismail and Atta Ullah were martyred on the spot. When we reached the site, the body parts of Atta Ullah were found almost two hundred meters away such was the impact.'*

Wing established its headquarters at Daggar, in a government girl's college building. Daggar is an administrative and communication hub. South east of Daggar a road leads towards Dewana Baba town, wing was entrusted with the responsibility of clearing the area east of Daggar. Naib Subedar Aurangzeb Khattak, Subedar Zulfiqar Turi and Captain Meraj of SOG were part of initial force which moved eastwards along with two tanks. However both the tanks were hit, one was burnt and other retreated along with the force back to Daggar. This first incident highlights the area, terrain, opposition and the difficult coming days. Notion of victory so important in any war; conventional or unconventional now rested with miscreants.

After two days of planning and recuperation No.2 Wing again move towards Dewana Baba, the distance from Daggar to Dewana

Baba is not more than 25 Kilometres, this time through immaculate planning and systematic clearance of area the force managed to reach objective without any incident. It does not mean that the route was safe, rather the force was ambushed twice. Thick growth, comparatively high ground on both side of road gives an advantage to any hiding armed group. On both occasions prompt artillery and Cobra Attack helicopters provided fire support. Mere presence of security forces at Dewana Baba was enough to take the notion of victory away from miscreants.

Posts were established at Dewana Baba and after two days Wing set course towards Chagarzai which is at a distance of 35 Kilometres away from Daggar. This route is much more difficult than the track leading towards Dewana Baba. It is steeper, narrow and have more ambush sites. There was one encounter with Taliban on the way who after short engagement withdrew. Force reached Chagarzai and after two nights stay came back to Daggar.

Now the direction of move was towards the North-North West of Daggar, Pir Baba is another small enclave perched high on mountains at a distance of 14 Kilometres from Daggar; it was the next objective. To reach Pir Baba few intermediately high points had to be cleared. Bai China was the first hurdle. Two Bell 412 Helicopters also accompanied the advancing force. At the top initially one helicopter was able to touch down but instantly it came under hostile fire in which one bullet hit the feet of the pilot. Before it pulled up two scouts had managed to get down and as such were now left alone at the peak. Wing Commander was monitoring the situation from the second helicopter; he made sure that his scouts are evacuated. Captain Meraj of SOG played a key role in this operation. Bai China was attacked again after two days. It was pounded with

artillery fire for a day before the commencement of advance. Cobra Helicopters also took part in this operation, No.2 Wing managed to reach and occupy the peak. Logistically it is much more difficult to sustain a force at the peak than at the base, at this place lack of water was the major issue and force remained without water for two days.

Ghazi Khanna also had to be cleared, occupied and kept under observation before Pir Baba could be invested. Tochi Scouts were in rear of the army led by 30 Punjab along with two tanks; these tanks were hit as in Dewana Baba. Force retreated back to Ghazi Khanna stayed the evening and next day arrived at Daggar. Air Force was called in for support for the next move which took place very next day, after the bombing and strafing the force move again in the same order of battle as before. Promptly Ghazi Khanna was occupied and No.2 Wing move two kilometres ahead on the western outskirts and reached a village by the name of Nawab. No resistance was offered by the natives, parhau was established at the village, night was spent in peace. Wing stayed two nights here and then move forward towards Pir Baba. Area is open and generally flat, thus the force had no major resistance in reaching the objective. At Pir Baba Ziarat an IED was discovered which was planted at the grave itself. Troops were able to move freely in bazaar, people welcomed them with open arms and warm hearts.

### *Kalpanrai*

Kalpanrai is a small village west of Ghazi Khanna, a track leads to it. It is approximately ten kilometres away. Short of village heavy fire was brought upon the force but retaliatory fire soon silenced the miscreants muzzles. Yasin a notorious Taliban commander was heading the miscreants, his house was searched, it was all luxury,

colourful women undergarments were in abundance; these were collected and burnt by Tochi Scouts. In the village and adjoining bazaar no resistance was offered, an old FC post along with two schools was burnt down by the Taliban in the past.

East of Kalpanrai lays Kingar Gali at a distance of 14 Kilometres, this village was also cleared without any resistance worth noting. However two IEDs were detected. Wing now moved towards the west to establish link with Swat by clearing the area. Karakar Mountains are another key feature which had to be physically cleared before any long lasting peace could be maintained in the area. It was cleared with feeble resistance offered by miscreants who now relied heavily upon IEDs to create friction in the advancing forces path.

Wing now arrived back to Daggar, it was now start of winter, almost four months of nonstop campaigning. Next task for the wing was to clear the Pir Baba again where few incidences of sniper attacks had taken place in recent past. Kala Kandao was the suspected hide out of the miscreants almost 25 Kilometres North West of Pir Baba involving steep climb. It was during this operation that bomb disposal Scout was injured.

Naib Subedar Mujahid Hussain Turi was the post commander at Kalpanrai. A small beautiful village two kilometres short of Dewana Baba and twenty kilometres ahead of Daggar. He narrates.

*'After the successful operation in Buner the people started coming back, there was a festive look and atmosphere in the air, it seems as if every house is celebrating a marriage. People of the village had been terrified of Taliban. The celebrations continued for well over a month. People used to visit our post bringing good wishes and praying for our health and prosperity. I remember one*



*particular incident , one day seven small school children came to our post and handed over ten packets of juice to sentry on duty, the boys were led by Mir Afzal himself a student of class fifth. We tried our best to return the packets but they simply refused to take it back. Next morning their teacher Mr Farman came and we narrated him the whole story to him and he updated us that children have saved their meagre money to buy us the gifts as a token of their gratitude.*

*On 22<sup>nd</sup> August 2009 we were ordered to move for Bajaur, whole village had close their shops, people stood on both sides of the road. Women were standing on the roofs with Holy Koran and praying for our success. Syed Hussain the principal of the local school was leading this farewell procession.*<sup>355</sup>

## No.2 Wing & Fakir of Damdola

On 23<sup>rd</sup> August No.2 Wing Tochi Scouts was ordered to move to Bajaur Agency. Lieutenant Colonel Naseer Janjua who had led his wing in an admirable manner was promoted to next rank, he took over Mahsud Scouts. Major Azhar Sahi acted as wing commander for a fortnight before Lieutenant Colonel Asim Baig took over the command. Wing was assigned the responsibility of establishing the writ of state in the agency. Check posts were established initially in Barkholozo area and later operations were conducted in the surrounding areas of Damdola to capture the mountain ridge of Khazai Sar. Apart from No.2 Wing Tochi Scouts there was a company of SSG in support. No.2 Wing suffered 17 casualties in this period, four scouts embraced shahadat and thirteen other were injured. Three junior commissioned officers were awarded IGFC commendation cards. Wing remained in Bajaur Agency from September 2009 -September 2010.

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<sup>355</sup> Interview with Naib Subedar Mujahid Hussain Turi, 26 October 2012 MiranShah.

Bajaur Agency is bounded in the north by Dir, on east by Swat, on south east by Malakand Agency, Mohmand Agency is in south and Afghanistan on west. Famous pass of Nawagai is also situated in this agency. Bajaur Scouts are the main military force in the agency. Bajaur also has a history of insurgency which is probably due to having joint border with Afghanistan. In 1960-61 a military operation was conducted by 7 Infantry Division in the area, more particularly in Khar. From Timergarh in Dir a metallic road leads into the agency passing through Torghundi, Alizai onwards to Nawagai Pass leading into Mohmand Agency; short of Nawagai Pass another road leads into a more southerly pass known as Sarlarai which also descends down into Mohmand Agency. Khar which is the administrative and Bajaur Scouts headquarters is almost in the mid of this main and sole line of communication. The troubled areas where No.2 Wing operated are located north of this road towards the Dir and Afghanistan. A road leads northward from Khar towards Inayat Qilla which is a sub-administrative headquarters of the Bajaur Agency. North east of Inayat Qilla at a distance of ten miles is a small mountain hamlet of Damdola, Maulvi Fakir Muhammad was the chief troublemaker. Road or track itself terminates few miles ahead of Inayat Qilla.

Wing spent a night at Timergarh and next day reached Inayat Qilla where headquarters were established in a college. Tactical, political and tribal situation was quite precarious, No.2 Wing of Bajaur Scouts was almost besieged at Kitkot. First mission was to open this road link. The scenario is almost replica of Tochi Valley where similarly No.5 Wing of Tochi Scouts was also in the same situation at Boya in same time period.

IGFC Major General Tariq Kundi came to Inayat Qilla and made a passionate and emotional speech which roused the scouts heart,

he apprised them regarding the current situation. The road leading from Inayat Qilla to Kitkot in the North-West was under the control of Taliban, IGFC very rightly said that only government can rule this country and area & no secondary power is allowed to do so. He further highlighted that nation, Frontier Corps and people of the area have pinned high hopes on you, you are their saviour, I hope you will not let me down. *'we all were really charged up with his speech and responded with battle cry of Tochi Scouts, long Live Pakistan, long live Frontier Corps and other religious war slogans.'* Recalls Naib Subedar Mujahid Husain Turi who was present there.

### *Inayat Qilla-Kitkot*

The plan envisaged by Major Azhar after consulting his JCOs was to move forward two companies after a gap of three days. Next day the JCOs had a conference among themselves and later took their wing commander in confidence. They had the apprehension that their initial plan of moving out after three days might have been compromised thus they advocated move within two days. Major Azhar readily agreed to this readjustment of plan.

Naib Subedar Mujahid Turi and Naib Subedar Gul Nawaz Bhattani had the difficult task of clearing the road till Qamar Killi which is 15 kilometres ahead of Inayat Qilla., they moved out at 0200 hours on foot, Mujahid leading and by morning they had established the piquet on the road. Gul Nawaz and his men were now at the start point. They have achieved something which can make the Tochi Scouts feel proud, these junior commissioned officers through personal leadership, bravery and astute tactical understanding of the situation had turned the tables on their opponents. At 0415 hours, Mujahid uttered the magic words of 'Da Toro Shrung' the code word

for success. On hearing these words the wing move out and reached Qamar Killi where check posts were established. Notion of Victory was snatched away from the Taliban by the Tochi Scouts. Wing had moved out from Inayat Qilla in an extended line with two companies moving forward, one company performing the duty of QRF and one was deployed on piqueting.

On third day after establishing post at Qamar Sar the wing move forward towards the Kitkot, Tarkholay is a small place short of Kitkot, wing established itself here. Posts were established at Barkholozo under command Subedar Ejaz, Meena Mor was another check post, company headquarters was also established here in a vocational college. The besieged wing of Bajaur Scouts was now free, link up with them was established.

Subedar Hidayat Afridi was performing the duty of wing junior quartermaster and also heading the quick reaction force. It was his duty to daily fetch the ice and other fresh items from the Khar for the wing. He recalls one particular incident. <sup>356</sup> *‘My usual routine was to clear the road, be ready for any emergency. One day, it was Ramadan and I had gone to the Khar along with my QRF which comprised of thirty odd scouts to bring the ice. Luckily on that day there was no ice available thus we move back rather earlier. On our way back I spotted three motorcycles with six Taliban riding. I challenged them to surrender their arms but they refused and started firing on us. They were in fact an ambush party which was set for us but our unscheduled move back from Khar had disrupted their plans. We killed two of them and rest all fled from the spot; I was given a commendation card for this. On another day, our QRF saved the day for No.2 Wing of Bajaur Scouts located at Kitkot under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Saleem. They were caught in an*

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356 Interview with Subedar Hidayat Afridi, 27 October 2012 MiranShah.

*ambush and sent us a signal for help. Our QRF reached the spot in short time, I was part of this QRF along with Subedar Aurangzeb and Major Azhar was leading us, a brave officer. Our arrival tilted the balance and force the Taliban to flee from the scene.'*

This part of Bajaur is known as Bara Mamun, People had a sigh of relief on this moral and physical victory of the scouts. According to Naib Subedar Mujahid Hussain Turi 'on the occasion of Eid people had a festive outlook and they told us that it is after three years they are celebrating Eid with festive look'. Damdola and Chotta Mamun had yet to be cleared; a showdown with Fakir of Damdola was on hands.

### *Mulla Saiyid*

Bajaur Agency is a small agency in terms of area as compare to Tochi Valley, other prominent difference is in terms of geography. Area of operation is like a tulip with a very short base, more or less like the Kazha Valley; in Tochi Valley the river by itself is the main feature which is lacking in Bajaur.

Ahead of Inayat Qilla the valley is small, surrounded by high mountains (6000-8000 feet). It is green dotted with trees and small hamlets interlink with hilly tracks which are more or less decided by nature itself, population is not sparse as in Tochi Valley. On the eastern edge of Inayat Qilla starts the mountain range which moves northwards and west ward, thus encircling the vale, beyond this mountain range flows Kunar River which is part of Afghanistan. Complete valley is known as Mamun.

For the time being, wing after establishing its post and having established a link with the Kitkot now had to keep this communication

link open, dominate the area and above all to wrest the notion of victory away from the miscreants. Wing had bomb disposal party from the army but these IEDs seems to have brought a revolution in military affairs. They are easy to made and easy to plant anywhere and then explode with either as a time tuned, pressure related or simply through signal. There were no suicide attacks on the wing. Taliban had established their 'Qatalgah' or slaughter house in the thick growth area on the track Qamar Sar- Kitkot.

Wing now move towards elimination of area on the north east of Qamar Qilla, it advanced into Salarzai. This is a tehsil administrative area also known as Little Mamun. Headquarters was established at Meena Mor, other major villages in the area apart from Qamar Qilla, are Sar Khalozao, Barkhalazao, Tarkho Qilla & Jangzai. During this period search and cordon operations were also conducted. One particular operation in Tarkhalo is worth mentioning because free use of rocket launcher, recoilless rifles took place. Naib Subedar Aurangzeb was injured in this operation along with Sepoy Hadi Gul. Subedar Rasm was hit with a bullet but his bullet proof jacket saved his life, while the miscreant were firing on Rasam another scout quickly threw three grenades on towards the attacker which killed him (miscreant).

Before the start of operation another incident occurred which highlights the Fog of War, Khan of Pasht is a pro government malak, he had posted his own men at the Turgat Peak for the protection of scouts camp down below, they were hit by own attack helicopters, four of them were killed and scored were injured. Later own helicopters evacuated the wounded men and flew them to Peshawar for treatment.

In October 2009 Mulla Saiyid welcome the scouts to its environs. Major Azhar took an advance party of 120 Scouts including Subedars Rasam Bhattani, Sami Marwat and Naib Subedars Mujahid Turi and Kimya Gul Bhattani. Wing Commander Lieutenant Colonel Asim Baig had an aerial reconnaissance of his intended target. Wing headquarters was established and posts were established on the surrounding heights known as Bajizo, Bar Mulla Saiyid, Sar Mulla Saiyid, Turgat and few other intermediaries were given numbers. Turgat is a dominating feature. The overall situation was not much different from the Madda Khel- Khaddar Khel tribal feud. Within the high ground few villages were pro-Taliban like Banda, Kazha and Damdola itself while majority were pro-government. The similar issue of water supplying to these posts and its inherent dangers were as much alive here as in North Waziristan Agency. Three posts were relying upon animal transport for water carrying where as in other the scouts were carrying it themselves. Food was cooked centrally at Mulla Saiyid and taken to the posts. It was a deviation from the standing procedures of scouts developed over a hundred years of experience; every post has to be independent in terms of ration with ample supply of ammunition. One reason for having a high number of cooks in wing organisation is mainly due to this factor. Reorganisation of wings overlooked this key factor and resultantly in the new organisation the strength of cooks (four in each company) is not enough to cater independent cooking at each post. Posts were established, area domination patrolling was also carried out. Posts were named as 70A, B, C, D, 70 & then 70B. It was not in any sequence and this haphazard numbering was its security and safety. 70B was the first post moving west wards towards Damdola and 70A was the last one. The post at the base of Turgat was known as BajjiSar Post.

Wing was able to occupy and establish post at Turgat without suffering any casualty although heavy fire was exchanged with Taliban. Sepoy Kamal Khan Orakzai embraced shahadat at Turgat due to sniper fire on 27<sup>th</sup> October 2010. IEDs remained a major concern for the wing commander. Month later (9<sup>th</sup> November 2009) Subedar Bakhti Badshah Khattak and Lance Naik Khumar Gul Khattak both laid their lives due to IED. Sepoy Pir Zada Bhattani was also injured near Mulla Saiyid due to one IED exploding. Bakhti Badshah was suffering from fever and as such opted to travel back on a vehicle. Another accident was uncalled but then these things are part of operational hazards, on 22<sup>nd</sup> December Sepoy Abid Qayyum Orakzai was injured when Lance Naik Abdul Aziz fired on him accidentally while performing sentry duty; he simply could not recognise him in the darkness.

### *January 2010-Damdola*

By the start of New Year 2010, progress already made enabled military to comprehensively launch a major and concentrated push to eliminate Taliban from the scene.

On 28<sup>th</sup> January 2010, No.2 Wing advance upward and east ward towards the capture of high grounds surrounding Damdola Village. 12 NLI & 25 Punjab Regiment pushed for Damdola from the multi direction along the base of mountain ridge whereas Tochi Scouts and a company of SSG had to capture the high ground.

Moving eastwards towards Damdola the Taliban had dug well camouflaged trenches and firing positions; in layers each supporting the other. Advance started early in the morning and by evening No.2 Wing managed to reach mid-way, Kazha Bowl was the major



hurdle as accurate fire put a lid on advance. Fading light diminished any support from attack helicopters and scouts along with SSG withdrew. Subedar Zulfikar Turi held the miscreants at bay ensuring a safe retreat.

Four scouts of No.2 Wing Tochi Scouts embraced shahadat while five other were wounded. SSG also suffered almost equal number of casualties, area was later cleared and it played a key role in eliminating the Maulvi Faqir Muhammad and Maulvi Umar from the area, writ of the government was established and peace restored.

Taliban were hiding in the high grounds with villages like Banda, Ghunday, Darra acting as their popular base support, using IEDs, suicide bombing and occasional ambushes they tried to demoralise the scouts, thereby increasing their area of influence. Army and scouts always overwhelming in numbers and firepower thus started eliminating the outer & inner cores of these anti state elements and with each victory the notion of victory was attained which started reducing popular base support resulting in a peace pact between two.

Wing was spread yet it was compact, well oiled, battle hardened, in a high state of morale which naturally comes in military units from victories attained on ground. Winter had been tough for the wing but it sustained. Logistics were much improved and highly appreciated by the scouts. Leave, food, pay, equipment, medical facilities, rest all were ensured by the chain of command who set personal example as well. In winter nothing is more demoralising than a luke warm food.

Damdola was captured by the army, scouts now had to do the mopping around Mulla Saiyid which was accomplished without any major incident.

*Gomal Zam Dam. October 2010- November 2012*

Major General Tariq Kundi came to pay his tribute to the No.2 Wing at Khar, wing had fulfilled his promise, commitment and loyalty. It had suffered casualties, passed through a harsh winter yet it never lowered its standard. The area which when they had first step foot a year ago was almost out of the government writ was now fully integrated thanks to the valiant sacrifices made by all the men in uniform among which No.2 Wing Tochi Scouts also stands with chest high.

IGFC in his speech stated that instead of giving the traditional prize he now leaves upon the wing to pick up a station of its own choice. Wing very wisely opted for duties at Gomal Zam Dam where a Chinese firm is in process of constructing a dam at Khajauri Kach in South Waziristan Agency. Wing had a relative peaceful tenure with Chinese and move back to its native valley in November 2012.

## **2012**

January 2012 was no different from the previous years, Sepoy Salim Iqbal Bangash embraced shahadat and Sepoy Rehmat Ullah Khattak received minor injuries when an IED was exploded on 2<sup>nd</sup> January 2012. These two along with six other scouts had gone down from Bangidar Post to collect water. Mule was also killed in this explosion. There were twenty IEDs attacks in 2012 alone. After Bangidar it was Kalanjar II which had to tackle this menace on 3<sup>rd</sup> April, another IED was encountered near Zakeem Hospital on two RODs one on 8<sup>th</sup> April other on 15<sup>th</sup> August 2012. Amin Piquet also had its share when an IED was exploded near it on 3<sup>rd</sup> September. November 2012 at Kalanjar was like a rice paddy full of snakes after monsoon rain. On 11<sup>th</sup> November 2012 three IEDs were detected out of which one exploded. On 12<sup>th</sup> November Commandant Colonel Wajahat, Wing Commander Lieutenant Colonel Tariq, Adjutant Lieutenant Mohsin along with twenty scouts went to the post to physically inspect the security measures around the post. Kalanjar Post is a complex of three posts, out of which one is the main post and other two acts as listening posts. A night prior to the ROD the protective patrol occupies the outlying listening posts. Commandant along with other officers and scouts marched the entire track and then stood with Major Zameer his quartermaster and discussed the probable blind spots around the post. Other scouts also looked around, alert and probing the ground for any marks. Commandant's eyes scanned the area and the track; they then froze at his own steps. He was standing on an IED; without panicking he calmly walked away with other officers and at a safe distance indicated them the IED where all were standing around few seconds before. Lieutenant

Mohsin had the honour of hitting it with a single shot; it exploded. Such is the risk involved and it is beyond the comprehension of mortals to understand how the nature works. Month of January 2012 was heavy in terms of IEDs,

Rocket attacks also surfaced with MiranShah receiving three rockets on 7<sup>th</sup> January without any damage. In retaliation Gosh Post fired three high explosives bomb of 3 inch mortar, 89 rounds of 12.7mm gun and 60 rounds of light machine gun; Isha Post was also not lagging behind in retaliatory fire. One positive step was the immediate dispatch of a fighting patrol comprising of two platoons led by three officers to the probable site of rocket fire area. MiranShah was again hit with rockets on 29<sup>th</sup> January when two missiles landed close to fort. Similar results were seen when two more rockets landed inside the fort on 10<sup>th</sup> February. It is not just the fort rather the posts on its inner perimeter are part of it. Datta Khel & Sargardan are worst affected in this manner. These two posts along with Stadium Check Post are the front row of posts and invariably they on alternate days receive either small arms fire or rocket. In March the intensity of rocket attacks remained unaltered, on 11/12 March, on 12/13 March and on 18<sup>th</sup> March MiranShah was hit with missiles. Khar Kamar was hit with four RPG-7s on the night of 12/13<sup>th</sup> January no damage was incurred; one rocket hit the post's mosque.

Amin Post which has been sustaining the attacks valiantly since 2005 again stood to its name, on 3/4<sup>th</sup> February 2012 a fire raid was repulsed. Heavy fire is one of the safe way of beating back any attack, on this occasion 331 rounds of G-3, three RPG-7 rockets, two grenades were expended by Amin and Banda Post also provided ample fire support. In 2012 Amin Piquet faced thirteen fire raids.

Miscreants used RPG-7 and small arms in the fire raid. A fire raid is different from physical attack in sense that miscreants in fire raid use rockets and small arms weapon purely for creating terror, they hope that their rockets will create some kind of damage or loss of life. Physical attack on the other hand is well planned and well co-ordinate affair, it also starts with fire raid in most of the cases but at times miscreants have been using the ground to inch closer to the posts. Tut Narai attack of 2006 is an example of physical attack coupled with fire raid. Hassu Khel Post January 2006 is another example.

### *Swiss Couple*

Frontier Warfare is full of surprises; monotonous is the last word here. On 15<sup>th</sup> March 2012 Thall Piquet received two unexpected guests, one male and other a female clad in local dress. It was 0230 hours and sentry had no intention of opening the gates of the piquet for any one pretending to be in need. Experience has reinforced the mindset of the scouts that miscreants can make use of their traditional hospitality. The couple almost shrieked for help. Sentry called his superiors which included a captain as well. The couple narrated in mixture of English and Pashtu that they are Swiss citizens who were abducted in Baluchistan and now released by the Taliban or miscreants. Post commander asked the man to lift his shirt thereby ensuring that nothing is wrapped around his body. The couple was treated with hospitality and next morning they were helilifted to Islamabad. On a lighter side the girl complained of gender discrimination, after all 'I was not asked to lift my shirt'.

### *Spring-2012*

There were eight attacks on various posts of Tochi Scouts in March 2012. On the night of 18/19<sup>th</sup> March 2012, miscreants launched a well-orchestrated attack on MiranShah, Amin, Thall, Gosh and Sargardan Posts. The usual pattern of miscreant is to carry out rocket fires for few days then to attack any one post physically. They also resort to deception by attacking posts other than the intended with fire and then silently creep onto the intended post. By March 2012 the Tochi Scouts and army units were well conversed with these tactics. Posts were well armed, well stocked and well led by veterans. There was only one casualty despite all these fire attacks, Amin Post had one casualty Naik Said Shah Afridi due to attack on 18/19<sup>th</sup> March 2012, early in the morning at 0545 hours one QRF moved from MiranShah for his evacuation. The QRF itself came under hostile fire; Naik Afridi is back on duty.

In April there was no let off in the intensity of miscreant's attacks, only the mode was changed they resorted to IEDs after their failure to subdue any of the Tochi Scouts posts. Sepoy Arshad Khan embraced shahadat while he was performing duty on a piquet, cause was an IED. Four more Tochi Scouts were injured when another IED exploded on 8<sup>th</sup> April near Zakeem Hospital, Subedar Laiq Khan Swati, Lance Naik Nasir Hussain Turi, Sepoy Noor Nawaz Khattak and Sepoy Signaller Taif Noor Mohmand were injured. There were six major incidents of fire and rocket attacks on Tochi posts in April alone without causing any damage.

### *Summer of 2012*

From the preceding it is obvious that life in the Tochi Scouts was anything but thrilling, it was a blessing in disguise because by

temperament these scouts love danger, and they like to live on the posts where they are at their best. What else a scout requires other than a machine gun with filled belts, good food and above all a well deserve leave. Life in Tochi Scouts was wonderful, exciting and fulfilling. The new uniform of combat dress finally replaced Khaki shalwar kameez, with Militia being worn twice a week.

From 2000 onwards and especially from 2005, special emphasis has been given to the administration and welfare of scouts living inside the fort and on posts. Water supply was made better with drilling of two wells (one is still in progress), new lines were constructed, and recreation room's standard was raised. Medical complex was enlarged and enhanced, dental surgery was made possible in MiranShah. Children Park astride family quarters was renovated and made functional, quarters itself given fresh coat of paint every year. Junior commissioned officers mess was tiled, mosque and imam bargah tiled and taken care in befitting manner. Mosque was made air conditioned in summer of 2012 and provision of warm water installed. Over forty new toilets were constructed to cater for increase in the strength. Mechanical transport sheds were constructed in 2010 and in 2012 the complete mechanical transport is being shifted to under construction complex. Monsoon of 2010 wreak the MiranShah Fort, one reason was the blocking of seasonal nullah by the army units. It was not their fault because any one coming and living at MiranShah for short duration is bound to have a different set of priorities. It was too late when Tochi Scouts realized that water is rising alarmingly. Electricity shortage is going to stay in the country in general and in NWA in particular for some times to come. Tochi Scouts procured diesel generators for the scouts, latest being procured in August 2012. The timings in summer are from 1400-1630 hours and again from 1900-2300 hours. In winter it is

from 1700-2300 hours. Solar lights were installed in the Fort in 2012. Provision of electric coolers for water, provision of vegetables, fruit and milk to scouts at much reduced rates is something part of Tochi Scouts heritage

In 2005-06 construction of scouts mess at MiranShah was initiated, construction of six scouts barracks was also started in MiranShah and one at Ghulam Khan along with construction of bachelor officers' quarters at Datta Khel and Khajauri; both were completed. Construction of four living bunkers along with stores at Gharlamai, construction of one cook house and store at Wacha Bibi, four living bunkers and a cook house at Baramand, three latrines/bathrooms at Ismail Khel, three living bunkers at Astaghai Narai, four living bunkers at Banda, three living bunkers at Machis, two bunkers at Khar Warsak, three living bunkers at Hussain Post, four living bunkers at Gandari, two bunkers at Mamoon Panga started in summer of 2006 and were all completed in time. Later almost all were handed over to army because Tochi Scouts wings were deployed at other places.

Reasons for highlighting all these administrative work is to bring forward one pertinent point; Tochi Scouts is here for last 117 years and as such it looks forward in maintaining the existing structure and creating new one to meet the forthcoming requirement. In army all this is planned and executed at highest level or at cantonment sphere; at Tochi Scouts everything is executed under the orders of commandant, who is advised by the Qaum Commanders and JCOs. Army unit has to move out from one military station to the other in a couple of years but Tochi Scouts have to spend quarter of their lives in North Waziristan Agency thus a high level of administration is paramount requirement.



### *Road Operating Days (ROD)*

The very first instructions regarding the road moves were issued by HQFC on 29<sup>th</sup> September 2004 and again on 18<sup>th</sup> December same year, reminded on 24<sup>th</sup> October 2005 ‘commanders to ensure that troops are well acquainted with standing orders procedures on road operating days and defence against Improvised explosive devices’.<sup>357</sup> The background of these instructions was the change in the attitude of locals towards the military after the start of operations in tribal areas. RODs were in use during the insurgency against Fakir of Ipi also and this time it was no exception. No individual was allowed to move out of garrison without an escort. Convoys were organised to move under the regulating headquarters established at Bannu and Tank. It affected the scouts because their leave was curtailed; ‘only compassionate cases are allowed that too under coordination with civil administration and khassadars/ mashrans of the area’. Till September 2005 no standing orders procedures were made for night move either by the Tochi Scouts or by the HQFC. Tochi Scouts made very comprehensive and detailed SOPs on the subject which are a monograph of the area and culture itself. *‘being an individualist the tribesmen excels at guerrilla warfare and is adept at camouflage, ambush and concealment, they are quick to notice, seize and exploit every opportunity, they rarely operate in large bodies and being self-sufficient operate independent rather than under the command of a leader, he would prefer to strike at the line of communication at unexpected location and time with precision’*.<sup>358</sup>

The weaknesses observed by the Tochi Scouts regarding the convoy moves were that the vehicles are overcrowded with high side and tail board restricting prompt action from troops. Single

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357 HQFC letter dated 24<sup>th</sup> October.

358 Tochi Scouts Policy Letter No.01/G/ Dated 28<sup>th</sup> October 2005.

escort vehicles, improper vehicular distance, no piquet on line of communication, lack of inter vehicular communication and above all casual attitude of the troops. From that date till today efforts are underway to overcome these basic observations because majority of the incidents which happened in relation to ROD are above all due to violation of these points.

Various methods were discussed, adopted and then further refined; road move became an exercise in itself. Initially four look out sentries in each vehicle were detailed in addition two loaded weapons were fixed on pedestals on each vehicle, wooden planks with sand bags on the side walls and floor were suggested. 100 meters inter vehicular distance was proposed. Communication was given the utmost priority. These instructions were adhered to but the one segment that troops should remain alert and vigilant is abstract in nature as no one can actually measure this level. As late as 2012 the troops are still hampered with the importance of wearing helmets during the move with military police taking down their numbers and passing it back to the respective formations.

The core issues with a road move includes protection from the IEDs which are of various categories, then ambush and finally the suicide bomber ramming him or a vehicle. The route seldom passes through any built-up area. In the initial days the road movement was carried out at night with curfew imposed in the area.

Each of the threat to a convoy have different remedy measures. An IED can be detected and diffused through jammer which requires bomb disposal party to walk in front of the whole convoy, detect and diffuse them. It took ages for the convoy to reach MiranShah from Bannu or vice versa, a motorised convoy had to adopt the speed

of a footman. Piquets were placed at the route. The leading scouts would take the positions on the side of the road and after some time & distance another party of scouts to perform the same task and so on. Each piquet had to be in observation of each other, stand almost whole day and then they would be picked up starting from the farthest and moving rearward. For IEDs diffusion armoured vehicles fitted with jammers were incorporated who would scan the area, jam the mobile frequencies, but this would also result in jamming of own communication. With the passage of time, Army Aviation helicopters were employed to provide protection to the convoys, attack helicopters flying overhead to thwart any ambush. Fixed Wing Y-12 aircraft were used equipped with electronic and infrared equipment would fly a night before the road convoy over the area and recording any abnormal movement astride the road. For protection against the suicide bombers no traffic is allowed on curfew day, no person is allowed to walk astride the route. Still a heavy number of casualties took place due to the incidents on ROD. This is no strange statement because Russian and American have also suffered the most on ROD; it seems that there is no fool proof system against such attacks.

Following incidents will highlight the situation. While standing on a ROD duty at MiranShah Bazaar. A scout observes a small girl walking all alone, she has no idea that there is curfew and starts crying in the mid of road; what to do now?. This happens almost on every occasion on 60 odd miles of road that starts from Datta Khel-Kamar. All villages are astride the road and children as per their routine plays along. There are deaths which have taken place among the locals a day before the curfew and now dead body has to be given a funeral, there are delivery cases, critical injuries, persons need immediate medical treatment, lunatics walking on road,

animals who are least pushed about curfew. These all need response and nothing can be given beforehand as an answer. It is the scout or the soldier on the spot who is the best judge; he has to be trained in this aspect.

In one instance a new unit arrives in the operational area (49FF) and on the very first day of ROD, while coming back from Amin Post with a QRF of Tochi Scouts, the ambulance of 49FF stopped abruptly in the main MiranShah Bazaar, when inquired about this sudden stoppage by Lieutenant Amin of Tochi Scouts the QRF commander, the driver of the ambulance very innocently replied ‘I had a doubt that in one of the tyres the air pressure is less so I have got down to check it’. This is the drawback of new regiments coming; they take time to have a mind-set in relation to the area. The driver of ambulance had no idea that at one time the instructions were to just leave the vehicle on road in case if it develops fault. (After Hassu Khel incident of September 2007).

By December 2005 it was accepted by the military that travelling of any uniform person even while coming back from leave is not safe in any public transport.

Tochi Scouts had one wing each of Thall and Swat Scouts under its command but over all four wings of Frontier Corps were employed exclusively for ROD. The whole area of responsibility was divided into two sectors, one known as MiranShah and other as MirAli. MirAli Sector for ROD was under the responsibility of Thall and Swat Scouts. It had two segments, one MiranShah-Bannu and other Isha-Kamsarobi. In the MiranShah Sector Tochi Scouts had the responsibility of clearing the road from MiranShah-Datta Khel-Alwara, other route was MiranShah-Baramand and last was MiranShah-Ghulam Khan.

## **ROD Routes Tochi Scouts**

MiranShah being the communication hub have two roads, one going westwards towards the Boya-Datta Khel and other going northwards towards Ghulam Khan. On the Road Boya-Datta Khel, almost ten miles after Boya at Khar Kamar a track leads towards the Gharlamai-Alwara. In the same sub sector another track leads to Ismail Khel-Baramand. On the road towards the Ghulam Khan the junction is Dardoni II Post from where one track leads towards the Saidgi and other to Ghulam Khan.

On MiranShah-Datta Khel route one wing of Thall was employed with one company of same wing being employed on MiranShah-Ghulam Khan Route also. Khar Qamar-Gharlamai-Wacha Bibi-Alwara was the task of Tochi Scouts whereas Gharlamai-Baramand was given to the Swat Scouts.

Khyber Rifles one wing was employed on MiranShah-Isha and on Isha-Khamsarobi. Mohmand Rifles had their wing responsible for Isha-MirAli where as No.2 Wing Tochi Scouts was responsible MirAli-Khajauri and Kurram Militia from Khajauri-Baran.

## **IED**

In the initial days because of fear of IED's the road was cleared by foot thus the whole wing had to walk on foot clearing the route. Scouts have been marching from MirAli-Bannu on foot and also on other tracks. The two leading scouts requires nerves of steel because they walk in front, looking for anything suspicious and if found then pioneer platoon and bomb disposal squad have to move forward and diffuse the explosives; a tiring time consuming and risky affair.

Simultaneously piquet's have to be place enroute, every piquet in line of sight of other carrying their own water and food. These scouts had to remain in sight of others walking and also keeping an eye on the area. At evening all these piquet have to move down and march back in the same fashion.

Initially a single day of move from Datta Khel to Bannu was not possible thus the troops moving back would have a night stay at MiranShah.

From 2006 onwards when jammers were incorporated then the move became fast but still risky. Army employed Army Aviation helicopters for route protection, for stand by and also used the Y-12 aircraft placed at Qasim Base Rawalpindi for a night sortie before the ROD to have photo imagery of any suspicious movement along the road. Curfew is imposed on the ROD. In later years the ROD was conducted on Sunday, a detailed SOP's were issued by the Divisional Artillery 7 Division. 'Communication had to be excellent.'

Presently on ROD the Tochi Scouts all officers less field officers move out early in the morning to the designated points in vehicles, dropping the sentries en route. For instance at MiranShah City every point leading towards the convoy route is protected with Scouts who have the order to shoot anyone who violates the curfew, no civil vehicle is allowed to run on the road neither any civilian is allowed to come out of his house or loiter around the road for fear of suicide attack.

Convoys coming from Datta Khel stops at Boya from where the Tochi Scouts convoy also joins in and the convoy coming from Gharlamai too. These convoys reach MiranShah before noon from where a consolidated convoy then move towards the Bannu.

At MiranShah the convoy control is responsibility of army, all the vehicles are parked in the division area, names, numbers of vehicles and persons are noted, machine guns on fixed line are fixed on vehicles.

War develops new games and fun for the children of the area, it is true here. Children's favourite plaything in NWA seems to be teasing the military. They normally put an empty bottle in a shopping bag, attach a cord with it, put all of these under rubble, then simply sit and enjoy the bomb disposal drills of military over their pranks. By and large they are friendly, waves their hands when they see a convoy, rush to the walls of their villages and then simply laugh. At times one notices the grown up children rushing inside to pick their toddlers; to ensure that they should not miss the fun part.

There is a lunatic living in MiranShah and surprisingly he has survived all these war years , rocket attacks and IEDs, even today he is the only person who is seen walking around amidst intense firing going on from both sides in all directions.

*One officers recollects his thoughts 'a night before the ROD there are always thoughts of this being the last journey, the conditions of roads are such that no IED can be detected by merely pointing out to the fresh digging on it because road is always under repair. People on both sides of the road generally do not care much about curfew, children still play around an odd old woman will be seen moving with her donkey laden with firewood. There are numerous places for laying a perfect ambush; there are culverts, orchards, road passing through narrow villages, high cliffs on one side, blind bends. There is extreme tension in the air where even the loud burst of a tyre can play havoc on the minds of soldiers. Soldiers thus chat among each other, every passing mile brings signs of smiles on the war torn*

*soldiers faces. My driver a Bhattani had served with a film actress in Lahore and thus the journey was pleasant...one feels as if tons of load have been taken away as the convoy reaches destination. That is the first time I had a good laugh and so did all others.’ Another officer who travelled in a hired taxi from MiranShah to Bannu had different fears ‘my biggest fear was that I should not be shot mistakenly for a miscreant, my driver was bent on increasing speed and overtaking the military vehicles, imagine a lone car in front of a military convoy speeding towards a check post...other option of moving inside the convoy was again full of danger and neither was the idea of being the last vehicle a good omen’. Ignorance is a blessing and probably it is true for those regiments who travel here for the first time. They have only heard the stories narrated by other regiments which naturally have more of drama and less of reality.*

### *Road Accidents*

Frontier drivers are famous for their dare devil driving skills, in seventies and eighties the Government Transport Service of NWFP plying light blue colour buses on inter provinces routes were regarded as the fastest. Pathans statistically are fond of driving; almost all public transport in Karachi is in their hands and Lion's share in national trucks ownership and driving. Tochi Scouts from October 2009 onwards was hit with accident plague on roads. No less than ten scouts lost their lives and other 22 injured in road accidents within a span of three years. Four scouts were injured in October 2009 while operating in Bajaur Operations, two out of these met accidents at Shabqadar near Peshawar. Worst road accident took place on 8<sup>th</sup> February 2010 near Lacchi (Kohat) when no less than five had fatal injuries (Havildars Yaqoob Ali & Yousaf Ali, Sepoys Zahid Hussain, Najaf Ali & Hamid Hussain) and other ten were injured.



Sadly all the casualties were from Turi Qaum. Lance Naik Pervez Khan Swati met his fate in a road accident at Wah Cantonment on 19<sup>th</sup> February 2010. Two more lost lives on 13<sup>th</sup> March 2011 near Khajauri (Lance Naik Shabid Nawaz Afridi and Junior Clerk Sami Ullah Wazir). Within a month, Sepoy Ali Janan Bhattani met the same fate at Bannu on 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2011.

Last casualty related to road accident took place on 2<sup>nd</sup> March 2012 when Sepoy Gul Rehman Wazir met a road accident near Naurang; he was coming back from leave. Seven more scouts received injuries which put them away from the operational duties for varying period when on 26<sup>th</sup> April 2010 they had an accident at MiranShah; cause was over speeding.

Over the years, the speed of convoy has varied, in the days of extensive attacks the speed was without limit and neither any vehicle developing any mechanical fault were recovered but now the procedures have been streamlined. Many accidents have taken place due to over speeding, wearing of seat belts are a sign of masculine weakness, unfortunately helmets have also joined in this list; at least when travelling outbound. Despite all these accidents Tochi Scouts drivers are a professional breed, they take risks and many a lives have been saved by their driving. Chitoon Village ambush is one example.

### **Uniform Uniformity**

By 2009 there were three different types of uniform being used in the Tochi Scouts, Khaki and Mazri Kameez Shalwar and the newly inducted field dress.

In 1994 the classical militia cloth was replaced with a khaki colour but with a drastic change whereas militia was 100% cotton

the khaki cloth was 65% Cotton and 35% Rayon. Footwear remains the same that is brown chappals, technically the original colour was tan, headgear on ceremonial also retained its dignity with paggri which is an integral part of militant tribal culture same holds true for kameez shalwar adorned with a brown leather belt with a brass insignia. Ranks were always the same as in army. In November 2006 the traditional dress was revived but as a ceremonial uniform.<sup>359</sup> Colour of dress remains Black (Mazri) with orange chappals and belt, toshdan and kullah were reserved for ceremonial occasions, it was meant only for office work or ceremonies. Thus Khaki was replaced by Mazri. Recruits were passed out in this traditional dress which is symbol and identity of Frontier Corps since inception.

Another aspect related to the appearance was the beard, patta and sanren; they all are methods of keeping long hair. From 2007 they were discouraged but not banned.

First change from tradition took place in 2005 when instead of chappals the rubber sole desert laced ankle high shoes were introduced under the shalwar as part of moderation of the Frontier Corps yet the choice of wearing chappals was still retained. In 2011 the grey colour fatigue comprising of a jungle shirt and multi pocket baggy trouser tucked in the desert shoes without a belt were regulated. By June 2012 it became a standard uniform along with a bullet proof vest and helmet as field dress without belt. Two days in a week are allowed to wear the traditional militia dress of militia colour kameez shalwar with brown chappals and belt along with beret. Within Tochi Scouts each wing has its own colour thus scouts of No.4 Wing have pink as wing colour therefore their chindi the base around shoulder ranks and titles is pink where as No.3 Wing

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<sup>359</sup> Ministry of Interior Letter, Revival of Old Ceremonial Dress, Dated 15<sup>th</sup> November 2006

has Blue, No.1 Wing has Red No.2 Wing has Green No.5 Wing is Yellow and No 6 Wing is given Black colour. The uniform items are provided free of cost to all ranks less officers from clothing store, each wing has its own clothing section.

For sports the light brown colour joggers Cheetah of Servis company of Pakistan are issued, Scouts wear white socks only both under the chappals and also in sports however the green socks are issued for field dress both in woollen and mixed pattern, white socks are pure cotton; always neat and clean. Tochi Scouts have made their own track suits for all the scouts which is in green colour with red writing it is not issued by the Frontier Corps rather the Tochi Scouts have made it at their own, it was introduced in 2000 but only for the sports teams. In 2012 every scout was given a track suit, he pays half the price and other half is subsidised by the commandant. The dress of Commandants orderly retains its magnificence especially in weekly traditional dress days. Commandant wears paggri only on durbar or at Jirga or attending the Frontier Corps week. A Qaum commander wears a red band around their left arm with the name of qaum written in abbreviation. Duty junior commissioned officer wears a cross belt over kameez shalwar. It must be remembered that the present day militia is not the original militia Mazri cloth rather it has a tinge of white in the form of sparkles in it. Tochi Scouts marching stick is unique among all the scouts and militia corps; it has a dagger in it which with a twist in cane can become a weapon.

Now blast proof helmets, bullet proof jackets, desert ankle length shoes, dark sun glasses are integral part of a Scout's dress.

*May 2012*

There are seasons, days which are landmark in military history purely from academic point of view, events and incidents which leave a lesson for other combatants to learn. 6<sup>th</sup> May 2012 was one such day which highlights how a minor incident in Frontier Warfare can actually turn into a catastrophe.

There were four infantry brigades and four wings of Tochi Scouts present in the Tochi Valley when the summer of 2012 started. Major General Ali Abbas took over the command of the division from Major General Ghayur Akhtar in October 2011, he thus became the sixth general officer commanding in seven years (2005-2012), Tochi Scouts command was handed over by Colonel Amir Akbar to Colonel Wajahat Hamdani in July 2011, Wajahat is also the sixth commandant since Tochi Scouts came under operational control of army. Divisional artillery was commanded by Brigadier Shahid, 103 Brigade by Brigadier Akhtar, there was segment of Frontier Works Organization busy in constructing road linking Ghulam Khan with Bannu. Army Aviation had its contingent comprising of two Cobras, one Bell 412 and one either Puma or Mi-17 helicopter. Pilots were residing in an annexe adjoining Tochi Mess; they were here for an attachment of fifteen days from 31, 33 and 35 Combat Squadrons apart from 25 or 27 Utility Squadrons. Aviation procedures which will play a critical role in coming days needs bit of elaboration. A Forward Operating Base(FOB) was established at Peshawar since 2009 and in 2012 it was being commanded by Colonel Sardar Sajjad. All aviation missions had to be routed through FOB.

Tochi Scouts had two wings at MiranShah, No.3 Wing under Lieutenant Colonel Rab Nawaz, and No.4 Wing under Lieutenant

Colonel Tariq Shinwari. No.5 Wing at Boya was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Ali (in October Lieutenant Colonel Tariq took over from him) No.6 Wing at Ghulam Khan commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Faisal, No.1 Wing at Sadda under Lieutenant Colonel Qaiser and No.2 Wing at Gomal Zam Dam under Lieutenant Colonel Arshad, Subedar Major Zulfiqar Turi was performing the duties of Corps Subedar Major. Major Zameer as Quarter Master and Major Talha Naik as the intelligence officer of the corps. There were four Ghazi officers who were on a six month attachment with the Tochi Scouts. It was the policy of the army to post newly commissioned officers after attending the infantry course at Quetta to the Frontier Corps from where these officers were attached with different corps. Captain Hammad, Captain Hamzah, Captain Zulfiqar, Captain Islam were attached with Tochi Scouts.

May has a notorious history in sub-continent as far as the military or more precisely army affairs are concerned. In North Waziristan Agency, month of May 2012 at the start look promising, it was hot but not unbearable, cool breeze in the evening, light showers occasionally made it pleasant.

Notion of victory was with military, no serious incident had taken place since summer of 2009 when a Baloch Regiment convoy near Gharlamai was ambushed resulting in the shahadat of 16 soldiers. Since then army have been responding heavily on even minor violations, a kind of see-saw battle was going on between the military and miscreants with army emerging as a winner.

*6<sup>th</sup> May 2012*

Amin Piquet is a strategic post as it dominates the area all around and keeps the miscreants on toes through intimidatory fire and as such

receives utmost reverence from them. It has been a front line post which has sustained the maximum attacks in last five years. In May the ROD was on Sunday and a coordinating conference was held at divisional headquarters on Saturday to iron out any issue. From the beginning of May, Amin was reporting suspicious movement of the miscreants, on 2/3 May it was hit with RPG-7 rockets, in retaliation it fire back over 600 rounds of LMG, 70 rounds of 12.7mm gun, six bombs of 60 mm mortars and six rounds of 75 mm RR. There were two tanks also placed at Amin. Miscreants were making use of the mud walls erected around local's fields, taking cover behind these walls they were carrying out their miscreant activities with a reasonable amount of safety. It was decided to demolish these walls on Sunday. GOC 7 Division Major General Ali Abbas and Commandant Tochi Scouts Colonel Wajahat Hamdani were both on leave. In any case demolishing of a wall is not an operation which requires elaborate discussion; this is what was perceived. Thus political administration was not taken into confidence, strange coincidence but even political agent was on leave. Captain Hammad of Tochi Scouts attended the conference, all Tochi Scouts knew was to be present outside the main gate at 0700 and report to Amin Piquet at 0730 hours.

Naib Subedar Sharbat Khattak is an experience hand in Frontier Warfare, for last almost seven years he is with QRFs and invariably taken part in almost all actions. He narrates *'I reached Amin at 0745 hours with four vehicles of QRF I had 32 scouts with me, there were four vehicles each carrying one RPG-7, one LMG and personal weapons like G-3 and SMG. Six magazines of G-3 and five magazines of SMG were also with these weapons, G-3 have twenty rounds in each magazine whereas SMG have 30 rounds capacity. Subedar Riaz Wazir of Tochi Scouts was the post commander. When we reached at the post the bulldozer was already there perched on*

*a transporter. Army subedar asked me as what to do and I asked him the same question, later we both went up to the post. I wired Captain Hamzah our adjutant as what to do, he told me to wait as army officers are about to reach the post. Our own officer Captain Hammad was already placing piquet on MiranShah-Bannu road, he had two vehicles of QRF with him. Meanwhile army officers also join us which included Major Habib, Captain Suleiman and Lieutenant Noman.*

*We all moved down in our respective vehicles, bulldozer also followed us; there were two APCs also with us. The intended wall was erected on the eastern side of the by-pass road which is southern slope of Amin Post. The wall was in L shape, within the field there were two more walls which were meant to separate the ownership of the respective acres. On the western side of the road another wall runs in similar fashion but much smaller in length. The algaad was the boundary, here the by-pass road dips then takes a right turn , runs along the algaad for a mile and then takes a left turn.*

*When we reached the intended wall site, there were children playing cricket in the mid of dry algaad. One of the army officer fired an aerial warning shot but boys paid no heed, I then went to them and requested them to leave the area as we intend carrying out military work, they all left the playing arena. Deployment of troops was in a manner that all corners and all eventualities were well taken care of. Dozer started grazing the wall and within an hour it was over; then walls in the mid were demolished, after this came the turn of western wall which was also demolished, there were few houses in ruins which were also razed to ground'.<sup>360</sup> Time now was past mid-day.*

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360 Interview with Subedar Sharbat Khan, 15th May 2012 at MiranShah.

Brigadier Aqeel commander 103 Brigade along with the commanding officer of 36 Baloch Regiment was also on the site. *‘Usually I would travel along the ROD route to observe how things are going on. I saw the demolishing operation from the Amin Piquet for half an hour and then I drove towards the Isha, while coming back from Isha, myself and commanding officer 36 Baloch regiment had a short stay in front of the stadium check post, it is here that I listen on the wireless that Captain Suleiman has been hit with bullets, we both immediately drove towards the site.’*<sup>361</sup>

**1400-1700 hours-6<sup>th</sup> May 2012.**

After demolishing the wall it was decided to have a search of the compound which is located at the track bend almost a mile away from the initial demolishing site. Who decided this is shrouded in Fog of War. Subedar Sharbat Khan Khattak recalls *‘initially I put up reservation to the idea of searching the compound to Major Habib basing upon my past experience, our strength was not adequate for any unexpected resistance. We made two groups of fifteen each, the army group encircled the compound from the west and Tochi Scouts from the south and east. In the north a track passes in front of the compound and next to the track the algaad. While moving towards the compound we made use of the ground, there were two manmade water channels close to the compound and also an orchard.*

*Myself and army group move forward towards the house, I was taken along for the reason that there was none among the army who could speak Pashtu. Compound had a normal ordinary gate made of iron sheet; army havildar simply kicked it, but it was bit strong for his leg. I interrupted and said that this is not how it works here, we have to get permission from the inhabitants of house for a search, and it*

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361 Interview with Brigadier Aqeel, 15th October 2012 at MiranShah.



*took time to make army understand this cultural aspect. We knocked and shouted that we intend taking a search of the house, two voices came from inside one male and other of a little girl both denying us the permission. I was given a mega-phone earlier by Major Habib, as per the Riway I started counting from one to ten after which we were free to knock down the gate. I had reached till six when the same army havildar knocked down the gate with another kick. We all rushed inside, there was another mud wall facing us, it had two wooden doors, one on the eastern end and other opposing it. Army soldiers moved towards the eastern door opened it and searched it; nothing was found.*

*I moved towards the western door, there was a wooden stair placed next to it, I climbed upon it and reached the roof which was ten feet high; inside I saw a courtyard with a tree in the middle behind the tree another mud room with a door. A woman and three young boys were standing next to the tree, I shouted to them that we intend carrying out a search so please get aside and open the door. They refused and taunted me that being a Pathan you are doing this to us, you have no regard to the traditions of us. In the meantime army opened the door and Captain Suleiman was the first one to enter the courtyard’.*<sup>362</sup>

In those micro seconds, a man came out of the room and fired a burst on the military, bullets hit Captain Suleiman, he jerked back, Subedar Sharbat Khan jumped down from the roof and fired back at the man.

*‘Probably man had a 40 rounds magazine because it seems as if he will keep on firing till eternity, he rushed back into the room, the women and boys in the meantime rushed towards another gate which*

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<sup>362</sup> Interview with Sharbat Khan.

*opened out into the rear of the courtyard; our men outside captured them. We all now move back from the place of incident back into the same alley. I dragged Captain Suleiman outside; Sepoy Iqbal Turi of Tochi Scouts was also wounded. A grenade was thrown onto us from the adjoining courtyard but luckily it struck the walls and landed into the same courtyard from where we were fired upon. We all now move out and put our wounded into the ambulance of Tochi Scouts, which drove back.'*

Fog of War regarding which Clausewitz had written almost one hundred and fifty years ago now sets in at this spot. It was at this particular moment when brigade commander and commanding officer heard about this firing and drove towards the place of incident reaching there in twenty minutes. They established their tactical headquarters almost a kilometer short of the compound in an algalad which was deep enough to allow them to stand and observe the proceedings. Two tanks were called down from the Amin Post to reinforce the two armoured cars already present. In another fifteen minutes attack helicopters also came in and hit the compound. One tank was moved to take position in the rear of the compound and other engaged it frontally. 'Mud walls are too tough, even tank rounds and RR failed to create any impact', Recalls Brigadier Aqeel.

Another search operation was immediately planned and groups sent back into the compound, while these groups were moving back to take position around the compound the curfew time expired. *'I was moving with Captain Hammad towards the compound taking cover of the trees when the first burst of fire from miscreants came, we hit the ground and crawled towards our target. We reached almost next to it when I saw a horde of miscreants coming, by this time sniper fire also started pouring in accurately on to us from*

*the village situated across the algaad. In another four or five minute few of our soldiers were hit or wounded due to this fire. Tanks also started moving back, now we were engaging the miscreants with small arms fire’.* Recalls Subedar Sharbat.

Brigadier Aqeel now had to take the most important decision of his military career, whether to stand and fight back in fading light or give up the fight for another day. ‘We were now being hit inside our tactical headquarters, we were firing back, light was fading and number of injured persons kept on increasing’. At this stage he was persuaded by the others to reach back at Amin Post for the reason that his presence so close to the action may jeopardize the rearguard action. He reluctantly agreed and ordered an organized withdrawal. Under the circumstances it was a very difficult decision because any delay would have taken the advantage of firepower away from military, one just have to look back at 77 Brigade actions in 2007 near MirAli to fully comprehend the gravity of situation.

Force was able to reach the safety of Amin piquet; unfortunately not all of the original members were lucky enough to come back, quite a number of soldiers laid down their lives to ensure their other comrades can retract safely. That night Amin was hit by the miscreants and it hit back even harder.

*7<sup>th</sup> May 2012.*

By midday all commanders who were on leave rejoined the garrison and miscreants were punished ruthlessly. MiranShah witnessed some of the heaviest firing duel between the military and miscreants. Rockets were flying freely across the short sky line of the city; earth was shaking and walls crumbling. One rocket landed

inside the fort close to the office block, hit a tree and then ricochet; hitting one scout Sepoy Sahib Zada Khan Bhittani embraced shahadat in the arms of his wing commander Lieutenant Colonel Tariq Shinwari. Sepoy Irfan Mohmand was also injured but not serious. Tochi Scouts QRF made a dash to the Fort from Amin Piquet amidst miscreants indiscriminate fire, one vehicle toppled near the main gate; eleven scouts were injured.

Rest of May days was spent in engaging the miscreants wherever they were observed.

### *Afghan National Army*

In the summer of 2012 the activities of ANA were a matter of concern for the Tochi Scouts. The issue is complicated in a sense that miscreants also fire upon them with rockets while remaining within the boundary of Pakistan. It is similar to attacks launched upon MiranShah which in majority of the cases are fired from 2-3 Kilometers away. On 4<sup>th</sup> May one mortar bomb of ANA landed within Pakistan territory, on 8<sup>th</sup> May two such bombs fell into own area, on 9<sup>th</sup> May at 1655 hours same event happened but this time Tochi Scouts post at Bangidar replied with equal number of rockets. On 10<sup>th</sup> May 2012 American & ANA forces came close to the Zero Point, initially one Chinook and one gunship landed at 1105 hours followed by eight APCs which all halted forty yards within Afghanistan territory. Tochi Scouts patrol on inquiry learnt that they were looking for a proper site for checking of vehicles. It was at this time it was learnt that they had given prior information of their intended reconnaissance to Islamabad but it took time before it reached down to the men on spots. With volatile situation boiling up due to Salala Post incident there were all the chances of the post opening up fire had they ventured even a meter inside own territory.

In June fire exchange between the Tochi Scouts and ANA increased substantially, on 5<sup>th</sup> June they fired nine mortar bombs and in return five were fired by Tochi Scouts Bangidar Fort Post. Heavy fire duel took place on 6<sup>th</sup> June which lasted almost whole day, first one at 1015 hours, second at 1125 hours. Third fire exchange of the day took place at 1320 hours when Bangidar, Behram and Zero Point Posts of Tochi Scouts fired five mortar bombs on ANA. One mortar bomb of ANA landed inside Bangidar Fort near exchange without causing any damage. Tarkhobi an ANA post is the main culprit.

Rest of the summer was spent in the same manner; there were days when the miscreants activities would increase and then suddenly dying down and surfacing again. Rocket attacks were launched against MiranShah after the 6<sup>th</sup> May incident. On 23<sup>rd</sup> June Fort received three rockets at 2012 hours, one landed near Sargardan Post, other at ROD ground but the third one landed inside the Officers Mess, missing the main structure by mere meters and hitting a mud roof room, there were two waiters inside both remain scratchless. Taking this particular rocket as case study, it is worth mentioning that no less than five senior officers were sitting in the mess lawn at that particular moment when this rocket landed mere ten meters away. These officers remained composed finished their tea and then calmly left the mess as if nothing has happened. The reaction of officers is vital in maintaining the overall stance of the corps. As a precaution commandant put a ban on the scouts sleeping outside their barracks at night.

Similar rocket attack was launched on the Amin by the miscreants on 5<sup>th</sup> August 2012 but post reacted heavily by firing 490 rounds of G-3, 45 rounds of 12.7mm gun, three bombs of mortar and three rounds of 106mm RR, reportedly five miscreants were killed.

Christian community also had a taste of war when an unguided rocket landed close to the Tochi Scouts church on 10<sup>th</sup> August. Same night another rocket landed close to the Datta Khel Post.

### *Life in MiranShah*

From the preceding events a different kind of life pattern emerges about MiranShah and words cannot do justice to the pulsating, exciting, thrilling, fulfilling and above all relaxing environments of this wonderful fort and garrison. No doubt it is the most dangerous place on this earth right now. Nothing can be taken as granted here, one moment it is all peace and very next moment a loud bang of a rocket landing close by. Here the morning wakeup call on majority of days is a loud burst of machine gun. Most of the nights it is the artillery fire which is soothing to the ears. After a week any new comer very conveniently and confidently can differentiate between the firing sounds of a G-3, Kalashnikov, Mortar, medium and field artillery pieces. Scouts walk here with their chest high; there is something in their walk and their conduct, their whole body radiating an aura of self confidence. These are the men who daily face danger, who stand all night guarding the fort, who on any given day move out of fort knowing fully well that roads and tracks are full of IEDs, they take every day as a last day, this is what this seven years of war has instilled in them.

It is blessing in disguise for the newly inducted recruits to understand the life pattern in which they are going to spend quarter of a century. Old hands are here to guide them through. For young army officers it is a dream come true, it simply brings the best out of them which probably even they were not fully aware of themselves in peace stations. RODs, piqueting and staying at posts is the kind

of experience which many a generations have passed away without ever hearing so much of fire power; except on firing range which this generation is experiencing every day. This life is different from Siachen Glacier where nature was the biggest enemy, here man is the worst predator and one wrong move on part of any officer in Frontier Warfare can make or break a life time reputation.

Tochi Scouts life has been affected by this war, they can no longer visit bazaar or sit idly, but it has been replaced with a better more positive life pattern. Living accommodation has been upgraded, lawns are sprawling, fresh seasonal flowers to refresh the tired and worried mind, above all sports. There are regular sports fixtures in the evening, volleyball, football, cricket for the scouts and tennis for the officers. Nowhere else in the world Tennis is played in such dangerous environments as it is done here. A set is often interrupted with a sound of machine gun and rocket firing, attack helicopters flying above, coming or going for a sortie. There is a telephone set with operator sitting, passing and collecting all the messages. Tennis is a kind of mental therapy for all the officers, divisional staff also plays here and it helps in cutting down the lengthy chain of command to discuss fresh ideas. Cup of tea after the game is the most relaxing drink in the world, with sun setting down on the Durand Line, an odd jet liner flying above leaving contra trails (MiranShah is an international airways check point) and the unmistakable humming noise of drones flying above. The best part of fort life is the Retreat Bugle, everyone in the open stands attention while the flag is lowered and the gates being closed.

Scouts in the summer evenings prefer long walk going around different posts, enjoying the fresh air, greenery and beautiful countryside. The orchards full of ripe plum, apricot and pomegranate.

Despite the instructions not to pluck them still like young naughty boys, these scouts indulge in this irresistible play. Posts always present a calm posture no matter how serious or grave the situation is but still faces of scouts radiate confidence. To a scout most precious thing seems to be his pet, usually a Chikor, he looks after him like his own child, covering him during the hot part of day with shade, washing him, feeding him and feels good talking about him. Just like traditional British society the best way to start conversation with a scout is by asking about his pet.

Ramadan in 2012 came in the early days of July, it changes life pattern, there is no question that anyone can find anything to eat in this month inside the Fort. Sehri is an elaborate affair, no working after ten o clock and then iftaari. Scouts traditionally prefer to have collective iftaari in the lawns outside their living barracks. Additional ration was supplemented by the commandant, on Eid he visits as many post as possible in two days. There is a rush for availing Eid leave and that is the delicate part.

Cricket was in full swing during the summer, Pakistan was visiting Sri Lanka and all scouts followed it intensively. The dress in summer consists of a T-shirt and trouser with shoes if wearing combat dress otherwise standard kameez shalwar. A page from the diary of a retired officer who happened to visit MiranShah on 7<sup>th</sup> May 2012 is reproduced here (with minor editing).

*In the afternoon I had a walk in the mess and found a library although it is not that rich in terms of books yet it is in these far flung remote areas especially among Scouts libraries that one comes across some rich manuscripts and same was the case here. I also went to Museum and one has to appreciate the spirit because it is*



*one of the best kept museum in Pakistan especially when one keeps in mind the environment, needless to say the female mannequins wearing local dress depicting the cultural heritage of the area are the only female sex symbols in the area and I have to admit that it does create sensations. The long walk on the main mall is mind refreshing the variety of roses planted here and all in their bloom is a treat for the eyes and soul. The traditional warning boards planted in the furrows warning the soldiers not to step on these rose buds have typical Scouts sense of humour embalmed in it.*

*Dinner in the mess all alone, the dining hall is square and big but not huge with corps and national flags on front wall, a piano in working condition, two glass cupboards with mess silver and half a dozen heads of Urial and deer mounted on the dining hall walls alongwith equal number of antique and not so antique weapons mainly machine guns forms part of dining hall décor. Mess has innumerable rooms or at least it seems like this, all having varying décor but weapons and silver remains the central theme. It is after a long time that one comes across a mess so rich in military décor. A scrap book presented in 1937 by two Scouts officers have wealth of old pictures my eyes caught the picture of an Auster aircraft at MiranShah strip in 1946 there is a letter of the pilot as well who visited the place in 1988 for nostalgic reasons.*

*2130 hours. Outside the thunder of clouds and that of explosives are intermingling, all day there has been constant firing between the miscreants and the Tochi Scouts. The fort is strong and almost a whole wing is entrusted with its inner cordon protection. A rocket exploded within the fort area while I was having a cup of tea with the quartermaster in his office but it seems routine affair, soon he told me after listening to the telephone call that sepoy Sahibzad*

*Bhattani has died in this explosion. I was just wondering whether I should walk back to the mess amidst this fire or just keep on sitting in this office. Thought of Lawrence of Arabia and was convinced that he must have got the same reception in 1927.*

*Another whistling sound of a rocket and a counter fire from the scouts but life within the mess is as normal as one can imagine. When I came from the strip on a jeep in this fort I heard the noise of gun fire and thought that scouts are carrying out range practice but my driver corrected me by stating it is actual fire. I have no hesitation in admitting that in my whole twenty three years of military service I have not seen so much hostile fire which I encountered today and it is still going on.*

*...I met the Corps Subedar Major Zulfiqar at his office a good natured person with a typical scout sense of humour which becomes obvious after few minutes of observation. He showed me a bullet cartridge which was collected from the post in yesterday firing, it was fired from the Cobra and SM was furious over this he also resented the fact that yesterday not a single rocket was fired by the Cobras. He updated me on the yesterday's episode 'sahib we also have wife and children and if these bastards are going to show no respect for them why should we do so... I ordered the troops yesterday to fire on the mosque as well; Taliban's were using it as a strong point'. I talked about the footwear of Scouts after having a look at his brown chappals; he very proudly told me that this chappal is made in his native hometown of Parachinar.*

*.... I saw MiranShah from the wedge of the post a scene typical of frontier, almost a dozen trucks were standing parked and there was no movement at all, along the road are few double storied*

*houses which also act as kind of hotels and my guide told me that fire normally comes from these high buildings although few have been demolished. The fear of unknown that the bullet may come from any direction at any time is quite sensational. Scouts have raised the banks of the road so as to create a kind of obstruction for the snipers. I also had a look at the observation post and the wall graffiti, there was no mention of sweet hearts as is common in Siachen posts neither any poetry of romance rather few advisory and morality related issues were chalked like; stealing is bad’.*

### *Winter of-2012*

By winter 2012 the situation was under control of military, 6<sup>th</sup> May incident was thoroughly analysed and deductions were reached and acted upon. Major General Ali Abbas highlights the fact ‘*to eliminate these miscreants through use of force is not a difficult task especially with the available manpower and firepower but the dilemma is how to avoid collateral damage which is bound to happen in this scenario. Thus army and for that matter military’s aim is to compel the locals to evict foreign fighting elements present among them’*. Ali further highlights that one of the key step he took was to make the division identify target during hours of darkness, aim was to avoid collateral damage. In this ‘*I was lucky to have good engineers present in my formation, we purchased laser pointers from open market, some from abroad and then convert them into night vision sights, it has helped a lot’*.

Despite all these efforts to avoid collateral damage there are still instances which compel military to take stern action. Friday 19<sup>th</sup> October 2012 promised to be a peaceful day but early in the morning at 0900 an attack took place at Stadium Check Post.

19<sup>th</sup> October 2012

Stadium check Post over the years has been fortified and technology has been integrated into the overall defence lay out of the fort and garrison. There is a walkway gate checking where all the males entering into the fort perimeter are searched. There are school children who come daily for education, there are civilians who are residing in political agent's colony, there are people who have official work at the political agent's office or at tehsil, there is a bank inside the perimeter. Thus scouts have to be extra alert and vigilant in dealing with such a variety of people. A lady searcher has been hired by the Tochi Scouts to have a look at the females.

All the time there is a guard of five scouts present at all corners of the stadium, over all a platoon is deployed under the command of a JCO. Surveillance cameras are also installed at key points which are inter connected with the garrison control room.

While the checking of people was in progress rather thin at this time of the day (0845). Lance Naik Ikram Ullah Marwat was checking the vehicles and Sepoy Irfan Ullah Bhittani was detailed at walk through gate. Guard Commander Naik Akhtar Jamil Khattak was also standing at the gate while another sentry Sepoy Rizwan Ullah Khattak was manning the machine gun bunker.

Two miscreants were walking across the road behind a truck and taking cover behind it they cross the road towards the check post and rushed, at that precise moment guard commander also spotted them, Sepoy Irfan Ullah Bhittani who was standing at the walk through gate also looked up and instinctively raised his sub machine gun from the same posture. Miscreant's fire and Bhittani's fire almost had mid air collision, Bhittani's bullets hit him in the

chest and he fell down but in the process his hand grenade which he had already thrown towards the post landed close to it. Second miscreant was also hit in legs. Naik Akhtar Jamil sustained bullet injuries and embraced shahadat. Miscreants were carrying one SMG, eight magazines and seven grenades.

Commandant Tochi Scouts was the first one to reach at spot because he was already going towards the office when he heard the firing and immediately diverted towards the post. The second miscreant despite being injured was firing on the post from across the road; he had other accomplices also with him. For next five minutes commandant held the post before he was joined in by the Lieutenant Colonel Rab Nawaz the wing commander, Captain Bilal the adjutant and Captain Saad.

Miscreants were later identified as Uzbeks, the whole attack had a purpose and back ground. Miscreants intention and plan was to overrun the Tochi Post with a suicide attack followed by a vehicle borne attack team which was to head towards the Tehsil Jail. However timely reaction by the post and commandant saved the day. It simply highlights how important an individual is in blunting any attack or in other words it is the sentry at post who can put an end to 'Domino Theory'. Just imagine had these miscreants been successful in infiltrating or penetrating the Tochi Scouts inner defence the notion of victory would have been snatched from Tochi Scouts for years to come. It is a great tribute to all the scouts and their officers at MiranShah that despite the fact that military installations have been hit and penetrated all over Pakistan, these miscreants have not been able to have the same effects here at MiranShah.

### *Evening 19<sup>th</sup> October 2012*

This attack had a back ground; there are foreign fighting elements present in the city. 7 Division had conducted one operation along with Tochi Scouts against them in January 2010. Machis a small village on the eastern end of Fort is their hub. On the evening of 19<sup>th</sup> October 2012, army hit back with all its might on these foreign fighting elements. For last almost two months there were negotiations going on with the Peace Committee regarding the future of these foreign miscreant. Peace Committee was trying hard but without any success, however the local population pressure was now mounting on these miscreants as all the misery coming on to the city is due to them. Military's policy of holding back the fury for last so many years was now bearing the results. Miscreants on 19<sup>th</sup> October had this strategic goal of humiliating the military in its own backyard there by establishing themselves as the war lords of the area; but it was foiled by the Tochi Scouts.

Now army had a legitimate excuse to punish these anti state elements and it did so. The evening of 19<sup>th</sup> October will remain engraved in the memory of all those present at the spot. Every weapon fired tanks, recoilless rifles, field and medium artillery, mortars and attack helicopters pounded the miscreants' locations with precision.

Captain Bilal, adjutant of Tochi Scouts is a ghazi officer; he joined Tochi Scouts in August 2012, and soon found himself at Machis Post. Bilal in classical scout style spent hours just observing the village down below, noting down every movement taking place and soon realised that there is a pattern which exists in this village. He was able to identify the houses of miscreants something which

own intelligence agencies were not able to do so with such precision in all these years. There were three different groups living in the village, Taliban, Uzbek and Mahsud apart from Punjabi Taliban. Bilal was able to identify all of them, he also spotted the house of an IED maker.

*‘It is a small house with four rooms all along the wall, there are kids and goats inside, he has two further pillared rooms like mechanical transport shed, an aerial is present for communication apart from a gas cylinder; this house is located in the centre of village and the road from Machis Factory leads to this house. A red land cruiser visited this house at around 1835 hours and all militants welcomed it. This house has a tower at its rear and a mosque with big verandah. Another coaster of white colour reached the house at 1845 hours; main house is used only for work and nothing else’.*

Captain Bilal also identified Talib’s house *‘the house is the last one on the corner and has 70 by 70 meters area of plain ground, the house is a complex with five rooms, number of green local trees inside on the north eastern side, a tower shaped feature on the eastern direction, house has two doors both on the same wall facing south, one door is painted blue and other is in rusted colour, blue gate opens into a baithak where as the rusted gate opens into the hallway’.*( this house was hit with a drone attack in 2008).

Regarding Uzbek’s house Bilal noted that *‘it has a clump of four or five tall trees which provides excellent cover and one door (light blue) opens towards Machis Village’.* Mahsud’s house was located on the bank of algalad, *‘one of the strongest complexes observed in the area...seven interconnected houses in one single line...all having foxholes’.* Captain Bilal’s observation regarding the miscreant is

interesting as he observed them the way a hunter concentrate on his prey. *'The Taliban are of all ages, mostly men having long beards and hair wearing turbans and boys of 16-18 years and another group of 14 years. In Mahsud complex the regular guests were coming in blue Binjo car and they used to meet each other in cultivated area usually for half an hour, there is a population of Turks and Tajiks in Mahsud's complex as well, they have six horses as well which normally grazes in algal, they patrol the area on these horses. Uzbek had two daughters of around four years of age and plays outside the house,'*

Machis Village was identified as the hub of nefarious activities and as such was punished on the evening of 19th October 2012. At 1600 hour's artillery opened up with observers at Amin, Machis and Sarbandkai directing the fire. Captain Bilal went up with the crew of Bell 412 to guide the Cobras on the houses of miscreants, all care was taken to avoid collateral damage and this is where Bilal's observation came handy. Cobras hit the exact houses, fired 20mm Gatling rounds hitting the vehicles parked inside the complexes. On ground tanks & recoilless rifles at Sargardan and Datta Khel Posts carried out direct hits on the houses suspected of facilitating miscreants in their fire attacks on the fort. There is no scene better than Cobras diving and attacking the miscreants hide outs, the sound of their guns following them after they have taken right turn out of the target area. Commandant Tochi Scout guided the Cobras while sitting at the top of water tank reservoir, Brigadier Shahid commander divisional artillery along with Colonel Akhtar was at Iftikhar Post, Brigadier Raza and Colonel Staff Colonel Riaz at the Sargardan Post. This heavy fire power continued for an hour. It was sad because at identical time all the mosques within the Fort and in the city called the faithful for Maghreb prayers. Military paused the



fire power for the duration of prayers; all night artillery roared. In the morning there were reportedly over thirty miscreants killed.

Another skirmish connected with the same thread took place on 22<sup>nd</sup> October when miscreants in retaliation attacked Tochi Scouts at Amin, fire raid started at 1915 hours from multiple direction, in reply almost all posts of Tochi Scouts that included Amin, Banda, Machis, Sarbandkai, Kalanjar fired back with no hold barred.

In November 2012 miscreants resorted back to IEDs, on 4<sup>th</sup> November Amin Post detected one, again on 11<sup>th</sup> November Amin detected one more. On 22<sup>nd</sup> Captain Saad detected one IED at Kalanjar.

### *Corps of Tochi Levies 'Machiavellian Chindits'*

Present History started with the raising of Tochi Levies in 1895 which were upgraded into Militia in 1900 and then transformed into Tochi Scouts in 1922. In 2005 Tochi Levies were re-raised in North Waziristan Agency thus the circle came back to where it all started in the beginning and this seems to be the life pattern here. Tochi Scouts were responsible for the raising and training of this Levy Corps, which was initiated with American funding. It is nostalgic in nature but more importantly it highlights the circumstances under which the original corps was raised in 1895. In 2011 a batch of 95 men all local were trained by Tochi Scouts undergoing 12 weeks of training.

The concept of Levies dates back to fourteenth century, Nicolai Machiavelli an Italian was an ardent supporter of having militia where the natives are entrusted with the task of defending their

homeland, thus the concept of militia and levies took birth. As one British political agent remarked that North Waziristan Agency for all practical purpose is an independent country composed of almost thirty two different clans each behaving and acting as a sovereign state. Political Agent thus assumes the role of an ambassador of the Crown and without having any military force under his command was nothing more than a laughing stock among these tribes. Tribes did not allow army to entered into their territory therefore political agent had to recruit men from the area, armed them, train them and then through them maintain law and order in his area, it is his police. Only limitation was that his police was not allowed to enter into the tribal area without permission; this is where the Militia came in.

North Waziristan Militia was raised in 1900 from the men of the area; this is the cardinal point of Machiavelli's 'Art of War'. This Militia differs from Levies in a sense that Levy was recruited only from a specific area or tribe (Daur in 1895) but Militia was all encompassing as it had Wazir among it. Wazir's conduct and attitude during the Third Afghan War (1915-1919) should be seen in the light of 'Clash of Civilisation' their actions were almost replica of what the Greeks did to the Spartans in war against Persians. *'Blood, language, religion, way of life were what the Greeks had in common and what distinguished them from the Persians and other non Greeks'*.<sup>363</sup> North Waziristan Militia was later transformed into Tochi Scouts in 1922; the main difference between the Militia and Scouts is in the fact that Tochi Scouts now enrolled men from outside the agency. British Army and RAF remained part of the military power in the NWA from 1930 onwards more specifically against Fakir of Ipi (1936-1947). Khassadars were introduced in 1922, a different approach from the Levy but more in line with

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363 Samuel Huttington, Clash of Civilisation (Penguin, ) p-34.

Machiavelli's thought. These were the men of tribes who were not paid directly by the political agent rather pay was given to the tribes, each tribe having certain vacancies; they were the tribes policemen. From 1947 onwards Pakistan Army vacated the forward garrisons at Gardei, Wanna and Tochi Scouts left Datta Khel and Boya, all forward areas ahead of MiranShah were entrusted to the tribes. Thus situation in 1947 was almost similar in North Waziristan Agency to what the British had in 1900; no military ahead of MiranShah. During the Fourth Afghan War (1979-1989) army did not move into the areas it had vacated in 1947, Tochi Scouts moved there between 1973-1978.

Tochi Scouts achieved almost a miracle in 2001 by marching into the areas vacated by army in 1947; Tochi Scouts did not had any casualty in this 'Operation Blue Lagoon'. Army had to intervene in the NWA from 2004 onwards not because Tochi Scouts had failed in coming up to the expectations but on the apprehension that they will do so. This has been the pattern of army intervention in NWA from 1899 onwards and with passage of time it has been realized that the best way to control and safeguards own interest is through the induction of locals into the military. Political Agent in the original scheme was the equivalent of a Viceroy in the NWA, he had the military in terms of Scouts, political administration and financial powers all vested in him. British Army in 1936, in 1937 and in 1939 had taken over the political control of the NWA from the political agent for limited duration. In such times political agent had no force to establish his writ in the area. Same is the situation now and that is why Tochi Levies were raised again in 2004, mainly to provide the political agent with some force through which he can carry out daily chores of maintaining law and order; he also have Khassadars to supplement this Levy Corps.

Thus North Waziristan Agency have two police forces working under political agent, Khassadars in tribal areas (Wazir) and Levy Corps in more urban areas of agency (Daur). Probably there may be a Militia also in near future which will be based upon tribes.

### **Tochi Army Public School MiranShah**

Gaining of education is part of our faith, it is our religious obligation. Our Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh) laid great stress on this aspect; during the early battles of Islam the prisoners of war were given the option of earning their liberty if they can teach one illiterate Muslim. There were educational institutions in the MiranShah yet there was a need to impart a kind of education which should be modern, nationalistic and religious in nature something which was possible only with the administrative back up of Tochi Scouts only.

On 2<sup>nd</sup> May 2001, the Commandant Tochi Scouts Colonel Wajahat Choudhary requested IGFC Major General Taj for establishing a public school at MiranShah and within a fortnight its formal inauguration was carried out by the IGFC on 31<sup>st</sup> May 2001. The vacant area on the northern side of the fort was utilised, school was opened opposite to the existing government school. Initially 100 children were admitted in classes from I-V which by end October 2002 increased to 142 and classes were also upgraded till VIII.

Tochi Scouts advanced a loan of Rupees 400,000 and local elders donated Rupees 45,000. The amount received from fees was Rupees 576,025 and expenditures amounted to 599,110 Rupees. Initially there were only nine teachers out of which four were females and four male instructors were provided by the Tochi Scouts who were all from education branch, one teacher from civil was also employed. For administrative purpose one JCO and one NCO

were deputed. One librarian, a sweeper and a mali were also part of the establishment. Facilities of conveyance and canteen were also catered.

In the ab-initio period the emphasis was on education and to improve the general layout of the area. Credit goes to the Tochi Scouts all ranks for making this venture a success story, by end 2012 there are over 516 students studying from Class I-I0. It is now affiliated with army public school management thus any student studying here is at par with any other student at any other garrison of Pakistan Army. The other three schools of Tochi Scouts at Boya, Ghulam Khan and MirAli are also affiliated with this school.

In 2001 none could foresee the chain of events that were about to unfold in the North Waziristan Agency; without any exaggeration it is safe to write that the most effective weapon, most constructive dialogue, most obvious evidence against the fundamentalism, most active defence against the attacks on the very ideology of Pakistan is this very school. In this school the students comes from all shades of life, there are seven girls also who are studying along with boys, the very first in North Waziristan Agency. Today when none can walk out of fort and none can come in; it is this very school which represents the semblance of normalcy among all warring parties.

In the early days the parents were allowed to drop and pick their most precious item from the gates of the school but with the changing security environments the vehicular movement was stopped thus these students were dropped at the colony gate from where they now have to walk almost a kilometre to reach their alma matter in winter and summer; surprisingly the ratio of late comers is no worse than any other school anywhere in the world. It is heart-warming,

touching, moving to see these young toddlers carrying their bags of books and walking this distance amidst gunfire and rocket shrilling noise. Their daily assembly at times coincides with the rocket attacks on the fort and surrounding areas by the miscreants, words are not enough to praise the courage of these students and salute to their parents who are suffering all this pain and agony for the better future of their children. Many a times it has happened that neither the students can leave the premises and nor their parents can come in because a battle is raging; Tochi Scouts then takes the responsibility of providing food, shelter and ensuring the safety of this future of Pakistan. One student's father is earning his living by making ropes out of Date's palm which is barely enough to maintain his dignity; he is residing near Ghulam Khan and daily travels almost seven kilometres on foot to drop and pick his son , he cannot afford to pay the fare of a transport. Tochi Scouts on learning his dedication waived all fees. There is a girl student who has six elder sisters yet his parents are dedicated, motivated and educated enough to ensure that all their daughters get good education. These students in fact provides a beacon of knowledge into the very heart of the social and cultural fibre of the society; which has been misrepresented, misreported and misinterpreted by those who have seldom set a foot in the agency.

Initially the uniform was shorts, shirt and a tie which was welcomed by the locals later in 2007 the Taliban threatened them with dire consequences and uniform was changed into shalwar kameez for the safety of students.

A Computer & Internet Café was also opened alongwith the inauguration of school; it was supposed to be operated independently and it did so for a short time but later it was amalgamated into the

main school. In the early days of Internet Café one Pentium III server was purchased for Rupees 45,000, two Pentium II for rupees 19,500 each and another six computers for a total sum of 1,09,000 Rupees. Regular computer teaching classes were operated teaching MS Office, Visual Basic and Power Point etc. The charges were Rupees 15/. hour for the civilian and Rupees 5/. for Tochi Scouts and students of the school. Later the computer and internet were amalgamated into the Tochi Public School and now the students are being given this modern education free of cost.

In 2007, HQFC sanctioned amount worth Rupees 5 Million for the construction of Boys Hostel in the school, 1.5 Million was released in the first phase which was completed by end 2008 with 35 students accommodated in hostel. When the overall project will be completed then it would be able to accommodate 75 students. The living environments are excellent, tiled television room, library, nourishing food provided free of cost by the Tochi Scouts, a disciplined routine which starts with Fajr prayers, breakfast, school, lunch, rest, games, evening tea/milk, prep, recreation and early to bed. Students from other agencies are also accommodated in the hostel, Orakzai Agency (3), MirAli (28), MiranShah (5), Datta Khel (27), Ghulam Khan (1) are studying and living in hostel.

Sports plays a key role in the development of a child's character, like other boys these boys also love cricket; few of them have all the making and temperament of being a next Shahid Afridi or Waseem Akram. At evening games period there are no less than half a dozen boys teams playing cricket. Tochi Scouts provided them with sports gear worth Rupees 25,000 in 2010, geysers were also installed, laboratory equipment worth Rupees 15,000 was also purchased by the Tochi Scouts and similar amount was spent on the purchase

of books for library. Tochi Scouts provide free education to the wards of its shaheeds and war orphans. By end 2010 the strength of students increased to 320 with classes upgraded till matric, there are eight civilian teachers including two females for Montessori and 12 Frontier Corps teachers.

Majority of the students when enrolled are not conversant in Urdu but by the end of their first year in school they are able to convey their meaning in Urdu and English. There are regular activities of extra-curricular, debates, drama, sports gala, art competition, and poetry and so on. It is tragic that majority of students enrolled in school and especially living in hostel have lost their father in the on-going conflict thus they are handled with love and care. The effects and impacts of insurgency is visible through their eyes and actions, their written work represents it. They all hate violence, they love Pakistan, they love moderation, enlightenment, freedom, democracy and above all, each one has a dream and desire to enlist in Pakistan Army and Tochi Scouts.

Computer cell and library were upgraded with the assistance of 7 Division. By end 2012 the school have an area of 13 acres.



# HONOURS AND AWARDS - TOCHI SCOUTS

## 1900-1947

S.#	Award	Abbreviation	
1	Victoria Cross (Captain Eustace Jotham)	VC	01
2	Military Cross	MC	13
3	British Empire Medal	BEM	01
4	Indian Distinguished Service Medal	IDSM	36
5	Indian Meritorious Service Medal	IMSM	01
6	Dehli Durbar Medal	DDM	07
7	Medaille Militaire	MM	01
8	Distinguished Service Orders	DSO	01
9	Order of British Empire	OBE	01
10	Member of British Empire	MBE	02
11	Order of British India	OBI	06
12	Indian Order of Merit I&II	IOM	11
13	Mention in Despatches	MD	42

## Sitara-i-Jurraat

Ser	R.No	Rank	Name	Tribe	Remarks	
1	6978	Naib Subedar	Muhammad Ali	Okz	Boya	1957
2	8431	Subedar	Nazarband Shah	Afd	Boya	1965
3	9307	Naib Subedar	Behram Gul	Wzr	Indo Pak war	1965

## Tamgha-i-Jurraat

1	12343	Havildar	Azim Khan (Shaheed)	-	Indo Pak war 1965
2	12944	Sepoy	Inam Ghulam (Shaheed)	Bng	-do-
3	12694	Lance Naik	Mosam Khan (Shaheed)	Afd	Boya
4	13452	Havildar	Paında Khan (Shaheed)	Okz	Indo Pak War 1971
5	14252	Naik	Abdul Khan (Shaheed)	Mmd	-do-
6	15824	Lance Naik	Hayat Gul (Shaheed)	Ktk	-do-

## Sitara-i-Basalat

1	PA-39109	Captain	Muhammad Yahya Jan (Shaheed)	MMD	Hassu Khel Post (Op-Almizan 2007)
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## Tamgha-i-Basalat

Ser	R.No	Rank	Name	Tribe	Remarks
1	18181	Havildar	Ziarat Khan Afridi	Afd	-
2	2189	AT Sepoy	Ali Baz Khan Khattak	Ktk	1986
3	PSS-8966	Major	Syed Muzaffar Raza Gardezi	-	1987
4	SM	Malang Shah	-	1987	
5	Naik	Amal Khan (Shaheed)		Ktk	-
6600840	Subedar	Zewar Khan (Shaheed)		Ktk	Hassu Khel
Post 2007					
7200804	Naib Subedar	Sahib Rehman (Shaheed)	Wzr		-do-
8202013	Havildar	Inayat Khan	Okz		-do-
9202693	Sepoy	Mukhtar Ali (Shaheed)	Turi		-do-
10	204402	Sepoy	Arshad Khan (Shaheed)	Mmd	Datta Khel
Check Post					
11	PA-38888	Captain		Tanveer Hussain	-
OP SWA					
12	202409	Naik	Syed Saddat Hussain (Saheed)		Bng -do-
13	202599	Naib Subedar	Ismail Khan (Shaheed)	Mwt	Bunair
14	206179	Sepoy	Atta Ullah (Shaheed)	Mwt	-do-
15	204433	Lance Naikk	Muhammad Arif	Yzi	Mamozai.
16	207217	Sepoy	Momin Khan	Bng	

## Tamgha-i-Imtiaz

1PA-5308	Lt Col	Muhammad Akram		
(PR regt)	-	Occupation of Saidgi 1979		
2PA-21525	Lt Col	Bilal Ashar	-	2007

## COAS COMMENDATION CARDS

1PSS- 3254	Major	Rehmat Ullah (FF)	-	Indo Pak war 1965
2PSS- 6122	Captain	Inam Ullah (AC)	-	-do-
316581	Naib Subedar	Yousaf Hussain	Turi	Good performance

in shooting competition USA,

420359 Lance Naik Sheraban Khan Ktk Good performance

during of Russia Afg War

5PSS- 11274 Major Raja Zahoor Amed -

-

622036 Naib Subedar Bakhtawar Shah Mmd -

716650 SM Alif Khan Ktk -

8PA-38609 Captain Altaf Hussain - Good performance

in Almizan (Okz Agency)

9207217 Sepoy Monin Khan Bng -

10 Subedar Khan Wazir Shah Ktk

-do-

11 Naib Subeadr Ali Zeb Bng -do-

12 Lance Naik Akhtar Ali Bng -do-

13 Sepoy Riaz Hussain Turi -do-

14 600927 Subedar Rasam Khan Btni Good performance

in Almizan

15 202571 Subedar Hayat Khan Afd -do-

16 201698 Subedar Aurangzeb Ktk -do-

17 200920 SM Zulfiqar Ali Turi -do-

18 202573 Naik Said Muhammad Turi -do-

19 202126 Naib Subedar Ayub Khan Afd -do-

#### IGFC COMMENDATION CARDS

Ser R.No	Rank	Name	Tribe	Remarks
115232	Subedar	Ali Mast	Afd	Good performance
223997	C/Sep	Muhammad Shafi	Pnj	-do-
315117	SM	Zahir Dad	Mmd	-do-
415998	Naib Subedar	Akbar Ghulam	Turi	-do-
519897	SM	Arbab Khan	Okz	-do-
617073	SM	Mumtaz Khan	Wzr	-do-
71592SM	Naubat Shah	Ktk	-do-	
815568	Subedar	Gul Tan	Afd	-do-
915613	Subedar	Umar Salim	Ktk	-do-
10 16782	Naib Subedar	Gul Khan	Afd	-do-
11 18181	Havildar	Ziarat Khan	Afd	-do-
12	SM	Zabardast Khan	Bng	-do-
13 16581	SM	Yousaf Hussain	Turi	-do-
14	Naib Subedar	Noor Salim	Yzi	Good Performance

in

Op Almizan

15	201809	Naik	Taj Muhammad	Ktk	-do-
16	202127	Naik	Haroon Khan	Afd	-do-
17	202680	Lance Naik	Khaista Khan	Okz	-do-
18	203194	Sepoy	Khalid Usman	Ktk	-do-
19	204165	Sepoy	Akhtar Shamim	Ktk	-do-
20	204263	Sepoy	Aman Ullah	Okz	-do-
21	203133	Sepoy	Amin Ullah	Ktk	-do-
22	203791	Sepoy	Sabir Ullah	Wzr	-do-
23	203795	Sepoy	Abdul Wahid	Wzr	-do-
24	201309	Naik	Rajab Ali	Turi	-do-
25	201398	Naik	Muhammad Ashraf	Bng	-do-
26	201940	Havildar	Abdul Hamid	Ktk	-do-
27	50127	Havildar	Ghulam Nasir	Afd	-do-
28	204116	Sepoy	Hameed Ullah	Ktk	-do-
29		Naib Subedar	Syed Arif Hussain	Turi	-do-
30		Naik	Asmat Gul	Ktk	-do-
31		Havildar	Masal Khan	Ktk	-do-
32		Naik	Hamid Mobeen	Afd	-do-
33		Havildar	Ahmed Khan	Ktk	-do-
34		Naik	Nabi Hussain	Turi	-do-
35		Subedar	Zulfiqar Ali	Turi	-do-
36		Subedar	Nadir Shah	Btmi	-do-
37		Subedar	Sami Ullah	Mwt	-do-
38		Havildar	Muhammad Mashal	Ktk	-do-
39		Lance Naik	Hikmat Khan	Afd	-do-
40		Sepoy	Alif Khan	Ktk	-do-
41		Sepoy	Fawad Khan	Mmd	-do-
42		Lance Naik	Mustaf Gul	Ktk	-do-
43		Sepoy	Kamal Ud Din	Mwt	-do-

PRESIDENT's SANADs

Ser R.No	Rank	Name	Tribe	Remarks
113261	Naik	Rehmat Ali	Okz	Boya 1965
212394	Lance Naik	Dir Alam Khan	Mmd	-do-
312357	Lance Naik	Waris Khan	Bng	-do-
412576	Sepoy	Hukmat Khan	Mmd	-do-
514446	Sepoy	Gul Azad Mir	Wzr	-do-
613837	Sepoy	Jabar Khan	Afd	-do-

# IMTIAZI SANADS

18815	Subedar	Gul Haider	Afd	Boya 1965
213196	Naik	Munher Jan	Afd	-do-
315264	Sepoy	Umer Khan	Afd	-do-
413346	Havildar	Amin Ul Haq	Okz	Indo Pak war 1965
511284	Havildar	Khana Gul	Okz	-do-
616750	Sepoy	Ihsan Ali	Bng	-do-
7	Naib Subedar	Awal Faqir	Okz	-do-
8	Havildar Rehman Ullah	Mmd	-do-	
9	Naib Subedar	Ijaz Hussain	Okz	-do-
10	Sepoy	Badshah Khan	Btni	-do-

## Tribes of Tochi Scouts

### Afridi.

There are ten platoons of Afridis, they have eight sub clans. Namely Koki Khel, Adam Khel, Aka Khel, Qambar Khel, Malik Din Khel, Qamar Khel, Zakha Khel and Sipahya. Out of these, seven clans live in Khyber Agency less Adam Khel. Subedar Muhammad Hayat Adam Khel Afridi is the Qaum Commander since April 2012.

### Bangash.

Six platoons they are mixed in terms of Shia and Sunni faith adherent. Kohat, Hangu is their abode. They all belong to settled areas. Subedar Major Ryat Khan Sur Gul Bangash is the Qaum Commander.

### Bhittani.

Eight platoons, they were inducted in 2003. Initially two platoons were inducted in No.5 wing later one more platoon was inducted then two more in same wing and lately another two have been inducted in No.6 Wing. Bhittanis inhabit the area of Lakki and Tank (Dera Ismail Khan).

### Khattak.

Thirteen platoons, they inhabit Karak, Kohat and surrounding areas. Bhangi Khel, Senni Khel, Saggri, Akora and Barak are sub clans of Khattaks. Barak lives in Karak District, Bhangi Khel resides in Kohat and Mianwali District. Saggri in Jhand Tehsil (Attock District) Senni in Kohat & Gumbat, Akora Khattak in Nizampur,

Nowshehra and Attock Districts.

Mohmand.

Five platoons. Mohmand have two major clans Alimzai and Tarakzai. Alimzai have six sub clans namely Darpa Khel, Bhabi Khel, Dawat Khel, Rarra Khel, Katar Khel, Yousaf Khel ; they all resides in Ghandara Agency. Other clan Tarakzai lives in Michni, Swabi and Tangi Prang {Shabqadar area}.

Marwat.

Three platoons, they were inducted in 1993.

Orakzai.

Five platoons. They live in Kurram Valley, adjacent Tirah Valley. Orakzai Agency itself was formed in 1973, a small patch of Orakzai Agency is adjacent to Thal on Kurram. There are four major clans in terms of population namely Ali Khel, Mishti, Shaikhan and Maula Khel. Overall there are eighteen sub clans from which Tochi Scouts are recruited out of them only two clan follows Shia faith {Baramad Khel & Manni Khel}. The clans in addition to name above are Feroze Khel, Akhel, Rabpa Khel, Mamazai, Bezoi Khel, Khuidad Khel, Utman Khel, Daulat Zai, Alisher Zai, Massuzai.

Swati.

Two platoons, inducted in 2007 from Thal Scouts as part of No.6 Wing. There are six clans of Swati in Tochi Scouts. Bismillah Khel, Tora Khel, Fazal Khel, Umra Khel, Paggra Khel, Qamar Khel and Khan Khel. They all live in District Manshehra.

People of Haripur also enroll in the vacancy of Swati. Subedar Laiq Muhammad Bismillah Khel Swati is the Qaum Commander (he is the first Qaum Commander) he joined Tochi Scouts in 2007.

Turi.

Six platoons they all belong to Kurram Agency, all Shias. They have Daparzai, Alizai and Bangash (Turi Bangash), Doprzai, Ghunday Khel, Mastu Khel, Hamza Khel, Badda Khel clans, all inhabit Parachinar area. In other Frontier Corps units Badda Khel are recruited as separate tribe but in Tochi Scouts they are part of Turi. They migrated from Turkestan. Presently Subedar Noor Hussain Daparzai is the Qaum Commander. He joined Tochi Scouts in 1989.

Yousafzai.

Seven platoons, Mardan, Swat is their recruiting ground.

Wazir.

There are seven platoons of Wazirs in the Tochi Scouts, they belong to the settled areas the two sub clans of Wazirs are Jani Khel and Hati Khel. They are mixed platoons, which means that no single clan have a platoon of their own. Jani Khel lives in area astride Bannu where as Hati Khel are almost in south of Tochi Valley. In the picture down below it is only Wazir who is carrying a weapon and a flower.



## ADJUTANT

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Serial	Rank	Name	Unit
1	Captain	R.C. Corfield	FF
2	Captain	S.K. Wilson	-
3	Captain	Mohammad Sher	GL
4	Captain	J.N. Ellis	-
5	Captain	M.U.K. Khalil	Baloch
6	Captain	Mohammad Aslam	12FF
7	Captain	Masood Amar	16 Punjab
8	Captain	Aman Ullah	12FF
9	Captain	Mohammad Aslam	12FF
10	Captain	S.S. Orakzai	12FF
11	Captain	K.M. Niazi	16 Punjab
12	Lieutenant	Aman Ullah	SIG
13	Captain	Abdul Jalil	FF
14	Captain	Sardar Muhammad	GL
15	Captain	Feroz Alam Khan	FF
16	Captain	Abdul Hamid	Arty
17	Captain	Feroz Alam	FF
18	Captain	Syed Islam Shah	10FF
19	Captain	Ali Gohar	AC
20	Captain	Aman Ullah	FF
21	Captain	Rahim Bukhsh	Arty
22	Major	Rahmat Ullah	FF
23	Captain	Anwar Khan	AEC
24	Major	Mohammad Rafique	Arty
25	Major	Ehsan Ullah	FF
26	Major	Zardad Khan	Punjab
27	Major	Saadat Mand	Baloch
28	Major	Ghulam Nabi	Baloch
29	Major	Mohammad Ashraf	FF
30	Major	Babar Hussain	AC

## Intelligence/Officer in Charge Administration

1	Major	Zafar Hussain	AC
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2	Major	Aziz Ahmed	Arty
3	Captain	Azeem Khan	ASC
4	Major	Rahim Zad	Arty
5	Major	Tariq Zahur	AC
6	Major	Shaukat Mehmood	Arty
7	Major	Mohammad Ali	Arty
8	Major	Mohammad Bashir	Sind
9	Captain	Iftikhar Ahmad	ASC
10	Major	Ashiq Hussain, g	Arty
11	Captain	Ahmad Sami Anwari	Baloch
12	Captain	Nauman Qadir	FF
13	Captain	Syed Nasir Zaidi	FF
14	Captain	Bashir Ahmad	FF
15	Major	Sharif Khan	Sind
16	Captain	Mohammad Hayat	Sig
17	Captain	Abdul Rauf	FF
18	Captain	Zafar Iqbal	Arty
19	Captain	Yaseen Rehman	AK
20	Major	Shah Ali	Sind
21	Captain	Atta Ullah	Sind
22	Major	Shah Ali	Sind
23	Captain	Atta Ullah	Sind
24	Captain	Sami Ullah	FF
25	Captain	Tanveer Ahmad	Punjab
26	Captain	Jehan Zeb	Baloch
27	Captain	Saif Ullah	Sind
28	Captain	Riaz Ahmad	AK
29	Captain	Asim Chaudhry	17 Punjab
30	Captain	Anwar Saeed	10AK
31	Captain	Mohammad Sajjad	43FF
32	Captain	Anwar Saeed	10AK
33	Captain	Zar Muhammad	FF
34	Captain	Shahid Khurshid	Baloch
35	Captain	Nadeem Haider, Tbt	Sind
36	Captain	Waseem Afzal	AC
37	Major	Syed Kamran Hashmi	Punjab
38	Major	Anwar Aziz	FF
39	Major	Rashid Minhas	FF
40	Major	Mozzam Imtiaz Cheema	AC
41	Major	Numan Kayani	Arty
42	Captain	Shahid Afridi	AD
43	Captain	Muhammad Zeeshan Aslam	AD
44	Captain	Muhammad Shoaib Waqas	AD
45	Major	Abid Latif	AD
46	Major	Muhammad Arif	BR
47	Major	Muhammad Yaqoob Awan	FF
48	Major	Talha Naik	Arty
49	Captain	Hamzah Hamayun	38 Cavalry

1.7.76	50	Lieutenant	Mohsin Khan	38 Cavalry
1.3.77				
23.2.78				
16.10.80				
16.6.81				
1.9.81				
11.2.82				
1.11.82				
3.11.84				
30.12.84				
2.8.86				
1.1.87	<b><u>Serial</u></b>	<b><u>Rank</u></b>	<b><u>Name</u></b>	<b><u>From</u></b>
27.9.87			Deputy Director Medical Services	
26.11.87				
5.7.88	1	Major	Mohib Ullah	03-1-83
5.10.88	2	„	Shahid Islam	23-5-87
29.1.90	3	„	Abdul Karim	12-8-02
30.5.90	4	„	Tanveer Hussain	03-7-06
4.9.90	5	„	Muhammad Shahzad Saleem	04-6-09
27.3.91			Regimental Medical Officer	
7.7.91	6	Captain	Mustafa Malik	05-9-84
1.11.91	7	„	Abdul Ghafar	05-10-85
14.3.92	8	„	Maqbool Ahmed Khan	12-5-86
1.1.93	9	„	Shahid Islam	31-8-86
18.9.94	10	„	Abdul Latif Qureshi	20-2-88
7.8.95	11	„	Maqbool Ahmed	10-3-88
31.5.96	12	„	Syed Zafar Hussain	01-9-88
17.9.97	13	„	Zulfiqar Ali	16-4-89
3.4.98	14	„	Nasir Ud Din	03-9-91
17.3.99	15	„	Asad Ullah Khan	02-1-93
31.8.00	16	„	Khalid Rafiq	13-5-93
11.1.02	17	„	Javed Gondal	30-12-93
23.12.02	18	„	Muhammad Sarfaraz Khattak	19-4-94
4.4.03	19	„	Asim Zafar	21-10-96
1.1.05	20	„	Hafeez Khalid	01-8-97
13.7.05	21	„	Tasfeen Bin Nazir	13-8-98
11-5-07	22	„	Younas Awan	10-2-01
3-7-07	23	„	Syed Muhammad Shabbir	19-4-01
9-12-07	24	„	Naeem Javed Saleem	17-12-99
8-8-08	25	„	Muhammad Touqeer Nasir	01-8-02
29-1-09	26	„	Muhammad Rizwan Kiani	15-4-03
16-5-09	27	„	Saeed Akhtar Khan Khattak	25-9-04
19-10-09	28	„	Niwaz Shahid	28-4-05
2-11-09	29	„	Javed Ali	22-6-06
29-10-10	30	„	Nisar Ahmed Abro	23-7-07
13-1-11	31	„	Abdul Jabbar Khaskheli	11-1-09
9-1-12	32	„	Syed Murtaza Rizvi	04-3-10
1-3-2012	33	„	Ali Javed	06-7-11



Serial	Rank	Name	Unit	Year
1	Captain	Mohammad Usman	Punjab	28.10.10
2	Captain	Aftab Ahmed	Punjab	28.10.10
3	Captain	Tor Khan	AC	10.11.10
4	Lieutenant	Khusham Dil	GL	1.11.10
5	Captain	Muhammad Mehmood Khan	GL	10.11.10
6	Captain	Sahib Zada	FF	2.6.11
7	Captain	M. M. Khan	Punjab	18.11.11
8	Captain	Jehan zeb Khan	FF	24.11.11
9	Captain	Hukam Dad	Punjab	3.12.11
10	Captain	Mohammd Nawaz	FF	21.12.11
11	Captain	Muhammad Hikmat	Punjab	16.12.11
12	Captain	Inayat Ullah	FF	5.1.12
13	Captain	Ali Gohar	AC	7.2.12
14	Captain	Mohammad Rafique	Punjab	1.7.12
15	Captain	A. Rashid Janjua	Baloch	30.7.12
16	Major	A. Rashid Janjua	Baloch	1.1.13
17	Captain	Javed Hassan	Artillery	17.1.13
18	Captain	Inamullah Babar	AC	1.5.13
19	Major	M. Javed Younas	Artillery	15.5.13
20	Major	Mohammad Rafique	Artillery	15.5.13
21	Captain	Yar afzal Afridi	Artillery	22.5.13
22	Major	Yar afzal Afridi	Artillery	12.5.13
23	Major	Saadat Mand	Baloch	2.1.14
24	Major	Maqbool Ahmed	Engrs	10.1.14
25	Captain	Daud. H. Beg	Artillery	12.1.14
26	Captain	Ashfaq Ahmed	Artillery	9.1.14
27	Major	Suleman Khan	ASC	14.1.14
28	Major	Aurang Zeb	Baloch	9.2.14
29	Major	Bahramand Shah	FF	5.1.15
30	Major	Haidar Hassan	AC	7.1.15
31	Major	Aftab Ahmed	Baloch	30.1.15
32	Major	Mohammad Salim	FF	18.1.15
33	Captain	Imtiaz Hussain	Punjab	9.8.15
34	Major	Imtiaz Hussain	Artillery	7.1.16
35	Captain	Mohammad Raza	Artillery	8.1.16
36	Major	Mushtaq Ahmad	Artillery	1.1.17
37	Major	Imtiaz Ahmad	Artillery	14.1.17
38	Major	Khalid Masood	Sind	21.1.17

**Deputy Assistant Adjutant & Quarter Master General**

1	Major	Khalid Masood	Sind	1.1
2	Major	Khalid Bashir Isc	Artillery	9.1
3	Major	Abdul Wahab	Artillery	4.1
4	Major	Mubarik Ahmed Isc	Sig	1.8
5	Major	S.M.R Gardezi Tbt	Baloch	17
6	Major	Tariq Iqbal	Artillery	10
7	Major	Mohammad Aslam	Artillery	10
8	Major	Liagat Ali	Ord	15
9	Major	Muhammad Anwar, g+	AD	28
10	Captain	Aslam Pervez	Sind	15
11	Major	Khalid Afzal	AC	24
12	Major	Muhammad Ismail	FF	13
13	Major	Saleem Akhtar	Sind	17
14	Major	Mukhtar Mohammad	Sind	17
15	Major	Mudassar Alam Baig	Punjab	1.3
16	Major	Muhammad Shakil	AC	1.7
17	Major	Waheed Akhtar	AK	26
18	Major	Mohammad Azhar	AD	20
19	Major	Tariq Mehmood	Baloch	03
20	Major	Pervez Ashraf	Baloch	1.1
21	Major	Hassan Akhtar	FF	7-4
22	Major	Muhammad Yaqoob Awan	FF	9-7
23	Captain	Kashif Imran	ASC	20
24	Major	Muhammad Zamir Ali	AK	16

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## History of History

I had never landed in MiranShah or for that matter in North Waziristan Agency in my 25 years of military career, had flown over it couple of times. Read about it, fascinated and dreamed of travelling through it. In 1996 bought a Russian jeep and a Kalashnikov for the purpose, one landed me in trouble with my wife and another with my commanding officer. Thus when I was offered a chance to write the history of Tochi Scouts I was thrilled. I had met Commandant Colonel Wajahat Hamdani only once before for short duration, he is unit officer of my course mate and dear friend Colonel Khalid Shahbaz, who for once did talk about something productive other than cricket in these twenty fivers of friendship; in putting me through or rather us together for this venture.

I landed at MiranShah when the 7<sup>th</sup> May 2012 action was in full swing; I have no hesitation to admit that I was scared, all night I kept on checking the windows and bolts of doors. I met Commandant next day, Commandant also looks like any other officer but he has that rare gift of being so rich in manners, etiquettes and courtesies; same holds true for rest of Tochi Scouts.

My guide was Havildar Muhammad Shah Wazir, a Janni Khel Wazir from Bannu area from education platoon. Every evening we would go out for a walk, he would take me to different posts, Butt Marka (he had a cousin there), Sargardan, Datta Khel, Agency Accounts Office, Grid, PTCL, Stadium Post, Iftikhar to name few. We visited Dairy Farm, orchards, pluck fruit from trees and walk along the length of the runway, spent evening outside his living

barrack sipping tea and listening to all kind of stories. I was fortunate to have him as my mentor; being a Wazir I had an insight in the tribal way of life. I understood what it means to be part of a Qaum, what is Watan, who are Scouts, how they live, how they think. What is a 'programme' (it is basically a party). Muhammad Shah spent many an hours sitting in my room discussing and elaborating tribal way of life, I asked him all kind of questions rather cautiously. How they arrange marriages, who cooks food in the house, what are the relationships between mother in law and wife. In short we were friends. I inquired about hashish, what is the frequency of smokers and came to know that Commandant has a zero tolerance policy on this issue only. I also came to understand what it means to be a commandant here, everyone is scared of him yet he is respected from heart, he is in true sense a tribal patriarch. After a month I realized that Tochi Scouts is more or less like another tribe in the valley.



## *Tracing History*

*Tochi Scouts have one of the best kept regimental histories in Pakistan; one reason is that they have never moved out of MiranShah in last 108 years; only issue was that key documents were not traceable. I started with the Commandant's own script a handy 40 page document. Frontier Scouts and Guardian of Frontier are two well researched books, Frontier Corps own magazine Balahisar is another good starting point. It was the Political Agent North Waziristan Agency's office which provided the real breakthrough. Initially none had the idea there regarding what I am looking for but on third day the assistant political agent simply called the clerk and said 'just take him to the record room and let him have a look'. For next two weeks, I went through a maze of files, all dusty and clobbered inside racks. There was a date mat on which the files were placed. Clerk very hospitable always offered me cup of tea. Files slowly and gradually started coming up. I found 1895s original files then 1897, 1898 and so on. Yearly reports of Political Agent are another great and very reliable source of knowledge. Inside these files lives a life of the agency. Leave applications of clerks, water disputes, financial issues, raising of Tochi Levies and later Militia. Intelligence reports from informers inside Fakir of Ipi's camp. Visit programme of the governors and commissioners.*

Tochi Museum is another place which helped a lot especially the photographs, after reading the books, files it was easy to place every item in the museum with the time line. I found old visitors book and Commandant found Captain Fergusson's hand written notes. Later we unearth many other old files, like Visitors Book of 1900, Standing Order Procedures of Tochi Scouts 1924.

Tochi Mess by itself is a history; Scrap Book of 1937 with its photographs and captions provides an insight into that era. Mess silver is mostly transferred into the Museum but still it helps. PAF's painting presented in 1988 gives an outlook of MiranShah of that period. Quarter Guard of Tochi Scouts is another treasure box.

Tochi Library is a masterpiece, fortunately or unfortunately it has remained in its original layout despite all other renovations carried out in the Fort. It still has one section exclusively for RAF with the same painted on the wood. Another original piece of Fort is an iron plate which was accidentally discovered; it was being used as a cover over a water flow near Recruits Mess. Library have unique, rare, antique and once classified as Top secret documents of British Army in Waziristan.

London Gazette is a free download paper and nothing can match its wide and rich panorama of knowledge, description, names dealing with North Waziristan and Tochi Scouts. I had no idea about it but Commandant was in picture about. Later I went through each issue of it and it invariably increased the number of Military Crosses which Tochi Scouts have now.

My two friends, Doctor Reena Rizvi in Virginia and Chohong in Hong Kong were very useful as they made the payments in foreign currency in my name enabling me to download the paid newspapers of England.

### *Qaum*

Havildar Ejaz Yusafzai has spent a life as an escort for the commandant, it is a privilege which in reality shows the high

marksmanship quality of him, extreme loyalty and above all a symbol of professionalism. He was retiring and going on pension from Boya. I have heard about the word programme from Havildar Muhammad Shah but now I saw it with own eyes how this Qaum system works. Here a havildar is going on pension, he had no medals or honors to boast about yet he belongs to a Qaum and now the qaum has to make sure that his sendoff is graceful. A dinner was arranged in his honour, I was also invited. After dinner speeches were made in Pashtu which I understood in a broad manner. Ejaz was recruited in Tochi scouts in 1991 and he remained in Commandant Squad for well over 13 years

Long list of gifts was a new experience for me, it was an unending flow. From Yusafzai Platoon he was given one dinner set, one blanket, one umbrella, piece of cloth and Holy Koran. From the Yusafzai Qaum he was given one blanket (Naik Iqtidar) Hot Pot set and water cooler (Naib Subedar Qaiser Ali) another Hot Pot set from Havildar Anwar Yousaf list can go on but to cut long story short there were 12 water sets, nine tea sets, one pressure cooker, three hot pots, one iron, two thermos, three blankets which were presented to him. Apart from the Qaum he was given farewell gifts by his friends from other Qaum also. Cash was another new thing, Subedar Zahid Yusafzai gave Rupees 2000, Havildar Niaz 500, Sepoy Akhtar Zaman 500, Sepoy Khalid 200, and similarly other qaum also presented him with cash. Dhobi staff gave 200, signal staff 1000, Wazir Qaum gave 1000, canteen gave wall clock, Naib Tehsildar gave tea set. One has to keep in mind that all this is being done when none can go out from the Fort and everything was purchased from the canteen. I was told that in good times the magnitude was much more. Certainly Ejaz has nothing to do with a dozen tea sets thus these are returned back to canteen and in lieu cash is taken. Next

day a coach was hired for him and all these gifts were packed into it. I also travelled with Ejaz from Boya till MiranShah and all the way he was bid farewell by his friends. I forgot to mention that he had to make a speech as well on his farewell; he could not do so because his voice was choked with emotions.

This small episode by itself explains everything so peculiar about the Tochi Scouts, Qaum system and how this complex system is working. Every Qaum have a Qaum Commander more or less like a Colonel Commandant in regular army. These are respected and feared by the respective scouts. In the end once I was compiling data about the Qaum and sub clans, I inquired from Turi Qaum commander about how many sub clans Turi have in Tochi Scouts, he told me three, next day he came running after me and handed over a list which contains a list of Turi sub clans there are over seven and he was very particular about it and inquired me thrice whether I have corrected my data or not 'history is important' were his remarks.

### *Scout*

If I have to explain what a scout is, how he lives and works, I think there is no simile readily available to explain. I have met over thousand scouts, had cup of tea with them, listen to their stories. They are simple depending upon the age and tribe. Over all they are simple in nature, obedient, introvert, conservative, religious and above all professional in every sense. They look after their equipment, everything which is under their charge. I recall how the education platoon was after me because one ordinary magazine was missing from the library. Razif Afridi (Hassu Khel fame) came to me almost two weeks after narrating his episode, he was bit worried about his account 'you see I have to live here for another ten years,

I hope you will not write anything bad about my account, it will be bad for my Qaum'. Every night I had a chat with sentry on Mess Guard, they all were from different Qaum and I found all of them good , thus I cannot say that one particular tribe have certain distinct characteristics than others, there must be but I have failed to notice that. This is the beauty of Tochi Scouts that eleven tribes have been merged into one.

I observed them keenly very keenly, I noticed that they wear white socks as part of their uniform in chappals and I not even once noticed a dirty pair of socks not even of off white colour, the elastic was always firm never hanging on toes. I saw their chappals polished, their belt for a change is not always very tight especially among elder scouts. They use perfume in the evening quite heavily.

### *Mess*

One of the finest mess in Pakistan, traditional and very hospitable. Much of mess silver has been shifted to the Tochi Museum; its old wooden floor has also been renovated in the past but over all a fine specimen of Scouts Mess. Afsar Khan, Zhoab, Fida, are the present lot of young mess waiters. One cannot fail to notice that there is no supervision of any officer for any kind of dinner parties; it seems to be working on auto channel. It is a credit indeed to the mess staff that the establishment trusts so much on their organizational ability. There is no connection of gas thus all cooking is done on wood fire. There is a gardener and two khakroobs who seems to be the first one to be seen every morning irrespective of the weather. Other regular members are the pigeons which are fed from the mess and odd cat. Fantastic atmosphere whole day, peace and tranquility with occasional outburst of missiles and machine gun fire.

### *Clerical Staff*

Very efficient, yet to come across a staff so proficient (Aitcheson College Lahore staff is equally good). Main branches are divided into, A, G, Accounts, Quartermaster, and Military Transport apart from Computer Cell which is headed by Naik Jehad and Kamran. Tochi Scouts have scout clerks and civilian clerks as well. There are clerks which are on FC pool thus they are inter posted from one corps to other. It is the beauty of the system that one is able to locate a visitor book dating back to 1900. It seems as if nothing is ever lost here it is only misplaced. They all were very helpful; I had more interaction with the A, G and computer cell.

### *Photographs*

Majority of the pictures are the property of Tochi Scouts. Brigadier Raza help in taking the pictures of the mess under full moon. Major Jawad (Dastoori) and Major Saqib of Aviation were instrumental in this regards.

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